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  CROSS-BORDER MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE CASE OF MERGER 
CONTROL V. MERGER DEREGULATION 
Abstract: 
During the last century, not only the legal literature but also the literature in many 
fields along with government efforts on all levels, were all mainly devoted to the debate of 
trade liberalization in general, and specifically to the case of the expected gains from using 
international agreements as a tool to remove the trade barriers. Meanwhile, all the parties 
have paid little attention to profound questions about identifying the impediments that they 
are facing and the other possible options that might maximize the general welfare, which are 
the cross-border merger and acquisition transactions. 
This dissertation will address that under-researched question, and it will try to identify 
some of those impediments that are facing the cross-border merger and acquisition 
transactions. The dissertation will mainly focus on the different premerger control laws that 
are adopted around the globe, as an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions, and it will try to identify the drawbacks of those laws and most importantly 
develop and examine reforming proposals. 
The underlying result of this dissertation will reveal that the multijurisdictional 
premerger control laws across the globe have numerous drawbacks that are actual 
impediments that face mergers and acquisitions in general, and especially the cross-border 
transactions. In addition to that, the best reformative option is the abolishing of the premerger 
control laws, or in other words the deregulation of the cross-border merger and acquisition 
transactions. 
The conclusion of this dissertation is that using the law as a useful tool should be 
reinvented on two dimensions, at one end of the spectrum the law should enable the state 
possibilities that are required to give a hand and facilitate the entry to markets, by abolishing 
the premerger control laws i.e. deregulating mergers and acquisitions, and at the other end of 
the spectrum the law should grant the state the power to monitor and challenge those 
practices that might cause harm to employees or consumers, before the courts, along with the 
primary power to challenge anticompetitive behaviors. 
Keywords: Corporation History, Antitrust History, Corporate Restructuring, Cross-
border M&A, Premerger Control, Behavioral Antitrust, M&A Deregulation. 
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Introduction 
Mergers and Acquisitions1 has gained significant attention during the second half of the 
20th century, and while the mergers between corporations that are not mainly based or operating 
within the very same territory or jurisdiction (hereinafter cross-border mergers) constitutes less 
than 50% out of the total announced mergers across the globe,2 those cross-border mergers are 
literally considered very significant category of transactions in the world economy, because it 
constitutes more than 50% of the foreign direct investments (hereinafter FDI).3 
As an example to show how huge that kind of cross-border transactions are, on April 12, 
2000 the European Commission (hereinafter EC) announced that it would not block the cross-
border merger transaction between the British corporation “Vodafone Airtouch” and the German 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 “Mergers” will be used to indicate mergers, consolidation, and acquisitions, for more accurate definition, types, 
classifications, see infra p.70. 
2  SALIM MOHAMMED, A STORY OF TWO HALVES, in 2008 INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS: CREATING VALUE IN AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT at 
11,15 (Financier Worldwide Booz & Company ed. 2008); H. Donald Hopkins, Cross-border Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Global and Regional Perspectives, 5 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT 207, at 208-209 
(1999). 
3 J. Peter Neary, Cross-Border Mergers as Instruments of Comparative Advantage, 74 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC 
STUDIES 1229, at 1229 (2007). 
2	  
corporation “Mannesmann,” and the value of the transaction was approximately 180 billion US 
dollars.4 In the same context, it was also reported that the volume of the transaction done in the 
Middle East region, as the fourth active acquirer in the world, exceeded 106 Billion US dollars in 
2007.5 
Furthermore, during the last decade of the 20th century, an important and regularly active 
category of players in the field of cross-border mergers appeared. In fact they are not new 
players but they started to be increasingly key players; those players are the “Sovereign Wealth 
Fund” (hereinafter SWF), those SWFs are simply state-owned investment funds. In that context, 
it was reported that in 2007 the total value of the cross-border merger transactions exceeded 48.5 
billion US dollars,6 and the overall SWF investments across the globe were estimated to be 6.5 
trillion US dollars by the end of May 2014, and that increase is expected to continue.7 
Based on the important nature of mergers transactions, many states tailored special 
bundles of laws and regulations to control those transactions. Those laws and regulations might 
be considered, in fact, as a stumbling block that faces the successful and efficient completion of 
mergers transactions in general and cross-border mergers specifically. The uniqueness of the 
cross-border mergers is due to the fact that those kind of transactions are not subject only to 
certain national law, but in fact are subject to different laws in different jurisdictions, and those 
different laws might be contradicting, or even if are similar they might be interpreted differently. 
The core subject of this dissertation will be to clearly identify and address how those laws 
and regulations are considered as impediments that face mergers in general and cross-border 
mergers specifically. The discussion will not be limited to those impediments that are imposed 
by the state or the different regulatory authorities, but it will also include additional layers added 
by others such as the professional service providers, in which the legal advisors is good example. 
Moreover, the dissertation will mainly focus on one fundamental impediment; the merger control 
laws, because merger control is typically one of the most complicated and influential 
impediments that hinders the cross-border mergers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Commission Notice, 2000 O.J. C 141/07. 
5 MOHAMMED, A Story of Two Halves, supra note 2, at 15. 2008. 
6 SONIA KALSI, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, in 2008 INTERNATIONAL MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: 
CREATING VALUE IN AN INCREASINGLY COMPLEX CORPORATE ENVIRONMENT at 16, 17 (Financier 
Worldwide Booz & Company ed. 2008). 
7 For more details and full profile of all SWF across the globe see http://www.swfinstitute.org last visited October 1, 
2014. 
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Despite the fact that a handful of jurisdictions were adopting merger control laws during 
the development of the merger control history i.e. during the 20th century, it was reported that by 
2010 more than 110 jurisdictions adopted a merger control system.8 Meanwhile, the dissertation 
will try to identify some detailed drawbacks of the merger control laws only in three selected 
jurisdictions, namely the United States of America (hereinafter US), the European Union 
(hereinafter EU), and Egypt. 
It should be noted that the main reasons behind the selection of the three systems 
specifically is that the US merger control laws were the first adopted merger control system in 
the world, in addition to that, both of the US and the EU jurisdictions are the most dynamic and 
active jurisdictions in that field.9 Moreover, the extraterritorial jurisdictional dimension of the 
application of the merger control, which uniquely characterizes both of the US and the EU 
systems, is a significant reason, and more importantly both of the two systems are heavily 
imitated in many other jurisdictions around the globe. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian system was also selected because Egypt is a leading country in 
the Middle East and North Africa (hereinafter MENA) region, and the Egyptian system is 
generally a typical model of the merger control system that is adopted in most of the developing 
countries. Furthermore, the Egyptian laws are widely copied in almost all of the Arab countries. 
Moreover, both the US and EU systems are premerger review systems, while the Egyptian 
system is a post-merger notification system, which are typically the two types or forms of merger 
control. 
Likewise, the Egyptian legal system is considered to be a civil law system and on the 
other hand the US is a common law system, and it will be more constructive to compare between 
the US system as a common law model and the Egyptian system as a civil law model. In addition 
to identifying the drawbacks, the dissertation second core issue will be examining some selected 
reforming proposals to overcome those drawbacks. This will be done by addressing the question 
of the possibility of adopting new system that might facilitate mergers generally and cross-border 
mergers specifically and to enhance the current situation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Julie Nicole Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers (2010) Queensland University of 
Technology). 
9 MAHER M. DABBAH, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF ANTITRUST POLICY at 278, 279 (Cambridge University 
Press. 2003). 
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Meanwhile, in order to assess the selected reforming proposals, that should be based on a 
deep understanding of how the merger control laws were developed to be as of now. And for the 
purposes of gaining a better understanding of the merger control systems, the dissertation will try 
to answer and address some introductory questions or subtopics. Those subtopics are considered 
as points of departure, and are namely; what is the history of the corporation as an idea and how 
was the corporation originated and for what purposes? How was the relation between the 
corporations and the state started and its developments? What is the history of the mergers? How 
the trusts lead to the antitrust laws?10 
The answer to those questions require one to discuss some of the benchmarks throughout 
the history of the corporation, those benchmarks might be considered as a prompt that led to the 
change, and to the development and proliferation of the corporation idea itself. This will include 
a brief history of some corporations, namely the East India Company, some named it the mother 
of the modern corporations, and the South Sea Company as it was the main cause for the biggest 
financial crisis during the early developments and that obviously lead to a change in the relation 
between the state and corporations. 
Generally speaking, the discussions of those breakthroughs are mainly to address the 
state role to regulate the corporations and its development in the western jurisdictions during the 
early ages. In addition to that, the discussions will address the role of feudalism in the relation 
between the corporations and the state, and how it opened the door for that relation to be 
developed in the future. The examination will start from the state that grants the monopoly and 
incorporation rights, followed by the corporation offering the state to make use of these rights as 
a financing tool to ensure the approval for continuation. Consequently the power of the state was 
lessen to help the corporation rescue the economy and contribute in the industrial revolution, and 
then when the corporation gained some power, the state started a new era by reregulating the 
corporations again, but that did not succeeded and led to two trends respectively, the 
privatization and then deregulation. 
To sum it up, this dissertation will try to address the core issues in addition to the 
aforementioned points of departure, in a constructive way, and in a chronological order, starting 
with the history, then the current situation, and the expected future under the reforming proposals 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The term “antitrust” is used interchangeably with others terms fox example: antimonopoly, protection against 
unfair competition and many others, hereinafter the term “antirust” will be used instead of all other similar terms 
whenever possible. 
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at the end. Thus, the dissertation will be mainly divided into three parts or chapters, the first one 
will be primarily designated for mergers demystification and the historical overview, whereas it 
will examine the history of: (1) the corporation, (2) mergers, (3) antitrust laws, and (4) the 
relation between the state and the corporation. 
Furthermore, regarding the discussions of mergers demystification, that part will first 
address the definition and classifications of mergers, in addition to examining some other 
corporate restructuring options and growth alternatives such as joint ventures, licensing, 
franchising, etc., and it will also address the typical details of the merger transactions, starting 
from the preparation before the transaction and until the post-closing stage of the transaction. 
The discussion of the merger transaction dynamics will be mainly to illustrate how the mergers 
transactions are complicated by nature, even if the transaction was not controlled by the state or 
subject to different laws in different jurisdictions.  
Moreover, scrutinizing the merger dynamics is crucial because a solid understanding of 
the merger dynamics is prerequisite to delve into the impediments to the merger process. In that 
regard, it is undoubtedly true that scrutinizing every single step in the merger dynamics is a 
prerequisite to understand the remaining steps, in addition to that, scrutinizing the merger 
dynamics will be undoubtedly a very helpful tool toward understanding how impediments could 
be removed or at least be should be mitigated. 
Subsequently, the second book of the dissertation will be divided into three main parts, 
the first part is introductory and it will mainly focus on identifying the most popular incentives 
that drives the parties to enter into merger transactions. The second part will be devoted to 
examine the mergers efficiencies, on both of the two dimensions or perspectives i.e. the success 
and failure factors of the transaction from the perspective of the merging parties and from the 
perspective of its impact on the national and global economy. That discussion is mainly to 
examine whether the transaction are worthy enough to put efforts in amending or reforming the 
current laws and regulations. 
The third part of the second book will be divided mainly into two subtopics; the first one 
will identify dozen of impediments that might face the parties of the mergers, as an introduction 
to the second subtopic. The second subtopic will mainly examine the merger control systems in 
detail, to show how far those systems are considered impediments that face cross-border 
6	  
mergers. The examination of the merger control systems will include an overview of the law in 
aforementioned selected jurisdictions i.e. US, EU, and Egypt. 
The third and last book of the dissertation will be mainly devoted to develop and examine 
seven proposals to reform the current situation of the multijurisdictional merger control systems, 
which are facing the cross-border mergers. In the introductory part of that book, assessment 
criteria will be designed and tailored specifically to assess the impact of each of the reforming 
proposals on the current situation, and that will be followed by a discussion to address each one 
of the proposals, whereas each will be described first and then tested under the same assessment 
criteria. 
Some of the reform proposals that will be examined in the third chapter are totally new, 
and others have previously been discussed but are enhanced and accordingly will be more 
efficient, those include: (1) bilateral cooperation agreements, (2) international merger control 
rules, (3) supranational premerger control institution, (4) jurisdictional rules, (5) common online 
filing system, (6) multilevel monitoring system, and (7) mergers deregulation. 
7	  
Chapter One: Mergers Demystification and Historical Overview 
The discussions in this chapter will be divided into two main topics the first topic will be 
a historical overview, and the second topic will be the merger demystification. In the historical 
overview four main subtopics will be addressed, the first will be the origins of the idea of 
corporation, and that will mainly show how the origin of the idea of corporation and its early 
developments was attributed to ethnic and religious groups; mainly the Greeks, Romans, 
Muslims, Italians, and even some claimed that Jews had contributed to the development of the 
corporation in a way or another. The second subtopic will address the corporations as seen by the 
eye of the early scholars at their time, what were the characteristics and classifications, as it were 
portrayed by them. 
The third subtopic of the historical overview will be devoted to breakthroughs within the 
corporation history, and it will address the main landmarks that might be considered as prompts 
that led to the change, the development, and proliferation of the corporation to date. It will 
address mainly the East India Corporation as it was maintained to be the mother of modern 
corporations, and also the South Sea Company and the Bubble Act and how they significantly 
influenced the corporation. Moreover, the proliferation of the trusts will be addressed, in order to 
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understand how that led to the development of the antitrust laws and to identify the real reason 
behind the enactment of those laws in certain jurisdictions. 
In addition to that, and since this dissertation is mainly concerned about mergers, the 
history of the mergers will be addressed as a breakthrough in the corporation history, and also 
the patterns of the mergers transactions through the history to date will be discussed, in order to 
understand what was the triggering incentives that led to the formation of the merger waves, and 
also the multinational corporations will be addressed. Finally, the fourth subtopic of the 
historical overview will address the immemorial relation between the corporations and the states, 
and it will be scrutinized through the history of the corporation to understand how the state 
controlled the corporations, by means of laws. In addition to that, to understand how that relation 
started mainly under feudalism and how it proceeded to date and even how corporations are not 
just an idle powerless party in that relation. 
Delving into the first topic, the historical overview, will undoubtedly led to better 
understanding of the corporations and how they are the way they are, and why they are the way 
they are, and that is a very essential step toward understanding how it might be changed for good 
in the future. Therefore, a better understanding of those issues addressed in that first topic is 
undoubtedly a prerequisite to delving into the following parts of this dissertation. 
Subsequently, the second main topic of this chapter i.e. mergers demystification, will 
include three subtopics, the first topic is simply mergers definition, and how mergers could be 
distinguished from other technical terms like acquisition and consolidation. The second subtopic 
will identify the different types and classifications of mergers, from economic, structural & 
procedural, and financial perspectives, and it will address also other restructuring forms and 
trends, and growth options that are used by corporation as an alternative to mergers. Following 
that, the third subtopic will scrutinize the merger dynamics. It will address each step in that 
dynamic starting from the preparation step until the closing of the merger transaction, passing 
through all the other steps such as the due diligence, valuation, structuring the transaction, and 
financing the transaction. The third subtopic will help in understanding the impediments that will 
face the merger transaction at the different stages of the transaction. 
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I. Historical Overview 
Indeed history is a good and efficient tool that could inform and guide every researcher 
about his topic. To be more precise, reverting back and scrutinizing the history of any topic will 
be beneficial on two dimensions; the first is the formation of the subject itself, and the second is 
that the development of its main characteristics.11 Moreover, it undoubtedly true that history 
should be deeply scrutinized to explore all the intrinsic as well as extrinsic factors that might 
contribute to the creation of one of the modern institutions.12 Obviously, to better understand 
corporation it will be very helpful to deep dig into the history until reaching its origins i.e. the 
seeds not only the roots. 
Unfortunately, early historians wrote most of the history of the corporation, and because 
none of them were legal professionals, many of them did not consider the differences between a 
corporation as an institution and a merchant who is doing business in his own name. It has been 
also noted that the resources that might draw a full legal picture of business in the Middle Ages, 
are not available.13 In addition to that, even the medieval sources should not be recognized as 
reliable, because mainly unqualified “non-historians-soldiers, explorers, missionaries, clerics, 
and businessmen,’’ wrote most of it.14 
Though historians used to simplify their work by subjects (i.e. economic, social, and 
cultural),15 it is not easy to find a historian who scrutinized history from a legal perspective. It is 
noteworthy that even law scholars might be excused for their modest efforts, due to the fact that 
no reliable data concerning the history of the modern organizations were recorded before the end 
of the 13th century, for instance the records of the King’s Court in the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter UK),16 started to be uniform and on a permanent basis 
only after the 12th century.17 
Law scholars did not even started to write about corporations more than four centuries 
later, some claimed that the first lawyer to write about the law of corporation was William 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 JOHN SMITH & RAYMOND O'BRIEN, CONFLICT OF LAWS at 10 (Cavendish 2nd ed. 1999). 
12 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE ORIGINS OF POLITICAL ORDER at 1 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 2011). 
13 A. T. CATER, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LEGAL INSTITUTIONS at 259 (Butterworth & Co. 4th ed. 1910). 
14 GENE W. HECK, CHARLEMAGNE, MUHAMMAD, AND THE ARAB ROOTS OF CAPITALISM at 1 (W. de Gruyter. 2006). 
15 FERNAND. BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY: THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE WORLD at 
17 § 3 (Harper & Row. 1981).  
16 A wide range of official names were used to refer to what is now known as the United Kingdom Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, especially due to the changes in is territories over the history, therefore UK will be used 
hereinafter instead of any of these names.  
17 Harold J. Laski, The Early History of the Corporation in England, 30 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 561, at 562 (1917). 
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Sheppard18 and that his first book was published in London in 1659 and his second book on the 
same subject was published after his death in 1702.19 Meanwhile, it has also been claimed that 
the reports of Sir Edward Coke20 were the first legal writings to discuss the law of corporation in 
detail, specially his writing on the Sutton Hospital Case21 that was first published in 1614.22 In 
his decision on that case, while he was refuting all the arguments that were submitted in the case 
before him as a Judge, he	  revealed all the main characteristics of corporations at his time. 
Actually, it has been asserted that most of the authors’ works during the Middle Ages are 
used “to describe, not to define.”23 That could be easily identified in the early efforts of the law 
scholars, while they were trying to contribute to the law of corporations they tended to explain it, 
not distinguish it. Regrettably but true, that most if not all the early works of history are more 
interested in describing the development of an idea rather than trying to analyze it. 24 
Furthermore, the legal scholars’ efforts, during the Middle Ages were considered modest to a 
large extent; they just drew pictures of what they saw without any analysis or critical thinking. 
For instance, it was common in that period to put a lot of effort into describing the different types 
of corporations, like Sole and Aggregate Corporations,25 while there are no actual differences 
between them. They even made an effort to describe the corporate seal as one of the most 
important characteristics of the corporations, while this “great antiquity” practice of using the 
seal could be traced back to the Roman Empire.26 
Accordingly, and based on the scarce of analytical resources, and due to the nature of this 
discussion i.e. giving a historical introduction, the discussion here will be more descriptive less 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 William Sheppard (1595-1674), he worked as a clerk at the upper bench in UK and then as a sergeant-at-law, and 
later he was directly involved in the corporate issues as he was drafting the charters granted to towns as incorporated 
corporations.  
19 Amasa M. Eaton, The First Book in English on the Law of Incorporation, 12 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL 259, at 
259-260 (1903). 
20 Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634), he worked as a Lawyer then as Attorney General, and later as a Chief Justice at 
two courts, and finally as a Statesman. For more about his life and ideas see EDWARD COKE, THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE at XXIV-XXVI (Steve Sheppard ed., Liberty Fund 
2003). For a brief overview about his works see id. at XXVII-XXIX. 
21 Sutton Hospital Case (1612) 77 Eng. Rep. 960. 
22 COKE, The selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, supra note 20, at XXVII. 2003.  
23 Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study In Legal Change, 34 AMERICAN 
UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 369, at 381 (1985), citing SUSAN REYNOLDS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE 
ENGLISH MEDIEVAL TOWNS at 97 (Clarendon Press. 1977). 
24 RICHARD HENRY TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, A HISTORICAL STUDY at 6 (Penguin books 
ltd. 1938). 
25 For more details about early classifications and different types of corporations see infra p.20.  
26 Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800., 2 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 105, at 
117 (1888). 
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analytical. The coming discussion will include different claims concerning the origin of the 
corporation as an idea, and several early efforts to describe the corporation, and its main 
characteristics and classifications. Moreover, it will try to light the way ahead to spot some 
significant milestones during the breakthroughs of corporation history, which are mainly the 
early developments and how the trusts, as a form of business institution, led to the introduction 
of antitrust laws. The discussion will also include other milestones during the breakthroughs of 
corporation history, which are the mergers waves, the multinational corporations, and the	  relation 
between the corporations and the state. 
1. Origin of the Corporation 
This discussion will show that there is a great debate between scholars concerning the 
origin of the idea of corporation, and how each civilization contributed to its development, so it 
might be more meaningful to call it the debate of origins and developments. While some argued 
that the idea was born during the Roman Empire and then borrowed and developed by Muslims, 
others claimed that Muslims created the first modern corporate form, and that the Italians 
introduced it to the Christian Europe. Alternatively, others argued that the modern corporation 
was an Italian invention basically invented to satisfy the deep needs of their daily trade practices. 
In addition to that, some argued that Jews were the fuel of all economies they lived in, and they 
profoundly contributed to the proliferation of the idea and development of the modern 
corporation. 
All of those claims will be scrutinized in a chronological order, because no single 
explanation can give the full picture of the origins and development. Though, it is noteworthy 
here that the following discussion will be limited to the origin and the development of the 
corporation until the end of Middle Ages at the 16th century, because the following periods will 
be dissected during the other following discussions of the corporations characteristics, 
classifications, and breakthroughs. Moreover, the origin of the stock exchange, banks, and other 
institutions will be out the scope of the discussion. 
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a) Greek and Roman origins 
Numerous authors27 argued that the first seed of the corporation idea was credited to 
Numa Pompilius28 and all of them are citing only Sir William Blackstone in his famous work the 
Commentaries on the Law of England,29 although Blackstone himself was citing another ancient 
Greek historian Plutarchus30 who was fully recognizing the idea of what Numa really created. 
According to Plutarchus, Numa’s idea was to make a separate legal personality for two groups of 
people, namely Sabines and Romans, and then he developed the idea to make a separate legal 
personality for subgroups of traders and workers.31 Moreover, the idea of tying the corporations 
to the basic unit of the society i.e. the family was also attributed to the Romans.32 Meanwhile, it 
was also claimed that such separation or categorization of groups of people into uniting 
association could be traced and attributed to the Greeks.33 
To the contrary, others alleged that it was reported, even before the Greeks and Romans, 
that there were some forms of corporations during the period between 2000-1800 B.C., whereas 
it was maintained that an Assyrians group of investors collected twenty six piece of Gold and 
they entered into agreement with merchant called Amur Ishtar, who himself paid his share as 
four pieces of gold, to form an association to be run by Amur himself, that association stood for 
four years.34 
Moreover, it was claimed that the Phoenicians, followed by the Athenians borrowed the 
ideas of the	  Assyrians and brought it to the sea in their trading voyages, and thus spread it to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Joseph K. Angell, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate at 34-35 (Samuel Ames & John Lathrop 
eds., Little, Brown 7th ed., rev., corr., and enl. / ed. 1861). Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of 
Corporations to 1832, 55 SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 23, at 25-28 (Winter 2002). Leonard W. 
Hein, The British Business Company: Its Origins and Its Control, 15 THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL 
134, at 135 (1963). Williston, HARVARD LAW REVIEW, supra note 26, at 106 (1888). JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & 
ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA at 4 (Modern Library. 2003). 
28 Numa Pompilius was the legendary second King of Rome, and he was born on the day of Rome's founding 
(traditionally, 21 April 753 BC). 
29 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS § 1 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 
1893). 
30 Lucius Mestrius Plutarchus (was born in AD 46 – and died AD 120), he was a Greek historian, biographer, and 
essayist.  
31 BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, supra note 29, at 468-469. 1893. 
32 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 4. 
2003. 
33Angell, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, supra note 27, at 35. 1861. Williston, HARVARD 
LAW REVIEW, supra note 26, at 106 (1888). 
34 ALBERT VENN DICEY, LECTURES ON THE RELATION BETWEEN LAW & PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND DURING THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY at 245 (Macmillan. 1920). 
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other civilizations.35 In the same context, it is noteworthy that the contribution of the Athenians 
became incorporated into the laws of Solon,36 and according to that law it was permissible to 
form a private corporation more easily than under the Romans rules.37 
It was reported that as the Roman Empire expanded, and the trusted Roman tax collectors 
were not capable enough to collect the taxes over that huge land, therefore a new form of 
corporations to collect the taxes was invented.38 It was also reported that during this era, the 
corporations and its principles was less developed or ran through dramatic changes, and by the 
end of this era the result was limited to a fairly fragile institution and that led some to call it as a 
“mere group of individuals.”39 On the other hand, it has been claimed that by the end of Romans’ 
era, there were different forms of corporations like works and trade associations i.e. “guilds,”40 
and a “merchant empire.”41 
b) Islamic origins 
Many authors held that despite the fact that Islam did not contribute to the creation of 
many commercial and banking instruments, due to the prohibition of usury in Islam, Islam was 
considered the origin of many corporations’ practices that was then borrowed by the Italians and 
introduced in Europe. Moreover, others claimed that Muslim scholars have worked effortless to 
structure and tailor corporate forms and even banking tools to fit into Islamic norms, and these 
designs and structures were borrowed by Italian and introduced into Christian Europe, where 
usury was also prohibited, and it helped European to survive the “devastating socioeconomic 
policies.”42 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 3-4. 
2003. 
36 These laws were attributed to Solon 638 BC – 558 BC, he was an Athenian Statesman and lawmaker.  
37Angell, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, supra note 27, at 35. 1861. Arner, SOUTHERN 
METHODIST UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, supra note 27, at 25 (Winter 2002). 
38 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 4. 
2003. 
39 MICHAEL IVANOVITCH ROSTOVTZEFF, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE at 160 
(Clarendon Press. 1926); and see generally ARNOLD HUGH MARTIN JONES, THE ROMAN ECONOMY: STUDIES IN 
ANCIENT ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (Rowman and Littlefield. 1974). 
40 For more about the development of guilds in the Middle Ages see Arner, SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY 
LAW REVIEW, supra note 27, at 26 (Winter 2002). 
41 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 7. 
2003. 
42 HECK, Charlemagne, Muhammad, and the Arab Roots of Capitalism, supra note 14, at 5-7. 2006. 
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To be more precise, because Islam banned usury, rich Muslims who have assets but do 
not want to run trade themselves, cannot lend their money to merchant for interest. It is reported 
that Muslims created what known later in Italy as commenda, which resemble a special purpose 
vehicle or a corporation, it was used to pool money and then others manage it and trade abroad, 
and after the trading voyage they share profits and losses.43 
It is noteworthy that those early trading voyages were mentioned in the Holy Quran, it 
was mentioned in the Quraish chapter that the people of Quraish, a group of individuals residing 
the city of Mecca in the same area that is now known as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, are united 
and their unity was due to their trading voyages, and they took trading voyages twice per year, 
one to Yemen in the winter and the other in summer to Bilad Al-Sham or what was then named 
the Greater Syria.44 
Despite the fact that usury was banned in Islam and the fact that it was clear that the 
commenda was literally a form of corporations, others wrongly argued that it was just a type of 
contract by which rich Muslims would lend merchants money to finance their trading voyages 
for a large amount of interest in return.45 To the contrary, some other scholars argued that the 
commenda was developed by means of the invention of the limited liability concept, whereas the 
non-practicing or inactive members of the commenda were granted a limitation of the liability to 
their pooled money. For instance, in Italy no individual was liable to the losses of commenda 
after the year of 1408.46 
On the other hand, it was wrongly claimed that the corporation form that was created by 
Muslims was suffering from several limitations required for growth and thus was not developed 
further. These claims were based on the argument that most of the transactions between Muslims 
were not written, and in addition to that the Islamic inheritance rules lead to the division of the 
corporate shares to too many successors after the death of the principal. Moreover, they argued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  John Braithwaite & Peter Drahos, Globalisation of Corporate Regulation and Corporate Citizenship, in 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE LAW ANNUAL at 7, (Fiona Macmillan ed. 2003). 
44 Quraish chapter, the Holy Quran. 
45 FERNAND. BRAUDEL, CIVILIZATION AND CAPITALISM, 15TH-18TH CENTURY: THE WHEELS OF COMMERCE at 122 § 
2 (Harper & Row. 1981). 
46 COLIN ARTHUR COOKE, et al., CORPORATION, TRUST AND COMPANY: AN ESSAY IN LEGAL HISTORY at 46 
(Manchester University Press. 1950). 
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that that was not the case in Christian Europe, because the principal was allowed to nominate a 
single beneficiary after his death.47 
In fact, these claims could be easily refuted, first concerning the unwritten transactions, 
contrary to the claim; Muslims should write all their transactions done by credit according to the 
Holy Quran. As per the instructions in verse No.282 from Al-Baqarah chapter, Muslims were 
instructed not only to do this, but also that verse stipulated that sales transactions should be also 
witnessed by trusted people in addition to the writing requirement, the case is the same even for 
insignificant or minor transactions. 
Moreover, concerning the inheritance rules, during the same early periods of Islam there 
were Jewish inheritance rules, and those rules were applied to both Jewish and Christians. 
According to those rules, which are not only similar to a great extent to the Islamic rules of 
inheritance, but also it allowed more family members to take a share of the dead person estate, 
for example in Islam neither brothers nor sisters have a share in the estate whenever the dead 
person has a son or more, while under the Jewish rules, brothers have a share in such case. 
To the contrary, others claimed that the Muslim trading practices and forms of 
corporation were developed and expanded to a very large geographic area, throughout the 
Mediterranean and to the east in the Indian Ocean and China, and that the Muslim trading 
community steadily took the whole Byzantine Empire.48	  It was also reported that thousands of 
Muslim merchants were traveling to do business and trade in China even before the famous 
Italian merchant Marco Polo found his way to China in the 14th century.49 
Moreover, it was even maintained that not only borrowing the corporate structure and 
ideas from Muslims was a success, but it was also a great success to conclude deals or 
transactions with them and get gold currency from them or even to get Syrian or Egyptian 
currency i.e. Dinar, because all these currencies were highly acceptable by merchants in order to 
purchase silk or salt from Byzantium and to resell them again to Muslims in what was known as 
“triangular transaction.”50	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 5-6. 
2003.  
48 BRAUDEL, The wheels of commerce, supra note 45, at 584. 1981; BRAUDEL, The Perspective of the World, supra 
note 15, at 108. 1981. 
49 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 5. 
2003. 
50 BRAUDEL, The Perspective of the World, supra note 15, at 107. 1981. 
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c) Italian origins 
It was claimed by many scholars that capitalism51 was a western invention, particularly in 
the same Italian cities that were trading with Muslims,52 thus it could be contended that the seed 
of capitalism could be traced to Muslims. Moreover, it was reported that the early corporations 
that were created in 9th century in dynamic cities of Italy, like Venice, Genoa, Amalfi, Gaeta, and 
Pisa, were structured in the same manner as the Muslims’ corporation, these same structure were 
those that were designed especially for the good of inactive rich people, and even for the same 
purpose of the single trading voyage.53 
By the second half of the 11th century, precisely during the period of 1072-1073 the 
commenda or colleganza,54 as a form of the trading voyage corporations, started to appear, and 
then it was developed into two forms; the first was unilateral colleganza whereby the inactive 
investor socius stands financed the whole voyage and the party who managed the trade socius 
procertans pay nothing for 25% of the profits, and the second was bilateral colleganza where the 
socius procertans shall advance 25% share and then the profit are shared between them 
equivalently.55 
Until this stage, it may be claimed that nothing was added to the Muslims’ contributions 
to the corporation development. However, it was reported that by the 12th century a somewhat 
distinctive form of corporation was developed in Florence, which was the compagnia, it was first 
developed as a family business, and was mainly based on the joint liability of all the family 
members, and in that regard it is unsurprising to know that the term compagnia was a 
combination of the two Latin words cum and panis, and their meaning is “breaking bread 
together.”56 
As it was previously mentioned that getting gold currency from Muslims was a great 
success, it was also reported that in Florence, as a development in the 13th century, that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 BRAUDEL, The wheels of commerce, supra note 45, at 237. 1981. This noted that it started to be used at the 
beginning of the 20th century and was defined as known today as the contrary of socialism. 
52 HECK, Charlemagne, Muhammad, and the Arab Roots of Capitalism, supra note 14, at 4. 2006. 
53 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 7. 
2003. 
54 The two terms were used differently in the Italian cities. 
55 BRAUDEL, The Perspective of the World, supra note 15, at 129-130. 1981. 
56 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 7-8. 
2003. 
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Italian started to coin their own gold currency, as early as 1250 and in Venice in 1284.57 At a 
later stage, in the 13th century, it has been alleged that Italians have invented two inventions that 
were profoundly the pillars for the corporation development; the first invention was the double 
entry bookkeeping that was mainly enabled by using the Arabic numerals instead of the 
Romans.58 It is noteworthy that the Italian Fra Luca Parioli was the first one to invent and use the 
double entry bookkeeping.59 
To better understand how the double entry bookkeeping invention contributed to the 
development of corporation, it was reported that “Genoese merchant would record money sent to 
his agent in Bruges as ‘paid’ in his accounts, while the latter put down the amount as ‘received.’ 
And rather than sending coins, the bigger merchants began to trust each other with letters of 
exchange-a business that Italian banks would dominate.”60  Accordingly, the double entry 
bookkeeping was directly involved in increasing the trade activities and unquestionably to the 
development of the corporation as a mean of the trading activities. 
Undoubtedly true, Fra Luca Parioli’s invention directly guided the Italians to what was 
deemed as their second invention, which is the persona ficta i.e. the separation of the corporation 
legal personality from its owner.61 In that regard, it was also argued that transferring the national 
debt into bonds was a later third Italian invention, which might be considered a financial 
revolutionary tool that helped European countries to succeed.62 In addition to that, it was also 
claimed that there was a fourth Italian invention in the 13th century and it was directly linked to 
the development of trade and corporations, which is the bill of exchange,63 meanwhile others 
refuted that claim on the ground that the bill of exchange was originally created by Muslims in 
the 12th century and was known as Saftaga, and it was created among other commercial tools 
invented during the same period, like the check for instance.64 	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2003. 
59 Dennis W. Carlton & Jeffrey M. Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization at 11 (Pearson/Addison Wesley 4th ed. 
2005). 
60 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 8. 
2003. 
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2003. 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 BRAUDEL, The Perspective of the World, supra note 15, at 112. 1981. 
64 See generally Mofizur Rahman, Financial Transactions With Commercial Papers in the Light of Islamic Shariah, 
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Another two important forms of corporations were developed in Genoa, in the first half 
of the 14th century; the first was the compere and the second was the maone, both forms of 
corporation were created to run the government tasks, and generally speaking not all scholars 
agreed on their nature and whether both of these forms could be considered a corporation, the 
first form was an association that comprised of shares owned and operated by private 
individuals, and the second form was literally a loan to the government.65 While the first form 
was a corporation to a large extent, the second one might be classified just as a loan agreement 
between government and private individuals, not as a corporation. 
By the end of the 14th century some of the Italian cities like Venice for example, were 
undoubtedly economically flourishing,66 and booming to the extent that it was reported that all 
European countries were borrowing its corporate forms, structures, and techniques. A very 
important example was the German’s Magna societas, whereas it was structured as a merger 
between three family businesses with a principal office in Ravensburg, which was a small town 
in Swabia,67 and with almost two hundred branches in many other cities like Barcelona, Genoa, 
Vienna, and Paris.68 
Undoubtedly true, the flourishing of the corporations in Italy was fueled not only by the 
rich people that owned shares of the corporations, but also by the organized lending institutions 
that were raised in the same time; for instance the banks69 or what was known at these times as 
the banchi.70 It was reported that also Banks expanded through branches and a complicated 
network throughout many cities located in different countries.71 The role of banks in financing 
the development of the corporation will be addressed shortly during the next discussion of the 
Jewish contributions. 
By the beginning of the 16th century there was an urgent need to limit the liability of 
some of the family members that were not engaged in the practice of management or trade i.e. 
the inactive party, accordingly a new form of a corporation started to exist, which was the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 BRAUDEL, The wheels of commerce, supra note 45, at 440. 1981. 
66 BRAUDEL, The Perspective of the World, supra note 15, at 119. 1981. 
67 BRAUDEL, The wheels of commerce, supra note 45, at 436. 1981. 
68 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 12. 
2003. 
69 The word Banchi was the origin of the word Bank, and it was named after the Italian word Banco, which means 
bench in English, and it was used to indicate the bench that was usually by lenders in Italy to sit or stand behind it. 
70 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 8. 
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accomandita, and the accomandita gradually replaced the aforementioned family compagnia.72 
As an inevitable result of these developments, the sea trading voyages or what some scholars 
named it as “naval capitalism” significantly expanded during that period.73 
d) Jewish contributions 
The fact through all the history is that the Jewish merchants’ network was expanding and 
it reached almost every country on the planet.74 For instance, it was reported in the “Cairo 
Geniza Documents”75 that in the 9th century the Jewish network spread from Egypt to Ethiopia in 
Africa and to India in Asia, using the means and channels that were developed by Muslims.76 
Additionally, it was reported in the 10th century that very rich Jewish families were involved in 
various business like trading, banking, and even tax collecting, in many jurisdiction; Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, etc.77 
It is undoubtedly true that any minority throughout history, whether due to nationality or 
religion background, as in case of the Jews, did unite and form a group for many purposes; to 
feel more safe, to share the benefits of the group, and to support each other.78 Based on that fact, 
it could be claimed that the members of the minority group might share in some practices and 
they may spread the practices in the community or the communities where they lived. In that 
context, scholars admitted that thousands of causes had contributed to the modern structure of 	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the corporations and the economy, and the examples include the discovery of America and the 
industrial revolution, and they also affirmed that capitalism would not be as it is if the Jews were 
not involved and added to the economy.79 
A breakthrough out of the legal environment, and a cursory overview of the art of the 
Middle Ages, will reveal the fact that usury was forbidden in most of societies and usurers were 
tortured and exiled out.80 For instance, Dante Alighieri81 in his poem “Inferno”82 that was 
published in 1314, classified the hell into circles and then he mentioned that usurers were sent to 
be punished into the core of the 7th circle, and people in that circle will be punished by “flaming 
sand with fiery flakes raining from the sky.”83 
In addition to the unity of the Jews due to their minority status, they were almost exiled 
by many societies during these early times, mainly because they were practicing usury, and that 
was banned by most of the nations. Being exiled from many societies and relocating from one 
place to another led to an inevitable result, which was that the Jews contributed and effected the 
development and the structure of the corporation through the history, as well as the economy in 
general, not only because of their used usury practices to finance economic activities, but also 
because they might have borrowed some of the practices from every society they lived in, and 
then spread them again when they settled in another. 
2. Early Characteristics and Classifications of Corporations 
Corporation, incorporation, body politic, and body incorporate are all terms that were 
used interchangeably, by William Sheppard and many other early scholars, while writing about 
corporations.84 They used to describe all of these terms as an assembly that gather many persons 
in one artificial person.85 In fact this is comparable to a large extent to the current brief 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 WERNER SOMBART, THE JEWS AND MODERN CAPITALISM at 9 (Mortimer Epstein trans., Batoche. 2001). 
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2003. 
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83 Dante Alighieri, Inferno at Canto XIV (National Library Company 1909). 
84Angell, Treatise on the Law of Private Corporations Aggregate, supra note 27, at 3. 1861; Eaton, THE YALE LAW 
JOURNAL, supra note 19, at 265 (1903). 
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description of the modern corporation.86 They believed that the artificial person is the perpetual 
successors of the group of all people, resembling their united soul;87 and even Sir Edward Coke 
concluded that corporation is nothing but a soul.88 More than two hundred years later, Chief 
Justice John Marshall repeated almost the same description by saying that the “corporation is an 
artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law.”89 
In the same descriptive context, most of the earlier law scholars repeatedly followed each 
other and mentioned the same main characteristics of corporations.90 Meanwhile, it is noteworthy 
that while they were repeating each other, they were also describing the corporations’ charters 
available before them, and that might sometimes have led to contradicting ideas or at least 
slightly differences or limitations. However these main corporation’s characteristics described by 
most of them can be summarized as follows: (1) generally the corporation has the right of 
perpetual succession, but in a range of instances it was granted limited succession period,91 and 
sometimes it has to be dissolved by the death of all its partners,92 (2) generally the corporation 
has the right to sue and be sued, but for instance the right to sue foreign corporation was 
unknown until it was first granted in UK in 1872,93 (3) generally the corporation has the right to 
purchase and hold lands and all kinds of assets,94 likewise some other scholars mentioned that it 
could not purchase or hold lands,95 (4) generally the corporation has the right to have a seal, (5) 
generally the corporation has the right to issue internal ordinances or by-laws, (6) there is an 
obligation on the corporation which is that it should allow government officials and others to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS at 5 (Harvard 
University Press. 1917). 
87 Hein, THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL, supra note 27, at 134 (1963). 
88 Sir Edward Coke Reports Volume 10 the case of Sutton’s Hospital p.33a 
89 Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
90 COKE, The selected Writings and Speeches of Sir Edward Coke, supra note 20, at 366-367. 2003; BLACKSTONE, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, supra note 29, at 475-476. 1893; Williston, HARVARD LAW 
REVIEW, supra note 26, at 117 (1888). 
91 That was the norm but some other times it was granted limited succession period for more see Hein, THE 
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL, supra note 27, at 139 (1963). 
92 BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, supra note 29, at 485. 1893; Arner, 
SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, supra note 27, at 37 (Winter 2002). 
93 SMITH & O'BRIEN, Conflict of laws, supra note 11, at 184. 1999. Mentioned that in 1872, it was established that a 
foreign corporation could be sued in England. 
94 BLACKSTONE, Commentaries on the Laws of England in Four Books, supra note 29, at 475. 1893. 
95 Hein, THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL, supra note 27, at 141 (1963). JAMES GRANT, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN GENERAL: AS WELL AGGREGATE AS SOLE at 108 (T. & J.W. Johnson. 
1854). This mentioned that the corporations cannot hold or purchase land. 
22	  
investigate it, (7) a corporation is not allowed to form one another corporation,96 but some 
scholars claimed that a corporation could be created by another corporation, and for instance the 
king is a corporation who has the power to form other corporations,97 (8) a corporation could be 
dissolved by act of parliament, by death of all the partners, by voluntary forfeit to the King, or by 
the courts as a penalty,98 while other scholars argued that this was limited only to parliament.99 
Scrutinizing or just taking a closer look of what was mentioned in these earlier works, 
will easily led to the conclusion that they were superficial to a large extent. For instance, as for 
the right of the corporation to sue and to be sued by third parties, none of these works discussed 
the concept in detail. To sue a corporation before 1826, a third party would have to sue all the 
partners in their exact and full name otherwise the suit would be unacceptable, and the right to 
sue and be sued under its own name or in the name of its representative was granted to some 
corporations, then it was totally forbidden, then it was granted again for some corporations 
starting from 1826, and by 1857 most of the corporations was granted that right permanently.100 
In the same context, some scholars mentioned that the corporation was granted its 
existence by four means: (1) by the common law, (2) by a charter issued by the king, (3) by an 
act of parliament, and (4) by prescription.101 Meanwhile others claimed that the corporation 
might be created by a fifth mean, which is corporation made by another corporation,102 and other 
scholars even asserted that some forms of corporations created themselves by themselves, for 
example many towns were created as corporations by themselves.103 
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It might be surprising that a political or a community unit like a town was classified at 
that time as a corporation, but that was the reality in the Middle Ages. In addition to that, most of 
the scholars at that time devoted a big portion of their writing to identify who might be 
incorporated or granted the right to be a corporation, for instance William Sheppard cited the 
following examples; City, Village, Borough, Town, Parish, hospital, traders, free men, existed 
corporation, among others.104 The fact that was cited by William Sheppard; which is that a pre-
existed corporation might be granted the right to be reincorporated, could be interpreted as that 
the corporations were allowed to reincorporated or restructured, and that could be considered 
also as an early sign that corporate restructuring was known and legally permitted. 
Concerning the early attempts to classify corporations, they were almost the same 
classifications, and most of the scholars were just repeating each other. For instance, the early 
attempts from the scholars to classify corporations, with regard to its subject, they distinguished 
between sole and aggregate corporations,105 on the other hand Romans did not recognize sole 
corporations.106 Depending on the jurisdiction, corporations were classified into ecclesiastical 
and lay,107 and some even classify lay corporations into two categories eleemosynary and 
civil.108 
Furthermore, with regard to the structure, or the creation of its “Body Politick” as it was 
called at that time, corporations were classified into elective and representative corporations.109 
Regrettably but true, none of those classifications has an indication or resemble any importance 
in reality, meanwhile it has been claimed that those classifications were very important at that 
time,110 however this claim did not mentioned any supporting evidence or even elaborations that 
might validate it. 
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At a later stage, during the 18th century, the classification of corporations started to be 
significantly different and it was even based on considerably different criterion. For instance, 
Adam Smith111 classified corporations into regulated, “private copartners,” and joint-stock 
corporations. The regulated corporation, which was also known at that time as “Hamburg 
Company” was an association that united a group of individuals, and any qualified person could 
join at anytime during its life, and each member of that corporation was allowed to perform trade 
activities, according the corporation’s internal rules but everyone has his own liability,112 in short 
this regulated corporation could be categorized as an equivalent to what was called in Adam 
Smith time a “Guild.” 
It is noteworthy here that some authors argued that the direct linkage between the 
development of regulated corporation in UK and the “Guilds” in Italy could be easily identified 
and traced, while the development of the joint-stock corporations in UK could not be traced back 
to Italy.113 It was even claimed that by the beginning of the 15th century the word “guildated” 
was a synonymous to the word “incorporated.”114 Some authors called Adam Smith’s regulated 
corporations as “societates,” and they gave some examples for it such as “the associations for 
working mines, salt-works, and for collecting taxes” and they also elaborated more by 
mentioning that this category of corporations was to a great extent resembling a natural person, 
with regard to its rights, obligations and liabilities.115	  In the same context, it was reported that the 
early examples of that category of regulated corporations was limited to local practices, but by 
the proliferation of sea voyages in the 16th century, the regulated corporation was granted the 
right to practice abroad, and it was even claimed that the East India Company was started as a 
regulated corporation.116	  
As a development to the regulated corporation idea, it was also reported that joining these 
abroad trading activities i.e. buying shares of the corporation, was on a voyage-by-voyage basis 
until 1614, then it became continuous, and by 1692 a dramatic change happened; members to the 
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regulated corporation were no longer allowed to practice trade privately.117 By the end of the 17th 
century, it could be easily identified that the joint-stock corporation was born as a new form of 
the corporations. 
Alternatively, some scholars reported that the joint-stock corporations, as a transferable 
shares concept, was not recognized by all legal systems at the same time, for instance Sweden 
recognize the joint-stock corporation more than one hundred years later, in 1848.118 Moreover, 
joint-stock corporations were not involved in manufacturing to the same extent as trading, but 
they were involved at least in	  glass and paper	  manufacturing as early as 1642, at that time the 
“Glass Work” joint-stock corporation was formed in Massachusetts, and one earlier example was 
the paper mill formed in 1706 in Pennsylvania.119 
On the other hand, the distinction between “private copartneries” and joint-stock 
corporations, as recognized by Adam Smith, is similar to a great extent to the modern distinction 
between partnerships and corporations. Undoubtedly true, Adam Smith distinguished between 
both of them on the basis that in the “private copartneries” the partners were not allowed to 
transfer their shares without a prior consent of all partners, and the liabilities of the partners was 
not limited to their shares.120 
As early as the 16th century, other classifications were recognized by the scholars, for 
instance they recognized that corporations could be classified according to its purposes and how 
it is connected to the government, in that regard some scholars classified corporations into 
private, public,121 semi-public corporations.122 In that context, it was also recognized that such 
distinction in not so productive, because the fact that the end purpose of all corporations, either 
private “civil” corporation or a public one is good for people.123 
An early example of the semi-public corporations was the military corporations, also an 
interesting example was a corporation named “Take Trustees of the Road and Ferries from 
Newark to the Road leading from Bergen Point to Paulus Hook” and it was later known as 
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“Jersey City,” this corporation was incorporated in June 20, 1765 to maintain and keep a good 
state the road between New York and Philadelphia, and in return it enjoyed the right to collect 
toll and donations for its own private profitability, this corporation was an interesting example 
because it was reported that the corporation was created by a way of merger between many other 
corporations.124 
By time all those early classifications were abandoned, and they were superseded by 
numerous classifications that were adopted by the different modern legal systems. It could be 
claimed that by the beginning of the 20th century the classifications became out of control. 
Though scrutinizing the modern classifications is out of the scope of this dissertation, however 
the following are just few terms that are designated to some forms of corporations classified 
according to the relation between the ownership and management; “small private companies, 
close companies, companies with concentrated ownership of shares, quasi-partnership 
companies, small and closely-held companies, SMEs, owner managed companies, micro 
companies, large public companies, quoted companies, companies with fragmented ownership of 
shares, Berle and Means companies.”125 
3. Breakthroughs Corporations History 
Throughout the history of the corporation there were landmarks, those landmarks might 
be considered as a prompt that led to the change, and to the development and proliferation of the 
idea itself. This section will be an overview of some of those landmarks, and it will include a 
brief history of some corporations namely the East India Company, as some named it the mother 
of the modern corporations, and the South Sea Company, as it was the main cause for the biggest 
financial crisis during the early developments. Moreover, the following discussion will address 
“trusts” and how it is considered as the main cause for the creation of the antitrust laws. Most 
importantly the discussion will address the history of mergers and scrutinizing the merger waves 
through the history, and lastly it will include an overview on the development of multinational 
corporations. 
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a) East India Company as the mother of modern corporations 
It has been claimed that the joint-stock corporation started to proliferate from the 16th 
century as a chartered corporation, during a time when the European monarchs started to create 
several joint-stock corporations.126 The following are just a few examples of these chartered 
joint-stock corporations, which was founded by the European monarchs during the 16th and 17th 
centuries: “Africa,” “East India,” “Hudson’s Bay,” “Levant,” “Massachusetts,” “Muscovy,” 
“Virginia,” and “The Company of Distant Parts.”127 
It was also maintained that those early joint-stock corporations were just a development 
of the “regulated corporation” that were practicing trade in the Middle Ages,128 and scholars 
further asserted that the two ideas are interrelated but generally speaking both are based on the 
same earlier idea of guilds, where all the members are allowed to practice trade or a certain 
profession separately but according to the internal rules.129 It was even claimed that the East 
India Company started as a “regulated corporation,” and to be more precise the shareowners 
were allowed to trade under the supervision of the management of the corporation until that was 
prohibited in 1692.130 
Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that some authors falsely claimed that the development of 
the idea of the chartered corporation was attributed to two main ideas borrowed from the Middle 
Ages, namely the idea of trading the corporations’ shares and the idea of limited liability.131 On 
the other hand other authors held that limited liability idea were not developed until after the East 
India Company was even chartered, and it was also reported that one of the main reasons to 
develop the limited liability was the high risk of the trading sea voyages, and for instance 
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between 1599 and 1601, four trading sea voyages were sent to East Indies and two of them were 
lost.132 
In the same context, it was also claimed that even the idea of trading the corporations’ 
shares in the stock exchange was based on the idea that investing in the trading sea voyages had 
become permanent instead of single voyage as previously shown.133 To the contrary, it was 
maintained that East India Company started by issuing shares for each trading sea voyage 
separately, and that continued for the first twelve voyages until it later switched to be the idea of 
permanent shares.134 It was also professed that the idea of holding the corporations’ shares for 
many voyages was borrowed from the Dutch, and even some authors argued that it took almost a 
century to be imitated by the English East India Company.135 
The idea of investing in a serious of trading sea voyages was first developed after the 
chartering one of the Dutch’s corporations, which had the same name of the English East India 
Company; the Dutch East India Company “Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie,” on March 20 
1602,136 and the idea was further developed to allow the investors to sell and trade their shares in 
the stock exchange.137 It is noteworthy that many other corporations were founded in the same 
period and had the same name, for instance the French East India Company was founded in 
1664, and the West India Company that was founded also in 1664.138 
It seems that all the ideas developed during that same period were wrongly attributed to 
the East India Company, despite the fact that many other well-known joint-stock corporations, 
like the Muscovy Company, was also known by some authors as the Russia Company, which 
was founded around 1553-1555,139 the Mines Royal in 1564,140 and the Levant Company in 
1581,141 all were chartered even before the East India Company, which was founded in 1599 and 	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chartered in December 31, 1600, and despite that many authors claimed that it is the “mother of 
our known modern corporations.”142 
That might not be surprising, after revealing the fact that the East India Company with all 
of its very long history, not only survived for more than five centuries, but is still alive today 
between all modern corporations in the 21st century.143 It is noteworthy that there are other 
corporations that were founded almost in the same period and are also still alive, but none of 
which are famous like the East India Company, one of those corporations is the Hudson’s Bay 
Corporation founded in May 2, 1670.144 
The East India Company was first chartered for the purpose of practicing trade between 
UK and Asia under the theme of the trading sea voyages,145 and that was developed by time to a 
permanent structure that ends up ruling India with an army of 260,000 troops.146 Moreover, there 
were great debates concerning the East India Company, for instance a slavery debate resulted in 
a boycott of one of its products i.e. sugar, until it started to import sugar from a non-slavery 
manufacture in Bengal.147 More importantly, in a political context, granting the East India 
Company monopoly rights over the trade of tea in 1773 led to huge protests and 342 boxes of tea 
thrown into the ocean, and that directly led to formation of the Boston Tea party.148 
Moreover, it was claimed that the East India Company heavily contributed to the 
development of the modern corporation ideas, for instance its structure could be considered a 
new development to the corporation idea during these early stages of the formation of the 
corporation idea, whereas it was designed to be managed by two-courts, the first court was a 
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general one and consists of all the share owners, and the second court consists of the managing 
directors, and in that regard it was reported that the sons of the owners of large shares were 
always selected to this managing positions.149 
It is noteworthy here that in addition to the well-known purpose of the chartered 
corporations during that period, mainly trading,150 another purpose that was considered as 
“quasi-government” developed by the time to serve certain interests for the king or the public, 
for instance sponsoring the searching for new sea passages, and canals excavation.151 Moreover, 
UK and France chartered two corporations; the South Sea Company and the Mississippi 
Company, in order to rescue them from the huge after-war debts by the end of the 17th century,152 
but as it will be discussed in the next discussion that led to the largest financial disaster in the 
history. 
Meanwhile, some other corporations were chartered in the same period to serve the 
king’s interest, and surprisingly most of them heavily contributed to the development and 
prosperity of the American Colonies, such as the Virginia Company and the Massachusetts Bay 
Company.153 It is noteworthy that by time those corporations got its independence in the US, and 
that was through a series of soft transition steps, and the final step to obtain the independence 
was taken by a remarkable decision declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward in 1819.154 
b) South Sea Company and the Bubble Act155 
The South Sea Company was chartered in 1711 as one of the other joint-stock 
corporations that were founded during that period, and its main purpose was trading and it was 
granted exclusive rights to trade with the “Spanish America,” and after struggling in its trade 
activities by 1719, its manager John Blunt changed the purpose to be mainly lending money to 
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the British government.156 During the same period, the typical feature among all the joint-stock 
corporations that offered their shares to trade was that there were great fluctuations of the prices 
in the market, and many of those corporations collapsed, and remarkably that trend reached its 
peak by 1720.157 
In 1720 the British Parliament devoted all its efforts to rescue the South Sea Company 
from collapsing, to be more precise the Parliament helped the corporation to put a plan for its 
purpose into effect, and in the same time helped it to flourish by trading of its debt shares.158 The 
parliament did this in two steps, the first was on January 21, 1720, whereas it announced that the 
South Sea Company will handle the British government debt exclusively, and that led to instant 
outrageous increases in the prices of the shares of the South Sea Company from £128 in January 
to £187 in February and finally £950 on June 24.159 
Unfortunately, the South Sea Company was about to collapse and the instant outrageous 
increase of the shares prices formed an actual “Bubble,” as it was named by most of scholars, 
and that bubble burst by September in the same year, and suddenly the owners of the shares 
found nothing that resembled their shares value.160 Other authors named it “[t]he drama of the 
South Sea Company,” as it was the biggest financial crisis in that early history.161 
The second step was the Bubble Act that was enacted by the British Parliament in the 
same year on June 11, 1720, that act was designed mainly to decrease the number of joint-stock 
corporations that might compete with the South Sea Company; according to that act the British 
Parliament prohibited any unchartered joint-stock corporation, thus resulting in that any joint-
stock corporation shall be chartered only by act of parliament.162 That second step succeeded to 
give a hand to prevent the collapse of the South Sea Company, and the corporation survived the 
crisis and even the prices of its share returned to £170 again by October in the same year, 
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followed by the British government nationalizing the corporation for its own interest i.e. to avoid 
paying the government debt.163 
The inevitable result of the Bubble Act in UK was that investors rerouted their trading 
practices to be done through old tools such as partnerships, and since the limited liability feature 
did not arm the old tools, the economy faced a great delay.164 It was even reported that most of 
the merchants, during that period, advanced the partnerships agreement to imitate the joint-stock 
corporations by making the shares of the partnership tradable.165 
The influence of the Bubble Act was not limited to the UK, but it was expanded also to 
the American Colonies in 1741, and obviously that also delayed the economy for some time.166 
However, the effect in the American Colonies was intolerable, because the economy mainly 
depends in its existence and proliferation on the early corporation, for instance all of the 
important American institutions were chartered as a corporation, banks, canals, churches, roads 
and even universities; the Harvard University was even chartered as a corporation in 1636.167 
Some authors claimed that the American Colonies did not get rid of the Bubble Act until 
the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776,168 however the Pennsylvania Assembly i.e. the 
parliament, violated the British prohibition and granted a corporation named the Philadelphia 
Contributionship,169 a charter as an American insurance corporation in 1768, prior to the 
Declaration of Independence. It was also reported that the first American corporation, the Bank 
of North America, was founded in 1781 in the north of the US after that British prohibition.170 It 
is undoubtedly true that the US boomed after getting rid of the Bubble Act, while the UK 
economy was still suffering from its effect, and it was even reported that 350 corporations were 
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incorporated in the US only during the period between 1783 and 1801, while no comparable 
activity was reported in the UK in the same period.171 
The Bubble Act was not repealed in the UK until more than a century after its 
application; in 1825, by that time there was an urgent economic need to allow individuals to do 
more business in order to rescue the economy.172 In 1844 the British Parliament enacted a new 
act to allow individuals to incorporate new joint-stock corporations just as easy as by mere 
registration.173 However, the repeal of the Bubble Act did not offer the expected effect, it was 
also reported that even after its repeal the situation was unreliable, because the incorporation of 
the joint-stock corporations was by that time a matter of the common law and the principles of 
the common law were neither developed nor solid enough to rely on it.174 
Accordingly, the Joint Stock Companies Act was enacted to fully recognize the 
unchartered joint-stock corporations.175 It is noteworthy that the British government was very 
hesitant towards the unchartered corporations in the period after the repeal of the Bubble Act, 
and it started to recognize joint-stock banks as incorporated corporations by registration in 1826, 
and then it changed the rules and one was not allowed to incorporate that corporation unless it 
was by a “letters patent” in 1844, then it was changed again so that it was permissible again to 
incorporate it just as easy by registration in 1857.176 
c) Trusts and antitrust law 
As it will be scrutinized later along with the discussions of the relation between the state 
and the corporations, it was widely accepted to grant most of the corporations an exclusive right 
to trade or to practice certain profession during the early ages. However, those exclusive rights 
led to the development of what was then called an “antisocial” monopoly practices, which was 
widely justified on the grounds that the monopoly owner always own a scarce goods or services 
and shall raise the prices to meet the unlimited demand to acquire such goods or services, which 
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then appears to be untrue and even vice versa i.e. the supply is literally unlimited while the 
demand is limited.177 
Despite the fact that twenty-one states in the US had their own antitrust laws by 1890,	  178 
the US Sherman Act of 1890179 was considered the father of the modern antitrust laws, or in the 
words of one antitrust scholar the “Magna Carat of free enterprise.”180 Others also claimed that 
the Canadian Act that was enacted on May 2, 1889, which was named “An act for the prevention 
and suppression of combinations formed in restraint of trade,” was the first modern antitrust 
law.181 Moreover, it was reported that France enacted the Le Chapelier act of 1791,182 to prohibit 
monopolies and any trade restraining practices,183 and even Austria enacted the Austrian Penal 
Code in 1852 adopting rules in the same direction, while on the other hand it has been reported 
that these practices were considered lawful and acceptable under other legal systems for instance 
in UK and Germany.184 
Meanwhile, digging deeper to explore the roots and the earlier seed of the antitrust idea 
shows that it has more depth than those modern experiences, and it was even held that the idea 
was developed first by Romans who incorporated the idea into many of their laws, it was then 
further developed five hundred years later in the Constitution of Emperor Zeno the Ishaurian of 
483 AD.185 Even during the early period of Islam, it was recorded after Prophet Muhammad, 
peace be upon him, said that whoever intervened in the prices to increase them, should expect the 
Almighty God to sit him in worst place in hell, in addition to many other instructions that forbid 
monopolistic behaviors that led to an increase in prices.186 
In the same context, it was also reported that later during the period of the Saxon Kings, 
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as a middle man, that crime was mentioned in Domesday Book187 in 1086, and the monopoly 
practices was also considered illegal in the Magna Carta in 1215.188 That early history of antitrust 
was not just a few instances or laws that were adopted during these early periods, but the 
common law as a judiciary work is clear evidence that the idea was recognized in some of the 
early rulings,189 for example the ruling of the English Courts in the Dyer’s case in 1414,190 and in 
the case of Darcy v. Allien in 1599,191 and then in case of Mitchel v. Reynolds in 1711.192 In the 
same context, it was even claimed that the Sherman Act of 1890 have a “transatlantic origin” and 
it was codifying of the old common law rules.193 
As it was said previously, the situation in Germany during the 16th century was similar to 
UK and the US i.e. the monopoly practices were widely accepted, for instance giant corporations 
like the Fuggers, Hochstetters, and Welsers were controlling mercury, sliver, and copper during 
the 16th century and no other corporation could even plan to enter into market of such 
industries.194 However, by the end of the 16th century, namely during the period of the King 
James VI and I, the situation started to take a new direction in the UK, both the parliament and 
the judiciary considered granting royal monopoly rights as unconstitutional, and that was also 
expanded to the US.195 On the other hand the situation remained the same i.e. monopoly 
practices are accepted in Germany for many centuries and even after the beginning of the 20th 
century.196 
Additionally, it should be noted that the mentioned change in the UK and the US does not 
mean that monopoly was prohibited, it was merely unconstitutional to grant corporations such 
rights by the state, and it was to the contrary of that; these monopoly practices were considered 
the main cause that led to the growth of some American corporations domestically, and even 
gaining a controlling position in the foreign markets, and by the end of the 19th century many of 	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what was called “trusts” were formed.197 Unsurprisingly, what mainly triggered the debate in the 
US concerning the prohibition of monopoly practices or even the abuse of the granted monopoly 
powers was the growth and expansion of these trusts.198 
An overview on the history of the Standard Oil Corporation may give a clearer picture of 
how these trusts appeared and grew in the US and then developed into the main trigger of the 
mentioned debate, and even then led to what was named antitrust laws.199 The story begins in 
1852, when John Davison Rockefeller and his friend Maurice Clark started to “pool” some of 
their savings and to use it in “commission business,” and by 1862 they partnered with Samuel 
Andrews to start new promising business, an oil refinery, henceforth their business grew and 
they started a second refinery and then they opened branches in different states, then Rockefeller 
invested into many refinery businesses, and by June 1870 he merged all his businesses that were 
worth more than one million US dollars, under the umbrella of the Standard Oil Corporation.200 
A dramatic change happened in 1871, when Rockefeller met a businessman who had a 
magic tool that was offered for sale, that magic tool was a corporation chartered under the name 
of the “South Improvement Company,” and the owner of that charter was granted the ability to 
do any business of any nature in whatever place he might decide, there is no need to mention that 
Rockefeller took the opportunity and bought the charter, but he was not alone, he arranged for a 
new form of institutions or associations, on January 2, 1872 he and many other businessmen in 
the refinery business pooled and divided the 2,000 shares of that corporation between 
themselves, and formed an association or that new business structure that was then known as a 
“trust” to take over the oil industry.201 That oil trust or to be more precise the trust idea was 
copied by many other businessmen, in many other industries in the US, during the same period, 
most notably the industries of the sugar refinery, tobacco, railroads, and steel among others.202 	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Controlling an industry was not a new trend that was sufficient to develop the antitrust 
idea, it just triggered the debate in that concern, and thus the debate led to the development of the 
antitrust laws in the US, the following will be an overview on the history of such debate. It is 
noteworthy here that while the history may reveal some of the legislative intent or goals, the 
discussion of such goals will come later during the discussion of the merger control as an 
impediment.203 
It should be noted that the debate lasted for almost two years, starting from January 
21,1888 until the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890.204 To be more precise, it started by the 
Representative of New York State; Henry Bacon, when he requested the inspection of the trusts, 
and unsurprisingly the Senator of the State of Ohio, which was the state that chartered the 
Standard Oil Corporation; Senator John Sherman presented an antitrust bill by the mid of August 
1888, and that bill was even named after him i.e. the “Sherman Act.”205 
One might think that Senator Sherman presented that bill because of the fact that the 
trusts was controlling the markets during that period, and that control led to public anger due to 
high prices, or due to the shortage of supply, or even the bad quality of goods or services, but 
surprisingly by scrutinizing the congressional records and analyzing some of the speeches of the 
Senators on that debate extremely unexpected results were revealed. Senator George Franklin 
Edmunds said: “Although for the time being the sugar trust has perhaps reduced the price of 
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sugar, and the oil trust certainly has reduced the price of oil immensely, that does not alter the 
wrong of the principle of any trust.”206 
It is noteworthy here that a deep analysis to the available data, showed that the trusts 
actually added to the output of the economy, during the period from 1880 to 1900, and there was 
an actual growth of output, and that was not limited to certain trust but literally for all the trusts, 
for example the oil, salt, steel, and sugar, as it appears in the following graph.207  
 
Figure 1: Output of certain industries during the period 1980-1900208 
Moreover, that opinion was not just a single opinion, it was the opinion of most of House 
at that time, and for example one of the most important statements was the statement by Senator 
William Ernest Mason, whereas he clearly said that: 
trusts have made products cheaper, have reduced prices; but if the price of oil, for 
instance, were reduced to one cent a barrel, it would not right the wrong done to 
the people of this country by the ‘trusts’ which have destroyed legitimate 
competition and driven honest men from legitimate business enterprises.209 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, House, 20 June (1890) P.2558 
207 DiLorenzo, INTERNATINAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 180, at 77-78 (1985). 
208 Data retrieved from Id. at 78-79, citing US Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the U.S., various years 
(Washington DC: Government Printing Office); US Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the U.S. 
209 Congressional Record, 51st Congress, 1st Session, House, 20 June (1890) P.4100. 
0	  2	  
4	  6	  
8	  10	  
12	  
Salt	  (Quantities	  valued	  in	  Millions	  US	  Dollar)	  	  	  Steel	  (Million	  Tons)	  Oil	  (Billions	  of	  Galons)	  	  Sugar	  (Hundereds	  Millions	  of	  Pounds)	  	  
39	  
It is clear that they were arguing about the protection of small businesses from the trusts, 
a giant powerful business that might swallow them easily, but unfortunately the prices were not 
important which means that the antitrust was at the cost of consumers, in that context it has been 
claimed that the purpose was to save the “less efficient ‘honest men’ [from being driven] out of 
business”210. 
To elaborate more on that point; while the Senators revealed vividly that the oil and sugar 
trusts kept the trend of the prices going down, some authors argued that there was also another 
cause, which was the drop of the railroad prices.211 Actually, it could be easily recognized that 
both of these causes i.e. the trusts and the drop of the railroad prices were interrelated, because 
the trusts were using the railroads as a means of transportation and they managed to get rebates 
for their large transactions,212 and that led to the drop of the railroads prices and vice versa; the 
drop of the transportation prices led to the fall in the prices of goods. 
Accordingly, the overall trend of the prices were going down for the good of consumers, 
but at the same time other groups of people were unhappy by these results, those groups were 
mainly the small businesses owners and the farmers, and they simply could not manage to get the 
same transportation prices for their small transactions and thus they struggled to compete with 
the prices offered by the trusts or generally speaking with the price trend during that period, and 
those groups joined the debate to the pro antitrust camp,213 if not considered as the actual 
triggering factor of the antitrust debate. 
However, the first bill that was presented by the Senator Sherman was very confusing, 
actually its language was indicating that the goal was nothing other than to protect consumers as 
follows: “That all arrangements, contracts, agreements, trusts, or combinations … made with a 
view, or which tend to prevent full and free competition … or which tend to advance the cost to 
the consumer … are hereby declared to be against public policy, unlawful, and void.”214 Here it 	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was clearly declared that the debate was taking into consideration mainly the protection of the 
consumer, side by side with the goal “full and free” competition as a mean to protect the 
consumer but not as an end in itself. 
When the debate over that bill started on January 23,1889,215 Senator Sherman himself 
declared the same meaning; he actually denied that the purpose of his bill was to cripple 
combinations of capital and labor, the formation of partnerships or of corporations, but only to 
prevent and control the combinations made with a view to prevent competition, or for the 
restraint of trade, or to increase the profits of the producer at the cost of the consumer. It is the 
unlawful combination … not the useful combination.216 
It is also clear that Senator Sherman was trying to defend the language of his bill by any 
means; some of his reasoning does not even make sense; he said that his bill seeks to make the 
“unlawful combination” unlawful. Meanwhile, it seems that most of the voices in the house were 
standing for purposes other than that was declared by Senator Sherman; the bill was referred to 
another committee and it was returned after six days with different language saying nothing 
about the “cost to the consumer” or even the “full and free competition,” the bill passed with the 
new language dealing with “restraint of trade,” and in fact by a majority of fifty two to one.217 
The enactment of the Sherman Act did not put the debate to an end. Instead the debate 
expanded to the courts and it was more confusing when enforced, it was also claimed that the 
continuous debate was anticipated and that it distracted the publics’ attention from the 
introduction of a new trade restraint tool, which was a new tariff bill sponsored by the Senator 
Sherman himself.218 There was too much evidence supporting that claim, for instance the first 
time the Sherman Act was used against the oil trusts present in the Standard Oil Corporation was 
more than fifteen years after the law was enacted in 1906.219 
Actually, it was not the first time to initiate a lawsuit against the oil trusts represented by 
the Standard Oil Corporation; in 1889 David Watson the Attorney General of the State of Ohio, 
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accidently read the agreement of the trust of the Standard Oil Corporation, and he realized that it 
violated the Ohio Charter by controlling other corporations out of the State of Ohio, and the 
Supreme Court of Ohio decided to the side of the state, but it did not declare the charter as void, 
and the trust continued under a new name the “liquidating trustees.”220 Accordingly Rockefeller 
moved the corporation to the more liberal State of New Jersey, and that actually led to the 
expansion of his business even more freely. 
By 1899 the trust was the owner and controlled another forty corporations,221 and it was 
even reported that the expansion was a result of the increase of its capital from seventy million to 
more than one hundred million US dollars.222 The second lawsuit against the trust, which was the 
first under the Sherman Act, was a knockdown of the trust; in 1911 the Supreme Court ordered 
the divestiture of some of the assets of the twenty two billion US dollars trust, and the result was 
giant oil corporations, namely Amoco, Chevron, Exxon, and Mobil.223 
Finally it should be noted that the movement in the west side of the Atlantic never 
stopped and many amendments were introduced to the Sherman Act, and these amendments will 
be discussed later along with the discussions of the merger control. 224 Furthermore, that 
movement was met with a deep silence on the other side of the Atlantic i.e. the European 
countries did not take their actual first steps toward modern antitrust regulations until it was 
incorporated in the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (hereinafter 
ECSC) in April 18, 1951.225 
However, it was claimed that the first step was in March 25, 1957, indeed when the 
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (hereinafter EEC) was signed.226 From 
that time and on the antitrust was considered “a fundamental provision which is essential for the 
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accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the [EU] and, in particular, for the functioning of the 
internal market.”227 
d) Merger waves 
Mergers as an idea was not clearly known during the Middle Ages, even the idea of that 
the corporation can own or create another one, was disputable as previously shown in 
discussions concerning the early characteristics of corporations. Whereas some claimed that 
corporations was not allowed to do so,228 while others maintained it was permissible,229 and even 
some mentioned examples to support that last claim, for instance the King at these periods was a 
corporation himself and he was allowed to own and create another corporations, and in the same 
context many American Colonies were corporations and they created corporations.230 
Accordingly, and since the merger was forbidden, the resources discussing its history 
during these early stages were very scarce; therefore few early merger examples were reported. 
For instance, the first report of a merger akin was that of the Dutch East India Company 
(Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie), which was formed on March 20, 1602, this was a 
merger between previous corporations. 231  It was also reported that the Queen and two 
corporations entered into some sort of agreements named “indenture tripartite” in order to unite 
in 1702, and then that turned into a completely merged corporation by an Act of the British 
parliament in 1708, and the outcome i.e. the new corporation was named “The United Company 
of Merchants trading to the East Indies,” and that was the case until the second half of the 19th 
century.232 
Starting from the second half of the 19th century, mergers started to be a reality of 
economic life, and it was claimed that the trusts that were formed at that time could be 
considered typical mergers, and that was obvious in the case of the oil trust of the Standard Oil 
Corporation, one more example was the tobacco trust; in 1890 James Buchanan Duke, who 
owned a tobacco corporation, had it merge with four other corporations to form the American 	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Tobacco Company, and the same trend also appears in many other industries like cotton and 
steel.233 
In Germany, during the same period, the recession was a great driving force to unite, but 
rather than enter into mergers they preferred a softer tool to unite, and most of the corporations 
entered into “cartels,” and it was even reported that 4 cartels were formed by 1875 and that 
number increased to 385 by 1905.234 Preferring that form of uniting rather than merging may be 
attributed to the fact that it has been previously noted that these cartels resembles trade restraint 
practices which were permitted and even widely accepted in Germany during that same period. 
Examining the literature concerning the history of mergers, which is very scarce, reveals 
that the only comprehensive data recorded was limited to US transactions, thus the following 
discussion of the merger waves in history will be limited to the US merger history. Furthermore, 
it reveals also that the available resources have many limitations; for instance some are limited to 
specific industries like mining industry, while others are limited to transaction with certain 
values, and even other limitation factors such as specific periods. 
Meanwhile, most of the literature that was written about the merger history was mainly 
dependent on the same resources, and again that was due the scarcity of the recorded data 
concerning the early mergers. These resources are mainly: (1) the works done at National Bureau 
of Economic Research, most notably done by Ralph Nelson,235 (2) the publications of the US 
Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter FTC), (3) the periodical named Mergers and 
Acquisitions, (4) the annual reports of W. T. Grimm & Co.236 
It is noteworthy that most of the literature regarding the merger history agreed on the fact 
that mergers throughout the history were always characterized by taking the form of waves or 
movements and some named it “episodic.”237 The wave begins at certain time and then booms 
until it reached its peak and then slows down again, usually because of a recession,238 or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 65-
68. 2003. 
234 ALFRED CHANDLER & TAKASHI D. HIKINO, SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM at 
423 (Belknap Press. 1990). 
235 RALPH L. NELSON, MERGER MOVEMENTS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY, 1895-1956 at VII-VIII (Princeton University 
Press. 1959). 
236 For more details about these resources and any industry, time, and transaction value limitation therein, see ALAN 
J. AUERBACH, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS at 26-29 (University of Chicago Press Paperback ed. 1988). 
237 NELSON, Merger Movements in American Industry, 1895-1956, supra note 235, at 4. 1959. 
238 PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS at 50-51 (Wiley 3rd ed. 
2002). 
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financial crisis.239 The reason behind the fact that mergers were episodic or in the form of waves 
will be identified in the coming discussion, as each of those waves has its own circumstances. 
In addition to that, the literature broadly agrees on the periods that constitute merger 
waves, and obviously on the number of those waves, which are six from the end of the 19th 
century to date, as it will be shown in this discussion. It should be noted here that the coming 
discussion will mainly focus on the first four waves. The last two waves are literally 
contemporary waves and they share the same the general trends and characteristics, and will be 
discussed later. 
However, most of the literature disagrees concerning the exact time on which the first 
wave started; some contended that it started in 1893, while others claimed it started in 1895, and 
others maintained it started in 1897, and even others claimed it started in 1898.240 In fact, the 
starting date of the first wave was not the only a disagreement, but literally the dates of the 
starting and the ending of all the waves are debatable, and that might be due to the lack of data; 
as it was previously noted or it might be due to different data analysis or interpretation. 
Nevertheless, the differences are not crucial and it will not lead to wrong results, at least 
in the context of this dissertation, especially because all the claimed dates are fluctuating within a 
small range, as illustrated in the following figure. But it should be noted that it has been argued 
by an author that there was a merger wave during the period from 1946 until 1956, and he even 
maintained that it was the third wave,241 meanwhile no one held the same, and therefore that 
wave will be set aside and not be included in the timeline and the coming discussions. 
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Figure 2: Timeline of mergers waves242 
The first merger wave (1893 – 1904) is argued to be the foundation of industrial 
development in the US.243 The main industries that participated in that merger wave were 
manufacturing, mining, 244  and oil industries. Ralph Nelson clearly identifies most of the 
manufacturing industries as (1) bituminous coal production, (2) chemical production, (3) 
fabricated metal production, (4) food processing, (5) oil production, (6) machinery production, 
(7) primary metal products, and (8) transportation equipment.245 
It was also reported that in 1901 J. P. Morgan succeeded in creating the first American 
one billion US dollars corporation by means of merger of 785 corporations, which was the U.S. 
Steel Corporation. 246  Moreover, it was also reported that during that first wave 1,800 
corporations were merged to form only 137 corporations, and it has been claimed that this wave 
was mainly fueled by a complete transportation network i.e. railroad.247 Others held that the lax 
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Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations, supra note 86, at 2. 1917; GAUGHAN, Mergers, 
Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 23, 28, 30, 32, 44, 50, 51. 2002; COLE, M&A Titans: 
The Pioneers Who Shaped Wall Street's Mergers and Acquisitions Industry, supra note 240, at 2. 2008; 
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OLIVER BLACK, CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF ANTITRUST at 23-24 (Cambridge University Press. 2005); NELSON, 
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Merger Waves: A Model of Endogenous Mergers, 38 THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 214, at 214 (2007). 
243 GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 23. 2002; Qiu & Zhou, THE 
RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, supra note 242, at 214 (2007).  
244 COLE, M&A Titans: The Pioneers Who Shaped Wall Street's Mergers and Acquisitions Industry, supra note 240, 
at 2. 2008. 
245 GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 23. 2002. 
246 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 24. 2011. 
247 WESTON & WEAVER, Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 240, at 7. 2001. 
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enforcement of the Sherman Act catalyzed business owners to enter into more horizontal 
mergers i.e. mergers between corporations operating at the same level of certain industry.248  
On the other hand, scrutinizing the data during that same period, as shown in the coming 
figure below, reveals that the number of the vertical mergers i.e. mergers between corporations 
operating at different levels of the certain industry,249 was very high if compared to the 
horizontal mergers during the same period. Therefore, the lax nature of the antitrust enforcement 
cannot be considered as the main driving force of that first merger wave. 
 
Figure 3: First merger wave classification250 
It was claimed that the main cause fueled the first merger wave was the “race to the 
bottom” between the American states to attract corporations to relocate their investments, as it 
was previously noted; Rockefeller moved Standard Oil to New Jersey, and many others did the 
same due to the enactment of the “General Corporation Act,”251 which allowed unlimited 
corporation size and mergers. It was even asserted that Delaware won the race by enacting an 
even more friendly corporation act in 1899.252 
The second merger wave (1916 – 1930) was characterized by a significant increase in the 
number of vertical mergers, and generally speaking this means that the manufacturers were try to 	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Press. 1990). 
251 New Jersey General Corporation Act of 1896. 
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control or at least integrate the means of distribution.253 For instance, Ford Corporation254 owned 
steel factories, railroad, and car manufacturing lines.255 Meanwhile, it was claimed that this wave 
was a horizontal merger wave, but that claim was not based on any facts or data other than the 
fact Samuel Insult created a utility corporation that was operating in thirty nine US states.	  256 
Generally speaking, this second wave was mainly fueled by three factors, the first one 
was the post World War I booming economy,257 and the second one was the development of the 
communication means specially the radio as a marketing tool,258 and the third one was the 
advancement of the transportation means.259 George Stigler260 claimed that the trend during this 
second wave turned from merge to monopoly to merge to oligopoly, which means that the 
market is dominated by a number of corporations, not only one.261 
The third merger wave (1955 – 1970), this wave was first characterized by a trend, 
described as the conglomerate transactions; the appeal of the traditional vertical and horizontal 
mergers faded away, and corporations from different unrelated industries started to go through 
mergers.262 It was also characterized by making use of the tools of mathematics in the financial 
markets, for the purposes of gaining outstanding profits, which was then known as “financial 
engineering.” For instance most of the corporations during that wave were driven to go through 
mergers of any kind, as soon as a new tool or principle of gaining profits was revealed, for 
example most of the mergers during that wave were driven by the profits gained under the model 
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of the Price-Earnings Ratio (hereinafter P/E),263 which will be discussed later along with the 
other mergers incentives. 
Accordingly, it was claimed that banks unlike the first two waves did not finance this 
wave, whereas businesses heavily relied on the financial engineering tools as a new financing 
option.264 It was also reported that the strict enforcement of antitrust during that period, and the 
enactment of the Clayton Act of 1914 and its amendments,265 as a reinforcement of the Sherman 
Act, were directly affecting the merger activity since the second wave.266 Strictly speaking that 
could not be considered as the fuel of that wave, but it could be easily be considered as to 
shaping the conglomerate as a means to avoid the antitrust violation. It was also reported that this 
wave reached its peak in 1969 with 6,107 mergers reported only in that year as shown in the next 
figure, and it was also reported that by the end of this wave 15 of the top 200 corporations of the 
US fortune 500 were conglomerate.267 
 
Figure 4: Number of reported mergers during the period 1963-1970268 
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The fourth merger wave (1980 – 1990) was characterized by the unfriendly or hostile 
takeover (hereinafter takeover), which briefly means entering into a merger transaction without 
the consent of one party or more.269 The advanced financial engineering trend, during this period, 
played a greater role in that regard, especially by making use of the new financing tools like junk 
bonds,270 and leveraged buyouts271 (hereinafter LBO).272 On the other hand it was also claimed 
that these very financing tools i.e. the junk bonds was double sword, it financed most of the LBO 
during this wave, and when it collapsed by the end of the period, it put the wave to an end.273 
Analyzing the data, specifically the numbers of the transactions and the value of the 
merger transaction that were conducted during the third wave and comparing them with the 
numbers and the value of the mergers of the fourth wave in the US, reveals a very surprising 
result which is despite the fact that the number of mergers conducted in the fourth wave were 
very low if compared to the number of mergers conducted in the third wave, the value of the 
transactions in the fourth wave were very high compared to the value of the transactions in the 
third wave, as figure illustrates. 
 
Figure 5: Value of transactions during the period 1970-1989274 
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Figure 6: Number of transactions during the period 1970-1989275 
The fifth merger wave (1992 – 2000) was characterized by the essence of scaling and 
going global as a main goal, and that was very appealing, and even that period was known as 
“the age of the Strategic Mega-Merger,”276 but very significant percentage of merger activities 
was limited to only five or six industries.277 Moreover, it was reported that the mergers activities 
during this wave set new records, regarding the transaction values and even the number of 
transactions.278 In the same context, it was also reported that during this merger wave, the merger 
benefits was undoubtedly expected, and the mergers in addition to some similar forms of 
transactions created approximately 20% of the American fortune 1,000 corporations.279 
Meanwhile, and because the fact that the mergers were scaling and going on all over the 
world, other countries relatively experienced the same merger wave, and it could be easily 
claimed that starting from the fifth wave mergers were expanding and crossing borders, and that 
became a fact not just a hope. Despite the fact that the data below revealed that other countries 	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were not experiencing the same merger wave in the same magnitude like the US, that might 
confirm in the same time that the mergers turned out of the American box and spread across the 
globe. It was also reported in a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (hereinafter UNCTAD) that during this wave, the number of mergers grew by 42% 
per year.280 
 
Table 1: Data table of the fifth merger wave in certain jurisdictions281 
The sixth merger wave (2002 – 2007) started with the “rebirth” of the LBO, the heavy 
use of financial engineering tools in general, and very complicated debt transactions, and it 
ended by the world financial crisis in 2007.282 The globalization spirit, and the maturity of the 
previous mega mergers corporations and the increase of their appetite to go global also 
characterized this wave; moreover the mergers transactions started to be more complicated 
similar to the trends, and there are also new players.283 Generally speaking, it is not easy to 	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scrutinize and understand the complex trends and the characteristics of mergers starting from this 
wave henceforth, that requires painstaking and dedicated efforts, but all the coming discussions 
will be an eye opening of what is going on, starting from this relatively recent period. 
e) Multinational corporations 
The German idealism, philosopher Hegel,284 asserted that the state is and will always be 
the centerpiece in any society, while both of Adolf Hitler285 and Vladimir Lenin286 argued that it 
will be the political party, while others maintained it will be the other institutions like the 
church.287 None of those claims seems to be materializing, and neither what Samuel Madden, a 
famous Irish satirist in the 17th century, ironically expected as described in one of his novels, that 
two titan corporations would rule the world in the 20th century.288 
It is undoubtedly true, that the development of the modern form of corporation was not 
accidental,289 but the corporation idea was steadily developing throughout centuries not decades, 
as it was shown during the previous discussions. In that context, it could be easily claimed that 
the proliferation of the latest breakthrough of the corporation history, which is the multinational 
corporations, was an inevitable result of the merger waves; this breakthrough is worth studying. 
During the third merger wave, the EU countries woke-up to a nightmare; most of the 
giant American corporations like IBM, Heinz, Kellogg, Ford and P&G invaded the EU markets, 
and many American corporations practiced hostile takeovers toward European corporations.290 It 
was also reported even before that i.e. from the end of World War I or the beginning of the 
second merger wave and before the third merger wave, that the financing institutions contributed 
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to finance the corporations to go global, for instance that period witnessed the expansion of the 
utility sector especially electricity by the help of multinational corporations.291 
It was also reported that by the sixth merger wave the estimated number of multinational 
corporations across the globe were 65,000 corporations, and the expansion was not limited to 
giant corporations, because small corporations were also given the opportunity to finance their 
deals and to mimic giant corporations.292 It is not clear if the inevitable result of the proliferation 
of multinational corporations was a driving force for the convergence of the different systems of 
corporate laws across the globe, or the convergence of the corporate laws was the fuel that drove 
the corporations to go global. It was even maintained that since the origin of the corporation, the 
corporate law was founded and designed to be a global tool.293 
All that was the main cause that corporations in general and especially multinational 
corporations shared the same characteristics across the globe; the people either at their “home or 
abroad” never loved them, however to the contrary, they are also considered as the “force for 
good … [and] they have given up sinning quite so egregiously.”294 In addition to that, it was 
even claimed that the convergence of the corporate laws across the globe was characterized by 
taking the same form of the merger waves; it was also episodic and constitutes “cyclic” 
movements or waves.295 
Finally, it is noteworthy that it was argued that there was a corporate raid, for example 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. is the result of merger transactions between more than one thousand of 
its predecessor, which were conducted over almost the last century.296 Moreover, by the end of 
the fifth merger wave the hundred biggest economies in the world were all corporations.297 
Generally speaking, the corporation turned out now to be the largest and most powerful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
291 William J. Hausman, et al., Global Electrification: Multinational Enterprise and International Finance in the 
History of Light and Power, 1880s-1914, 58 REVUE ÉCONOMIQUE 175, at 176, 186-187 (2007). 
292 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 173-
174. 2003. 
293 Gevurtz, WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, supra note 128, at 479-480 (2011). 
294 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 176-
178. 2003. 
295 Gevurtz, WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW, supra note 128, at 485-486 (2011). 
296 J. P. Morgan Chase, The History of JPMorgan Chase & Co: 200 Years of Leadership in Banking at 1 (JPMorgan 
Chase & Co ed., JPMorgan Chase & Co. 2008). 
297 BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, Globalisation of Corporate Regulation and Corporate Citizenship, supra note 43, 
at 4. 2003. 
54	  
institution throughout the history.298 Meanwhile, the government or the state across the globe 
was not standing idly toward that corporate raid, but there was always some sort of control or at 
least relation between these two powerful institutions, and the story of this relation will be 
discussed in detail in that coming discussion. 
4. Relation between State and Corporations 
Throughout history different forms or models of the state were developed, for instance in 
the early history i.e. the Middle Ages, the ruler whether a King, Queen, or even the church, was 
the owner of everything.299 Scrutinizing the different models from the perspective of the relation 
between the state and the corporation reveals that throughout history there was always some sort 
of relation between both of them. At one end of the spectrum that relation was that the state was 
fully controlling the corporation either by granting the creation of corporation itself, licensing its 
practices, or by overseeing corporation as a regulator, and to the other end of the spectrum where 
the state was giving a hand to help the corporation surviving by means of subsides and some 
other helpful tools. 
If it is true that the corporation has always been the focus of attention or in other words 
the key player in the economy, and these relation spectrums could be shortened in a quotation by 
Ronald Regan300 as he said: “Government’s view of the economy could be summed up in a few 
short phrases: If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidize 
it.”301 On the other hand, the corporation role changed throughout the history, and accordingly 
the following discussion will be an overview of the stages of the different roles throughout 
history, and how the relation with the state was developed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298 KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 
at 4 (University of Chicago Press. 2006). 
299 BRAUDEL, The wheels of commerce, supra note 45, at 519. 1981. 
300 Ronald Wilson Reagan (February 6, 1911 – June 5, 2004) was an American actor and politician, and the 40th 
President of the United States. 
301 PRESIDENT REAGAN RONALD UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER UNITED STATES, PUBLIC PAPERS 
OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, RONALD REAGAN: 1981-1988-89 at 1109 (U.S. G.P.O. 1982). 
55	  
a) Early history and feudalism 
Despite the fact that the information concerning the early history of feudalism302 as a 
form of relation between the state and corporations are sometimes contradicting and in other 
instances unclear. The following discussion will continue to reveal the effect of feudalism on the 
development of corporation as an idea. At first glance one might think that feudalism has no 
effect or even not related to the development of corporation, but analyzing the history of 
feudalism reveals that the relation started as land ownership issues then it turned into the ruler 
granting the right to create the corporation. 
The history might be scrutinized even before feudalism, whereas the first reported 
relation between one form of the state, which was represented by the temple, and the landowners, 
was just after the Sumerians had developed the concept of land ownership around 3000 B.C., and 
by entering into agreements, the temple was granted the right to be involved, and it was claimed 
that the temple practiced a form of control or supervision over all the issues concerning the land 
ownership.303 
Then during the Middle Ages, an important breakthrough in that relation happened; it 
was the development of the feudalism, an idea by the Norman Conquests,304 where there was a 
ranked system of land ownership and control of society, it started with the lord or noble who was 
at the highest rank and it ended with the fief at the lowest rank.305 In that context it was held that 
feudalism paved the way for the development of capitalism, while others asserted that it was the 
rights and the privileges granted to certain lords or nobles that drove the development of the 
capitalism, in other words the nobles and lords found feudalism “a favourable climate in which 
… [they could] ‘institutionalize their own position.’”	  306	  
To elaborate more on how they institutionalized their positions, the nobles were granted 
rights to collect feudalism fees or taxes on behalf of the ruler, and by time they figured out that 
these tasks should be performed under some sort of institution in order to stand for a long time, 
and consequently they recognized that the idea of creating a corporation would help them 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
302 Definitions of feudalism are contradicting and inconsistence, for more details about that see generally Elizabeth 
A. R. Brown, The Tyranny of a Construct: Feudalism and Historians of Medieval Europe, 79 THE AMERICAN 
HISTORICAL REVIEW 1062, at 1063-1088 (1974). 
303 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 3-4. 
2003. 
304 CATER, A History of English Legal Institutions, supra note 13, at 16. 1910. 
305 Brown, THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW, supra note 302, at 1071 (1974). 
306 BRAUDEL, The wheels of commerce, supra note 45, at 594. 1981. 
56	  
protecting these personal interests. It was reported that the oldest corporation of that purpose was 
the Aberdeen Harbour was created in 1136,307 and the City of London Corporation was another 
example that was also created in the 12th century, and interestingly both of these two 
corporations are alive today.308 
Then the idea of seeking that institutional framework became widespread and proliferated 
by time, and it was even reported that any group of people that planned to avoid the feudalism 
system struggled to be granted a corporation right, for instance by that time many “groups” were 
granted the right of to be a corporation, for example the boroughs, guilds, universities.309 
Moreover, literally most of the towns in the UK were granted the right to be corporations at that 
period.310 
Meanwhile, the widespread use of corporations was not serving the ruler interests, 
because as it was previously shown that one of the old corporations’ characteristics was the right 
of perpetual succession, which means that whenever a group of people are granted such 
corporation rights they will avoid the feudalism system forever, and accordingly Edward I 
enacted what was known as the Statute of Mortmain in 1279, in order to control the amount of 
land to be owned by corporations. It should be noted that despite the fact that the Statute of 
Mortmain could be clearly considered as a form of state control over corporations, it did not stop 
the widespread of the idea of corporation.311 
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b) Granting charters and monopolies312 
Most of the corporations that were created under the feudal system were granted certain 
exclusive rights or monopoly, in order to perform its tasks, that monopoly was actually granting 
those corporations a privilege to accumulate profits, for instance it was reported that some of 
those corporation made profits rates of more than 150%.313 However, the corporations granted to 
those monopolies were not limited to the feudal corporation, because it was also granted to other 
individuals in order to practice trade, and the first private corporation to be chartered was Stora 
Enso of Sweden,314 which was chartered in 1347,315 and as previously mentioned that the first 
joint-stock corporation was the Muscovy Company, which was founded in 1553-55.316 
As previously been shown, Sir William Coke and others claimed that the corporation, 
during the early ages, where created by one of the following instruments; (1) by common law, 
(2) by charter issued by the king, (3) by an act of parliament, (4) by prescription.317 Meanwhile, 
it is noteworthy that for a corporation to be created by prescription i.e. long time standing or by 
common law it should not practice trade, examples of those corporations; the Brought, the 
Church, the Parish, etc., and even in those cases it was held that those corporations hold an 
unstated “assent of the King.”318 
In that context it should be noted that granting the right of incorporation by the ruler or 
by the parliament was almost the same, and most of the early scholars even failed to differentiate 
between them, furthermore it was asserted that granting the right to incorporation by the ruler 
was more appreciated in the society, because it was considered that the parliament was just an 	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agent of the ruler, so it was more prized to be granted the right from the principal.319 In that 
regard it is noteworthy that if the corporation was created by an act of the parliament it was 
known as a “statutory company.”320 
Meanwhile, it was reported that the instrument issued by the ruler to grant a monopoly 
for a group or corporation was named a “charter,” while it was named as a “letter of patent” if it 
was granted to an individual.321 In fact some might claim that such distinction is not important, 
however it is important, because the fact that granting a monopoly for an individual will be for 
his own good and is not accepted and vice versa.322 That fact was early realized by Francis 
Bacon in his speech before the parliament in November 20, 1601 as he said: “If her Majesty… 
make patent or a monopoly into any of her servants, that we must go and cry out against; but if 
she grant it to a number of burgesses, or a corporation, that must stand, and that, forsooth, is no 
monopoly.”323 
Moreover, it was claimed that most of the successful trading corporations were created at 
first as monopolies,324 and without the monopoly rights most of those corporations would not 
realize any profits at all. 325 Likewise, other individual merchants whom were not granted any 
letter of patent and also most of the public, were all suffering from these monopolies, and that 
led to a great debate among the people everywhere and most importantly in the UK Parliament, 
especially because of the increase in the prices and poor quality of the goods offered by the 
monopoly corporations during that period, and the debate ended by the enactment of the Statute 
of Monopolies326 in 1623, which prohibited certain types of monopolies.327 
The right to grant the other types of monopolies, which were permitted under the Statute 
of Monopolies, was an abused by the King at that time, to the extent that it was reported that the 
terms “incorporated” and “monopoly” were synonyms in the UK, and that actually led to reserve 
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the right to grant monopolies only to the parliament, in 1688.328 However, the Statute of 
Monopolies was revoked by 1844 when the state realized that the monopoly was not the problem 
and that the problem was the abuse of the monopoly powers, consequently that is the principle 
adopted nowadays in the UK, under the Competition Act of 1998 and the Enterprise Act of 
2002.329 
It was also reported that all the previously mentioned development of granting the 
incorporation by a ruler charter or by act of parliament, was also taking effect in the American 
Colonies until its independence was declared.330 After the independence, the development of the 
creation of corporation was slightly different in the US than the UK, for instance it was reported 
that according to a Federal Circuit Court decision in 1771, the creation of corporation by 
prescription was more accurately described in the US and was also limited only to “religious, 
charitable, or literary purposes.”331 
Granting the charter was not limited only to the ruler and the parliament in UK territories, 
but it was also reported that the parliament in the American Colonies practiced that right as early 
as 1652, for example the Massachusetts General Court granted the people of Boston the right to 
form corporations, in order to support themselves with utilities such as water.332 In the same 
context, too many corporations were chartered by the parliament in the US after independence, 
most notably for the purpose of developing railroads, which was known as the “railroad 
mania,”333 and by the end of the 18th century most of the US states were involved in granting 
corporation charters for all purposes.334 It is noteworthy here that the Economist started in its first 
issue by designating a small portion of the stock market column, and then it turned to be a nine 
page section designated only for the railroad stock market in 1845.335 
Finally the previous discussion shows that both the ruler and the parliament were only 
controlling the right to incorporate or granting monopolies, as both of the terms were almost 	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synonyms, but also both of them were trying to take a bigger role in that regard, and in the same 
time the public and non incorporated groups were suffering from difficulties under the 
monopolies. That relation between the state, represented by the ruler and the parliament, and the 
corporation did not stop at that end, whereas the state decided not only to control the corporation, 
but also to make use of it, as it will be scrutinized in the coming discussion. 
c) Corporation as a financing institution 
Surprisingly, it was reported during the end of the 17th century and the beginning of the 
18th century, that the state was going “hand in hand” with corporations, and nothing was 
forbidden by that time in the commercial community, and the state even “turn[ed] a blind eye” if 
something went wrong.336 Meanwhile, that might be foreseeable if someone was well informed 
about what the state was planning to do, the state introduced such flexibility and cooperation but 
that was not for free, something should be given back in return, and that will be revealed in this 
discussion. 
The idea of converting the state’s debt into tradable or transferable bonds was first 
invented in Naples in the 17th century, by	  Neapolitan Lorenzo Ponti in 1653,337 the state usually 
used the debt to help in accomplishing all the tasks that require financial resources, for instance it 
was used sometimes to finance war,338 other times to finance “quasi-government” purposes for 
example, the exploration of sea passage voyages. Meanwhile, despite the fact that the idea of 
securitization was a Neapolitan invention, the ruler in the UK decided to heavily make use of it, 
and that led to the result that the UK appeared to be a more successful country than the other 
European countries during that period, for instance more successful than France.339 
In order to consider the idea of securitization of the national debt as a landmark in the 
relation between the state and corporation, that requires one more step, the step of converting the 
debt into corporate shares, and that step was actually invented in the same time in both the UK 
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and France. In France, that step was motivated by John Law,340 whereas after he invented the 
paper money he converted the debt bonds of the French government into a joint-stock 
corporation in 1729, that corporation was the Mississippi Company and it handled the French 
government debt that was so huge over time, especially after the war during the period from 
1689 to 1714.341 
In the UK, the position was almost the same, as previously shown the parliament 
announced on January 21, 1720, that the South Sea Company would handle the British 
government debt exclusively.342 Moreover, as it was previously shown, handling the debt of the 
state caused one of the biggest financial crises in the history and that it was even named “[t]he 
drama of the South Sea Company.”343 Similarly, the Mississippi Company also turned out to be a 
bubble that busted suddenly in the face of the investors who found no assets.344 Meanwhile, it 
was claimed that the “drama of the South Sea Company” did not reach the same peak of the 
Mississippi Company crisis. 
Unfortunately, that stage of the relation between the state and the corporation was 
unsuccessful and it ended with an unhappy crises, and as it was previously mentioned the Bubble 
Act was introduced by the British Parliament to survive the crisis and in fact it did; by 
prohibiting the uncharted corporations and limiting the power of incorporating incorporation 
only to the parliament, but that was at the expense of the economy and development of the 
corporation idea. In fact, those led to the next stage of the relation, which in the repeal of the 
Bubble Act and allow individuals to incorporate corporations just as easy by registration as it 
will be shown in the coming discussion. 
d) Incorporation by registration 
After the period of the mentioned financial crises, the economy of most of the European 
countries was struggling, and that led the state to start some initiatives to restore the economy, 	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and those initiatives mostly focused on removing all the internal customs, duties, and tolls, and 
that initiatives began in Spain as early as 1717 and its end was in France by 1790.345 But it could 
be easily recognized that all the initiatives were modest, at least in its scope, and it did not 
deliver what was expected, and that led to the following radical changes in the relation between 
the state and the corporation in order to restore the economy. 
As it was previously mentioned, during the discussion of the South Sea Company and the 
Bubble Act,346 the British Parliament repealed the Bubble Act and enacted a new act that permit 
the creation of a new joint-stock corporation as easily as by registration. However, that was not 
applicable to corporations for all purposes, for instance joint-stock corporation for the purposes 
of practicing banking were not allowed to incorporate by registration, and that could be 
attributed to the fear from future crises that could have similar effect of the crisis resulted from 
the use of the South Sea Company as a financing institution. 
Starting from 1844, it was allowed for any individual to incorporate a joint-stock 
corporation by registration. 347  In that context, it was claimed that incorporating a new 
corporation just by registration “truly arrived” by that time, and a new dimension was opened in 
the relation between the state and the corporation by adopting that liberalized approaches.348 In 
fact that liberalized approach started by allowing the incorporation by registration but it did not 
stop at that end, many other acts followed the same approach for a long period of time, for 
instance it was reported that by 1856, the limited liability principle was permitted by law, and 
that led to the proliferation of the incorporation and the economy in general.349 
It is noteworthy that that liberalized approach was expanded to include industries other 
than the trade, it mainly expanded to include banking; whereas banks was granted the right to be 
incorporated as a limited liability corporation in UK by the 2nd half of the 19th century, and that 
liberalized approach was also borrowed by many other countries in Europe and across the 
globe.350 Meanwhile, that liberalized approach was followed by another trend that was not in the 
same line, thus the state started to plan for opening a new dimension in its relation with 	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corporations, which was introducing more rigorous procedures in order to regain the control over 
the corporations and make use of them.351 
e) Protectionism 
By the end of the 19th century, it could be easily identified that many countries around the 
world, specially the US, fully realized the fact that they should step-in and intervene in order to 
protect and support their own economies against any failure. In order to accomplish that, the 
state should play two different roles; the first was the adoption of stricter policies toward its own 
domestic corporations and the second was to protect its own domestic corporations against 
foreign corporations. In fact, supporting the domestic corporations in order to grow was a 
prerequisite to benefit from them, but in the mean time they should remain under control, and 
that will be clearly shown in this discussion. 
For instance in the US, as it was previously discussed, antitrust measures were introduced 
by the end of the 19th century, in order to impose some sort of control over domestic 
corporations. On the other hand, it was also reported that the trend during that period in many 
countries like France and Germany was to impose trade barrier measures against the foreign 
corporations,352 both fiscal barriers like tariffs and antidumping measures, and non-fiscal barriers 
like requiring special standards and licensing requirement, and all these barriers were considered 
a golden key that would support the economy. 
While on the other hand a more liberalized environment in the UK was flying the free-
trade flag during the same periods, encouraged more foreign corporation to invest and even 
incorporate in the UK, and that was not an exceptional characteristic about the UK, it is 
undoubtedly true that that is the result in any other liberalized economy.353 In that context, it was 
reported that American corporations invaded the European markets during the period from the 
late 19th century to the beginning of the 20th century and that led the Austrian officials to send 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351 Hein, THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LAW JOURNAL, supra note 27, at 151 (1963). 
352 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 164. 
2003. 
353 MAHER M. DABBAH, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST at 5 (Cambridge University Press. 
2007). 
64	  
letters to their counterparts in the other European countries asking them to unite against to what 
was named the “American invaders,” in 1897.354 
What put that trend or form of relation between the state and the corporation to an end, 
after almost fifty years, was the introduction of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(hereinafter GATT),355 while it was just a temporary agreement to put into action the proposed 
system of tariff reductions, it turned out to be the “framework for international coordination of 
trade policies.”356 One of the main reasons behind that movement for the GATT was that by the 
end of the First World War most of the countries across the globe were playing the role of 
supporting their domestic corporation, as they were adopting protectionist measures, and even 
the UK surrendered to that idea in 1932.357 
In the same context, almost all countries circumvented the GATT and all the other 
movement that counterattacked their tendencies to control corporation by several actions. One of 
these actions was designing exceptions for additional protectionism measures, such as the 
antidumping system.358 It was even reported that the state tried to introduce “industry-specific” 
regulations by the second half of the 20th century, and it was trying to drive all the corporate 
goals to the economic and social welfare ends.359 
For instance, President Roosevelt360 himself said that: “[Corporations] are indispensable 
instruments of our modern civilization; but I believe that they should be so supervised and so 
regulated that they shall act for the interests of the community as a whole.”361 The state goal was 
a good one to defend but how to reach it that was another part, and it could be claimed that it was 
not yet well planned, accordingly that form of the relation almost failed and led to the adoption 
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again of some of the old liberalized approach but possibly with a more liberalized essence, as it 
will be shown in the coming discussion. 
f) Privatization and industry deregulation 
During the second half of the 20th century most of the economies were not promising 
across the globe due to high inflation rates, recession, and high unemployment rates.362 All these 
negative features of the economy were the main reasons behind pushing the state to adopt more 
liberalized-approach measures toward the economy in general and the corporations specifically; 
one of these measures was the “corporatization” which was changing the structure and the 
environment in the corporations owned by the government to resemble the private management 
schemes.363 
Those measure were followed by more serious steps, one of those steps was started by the 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher364 in 1982, it was the privatization trend or mania i.e. 
all the governments all over the globe started to sell the government owned corporation to 
private parties, and the British government privatized the North Sea oil and gas corporation and 
then it continued and privatized the British Airways, Electricity, Gas, Steel, Telecom, Water and 
within ten years two third of the state owned corporation were sold.365 
Meanwhile it was also reported that not all industries had gone through the said 
privatization scheme, but the state reserved some industries to itself,366 for example it is not 
permissible in Egypt until now to own or to operate a power plant by a privately held 
corporation. 367  But generally speaking, by 1992 the privatization mania was spreading 
everywhere across the European countries, and all the state owned giant corporation like 
Deutsche Telekom, ENI, Elf, Renault, and Volkswagen were either entirely or somewhat gone 
through the privatization scheme, the same was also the trend in Southeast Asia and Latin 
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America, and it was also reported that Russian President Boris Yeltsin368 started a huge 
privatization plan through the same pattern i.e. “corporatization.”369 
Someone may claim that the privatization has nothing to do with the relation between the 
state and the private corporations. Meanwhile, it was stated that there was a direct proportionate 
relation between the privatization as a trend and introducing regulatory measures over the 
corporations, and that was reported across the globe and in many industries for example the 
telecommunication industry and the power industry.370 In addition to that, it was even claimed 
that the privatization mania was one of the main factors that forced the state to take more radical 
moves in the future, which was the “deregulation.”371 
During the same period i.e. 1980s-1990s, the position in the US was totally different, due 
to the different structure of the corporate environment, the US was already taking the next step 
i.e. industry deregulation, and to be more precise the US President Jimmy Carter started by 
deregulating the airline industry and that was followed by the railroads and trucks and then the 
telecommunication, and ironically though, even after the deregulation started, the state 
bureaucratic representatives in the US and across the EU were ready to hold up that liberal 
approach by finding some roles for themselves in the new form of relation between the state and 
corporations.372 
The deregulation liberal approach was expanded in the US to an unprecedented extent 
during the term of President George W. Bush,373 who was the first American president to hold 
the degree of a Master of Business Administration. He was planning to deregulate the power 
industry, but unfortunately by the end of 2001 a stream of accounting scandals started by 
collapsing of a giant power corporation “Enron” in just a few weeks and that was also followed 
by the collapse of a telecommunication giant corporation “WorldCom,” and also most of the 
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related accounting firms like “Arthur Andersen” collapsed.374 Actually delving into the details of 
these accounting scandals is beyond the limits of this dissertation,375 but it should be noted that 
the inevitable results of these scandals was that the state started to intervene again, and some 
laws and regulations like the Sarbanes Oxley Act376 was introduced to regain power over the 
corporations.377 
Undoubtedly true, the industry deregulation trend was running in parallel with other state 
control measures taken toward corporations. For instance, several controlling measures were 
introduced like the Sarbanes Oxley Act and many other protectionism measures like controlling 
the foreign investments in the US by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act,378 which 
will be discussed later in detail during the discussions of the impediments to the cross-border 
merger.379 
In the same line, it was maintained that the deregulation was offset by the political efforts 
exerted towards the old goal of driving all the corporate goals to the economic and social welfare 
ends.380 Most importantly, it was claimed that the deregulation was just a deregulation of the 
markets, while the relation between the state and corporations started a new route of 
overregulation that was even more complicated than before.381 Thus scrutinizing all the details of 
those current complicated and overregulation trends is unmanageable and beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, and it will be limited to scrutinize only the regulations of the merger industry, 
and to be more precise the rules that controls merges. 
g) Corporation counterattacking state 
It is undoubtedly true that corporation throughout the history was not that innocent 
powerless or idle party in that relation i.e. the relation with the state. The corporation threatened 	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to counterattack the state whenever it had to do so, mainly in the situation where the state was 
using its powers to over-control the development or the expansion of the corporation. It is 
noteworthy that the corporation threats were not a new phenomenon; it was as old as introducing 
the state measures to control corporations. This discussion will include three straightforward 
examples of a clear threat to the economy of state by corporations. 
The first example is based on what was previously discussed concerning minorities 
throughout the history, whether due to nationality or religion, they did unite and form a group to 
feel more safe, to share the benefits among the group, and to support each other, these groups did 
not hesitate to threaten the state and to draw their investments, even just for personal reasons not 
related to the state over-control. For instance, it was reported that in 1723 the Russian 
government refusal of an Indian widow’s request to be burned along with her dead husband led 
to a real threat from all Indians to take their investments and leave Moscow, therefore the 
Russian government bowed at the end, and it should be noted that that very incident was not the 
only one, the same incident was reported again in 1767.382 
The second example was reported in the 1920s, when the American General Motors 
Corporation acquired the British Vauxhall Corporation and the German Opel Corporation, and 
the transaction was mainly structured to bypass the tariff imposed during that period, and it was 
reported that its Chief Executive Officer (hereinafter CEO) Alfred Pritchard Sloan announced it 
clearly when he said that: “[w]e had to work out a special form of organization that would be 
suitable overseas.”383 That example clearly demonstrates that whenever the state show up with a 
new policy tool such as tariff, corporations would immigrate to a friendlier environment. 
The third example was simply a dream of CEO of Dow Chemical Corporation in 1970, 
he revealed this saying: “I have long dreamed of buying an island owned by no nation and of 
establishing the world head quarters of the Dow company on the truly neutral ground of such an 
island, beholden to no nation or society.”384 The dream of the Dow Chemical Corporation was 
similar to some extent to the second example, but it was more far reaching one, he dreamed to 
own the environment instead of just live in a friendly one. 
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The fourth example is the telecommunication corporations in Cuba; in that example the 
corporations were actually controlling the state and its decision.385 Those examples are not the 
full list, and it could be easily claimed that a lot of examples already appeared and will continue 
to appear every now and then. Those examples were mainly due to the fact that the state 
approach toward corporations is not always in the same manner all over the globe, and whenever 
one state overuse its power to control, the corporation threatens to leave that state, by making use 
of opportunities offered by another state that underuse its powers. 
However, others argued that despite the fact that the approach of almost all the states 
were and will be more complicated by time, and that it is not always in one direction. The 
approaches are always fluctuating between the two extremes deregulation and overregulation; it 
was and will last as trends or “cyclic” patterns. An example is when the state sometimes uses the 
antitrust laws as a tool to control a corporation that already operate in a deregulated industry,386 
and that is supporting the very claim that state was deregulating the markets or industries not 
deregulating the corporation itself. 
Finally, it was so clear from the previous discussions that the corporations used the state 
to develop itself at first, but that turned out through the history to became an opportunity for the 
state to attack back by control and make use of the corporations, and during the history the state 
did not follow a single approach, it rather followed many, while struggling to manage its 
goals.387 Some of these approaches were welcomed and sometimes initiated by the corporation 
itself, while others were counterattacked. To sum it up, the relation between the state and 
corporations is a battle of interests that will never come to an end, and sometimes they cease the 
fire in order to take time to be prepared and re-attack, or even due to the convergence of their 
interests. That was perfectly summarized as that the corporation was born under a “franchise” 
from the society represented by the state, and the corporation will always need to keep that 
“franchise,” but the state will never give it up unconditionally.388 
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II. Mergers Demystification 
The following discussions will first include a technical definition of mergers as a term, 
and then it will include a classification of the different types of mergers, and a distinction 
between mergers and some other alternatives. Secondly it will include an overview of the merger 
dynamics; how the transaction starts with preparation and screening and moves through various 
steps, and how these step ends with closing the transaction, and that will also include an 
overview of some of the post-closing issues, as follows. 
1. Mergers Definition 
Although the corporation started as an embryo of the state and developed throughout the 
history to help it hosting the society, and there were always various breakthroughs during this 
very long journey, the scaling through mergers, and even more through mergers between 
competitors, was one of these exceptional breakthroughs.389 Moreover, mergers were to a great 
extent popular and old, the mergers waves were previously discussed, and that was relatively 
sufficient to have the same solid definition in most legal systems across the globe. Meanwhile, as 
it was previously noted that the mergers term is used in these discussions to indicate mergers, 
consolidations, and acquisitions, it should be noted that there is a distinction between all these 
terms as follows.390 
Acquisitions were defined as the process of purchasing all or part of the shares of a 
corporation (hereinafter target) by another corporation (hereinafter acquirer), and by that process 
the target will continue to exist as well as the acquirer, but all assets and liabilities of the target 
that resemble the purchased shares will be owned by the acquirer. On the other hand, the merger 
was simply defined as the process of the combination between two or more corporations to 
become only one corporation, one of these corporations will survive but all the others will cease 
to exist. Meanwhile, consolidation is almost like the merger but in consolidation all the 
corporations ceased to exist, and all are combined under the formation of one new corporation.391 
The following diagram will simply illustrate the differences well to avoid any confusion. 	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Figure 7: Acquisition 
 
Figure 8: Merger 
	  
Figure 9: Consolidation 
However, the everyday transactions are not as simple and straightforward as these 
definitions or the diagram may indicate, and actually different terms are given where the 
combination of these processes that might be used in one transaction. To illustrate, acquirer A 
may purchase target B in a process	  known as “subsidiary merger” by which both will survive but 
B will be a subsidiary of A, and if then B merged again with A and cease to exist the process is 
known as “reverse subsidiary merger,” while in other cases different terms are also used to 
distinguish between the friendly transactions done by the will of all parties from unfriendly 
transactions, “takeover” and “hostile takeover,”392 and even more terms are used for other 
complicated transactions, as it will be scrutinized in detail in the coming discussions. 
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The most complicated transactions are the cross-border mergers, and while it constitutes 
less than 50% out of the total announced mergers across the globe,393 it is literally considered a 
very significant category of transactions in the world economy, because it constitutes more than 
50% of the FDI.394 To illustrate more about how huge that kind of transactions are, and of a great 
value to the world economy, on April 12, 2000 the European Commission (hereinafter EC) 
announced that it will not block the cross-border merger transaction between the British 
corporation “Vodafone Airtouch” and the German corporation “Mannesmann,” and the value of 
the transaction was approximately 180 billion US dollars.395 In that context, it was also reported 
that the volume of the transaction done the Middle East region, as the fourth active acquirer in 
the world, exceeded 106 Billion US dollars in 2007.396 
Meanwhile, it is noteworthy that due to the fact that corporations nowadays become 
multinational, with operations in many countries, added to the fact that is there issues related to 
defining the corporate nationality, sometimes it is not an easy task to distinguish between cross-
border mergers and “semi-domestic” merger transactions. Moreover, there is no clear definition 
to what should be a pure domestic transaction and what is not. For instance, it was reported that 
the merger transaction between the American corporation “Wal-Mart” and the Puerto Rican 
corporation “Supermercados Amigo” was considered “semi-domestic” transaction because 
Puerto Rico is a “partially autonomous US commonwealth.”397 
Finally, it should be noted that during the last decade of the 20th century there was an 
important regularly active category of players in the field of cross-border mergers, in fact they 
are not new players but they started to be steadily key players; those are the “Sovereign Wealth 
Fund” (hereinafter SWF), those SWFs are simply state-owned investment funds. In that context, 
it was reported that in 2007 the total value of the cross-border merger transactions exceeded 48.5 
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billion US dollars,398 and the overall SWF investments across the globe were estimated by 6.5 
Trillion US dollars by the end of May 2014, and that increase is expected to continue.399 
2. Mergers Types and Classifications 
The following discussion will show that mergers’ types and classifications are vast, and 
that it mainly depends on the perspective. First the discussion will include a classification of 
mergers from an economic perspective; according to this classification mergers will be 
categorized as horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers. Meanwhile, the second part of the 
discussion will include a classification from a structural and procedural perspective, whereas 
mergers could be classified into direct, triangular, reverse, and many other types that have more 
complicated structures. 
A third classification will be from a financial perspective, the discussion will show how 
mergers are classified according to the financial schemes that are used to finance the transaction, 
and that depends on whether it was through debt or equity. According to that classification the 
merger transaction could be done through many debt structures, such as LBO, Management 
Buyout (hereinafter MBO), or Employee Stock Ownership Plan (hereinafter ESOP). Moreover, 
the merger transaction could be also done in cash, stocks or assets exchange, and also through a 
mixture between any of these financing tools. 
In the same context, it should be noted that mergers are generally considered as a 
corporate restructuring transaction, whether for the purpose of growth or for any other purposes, 
and it could be also be distinguished from other restructuring transactions, by the fact mergers 
are classified as an operational restructuring process and not as a financial restructuring process. 
Meanwhile, there are some other trends and forms of corporate operational restructuring 
transactions like spin-off, carve-out, roll-up, etc.,	  400 thus the fourth part of the following 
discussion will address some of these trends and forms of transactions. The following discussion 
will end up by addressing some other transactions, which are usually used by corporations for the 
purpose of growth, as an alternative to mergers. 
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As it was previously mentioned, mergers could also be classified according to the nature 
of the approval of the transaction by the target’s management and shareholders, to what is called 
friendly and hostile takeovers. Meanwhile, as it was previously mentioned in the introduction, 
that the hostile takeovers transactions are governed by specific rules that are not applied to the 
friendly mergers, and the discussions in this dissertation it limited to the friendly mergers, the 
following discussions will not include such category of classification. In the same context, and 
for the same reason, the following discussion will not include the classification of mergers from 
a tax perspective i.e. to a taxable and non-taxable merger. 
a) Economic classifications 
From an economic perspective, scholars usually divide mergers into three categories; 
horizontal, vertical, conglomerate mergers. 401  As it was previously mentioned during the 
discussion of the merger waves,402 a horizontal merger is simply a merger between two or more 
corporations that are all operating at the same level in the same or related industries. For 
instance, the merger between two corporations that are operating at the level of manufacturer in 
the computer industry, like for example the merger that was concluded between Hewlett Packard 
and Compaq.403 
Another example in the oil and gas industry was the merger that was concluded between 
two giant corporations Exxon and Mobil and between Chevron and Texaco. Moreover, as an 
example from what is known as the fast-moving consumer goods industry, the merger between 
Procter & Gamble and Gillette was also classified as a horizontal merger.404 An example from 
the industry of the technology and social media networking is the merger between Facebook and 
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Instagram is a horizontal merger example,405 and even more recent, the merger between 
Facebook and WhatsApp.406 
It should be noted that the horizontal mergers are classified into two subcategories as 
market-extension merger and product-extension merger; the merger would be classified as a 
market-extension when the merging corporations are operating in the same industry but in 
different markets i.e. not in the same geographic area, and in that type of mergers the corporation 
will get the opportunity to access all these different markets. While the horizontal merger is 
known as a product-extension horizontal merger if the merging corporations are operating in 
related industries, whereas the merging corporations will get the opportunity to share resources 
and operations and sometime bundling.407 
On the other hand the vertical mergers, as was also previously mentioned during the 
discussions of the merger waves,408 could be simply defined as a merger between two or more 
corporations that some or all of them are not operating at the same level in the same or related 
industries. A good example is the merger between two corporations, one of which is operating at 
the manufacturing level and the other is operating at the distribution level. The merger 
transaction between “Time Warner” and the media production corporation “Turner,” is an 
example of the merger transaction concluded between the giant broadcasting and cables operator 
corporation.409 
In addition to that, the vertical mergers are also classified into two subcategories as 
forward vertical mergers and backward vertical mergers; the transaction will be considered as 
forward transaction if the acquirer purchased a target that is operating in a level before the level 
that the acquirer is operating and vice versa. To elaborate more, an example of the forward 
vertical merger, the merger between Boise Cascade as an acquirer and OfficeMax as a target, 
whereas the acquirer is a wood products supplier and the target was a distributer of some of these 	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products.410 An example of a backward vertical merger is the merger between Walt Disney as an 
acquirer and Pixar as a target whereas the studio entertainment segment of Walt Disney 
Company distributed animated and featured movies and Pixar is a creator of such movies.411 
Meanwhile, the conglomerate merger is simply the merger between two or more 
corporations that are some or all of them are operating in different or unrelated industries, in 
other words it is neither a horizontal nor a vertical merger.412 This would be a merger between 
two corporation, one of which is operating in any level in certain industry and the other is 
operating in same or other level in another unrelated industry, for example the merger that was 
concluded between “Phillip Morris” which is operating in the production level in the tobacco 
industry and “Kraft General Foods” which is operating also in the production level but in the 
grocery manufacturing and processing industry.413 
b) Structural and procedural classifications 
A merger could be also classified according to the structure and procedures taken to go 
through the transaction, in that regard there are many classifications. Basically mergers could be 
classified according to how the transaction was done i.e. whether it was directly between the 
merging corporations or indirectly through a subsidiary owned by any of them. In that context 
the mergers could be classified into two categories; direct and triangular mergers, in the direct 
merger the transaction is simply concluded between the merging corporations, whereas in a 
triangular merger a subsidiary owned by one of the merging corporation will go through the 
transactions instead of its parent corporation.414 
There are so many advantages in the triangular merger transaction; (1) the transaction 
should be approved by subsidiary shareholders i.e. the acquiring parent corporation not the 
shareholders of the acquiring parent corporation itself, and that might circumvent any 	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requirement imposed in that regard, (2) the acquirer parent corporation will not be liable for the 
target liabilities and the liability will be limited only to the subsidiary, (3) the registration fees of 
the target assets might be avoided in some legal systems as well as taxes.415 
In the same context, it is noteworthy that there are two subcategories of the triangular 
mergers; if the target is merged into the subsidiary it will be known as a forward triangular 
merger, and if the subsidiary is merged into the target the transaction will be known as reverse 
triangular merger.416 It should be noted that in the triangular reverse mergers there are some 
additional advantages, for example the target might hold a non-assignable agreement and any 
other regulatory licenses, unless otherwise clearly required by law.417 
Mergers could be also classified according to the structure of the merging corporations 
after the transaction into two categories, statutory mergers and subsidiary mergers. If the acquirer 
swallows the target in the transaction and all of its liabilities and assets, and the target ceased to 
exist, the transaction will be classified as a statutory merger. On the other hand if the target 
survives after the transaction as a subsidiary of the acquirer the transaction will be classified as 
subsidiary merger.418 
Mergers could be also classified according to the procedures or the steps taken to finalize 
the transaction into two categories, according to whether the transaction to be finalized in just 
one step or in a series of steps.419 In that context, the typical first category is the classic merger 
transaction in which the transaction is finalized in one step. A second category in which the 
transaction is done in two steps; the first step is acquiring a significant or controlling share of the 
target and that is almost done through a tender offer, and the second step in merging the whole 
target into the acquirer or merging the acquirer itself into the target which is known as “reverse 
merger,” and that second step is almost done through a transaction known as a “squeeze out” 
because in that transaction the minority shareholders will be forced to go through the merger.420 
It is noteworthy in that context that the private corporations i.e. corporation that does not 
have its shares as tradable in the stock exchange, may use the “reverse merger” transactions to 	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circumvent the stock market regulations or requirement for the purpose of going public i.e. listed 
in the stock exchange and its shares become tradable.421 In other words a private corporation may 
acquire publicly traded corporations as a “shell corporation” and then the acquirer merges into 
this shell and becomes a publicly tradable corporation by the end of the transaction without 
satisfying any listing requirements. 
c) Financial classifications 
As it was previously mentioned, the merger transaction could be financed either through 
a debt or equity or even by a mixture of both, and if the transaction will be mainly financed 
through debt the merger will be known as an LBO.422 In a typical LBO transaction the acquirer is 
almost a shell corporation with modest borrowing abilities and arrangements for financing a 
large percentage or even all the transaction through debt and both of the target’s assets and the 
expected returns or profits will serve as collateral for that debt.423 
If the management of the target was the shareholders of the acquirer shell corporation, the 
transaction is known as MBO.424 It should be noted here that most of the MBO transactions are 
used as defensive tactic against hostile takeovers or what is known as “poison pills.”425 
Moreover, both LBO and MBO are frequently used to restructure a public corporation to turn it 
into a private one i.e. shares will be no more tradable in the stock exchange,426 while in other 
cases if the transaction is reversed i.e. to go public it will be known as “Reverse LBO.”427 
Unfortunately, bad management practices may lead management team to be engaged in buying 
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undervalued shares through a MBO transaction, and then resell the shares back again through a 
Reverse LBO transaction, for an overvalued or even fair value only to gain personal profits.428	  
There is another version of the LBO transactions, which is the ESOP, where the 
employees’ pension plan funds are used mainly to acquire the shares of their employer through 
the use of a shell corporation, that version of the LBO i.e. ESOP is generally used as defensive 
tactic against hostile takeovers.429 Furthermore, ESOP has some other benefits, for instance it has 
been reported that ESOP has been widespread in the US since 1920s, and that was mainly for its 
tax benefits.430 
However, ESOP has also some other disadvantages; these are at least phony benefits that 
are not usually realized to the expected level, for instance it was maintained that the corporation 
will realize extra gains or profits because the employees themselves will do extra efforts to serve 
their own interests, but in fact it was reported that no such differences were found between ESOP 
and other LBO or mergers transactions in that regard.431 Moreover, the proper financial analysis 
to the actual costs of the ESOP transactions proved that one of its disadvantages is that it is 
considered as an equity dilution and that will inevitable led to loss of control over the corporate 
shares.432  
It is undoubtedly true that all these classifications from the financial perspective have 
important implications on the transaction and how it might be taxable or not.433 Therefore, 
merger transactions could be also classified into three main categories; taxable transactions, 
partial tax-free transactions, and tax-free transactions,434 and that will be further scrutinized 
during the discussions of structuring the transaction in the merger dynamics.435 Meanwhile, it is 
noteworthy that the tax-free merger transaction is not absolutely free, and to be more precise it 
could be considered a deferred taxable transaction, because the shareholders will defer the tax 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
428 Leslie Wayne, Reverse LBOs Bring Riches, NEW YORK TIMES, April 23, 1987. 1987. 
429 WESTON & WEAVER, Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 240, at 191-193. 2001. 
430 GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 370. 2002. And for more 
details about the tax benefits in the US see Id. at 379-380. 
431 U.S. General Accounting Office, Employment Stock Ownership Effects: Little Evidence of Effects on Corporate 
Performance, Report to the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate (U.S. G.P.O. 1987). 
432 GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 381-382. 2002. 
433 For more details about the general idea of taxes and their effect on merger transactions see Joseph P. Driscoll, 
Taxable Acquisitions and Their Effect on Seller and Purchaser at 81-103 (The Bobbs-Merrill Company - 
Indianapolis 1956). 
434 ANDREW J. SHERMAN, Mergers & Acquisitions from A to Z, supra note 391, at 113. 2006. 
435 See infra p.103. 
80	  
until entering into a later taxable transaction, but in the merger industry that is known as a tax-
free merger transaction.436 
In the same context, as it was previously mentioned that the merger transaction could be 
financed through one or more of these four financing schemes, accordingly the merger 
transactions could be also classified into additional four categories; the first is an only cash 
transactions, the second is an only stock transactions which is known as stock for stock 
transactions, the third is what is known as stock for asset transactions, and finally the fourth 
could be a mixture between any of these schemes. In that regard, and according to the US tax 
regime, it should be noted that two of these mergers are considered tax-free transactions: (1) 
stock-for-stock mergers, (2) stock-for-assets mergers.437 
In that tax context, it is should be distinguished that there are some merger structures that 
were specially tailored to avoid taxation in the cross-border merger transactions, these are as 
follows: (1) “Dividend Access Share Structure”: in that structure the transaction will involve 
linking the value of the shares of the merging corporation without actual exchanging of the 
shares between the parties, (2) “Exchangeable Share Structure”: in that structure the transaction 
is the same as the dividend access share structure but the target will issue exchangeable shares to 
be exchanged on demand, and (3) “Equalization Structure”: in that structure the transaction will 
be also the same as the dividend access share structure but the merging corporations will jointly 
control the merging corporations.438 
Finally, the merger transaction could be classified to two categories according to the 
percentage of the shares acquired by the acquirer, whereas the acquirer may acquire only a 
controlling share of the target, and in that case the acquirer will be known as a holding 
corporation. On the other hand the acquirer may acquire all the shares of the target, and in that 
case the target will be known as a wholly owned subsidiary. It should be noted that to call an 
acquirer a holding corporation that depends mainly on the percentage of acquired shares, and 
usually certain threshold is required under the various legal systems.439 	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d) Other restructuring trends and forms 
There are various trends and forms of restructuring transactions that are closely 
connected to mergers, these are mainly: spin-offs, carve-outs, roll-ups, and tracking stocks. This 
discussion will address each of these trends or forms of transactions in turn. Generally speaking 
spin-offs and carve-outs are classified as divestiture transactions, and a divestiture transaction is 
simply a transaction by which a corporation decided whether to split a part or a whole of one of 
its owned subsidiaries, or a business unit, and sometime only certain assets.440 
In fact corporation might decide to go through divestiture due to either the poor 
performance of that subsidiary or business unit, or simply as a step to accomplish a new plan or 
strategy to be more focused on certain type of operations, or even sometimes to serve other 
downsizing purposes.441 However, in specific circumstances corporation may be obligated to go 
through involuntary divestiture transaction, as it will be scrutinized later in detail in the 
discussions of the merger control. 
The carve-out transaction is a typical divestiture transaction whereas the divested unit 
will be offered for sale to third party i.e. another corporation or even to public in the stock 
exchange.442 On the other hand spin-off, also a typical divestiture transaction, differs from the 
carve-out, because the divested unit will remain owned by the shareholders of the corporation 
and will not be offered to a third party, and that unit will take the form of a new corporation that 
operates independently away from the parent corporation.443 
One more difference between both these forms is that the spin-off is always a free 
transaction, while carve-out might be taxable in some taxation systems.444 In that context, it was 
reported that because of that exemption from taxation of spin-off transactions, some corporations 
deceptively use the spin-off form of transactions to evade taxes by hiding profits in the new unit 
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or even use it the other way to hide losses into it, and that trend was reported to be widespread 
throughout the US during the 1990s.445 
On the other hand the roll-up transaction is a kind of strategy adopted by an acquirer, 
who is always a holding corporation, through that strategy the acquirer will acquire as many 
targets operating in a certain industry or a geographic region, and that could be done through a 
horizontal, vertical, or even conglomerate transactions, and that trend was also widespread in the 
US in the 1990s.446 Meanwhile, the tracking stocks are those types of stocks or shares that are 
issued and acquired by an acquirer who is interested in specific type of operation within a certain 
corporation and not in all its business, or even in a specific high growth division of the 
corporation.447 
e) Distinction between mergers and other growth alternatives 
Generally speaking, corporations might make use of its own resources to grow internally 
i.e. to maximize the shareholder value as an ultimate measure of the corporation success,448 and 
that could be accomplished by: opening a new sales channels, hiring more sales staff, developing 
new products, etc., and it might opt out for external growth options like mergers or some other 
merger alternatives. Those alternatives are mainly the joint venture (hereinafter JV), strategic 
alliance, franchising, licensing, exclusive agreements, and minority investments.449 
Due to the close connections between all those external growth alternatives, this 
discussion will be an overview of each of those alternatives to draw a clear distinction between 
all of them, each in turn. The discussion will start with the growth alternative that gives the most 
controlling power; which is the minority investments, and passing then by the less to the lesser 
less, followed by JV then franchising, and then licensing and exclusive agreements, until the 
least controlling power giving growth alternative, which is the	  strategic alliance option. 
The minority investments option is the closest growth alternative to merger,450 because a 
corporation or an investor wants to maximize the shareholder value through the acquisition of 	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minority controlling share, in other words acquiring less than 51%	   of the target’s voting 
shares.451 That growth alternative has many advantages, for instance, the transaction might be 
easily done without any consent or prerequisite approvals, and in addition to that the acquirer 
will be passive and will not bear any management obligations, however the acquired share might 
have a significant voting power that could exercise control over the target.452 It should be noted 
here that SWF are the most active players in that field, for instance it was reported that Qatar 
Investment Authority which is running the State of Qatar’s SWF is typically opting to that 
growth alternative.453 
On the other hand, in a typical JV two or more corporations enter into agreement to form 
a new independent legal entity, whether a corporation or just a partnership, and usually JVs are 
limited most of the times to a certain joint task or goal to be achieved, and in some other times it 
is even limited to a certain short or long periods.454 Moreover, that new independent legal entity 
resulted from the JV might be directly managed or at least controlled by all the parties of the JV 
agreements, and it was reported that the parties of the JV agreement might be competitors but 
they share a common goal that serve their interests.455 
In a JV, parties pool their resources to reach the planned common goal or task, and in that 
context many successful examples of JVs could be listed, most notably in the car manufacturer 
industry in the US and Japan. A prime example is the JV between two giant cars corporations, 
Chrysler Motors and Mitsubishi Motors, to manufacture cars in a new manufacture facility in 
Bloomington, Illinois. 456  On February 20, 2001 two giant Fast-Moving Consumer Goods 
Industry corporations namely Coca-Cola and P&G, entered into a JV agreement to develop a 
new 4.2 billion US dollars corporation for juices and snacks, which is undoubtedly considered as 
another successful JV example.457 
It should be mentioned here that in addition to the usual benefits of reaching common 
goals, corporation might enter into a JV agreement for many other purposes; for instance, some 
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corporations enter in JV in order to circumvent the barriers that might be facing some of the 
parties as a foreign investments.458 For instance, foreign corporations enter into JV with local 
corporations to circumvent the laws that control foreign investments and activities in certain 
industries within the US,459 and in the G.C.C. region, and most significantly in China. Despite 
the fact that it was reported that the JV as an option of growth started to lose favor a few years 
ago due to its problems, which are in fact similar to those facing merger transactions,460 it might 
be beneficial to discuss the Chinese experience in some details. 
China is in fact the most important example here because; firstly it is the leading receiver 
of FDIs among all the developing countries i.e. inbound FDIs, and secondly because in the 
meantime China is the leading user of the FDIs as an acquirer of foreign corporations i.e. 
outbound FDIs,461 and thirdly the Chinese SWF is ranked as fourth with concern to the volume 
of its outbound FDI activities.462 In that context, and as an explanation of the inbound FDIs, 
there is empirical evidence that revealed that the corporations generally preferred the JV as a 
mode of FDI or entry to the more restrictive closed markets, such as China.463 
On the other hand, that could not be generalized, because that is not always the case, 
whereas the corporation in most cases is obligated to use the JV option as a mode of entry, in 
order to circumvent the restrictive practices of banning the acquisition of a national corporation 
in certain industries or the requirement of national partner with a specified percentage to enter 
into certain industries. That concept will be discusses in more details during the discussions of 
the impediments that faces the cross-border mergers.464 
Further, concerning the explanation of the booming outbound FDIs from China, it was 
claimed that the outbound FDIs from China are significantly increasing due the fact that the 
Chinese corporation acquired experiences from entering into cross-border JVs with foreign 	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corporations.465 Accordingly, it could be argued that facilitating the path for the FDIs to use JV 
as a mode of entry will not only benefit the economy domestically in the hosting country, but it 
will also benefit the national corporations in outbound FDIs in other countries. 
It is significant that China in order to fully utilize that JV option adopted a JV law on July 
1, 1979, which was then amended on April 4, 1990 and was then amended for the second time 
March 15, 2001. It was reported that since the adoption of that law the inbound FDIs proliferated 
exponentially by means of JVs.466 Meanwhile, it was reported that the actual number of 
operating JVs in China decreasing from the registered JVs,467 and just taking the registered JVs 
number into consideration might led to a false indication in that concern. 
At the same time, it could be claimed that that proliferation in the JVs transaction in 
China seem not only limited to the proliferation of JVs as an idea. China is generally witnessing 
a booming economy, even during global financial crises periods. For instance it was reported that 
while the US and many other western economies in the world witnessed almost a 30% decrease 
in the merger activities, during the financial crisis of 2008, China witnessed an increase by 1% at 
least in the merger activities.468 
In addition to those efforts to attract the FDI generally, and to use the JV specially as a 
mode of market entry, China issued a specialized catalogue to guide the investors planning to use 
FDI in China in 1995, and that catalogue is updated periodically and the most recent version is 
the 2011 version.469 It was claimed that the catalogue mainly categorizes the industries into three 
main categories; the first category is the category of the encouraged industries, and the second is 
the category of the restricted industries, and the third category is the other industries that does 
not included in any of the first two categories, and that is a permitted industries category.470 
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That claim is not completely accurate, because the general rule in China is that if 
something is not restricted it does not mean that it is permitted,471 and that is generally the trend 
in the developing countries not only in China. In addition to that the authorities in China do not 
apply only the law but also apply the directives as spelled out by the government authorities as 
compulsory rules for implementing the general rules that are stipulated by law; those directives 
are known as the “Red-Title Documents.”472 
The most important remark on that investment catalogue is that many of the FDI 
opportunities that are spelled out in it are reserved just for the JVs route, such as the business of 
cultivating the traditional Chinese medicines, exploitation and utilization of coal-bed gas; 
petroleum; and natural gas, and most notably the manufacturing material of high technology 
semiconductors. The Chinese efforts are also extended to encourage the JVs and the FDI in 
general through other actions taken by the government officials. To illustrate, it was reported that 
the current Chinese Primer developed a policy to attract the professional human resources to be 
an added value to the economy in general, and that will undoubtedly be considered an added 
value to the FDI environment in China.473 
Meanwhile, there was also empirical findings that indicate that some corporations did not 
prefer the cross-border JV as a growth alternative in China due to many reasons: (1) the fear that 
the JV will not sufficiently protect IPR owned by them,474 (2) the discrimination against JVs that 
are owned by foreign corporations specially with concern to the government procurements,475 (3) 
the lack of coordination between the different regulators in China,476 (4) the JV option will not 
provide the full sole control that might be offered by other growth alternatives, and accordingly it 
that might fully serve the interest of the shareholders of the investing corporation, (5) the lack of 
harmonized standards with the global economy and that include not only production standards 
but also management schemes … etc., (6) the short term orientation or mindset of the Chinese 
partner of the JVs, (7) the foreign partners in the JV in China are always expecting to suffer from 	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foreign exchange difficulties,477 and profit remittance problems, and (8) the JV option might led 
to taxation complexities similar to those caused by the mergers.478 
Likewise, it was also claimed that the JV as a growth option has anticompetitive effects 
on the markets, as well as the mergers, and in that context it should be noted that the empirical 
findings of the researches done in that regard revealed that pure domestic JVs has more positive 
effects on the economy than the cross-border JVs, and even that pure domestic horizontal JVs 
has less negative effects on the economy than the cross-border JVs, and that the strong belief that 
the JVs are pro-competitive is not an accurate hypothesis.479 
Accordingly, it could be declared that the Chinese experience in using the JV as a mode 
of entry for FDI is the closet growth option to mergers, and while it could be used to overcome 
some of the impediments that face cross-border mergers, it will be discussed later in detail. The 
JV is not a cost free transaction as it might be imagined, because planning for a successful JV 
will consume nearly all similar resources,480 but as it was mentioned it is a preferred option in 
many closed developing economies and used for the purposes of circumventing the FDI 
limitations that are imposed in those jurisdictions,481 and in return the investing corporation will 
reap the full benefits of the growth opportunity but with some limitations specially with concern 
to the full control over the JVs. 
By the same token, the JV as a mode of entry is also regulated under the same rules that 
control the mergers in almost all the jurisdictions in the world.482 In the same context, it was 
suggested that the foreign corporation will always show a tendency to fully acquire the JV i.e. 
buyout the local corporation shares, if the JV appeared to be successful.483 That means that the 
corporation, if not obligated under a restricting closed market regime, in order to fully utilize the 
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growth possibility it should turn the JV into an actual merger, wholly owned and fully controlled 
by the corporation. 
An example of a giant corporation that refused to enter into JV with a local partner in 
China, is the American insurance corporation “AIG,” whereas it was even reported that that 
corporation lobbied with the US government to oppose the China accession to the WTO until it 
waived the requirement of entering into JV with a local partner in order to enter into the 
insurance industry in China, and at the end AIG was granted the right to continue its operations 
in China without entering into JV with a local partner.484 
Corporations might enter into JV agreement for the purpose of reducing the risks, or even 
eliminating the unplanned risk that might appear when entering into a new business alone, and 
that could be simple by dividing risk among all the parties of the JV.485 It should be also noted 
here that the horizontal JV transactions are used heavily as a merger alternative,486 and that is 
obviously to circumvent impediments that might face the typical horizontal merger transaction. 
On the other hand, franchising is a totally different growth alternative, whereas the 
concerned parties enter into a franchising agreement under which a party “the franchisor” grants 
another party “the franchisee” the right to manufacture or sell the products or services or even 
just use the name and the business model of the franchisor, and under that agreement they also 
share some of their resources in return for sharing profits.487 That form of a growth alternative 
i.e. franchising is widespread in the fast-food industry,488 and also the hotel industry. Franchising 
is almost at no cost to the franchisor but will designate some of its resources to the success of the 
franchise.489 
Licensing is also another and almost free growth alternative,490 here the concerned parties 
enter into licensing agreement under which the owner of intellectual property rights (hereinafter 
IPR) i.e. “the licensor” grants another party “the licensee” the right to use or exploit the IPR 	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rights without the transfer of the ownership, in the exchange of some royalties which is almost 
less than the profits expected.491 In that context, it should be noted that licensing is a widespread 
growth alternative in the pharmaceutical and technological industries.492 Licensing is also of 
great advantage to the licensee because the licensee will be granted the access to the developed 
IPR without investing or using resources in its developing.493 
Likewise, distributorships and dealerships, which are mainly classified as exclusive 
agreements growth alternatives, are to a great extent parallel to the franchising and licensing, 
whereas the owner of the rights of marketing of certain product or service enter into agreement to 
grant an independent party “the dealer” or “the distributor” the right to exclusively market that 
product or service.494 These exclusive agreements most of the times grant the owner access to 
new market beyond his reach.495 
Furthermore, those exclusive agreements are almost giving marketing rights that are 
limited to certain markets or certain geographic area, or even limited to certain category of 
consumers, and it might be also limited for certain time or a period.496 It is noteworthy that under 
the exclusive agreements model the owner will exercise less power over the dealer or the 
distributor than in the franchising or licensing models, but those exclusive agreements are 
classified as franchising agreement in some legal systems, and that might lead to very 
complicated problems unless otherwise clearly mentioned that there are minimal control power 
granted to the owner.497 
Lastly, the strategic alliance alternative is to a great extent a flexible form of JV,498 
whereas in a strategic alliance there are some significant differences; first: ranging from minimal 
to no formal or written agreement is required, and that mainly saves financial resources and 
increase the flexibility;499 second: the parties will use their own legal entities and no new 
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independent legal entity will be developed;500 third: is characterized by the uncertainty and 
ambiguity of the terms and the relation between the parties depends mainly on the 
trustworthiness between them;501 fourth: parties of the strategic alliance coordinate but each take 
decisions more independently;502 fifth: no capital contributions are required;503 sixth: strategic 
alliances are always temporary or even limited by time.504 
Finally, it is significant that some corporations use mergers and all those growth 
alternatives at different stages during its history, and even may use some or all of them combined 
together at the same time. Scrutinizing the history of a corporation like the Mail Boxes ETC will 
reveal that it used franchising as growth option in the early 1980s and in then in 1990 the United 
Parcel Corporation acquired a minority but significant percentage of its shares (15%) and then 
Mail Boxes ETC entered into JV with USA Technologies to jointly market one of its products 
(MBE Express), and then U.S. Office Products acquired Mail Boxes ETC through a 267 million 
US dollars transaction, and then it entered into strategic alliance with iShip.com.505 
3. Mergers Dynamics 
As it was previously mentioned, this dissertation is limited to the friendly mergers and it 
will not address the hostile takeover, because the hostile takeover is characterized by different 
rules, and that is mainly because in the hostile takeover transactions the acquirer is an 
opportunity taker, which obviously means that the transaction is most probably unplanned and 
therefore it will be difficult, if not impossible, to predict its procedures, structure, and dynamics. 
Scrutinizing the merger dynamics is crucial because a solid understanding of the merger 
dynamics is a prerequisite to delve into the impediments to the merger process. In that regard, it 
was claimed that scrutinizing every single step in the merger dynamics is a prerequisite to 
understand the remaining steps, and that both the acquirer and the target should “drink at the 
ever-renewing spring of M&A knowledge [and to] drink deep, they must recognize first that 
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there is something called an acquisition process, with many crucial stages….”506 In addition to 
that, scrutinizing the merger dynamics is undoubtedly a very helpful tool toward understanding 
how impediments could be removed or be managed at least. 
This discussion will be devoted to the dynamics of the mergers, and it will address first 
how the target may prepare itself for a future merger and screen for a prospective acquirer. Next 
it will examine the preliminary agreement that might be entered into by parties as a second step. 
The third step it will also address the comprehensive appraisal of the target i.e. due diligence507 
and valuation. This will be followed by the fourth step that will review how the transaction could 
be structured and financed. Finally, the discussion will address the closing of the transaction as 
the fifth step. 
a) Preparation and screening 
Whatever the incentives are for entering into a merger, whenever a target decided to go 
into a merger, or even a prospective acquirer approaches it, it will be of a great benefit to go first 
through preparations.508 Preparing the target for a merger could easily be shortened in what is 
known as “getting the house in order.”509 In order to successfully accomplish that step the target 
should first start by assembling its preparation team, and typically that team will include its own 
in-house accounting, financial, legal, and corporate affairs team, if any, and in addition to that it 
may also seek other external professionals’ services like investment bankers, tax advisors, estate 
planners, etc.510 
The main task for the preparation team will be simply to get the house in order, and that 
might include finalizing all pending financial, accounting, legal, tax, and estate issues, making all 
documents and records clear and available, and also make a preliminary evaluation of the target 
among a long list of preparation tasks.511 That team should mainly perform its mission with a 
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single goal in mind, which is to maximize the value of the target and to make it more appealing 
to potential acquirers, and in that regard it was claimed that unprepared or even “poorly” 
prepared target will be less appealing to prospective acquirers or at least will delay closing the 
transaction in a proper timing.512 
Searching for a prospective “dancing partner” in the merger transaction, whether it is 
acquirer or target, which is known as the screening process, is an important part of the 
preparation step or at least directly interrelated to it.513 In the screening process the corporation 
by itself or by the help of an intermediary, which is typically an investment banker or just a 
broker,514 will draw an exhaustive list of the most qualified acquirers or targets.515 Almost all of 
those corporations that are included into the list should fit into the merger planning or strategy,516 
but obviously not all of them will have the same willingness to enter into the proposed merger, 
therefore the list should be narrowed after approaching them, in order to identify the prospective 
acquirer or target. 
After the parties of the proposed merger transaction found common ground and 
demonstrate their interest towards the transaction, they will usually develop a plan and timetable 
in order to proceed to the next step of the merger process. Towards the closing of the transaction, 
they may as well enter into a preliminary agreement or something similar to that effect, which 
will govern all the subsequent steps,517 as it will be discussed in the following discussion. 
b) Preliminary agreement 
By reaching this step the parties are more serious about entering into the proposed 
merger, and that accordingly requires developing an action plan, and entering into preliminary 
agreement that includes the terms and conditions that would govern all the remaining steps until 
closing the transaction, or even some post-closing issues, and also how the process might be 
terminated. That kind of preliminary agreement is recognized under various legal systems and is 
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usually titled as “Letter of Intent,” “Term Sheet,” “Heads of Agreements,” or simply as 
“Preliminary Agreement.”518 
Meanwhile, entering into that kind of agreement is not a worldwide practice, and it was 
proclaimed that it is impractical in some cases and even problematic in other cases especially if 
one of the parties of the proposed merger is a publicly traded corporation. For instance, under 
securities regulations in the US, entering into such agreement might be considered a premature 
merger announcement for the purpose of influencing the prices of the shares in the stock 
exchange.519 Accordingly, these agreements should be carefully drafted, and parties sometimes 
draft it and agree to its terms but just do not sign it, and they even adopt “no-comment” policy as 
a response to any inquiries concerning the proposed merger transaction.520 
However, it should be noted that the preliminary agreement usually governs all the issues 
concerning the remaining steps of the merger process, and that might be different from case to 
case. Meanwhile in most of the cases it will address the main general terms and conditions, 
among which are the following issues: (1) granting access to books and records, (2) protecting 
confidential information, (3) publicity and announcements concerning the transaction, (4) merger 
process expenses, (5) the brokers fees, (6) the expected effect of the transaction on the 
employees, (7) conditions to closing the transaction, (8) operations during the merger process, 
(9) key terms to be incorporated in the closing agreement, and (10) deadlines and timetable.521 
Generally speaking, the parties are always concerned with allocating the risk of the 
transaction between them, which could be accomplished through the terms incorporated in the 
preliminary agreement, and it was even reported that the parties might enter into insurance 
agreement specially designed for mergers transactions.522 In addition to those general terms, the 
preliminary agreement may contain some other crucial provisions concerning the following 
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issues: (1) conducting negotiations in good faith, (2) locking-up the transaction, (3) termination 
and break-up the process, each of those additional provisions will be discussed in turn as follows. 
Concerning the “good faith” provision, some preliminary agreements include such 
provision that require the parties to negotiate in good faith, but that kind of provisions are not 
similarly recognized in all the countries around the world; at one end of the spectrum that 
provision has no legal impact in the UK, while in Australia it has some impact if it is clearly 
mentioned that the agreement itself is binding, while at the other end of the spectrum the 
provision is binding even if it was expressly mentioned in the preliminary agreement that it is not 
a binding agreement in most of the US jurisdictions.523 Accordingly, in a cross-border merger 
transaction using that provision might have different interpretations and that might end with a 
dispute before courts. 
In the same context, it was claimed that the “good faith” provision in the preliminary 
agreement might contradict with the directors’ obligations (good faith, fiduciary duty of care, 
and loyalty) in the US legal system.524 To elaborate more, the obligation to negotiate the merger 
transaction in “good faith” might led to missing some other opportunities with third party, and 
those opportunities might better serve the shareholders’ interests, and this is highly problematic 
because there is no clear standard that defines the directors’ obligations.525 As a clearer, precise, 
and more effective alternative to the “good faith” provision, the parties may clearly state and 
define their obligations with regard to the negotiation process and the consequences in the case 
of the breach instead of these generalized vague obligations.526 
The parties, mainly the acquirer, may wish to save their interest in the transaction and not 
to waste resources by finding that the transaction ends up intended for a third party, accordingly 
they might incorporate a lock-up provision in the preliminary agreement, or what is known as 
“non-solicitation” or “no-shop/no talk” provisions, and under those lock-up provisions the target 
is banned from entering into negotiations or even talks concerning other proposals with third 
parties, at least for a certain period.527 
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One more time, that kind of provisions is also highly problematic in some jurisdictions, 
especially in the US, because it might also contradict with the directors’ obligations (good faith, 
fiduciary duty of care, and loyalty).528 As a clearer alternative, it could be argued that kind of 
lock-up provisions would be better replaced by a termination provision i.e. setting consequences 
in case that the target terminate the process for any reason. 
Concerning the termination and the break-up provisions that might be incorporated in the 
preliminary agreement, the parties may agree to set certain fees to be paid in case the acquirer 
did not close the transaction, or the target terminates the process as a result of a third party offer, 
those kinds of provisions are known as “reverse termination fees,” “break-up fees,” or simply as 
“termination fees” provisions,529 and those provisions are of a great importance and have great 
implications in almost all the cases. 
To better understand the importance and the implications of such termination provisions, 
consider the fact that the percentages of termination fees have reached up to 19.40% of the 
estimated purchase price of the target in some transactions during 2011.530 Furthermore, it was 
also reported that in 2011 AT&T paid a 3 billion US dollars as reverse break fees to Deutsche 
Telekom AG, because it did not close the transaction, regardless of the fact that the transaction 
was blocked by the authorities in the US i.e. the US Department of Justice (hereinafter DOJ), 
despite the fact AT&T was not responsible for its failure.531 
Meanwhile, it was reported that kind of termination provisions are not recognized 
similarly in all jurisdictions in the same manner, such as high fees percentages are not acceptable 
in some jurisdictions, and for instance, it is only acceptable by the courts to set a termination fees 
within the range of 2-3% of the estimated purchase price of the transaction, in some jurisdictions 
of the US.532 
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In the same context, it should be noted that some of the termination provisions in the 
preliminary agreements are not just a straight forward provisions i.e. not just setting certain 
percentage of the estimated purchase price as a break-up fees. Termination provisions could be 
designed and drafted in a tiered structure, which means the percentage is not fixed but fluctuated 
according to certain scenarios, for example, in the transaction between Medco Health Solutions 
and Express Scripts the termination fees was ranging from 650 million US dollars to 950 million 
US dollars.533 Meanwhile, the tiered structure of the termination provision will inevitably 
increase the risks and uncertainties during the merger process. 
Finally, it was also reported that those termination provisions are not only widely 
accepted between parties, but also some acquirers might prefer to pay a high termination or 
break-up fees instead of entering into an over-valued transaction,534 and it is noteworthy here that 
the target valuation and determining whether it is over-valued or not will be identified in the next 
step in the merger process i.e. the step of due diligence and valuation, as it will be addressed in 
the next discussion. 
c) Due diligence and valuation 
In the due diligence and valuation step the parties will put the transaction into a “reality 
test” to deeply examine the records and documents, in order to decide whether the transaction is 
of a real value as it appeals or not.535 In other words, the parties will examine the results 
accomplished by the preparation team, during the preparation and screening step, in order to 
make sure that the proposed or expected value is realistic and is not just a synthesized value by a 
professional team, and it is undoubtedly true that the results of that examination i.e. the due 
diligence will inevitably effect the final decision as whether to enter into the transaction or not.536 
The due diligence mainly involves the examination and the analysis of all the records and 
documents of the target from legal, financial, and accounting perspectives. Moreover, from all 
those perspectives, the due diligence main tasks include; the assessment of the current situation 	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of the target, valuating the expected benefits from the transaction, identify potential risks and any 
impediments that might face closing the transaction, gathering all information that will be used 
in the next steps, for example, the information that will be possibly used to structure and finance 
the transaction.537 
The documents to be checked by the acquirer’s representing team during the due 
diligence might be classified into hundreds of categories,538 and it is not easy if not impossible to 
draw up an exhaustive list of the documents, but as guidance, some authors tried to classify those 
documents under key categories. Under the corporate affairs category there is a huge list that 
starts with all documents related to corporate registrations, by-laws and any amendments thereof, 
board and shareholder meetings’ minutes, and all corporate affairs related management reports. 
Under the financial issues category there is also an enormous list that exceeds the corporate 
affairs category, as it includes but not limited to all the financial information starting from the 
taxation documents, auditing reports, books, all documents related to debt and financing issues, 
financial statements, balance sheets, and all the management reports related to finance.539 
Moreover, under the employment category there is also a massive list that might include 
for example; all employment agreements, consulting and management agreements, all benefits’ 
plans specially those for the top-tier management team, unions or collective agreements, all 
documents proving compliance to regulatory issues such as those rules issued by the U.S. Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and those required under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act,540 those adopted by the administration at the United States Department of Labor, and 
all the employment policies that are adopted internally.541 
Furthermore, under the assets category there is another gigantic list, no less than the list 
under the previous categories, and that might include for example documents related to real 
estate registrations and taxes, insurance plans, all agreements related to real estate transactions 
such as rent; purchase; and mortgages, and all documents related to IPR.542 In that regard, it 
should be noted that assets registration especially lands are highly problematic under most of 
legal systems, and that the real estate registration issues resembles a great percentage of the legal 	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issues that might be discovered during the due diligence, and it was even reported that targets 
operating in agriculture industry have always been acquired at an underestimated value due to 
that very reason.543 
Ironically, it is not even easy to draw up the list of categories of the lists itself, for 
instance many other categories could be listed, for example all documents related to domestic 
and overseas operations, documents related to filing and licensing from industry-specific 
regulatory authorities and all compliance reports thereof, documents related to all the business 
agreements whether already performed or still pending, documents related to any disputes 
discovered during what is known as the “litigation analysis.”544 
It could be easily claimed that those huge lists of documents are not only highly 
problematic because it is not easy to accurately draw up an exhaustive list for them, but also 
because the examination of such documents might lead to disclosing confidential information to 
the acquirer, disturbance of the daily operations by conducting on-site visits, and finally 
consuming the parties’ resources. However, regarding the confidentiality of the information that 
might be disclosed during the due diligence step, it was previously noted in the discussions of the 
preliminary agreement step, that in most of the cases the parties enter into a special 
confidentiality agreement or incorporate confidentiality clause in the preliminary agreement in 
order to properly protect their interests at that stage and during the whole process.545 
In the same context, and as a solution to some of the mentioned problems, the idea of 
Virtual Data Room (hereinafter VDR) emerged, by which a VDR service provider will manage 
to upload a soft copy of all the documents to online servers, and the target gives the potential 
acquirer access to those servers.546 To demonstrate how these VDRs are useful, it should be 
noted that; the parties would incur no traveling or lodging expenses,547 access to certain 
information might be restricted and limited only to certain top-tier management team, documents 	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will be available at anytime regardless of different working hours or conflicting time zones, 
avoiding the affect and negative impact on the target’s employees or what is known as ‘‘water-
cooler rumor mills’’ that might develop during the on-site visits, granting access to several 
potential acquirers at the same time, and even indexing and searching are easier than the 
traditional on-site visits.548 
In addition to the mentioned problems, it should be also noted that due diligence in cross-
border mergers is highly complicated because the documents should be examined according to 
different jurisdictions, each might have its own legal, regulatory, financial, accounting rules that 
are not only different but sometimes contradicting, for instance there are conflicting issues 
between the rules of preparing the financial statements in many countries as it will be discussed 
while discussing the cross-border mergers impediments in detail. It also could be claimed that 
due diligence is a highly complicated task that should be accomplished by specialized 
professionals otherwise that might lead to fatal problems that put the transaction to an end or 
even lead to more serious problems.549 
In the cross-border context, there are different trends in using external professionals to 
conduct or assist in carry out the due diligence, for instance in some jurisdictions in the EU the 
target may finalize due diligence reports through an independent third party before engaging into 
serious steps with any potential acquirer, and it should be also noted that not only the different 
trends and contradicting or conflicting rules are problematic, but also every different jurisdiction 
has its own “hot-buttons” i.e. issues that are resembling a high priority to that jurisdiction, for 
instance it was reported that environment related issues are “hot-buttons” in the US meanwhile 
the employees’ pension plans are “hot-buttons” in the UK.550 
Based on the just mentioned “hot-buttons” issue, it was claimed that the domestic 
acquirer might be more aware of the target status than any other foreigner acquirer, and that 
might ease finalizing the due diligence step with more accurate results,551 and obviously that is 	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also true for the publicly traded corporations, because it would be easier to get access to most of 
its records and financial statements due to the disclosure obligation imposed by the rules adopted 
in the stock exchange in most of the jurisdictions, and that is even before the due diligence and 
without entering into a preliminary agreement. 
It is noteworthy that the due diligence will not stop throughout all the other remaining 
steps during the merger dynamics, or even by closing the transaction, it might be slowed down 
but it should not be stopped, for instance carrying out a due diligence after the closing is highly 
important to ease the management tasks and to check the validity of any representations that 
were made before the closing. In that context, the parties often incorporate a “bring-down” 
clause into the merger agreement, which imposes an obligation and warranties on the target to 
keep the financial and legal status unchanged until the closing of the transaction.552 
As it was previously mentioned the main goal of the due diligence is to determine the 
realistic value of the target, therefore the valuation is extremely interrelated to the due diligence 
and both of them could be considered as the second step in the merger dynamics. However, 
successful due diligence is a prerequisite to start a valuation process on a solid ground and 
equipped with the realistic information about the target, and undoubtedly that will also help in 
expecting its future. It should be noted that the valuation process might be conducted by using 
one of the following valuation methods. 
The first method is the most common valuation method, which is the Discounted Cash 
Flow (hereinafter DCF) method. The DCF method is based mainly on the principal of time value 
of money, which means that the current value of certain amount of money is not the same in the 
future, and according to the DCF method of valuation the target is valuated as follows; first all 
the expected future cash flows are estimated, and then that estimated amount is discounted at 
certain rate in order to determine the current value of these cash flows as if it was earned 
presently, not in the coming future.553 
The second method of evaluation is the Relative Valuation method, according to that 
method determining the value of the target depends mainly on the market value of comparable 
corporations, and comparable within that method means that both corporations i.e. the target and 
base corporation are almost of the same size, operating in the same industry, and having same 	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financial status.554 The third method is the Replacement Value Method (hereinafter RVM), 
according to the RVM the target is valued by determining the cost of building it from scratch, 
and in that method not only the cost of the tangible assets are considered but all other “soft 
assets” like for instance the cost of hiring the current employees are also considered.555 
The fourth method is Average Rate of Return (hereinafter ARR); within that method the 
target is simply valued by dividing the average of the expected accounting profits by the average 
expected investments.556 The fifth method is the Payback method, in which analyzes the decision 
as whether to proceed for a merger according to certain proposed value based on the payback 
period, and that period is the period after which the capital investments are recovered back to the 
acquirer, and it should be noted that in the payback method any returns beyond the payback 
period will be disregarded.557 
The sixth method of valuation is the Internal Rate of Return (hereinafter IRR) and it is 
sometimes referred to as Economic Rate of Return (ERR), that method is also based on the 
principal of time value of money like the DCF, however according to the IRR or ERR the target 
is valued by estimating the expected future returns not the cash flows, and then that estimated 
amount is discounted at certain rate in order to determine the current value of these returns as if it 
was earned currently, not in the coming future.558 
The seventh method of valuation is the Market Value Method (hereinafter MVM), the 
MVM is mainly used in acquiring publicly traded corporations, whereas it depends mainly on the 
value of the of comparable corporations, and comparable here in that method means that both 
corporations i.e. the target and base corporation have the same P/E.559 The eighth method	   of 
valuation is the Comparable Net Worth to MVM, as its name appears it is similar to MVM but 
actually with some accounting adjustments for the purposes of a more accurate valuation even by 
using less amount of information, and it was designed mainly to protect minority shareholders in 
squeeze-out transactions.560 
Despite the fact that the assessment of those valuation methods is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation, it is undoubtedly true that a deep understanding of all those valuation methods 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
554 MILLER, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide, supra note 414, at 32-33. 2008. 
555 REED, et al., The Art of M&A, supra note 366, at 87, 104-105. 2007. 
556 Id. at 87-88, 105. 
557 Id. at 88, 105-106. 
558 Id. at 88-89 106. 
559 Id. at 89, 106-107. 
560 Id. at 89, 107-108. 
102	  
will reveal that the valuation is “not a precise science [and] is based upon both objective facts 
and subjective beliefs and assumptions about the future performance of the [target].”561 It was 
even claimed that all the known valuation methods are impractical and are “highly subjective,” 
and the final valuation depends mainly on negotiations and the supply and demand forces i.e. the 
acquirer is willing to pay certain amount for the target and the target is willing to go through 
merger in return for a certain amount also the estimated valuations are usually a rough range that 
fits in between those wills.562 
Generally speaking, parties always enter into negotiations and even make adjustments to 
the valuation until the closing date in order to mitigate any fluctuations in the market prices, 
foreign exchange rates, and other possible factors that might affect the initial valuation.563 In the 
same context, it is noteworthy that the value is wrongfully used as synonym for the price, 
meanwhile they could be easily distinguished; whereas the “[v]alue is the intrinsic worth of an 
asset, while price is what a buyer has actually paid for it. Value essentially exists only in the 
minds of people, while price reflects real-world market behavior.”564 
Moreover, in order to circumvent or at least to cutback any gaps that might be between 
the valuation of the target and what the acquirer is expecting about the performance of the target 
in the future, is known as “earn-out” provision. Under the earn-out provision the purchase price 
will be linked to the future performance such as sales or total revenues, etc., and that provision is 
also held to be an incentive for the target to maintain or improve its performance that may 
increase the purchase price in addition to mitigating the gap between the valuation and the 
acquirer expectations.565 
Finally, it should be noted that the due diligence and the valuation step are almost 
continuous until the closing of the transaction, and it is also primarily governed by the terms and 
conditions of any preliminary agreement thereof, like all the other steps throughout the merger 
process. However, if the parties are interested in proceeding to the next step in the merger 	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process, which is deciding which merger structure will best serve their interests and how the 
transaction will be financed, which will be addressed in the next discussion. 
d) Structuring and financing the transaction 
As it was previously addressed during the discussion of the mergers types and 
classifications, the merger transaction could be executed or structured in	   enormous structures, 
and mergers could be also classified according to how the transaction was financed. 566 
Furthermore, it should be noted here that structuring and financing the transaction are directly 
interrelated to each other, whereas the structure will be executed by means of the financial tools, 
meanwhile financing the transaction depends mainly on how it will be structured. 
Actually, both structuring and financing the transaction will mainly depend on the 
information that was gathered during the due diligence as it was also previously mentioned, and 
the more the due diligence was successfully accomplished the more the decisions that will be 
taken to choose the structure and the right financing tool will fit into the interests of all the 
parties. Generally speaking, the parties may decide to structure and finance the transaction to 
resemble any of the structures that was previously mentioned during the discussions of the 
mergers types and classifications.567 
For instance the parties may decide to structure their transaction as one of the following 
structures: (1) direct merger, (2) triangular merger, (3) reverse triangular merger, (4) statutory 
mergers, and (5) subsidiary mergers, or even one of the nontraditional structure like: (1) dividend 
access share, (2) exchangeable share, and the (3) equalization structure, or any other structure of 
the previously discussed structures. Moreover, they may decide to finance the transaction either 
through debt or equity, and they might use any of the previously discussed financing options, for 
example: (1) leveraged buyouts (ESOP, MBO), (2) cash for stock, (3) stock for stock, (4) stock 
for asset, etc., or even the parties may also decide to finance the deal through a combination of 
any of the financing tools. 
What should primarily drive the parties decisions for certain structure or financing tool 
deals with how that structure and financing option will serve their interests on a case by case 
basis, but generally their main concerns in that regard could easily be identified as follows: (1) 	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taxes (instant or deferrable tax), (2) availability of the financial resources, (3) limiting the 
liability of the acquirer through a triangular structure, (4) how the target will operate after 
merger, independently or it will be wholly swallowed by the acquirer, (5) whether the target’s 
agreements and licenses are assignable or not, (6) the complexity of the structure and how it may 
take time to be executed, and (7) the legality of the proposed structure in the jurisdictions where 
it will be registered and where the operations will be performed. 
As an example of how the transaction might be structured, take the following example, 
the ESOP fund at corporation “A” and some of the shareholders of corporation “C” agreeing to 
jointly acquire “A,” and to keep “X” (operation unit in “A”) operating independently, and to sell 
“Y” (operations unit in “C”), while the rest of “C” is to operate as a part of “A,” the structure 
may be as follows: the partners will incorporate a new corporation named “B,” and then “B” 
enter into debt agreements with various lending sources, following that “B” will acquire 
controlling share of “C,” then “B” acquire the rest of shares of “C” in a squeeze-out transaction, 
then “C” will swallow “B” in a reverse triangular merger transaction, next “C” divest “Y” 
through a crave-out transaction to a third party, followed by “C” entering into debt agreements 
with various lending sources to acquire “A” in an LBO transaction, resulting in “A” divesting 
“X” in a spin-off transaction, and at the end “A” swallowing “C” in a reverse triangular merger. 
e) Closing the transaction 
Closing the transaction is the final step in the merger dynamics, and that crucial step will 
successfully finalize all the efforts done throughout the entire process of the merger transaction, 
and will put it into a working reality. Closing the transaction could be simply defined as “the 
event through which the parties to [the merger] transaction consummate that transaction by the 
execution and delivery of documentation, and, if applicable, the transfer of funds …”, and 
accordingly it encompasses two categories of closing issues, the first one is the corporate issues 
and the second category is the financial issues.568 
The closing of the transaction, as a step in the row of steps in the merger dynamics, 
begins after all the preliminary negotiations and the due diligence and valuation is successfully 
done, and the transaction was structured and the parties decided how it would be financed. The 
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closing step starts by drafting and negotiating a definitive agreement, to determine all the key 
terms and conditions of the transaction such as, the representations and warranties, 
indemnification, payments terms and conditions, closing conditions, post-closing rights and 
obligations, and how the transaction will be executed and defining the remedies for any breach 
thereof.569 
The tasks to be accomplished during the closing step are basically enormous, and could 
be categorized into three phases: (1) pre-closing, (2) closing, and (3) post-closing phases.570 In 
that context, drafting and negotiating the mentioned definitive agreement is a task in the pre-
closing phase, meanwhile signing the definitive agreement is not recommended during that phase 
because it will be risky to do so, since there are still some closing conditions to be satisfied 
before signing the definitive agreement.571 It was reported that in most of the cases the parties 
sign the definitive agreement and closed the transaction simultaneously during the closing 
phase.572 
In addition to drafting and negotiating the definitive agreement during the pre-closing 
phase, the parties should do all preparations to satisfy any closing requirements and conditions as 
per the agreements, laws, and regulations in all the concerning jurisdictions. For instance, filing 
and obtaining all the required shareholders approvals, any required regulatory approvals such as 
antitrust clearance by the merger control authorities, approval by the stock exchange authorities 
in case that one or more of the parties is a publicly traded corporation, in addition to any 
industry-specific premerger approvals, and also any foreign investment or national security 
approvals.573 
It should be noted that not only the volume of the transaction and how it will be 
structured will determine the time it might take to close it, but the time will overwhelmingly 
depend on the tasks to be accomplished during the pre-closing phase, due to the fact most of 
those tasks are in one way or another depending on actions to be done by third parties or even the 
waiver of their rights, such as the antitrust authorities in a situation which a premerger approval 
is required, and third parties in a situation that the assignment of the agreements with the target is 
precondition. 	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To overcome any lengthy time periods that the pre-closing phase might take, any 
negative effects it might cause to the operations of the both the target and the acquirer, or on the 
prices in the stock exchange, and any changes to the governing rules and regulations in 
circumstances that a new law is adopted, the parties may sign the definitive agreement and an 
arrange for an escrow account to be designated specially as a guarantee for the tasks that are not 
accomplished until the signing date, while on the other hand signing the agreement is sometimes 
a prerequisite condition by the regulatory authorities and the financing partners.574 
The closing phase is usually short, ranging from few hours to few days, during which the 
parties shall satisfy the final task checklist, that list may generally include: (1) making a final 
review of the documents, (2) date any undated documents, (3) sign all the documents that 
requires such signature and were not yet signed, (4) checking whether all the closing condition 
were satisfied or waived, (5) making payments, and finally (6) deliver documents.575 Obviously, 
starting from the moment of the signing the definitive agreement the relation between the parties 
and any closing or post-closing issues will be governed by the definitive agreement not the 
preliminary one. 
The last and final phase is the post-closing phase, during which each party will receive 
any remaining documentation that it is entitled to receive it, but was not yet delivered during the 
closing phase, as it happens in some cases the delivery of some the documents during the closing 
phase is not possible.576 In fact, during that post-closing phase, the parties have to implement 
what is known as the post-merger plan that was designed to overcome any challenges that the 
parties might face in the implementation, and they even sometimes have to mutually monitor the 
post-merger operations as in the case of earn-out transactions.577 
It is noteworthy that the post-merger plan might take a long time starting from three 
months to more than six months,578 because in most instances it is an integration process between 
two or more different corporations in many aspects, such as operations, policies, financial and 
accounting perspective, etc. In summary, that integration will mainly depend on the volume and 
the complexity of the structure of the transaction itself, and on many other factors like cultural 
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differences between the corporations of the merger transaction, whereas the cultural differences 
are considered the main problem that might face the implementation of the post-merger plan. 
While the cultural differences do not lead directly to merger failure it might cause a 
negative impact on the implementation of the post-merger plan, or at least slow down the ideal 
integration level to fully realize the expected efficiencies from the merger. Consequently, it was 
reported that most of the well-known mergers suffered from the cultural differences, for example 
the mergers between Sony Corporation and Columbia Pictures, AT&T and NCR, Daimler-Benz 
and Chrysler, Citicorp and Travelers Group, AOL and Time Warner, and Hewlett Packard and 
Compaq Computer. To demonstrate how crucial the issue of cultural differences is, consider the 
case of the Hewlett Packard and Compaq Computer merger transaction, whereas tremendous 
efforts, more than two years’ worth of time, were made to identify these cultural differences to 
overcome, during which more than hundred and forty focusing group were conducted in more 
than twenty countries.579 
III. Conclusion 
By the end of this chapter, many conclusions could be identified, the first was that the 
origins of the idea of corporation and it development could be attributed to all the humans 
throughout history, some ethnic groups think about it, maybe others imagined its future, some 
just spread it or even developed it, but the most important fact was that it was mainly originated 
and developed for the good of them i.e. humans. The second conclusion is that the early scholars 
did not contribute to its development as much as it was expected, and they just tried to describe 
what they experienced in their time, and they even did not give the full picture to their 
successors, but that could be attributed to the limited resources at their time. 
Moreover, the third conclusion is that the East India Company is an example of how that 
very same early corporations from the 17th century is surprisingly still alive to date, and the fact 
is also that it is not the only one, there are others. However, others like the South Sea Company 
was not just a example of the an early corporations, but they significantly changed the history of 
the corporations and its relation with the state, whereas it was used as a financing tool, in 	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addition to that it proved that the corporation could to led to the collapse of the economy 
whenever it was not used for the good of people. 
The fourth and actually a very important conclusion is that surprisingly the US antitrust 
laws were not enacted for the purpose of protecting the consumers, nor to put the harmful trusts 
of the American economy to an end, these laws were actually enacted to support some jumpy 
farmers and some other small inefficient corporations, while also to distract the public attention 
to introduce a new tariff bill, and on top of that the trusts were doing good for the economy or at 
least it was not engaged in anticompetitive behavior. 
The fifth conclusion is the very surprising role of feudalism in the relation between the 
corporations and the state, and it literally opened the door for that relation to be developed in the 
future. Altogether that development could easily be portrayed as starting from the state granting 
the monopoly and incorporation rights, and then the corporation offering the state to make use of 
it as a financing tool to ensure the approval for continuation, followed the power of the state 
being lessen to help the corporation rescue the economy and contribute in the industrial 
revolution. Next when the corporation gained some power, as represented in the trusts, the state 
started an new era by reregulating the corporations again, but that time under a new scheme and 
more professional fashioned style, again that did not succeeded and led to two trends 
respectively, the privatization and then deregulation. 
The sixth conclusion is the creation of the state’s role to regulate the corporations and its 
development in the western jurisdictions; this could easily be identified in the form of the 
regulatory role of the state during the last century by mean of legislations, while the tool are 
nonexistent in the most of the eastern jurisdictions, especially the Arab countries. That could be 
attributed to the fact that from the Islamic perspective that was prevailing in the Arab countries, 
at least during the early periods, is that the state should not intervene or introduce legislations to 
control the market unless it should do so to rescue the market from total collapse,580 for instance 
there is nothing reported about any requirement or procedure to incorporate a new corporation. 
Furthermore, the seventh conclusion is that mergers are not the only restructuring options 
for the corporations, from a legal perspective, and there are other alternatives, but the merger is 
always expected to be more powerful tool that might led to better results, but that is not in all the 
cases and the parties may opt for other options. The eighth conclusion is that mergers are very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
580 DABBAH, Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East, supra note 353, at 24. 2007. 
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highly complicated transactions that should be carried out by professionals, and that most of 
them are based mainly on highly subjective estimations, and it consume huge resources, and that 
actually raised very perplexing questions, which are mainly; is it worth to enter into such kind of 
transactions? Does it really work in reality? Those questions and many other important questions 
will be addressed in the next part.  
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Chapter Two: Mergers Incentives, Efficiencies, and Impediments	  
This chapter is considered the core of the dissertation not because it will try to answer the 
questions of what are the impediments that face mergers, but as a starter and for a clear 
knowledgeable answer, the incentives that drives the merging parties to engage in such kind of 
transactions. In other words this chapter will identify what are the expected gains, and then the 
question of whether the mergers are efficient and will the parties recognize what was expected. 
Moreover, the coming discussion will try to portray a full picture of the efficiencies of mergers, 
if any. 
This chapter will try to answer each of the above-mentioned questions in turn, therefore it 
will first address the question of what are the incentives that drives the merging parties, or to be 
more precise its management, to take the decision to enter into a merger transaction. Because 
identifying those incentives should be used as standards to evaluate the merger transaction, 
whereas to assess the idea and determine how it is effective the expected gains should be defined 
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first. In that context, the discussion will try to identify those incentives and understand how the 
merging parties might use them in order to realize the expected gains. 
The discussion will address the conventional incentive such as, the operational and 
financial synergies, technological alignment, tax benefits, and even the mismanagement biases 
like the hubris and winner curse. It will also address the incentives that are mainly related to the 
cross-border mergers, like for instance the exchange rate, and the market incentives offered in 
foreign jurisdictions, among others. Then the discussion will try to answer the second question of 
how efficient are the mergers, and it will try to identify the success and failure factors of the 
merger transactions. 
While answering that second question of the merger efficiency the discussion will try to 
draw a full picture of the impact of the mergers on the different players in the society, not only 
the merging parties but all the other members, for example the employees. In addition to that, 
due to the nature of the question the discussion will not be limited to the argumentative 
discussions, but will also discuss the empirical findings to figure out the reality of the impact of 
mergers on the total welfare. In the same line, but from a cross-border mergers perspective, the 
discussion will try to go further and answer marginal but important question of what is the 
impact of cross-border mergers on the globalization, and a more profound question of how far is 
the world now from a globalized world, and is it expected from cross-border mergers to deepen 
the fears from globalization and even are these myths real. 
Then the discussion will be concrete enough to answer the third question, which is the 
core thesis of this dissertation i.e. what are the impediments that are facing the mergers in 
general and specially the cross-border mergers, and how they affect the merger transactions. 
Additionally, the discussion will address the issue of how those impediments could be classified, 
and does it really matter to classify them into categories. The discussion will identify and address 
a dozen of those impediments, which are not limited to those impediments imposed by the state 
or the different regulatory authorities, but it will also include those impediments imposed by 
others, for instance the professional services providers such as the legal advisors and the role of 
the law schools in that regard. 
The discussion will then attempt to gain a deeper understanding of one additional 
impediment that faces the mergers, in order to answer the fourth question, which is how the 
multijurisdictional merger control systems around the globe are hindering the merger 
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transactions. In order to answer such question the discussion will first start by an overview of 
three different merger control systems, which are namely the merger systems in the US, the EU, 
and Egypt. Following that, the discussion will identify some of the drawbacks of adopting such 
different merger control systems around the globe on both the pure domestic mergers in general 
and the cross-border mergers specifically. 
The discussion of the drawbacks that will be identified will be limited to only ten, and the 
discussion will show how each of them are expected to influence the merger transaction, and 
how that will range from just making it more difficult to realize the expected gains from the 
transaction, or even not realizing any gains at all, to the extent of total failure of the transactions 
and suffering from losses or sometimes bankruptcy. By the end of that discussion the problems 
or the impediment that might face the cross-border mergers should be clearly identified, and the 
research could be advanced to the next step, which will be the design of some reforming 
proposals. 
I. Mergers Incentives 
As it was shown, the merger transaction is not an unplanned process, it is also 
undoubtedly true that deciding to enter into a merger transaction is not a spontaneous decision, 
but actually a number of incentives motivate the decision maker and drive them to be involved in 
such complicated transaction. Those incentives were identified by many scholars and merger 
industry professionals, and the incentives list is extremely varied, at one end of the spectrum it 
was limited to only one incentive, for example it has been claimed by Warren Buffet581 that the 
main and only incentive to enter into a merger transaction is “to move investment out of cash and 
into assets,” while at the other end of the spectrum other scholars claimed that the common list of 
incentives includes ten or more incentives.582 
In that context, the list of common merger incentives could be simply identified by the 
following 11 incentives: (1) operational synergies, (2) financial synergies, (3)	   undervalued 
assets, (4) managerial pride (Hubris), (5) agency problems (mismanagement), (6) technological 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
581 Warren Edward Buffet (August 30, 1930) is an American businessman and is the 2nd in the richest people list, in 
the U.S., according to the Forbes Magazine, and for more details about his profile visit the Forbes magazine website 
at http://www.forbes.com/profile/warren-buffett last visited October 1, 2014. 
582 REED, et al., The Art of M&A, supra note 366, at 646, 647. 2007; ANDREW J. SHERMAN, Mergers & Acquisitions 
from A to Z, supra note 391, at 13-17. 2006. 
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alignment, (7) exchange rates, (8) strategic planning, (9) market policies (regulation and 
deregulation), (10) market power, (11) tax efficiencies.583 All those incentives will be addressed 
in this coming discussion, but it should be noted that some of those incentives are directly related 
to one or more of the other incentives, accordingly the discussion will occasionally address some 
of those incentives under the same title, as follows. 
1. Synergies 
Synergies are always classified as the main incentive that drives the decision maker to go 
through a merger transaction, and in addition to that it is always expected to realize synergies 
even if it is not the incentives that drive the parties.584 Synergies in the merger industry are 
defined as a “increase in competitiveness and resulting cash flows beyond what the [merging 
parties] are expected to accomplish independently,”	  585 and it could be explained more simply as 
the value created or added to the value of the parties by means of the merger transaction. 
To elaborate more, consider that simple example; the value of corporation A is VA, and 
the value of corporation B is VB, the value of both corporations together before the merger is 
VA+VB, while the value of both corporations together after merger transaction is expected to be 
VAB, which is greater than VA+VB, because it equals VA+VB+ Synergies.586 In other words, 
expecting that one plus one will be more than two after the merger transaction will drive the 
decision maker to enter into that transaction.587 
As it was shown previously, the merger is considered a restructuring tool, and generally 
speaking the corporate restructuring process can be divided into two main categories; the first 
category is restructuring for operational purposes (operational restructuring), and the second 
category is restructuring for financial purposes (financial restructuring). Accordingly, the main 
incentives to merger transaction as a restructuring tool can be also classified into two main 
categories; the first category is incentives related to the expected operational synergies, and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
583 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 3. 2011. 
584 Steffen Huck & Kai A. Konrad, Merger Profitability and Trade Policy, 106 THE SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF 
ECONOMICS 107, at 107 (2004). 
585 MARK L. SIROWER, THE SYNERGY TRAP: HOW COMPANIES LOSE THE ACQUISITION GAME at 6 (Free Press. 1997). 
586 ROSS, et al., Corporate Finance, supra note 401, at 823. 2002.  
587 REED, et al., The Art of M&A, supra note 366, at 27. 2007. 
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second category is the incentives related to the expected financial synergies.588 Both of these 
incentive categories will be addressed in that discussion each in turn, as follows. 
a) Operational synergies 
As it was previously mentioned, operational synergies is expected in most if not all 
merger transactions, meanwhile there are two subcategories of operational synergies to be 
expected out of the merger transactions. The first category is the operational synergies that could 
be realized on the vertical level, for instance the reduction of the sales and marketing costs of 
production inputs in case of merger between supplier and manufacturer, or of the final product in 
case of a merger between that manufacturer and the final product distributor.589 
The second category is the operational synergies that could be realized on the horizontal 
level, for instance the reduction of significant percentage of expenses by sharing or using some 
of the common resources between the merged corporations. For example reducing the fixed 
costs590 by sharing some of the resources such as facilities or even employees, or reducing 
variable costs by sharing the inventory costs of spare parts or any other resources that could be 
shared on the same horizontal level.591 
On both the horizontal and vertical levels the parties of the merger will realize synergies 
due to the average costs592 reduction, and that reduction could be explained under various 
explanations for instance, as a result of applying better management practices,593 and even easier 
compliance requirements.594 Meanwhile, there are two main theories in that regard, the first one 
is the economies of scope, according to which the synergies would be realized in the case that the 
average cost is less when the parties of the merger operates together. For example in the case of 
using the output or the products manufactured by one party as an input for another party of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
588 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 4, 13. 2011. 
589 REED, et al., The Art of M&A, supra note 366, at 19. 2007. 
590 Fixed costs is also known as overheads and are distinguished from variable costs as expenses to be incurred by 
the corporation independent of any change in the operations, either increase or decrease, for example facility’s rent 
and the management team pay. 
591 REED, et al., The Art of M&A, supra note 366, at 27. 2007. 
592 Average cost equals the total costs of certain products or services divided by the number of such products or 
services.  
593 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 4. 2011. 
594 Horst Lukanec, et al., Corporate Restructuring -- the European Cross-Border Merger Directive with a Special 
Focus on Employment Issues, 19 EMPLOYMENT & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW 13, at 13 (2009). 
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merger or even sharing some of the resources on the horizontal level as been previously 
mentioned.595 
On the other hand, the second theory is the economies of scale,596 under which the 
synergies would be realized in the case that the cost of operations for the parties of the merger is 
less when the scale of operations is increased, in other words the merger may induce the parties 
to increase the scale of their output and that might led to the reduction of average costs by 
spreading the fixed costs on more output.597 However, it should be mentioned, that this is not 
always the case because at certain levels of production or output the average cost will be 
increased if the output is increased, in other words if the marginal cost is more than the average 
cost, the merger will not realize synergies due to diseconomies of scale.598 
It should be noted here that realizing synergies in a merger under the theory of the 
economies of scale or even the economies of scope does not mean that the merging parties 
should operate in same facilities or use the same stores, etc. but they might share their resources 
while operating in different plants or facilities, to illustrate, the merging corporations may use the 
same sales, marketing, management, and financial teams while the production will remain in 
their own separated facilities or plants in different locations.599 
In the same context, George Stigler claimed that the theory of economies of scale is 
missing effective tools to determine the optimum scale of output, and thus he developed the 
technique known as “survivor method” in order to determine it accurately.600 The following 
example could be used to show in a simple way the main idea of the economies of scale; it was 
reported that the libraries in Indiana have a u-shape average cost curve, whereas for one small 
library with a circulation of 2,000 per year the average cost per circulation is 3.63 US dollars, 
and if some small and medium size libraries entered into a merger to reach a library with a 
circulation of 350,000 per year its average cost per circulation will be only 2.13 US dollars, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
595 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 44. 2005. 
596 For more discussion and details about the theory of economies of scale see George J. Stigler, The Economies of 
Scale, 1 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 54 (1958). 
597 MILLER, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide, supra note 414, at 11. 2008; 
DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 4. 2011; Hopkins, 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 215 (1999). 
598 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 35, 39. 2005. 
599 Id. at 46. 
600 Stigler, JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 596, at 54 (1958). 
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meanwhile the average cost of a library with a circulation of more than 350,000 per year will be 
at an average cost per circulation of more than 2.13 US dollars.601 
It is noteworthy that in order to realize the operational synergies in a horizontal merger 
transaction, economists claimed that there are preconditions, the main precondition is that the 
output of the merging parties should have different marginal costs,602 while in the case that the 
outputs have similar marginal cost it was stated that the mergers will not be profitable and 
accordingly the operational synergies will not be the incentive to drive such a merger 
transaction.603 
It is undoubtedly true that the merger might be induced not only by reducing the average 
costs of operations, but also by the other operational synergies that might be realized from 
reducing liabilities of the transactions, at least between the parties of the merger themselves, or 
even otherwise with third parties.604 Actually, operational synergies could also be realized by just 
improving the risk profile of any of the parties to the merger605 or even by enhancing the 
borrowing capabilities, to demonstrate a party of the merger may benefit from having access to 
certain output of the other parties and using it as a source of input during shortage periods in the 
market which will unquestionably support operations to better perform its obligations and to 
manage risk and liabilities. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that despite the fact that synergies are considered as the 
“magic force” that led to positive efficiencies, either as a revenue increase or even as cost cutting 
mechanism, some of the synergies coincided with a negative impact in general on economy. For 
instance, sharing common resources such as the management teams will lead to a fixed cost 
reduction by saving salaries, but in the same time that will lead to an unemployment negative 
effect on the economy i.e. job cuts will inevitably lead to an increase in the unemployment rates 
and even sometimes lead to losses for the merging corporations because most of the employees 
will get compensation packages upon leaving.606 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
601 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 41. 2005. 
602 Marginal cost is the change in the total costs when one more unit of outputs is produced. 
603 Qiu & Zhou, THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, supra note 242, at 215 (2007). 
604  MADS ANDENAS & WOOLDRIDGE FRANK, EUROPEAN COMPARATIVE COMPANY LAW at 491 (Cambridge 
University Press. 2009). 
605 MILLER, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide, supra note 414, at 12. 2008. 
606 Cicarini Jr., Valuation for M&A Purposes: An Analysis of its Importance to Present a Fair Value of a Company 
and its Implications for the M&A and Post-integration Process, supra note 407, at 16. 2009. 
117	  
b) Financial synergies 
The financial synergies are the second category of the synergies that might induce the 
parties to enter into merger, whereas the financial synergies simply refer to the synergies 
expected out the merger transaction by reducing the cost of capital.607 In that regard it was 
claimed that the cost of capital might be reduced in many merger cases, one of the clearest case 
is where one or more of the merging parties have excess cash flow and entered into the merger 
with one or more of the other merging parties that do not have enough internally generated 
financial resources to finance its operations, in other words the cost of financing the operations 
through debt will be reduced.608 
It could be argued that no synergies are realized in that situation and the corporation with 
excess cash flow would otherwise reduce its own cost of capital instead of the other merging 
party, meanwhile that is clearly untrue because the average reduction in cost of capital of the 
merging parties will be more than the reduction of the cost of capital only of the corporation with 
the excess cash flow. The reason behind that is actually the increase in the value of the merging 
parties reflected from the other merger operational synergies, for example the enhanced risk 
profile and borrowing capabilities. In addition to that, it could be maintained that the financial 
synergies could be realized even without any operational synergies through what is known as 
financial engineering.609 
In that context, explaining the P/E model,610 which is a financial engineering tool, will be 
a good example to show how merging parties would realize financial synergies through mergers 
and how it could be a robust incentive for the parties to enter into the merger transaction. 
Assume in a P/E game model, corporation “A” with an outstanding 1000 share and each share is 
worth 11 US dollars and its total earnings is 1000 US dollars, which means that its earnings per 
share (hereinafter EPS) is 1 US dollar and its P/E equal 11; while corporation “B” with an 
outstanding 1000 share and each share is worth 5 US dollars and its total earnings is also 1000 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
607 The cost of the capital is the minimum returns that are required to induce the future acquirer or the lender to 
finance the acquisition of corporations’ stocks either through debt or equity. 
608 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 5. 2011. 
609 MILLER, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide, supra note 414, at 9. 2008. 
610 P/E equals the market price of the stocks of certain corporation divided by its earnings to the shareholder, on a 
per stock basis, and for more details about the P/E model see GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate 
Restructurings, supra note 238, at 35-36. 2002; WESTON & WEAVER, Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 240, at 
88-89. 2001. 
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US dollars, and that means that its EPS is also 1 US dollar but its P/E equals 5, thus the total 
value of both A and B equals 15,000 US dollars. 
In the event that A acquired B through a stock-for-stock merger transaction, A would 
offer 1 share (worth 11 US dollars) for 2 shares of B (worth 10 US dollars + 1 US dollar as a 
premium611), and that means that A will offer 500 of its shares for the 1000 shares of B, and the 
merger will result in holding an outstanding amount of 1500 shares in total. Accordingly, the 
average EPS will be approximately 1.33 US dollars (the total earnings 2000 US dollars ÷ total 
number of shares 1500), and since the empirical results proved that the stock exchange will 
usually keep the old P/E of the acquirer not of the target,612 which was in that situation 11, 
whereas the final result will be that the average market price of each share approximately 14.6 
US dollars and the total value of the corporations approximately 21,900 US dollars instead of 
just 15,000 US dollars, before the merger i.e. 6,900 US dollars could be realized as a financial 
synergies out the thin air. 
It was even reported that the financial synergies that might be realized from the P/E game 
model was the only incentive in unprecedented number of merger transactions,613 and that was 
clearly evidenced during the period (1955 – 1970) i.e. the third merger wave in the US.614 As it 
was previously mentioned in the discussion of merger waves, that the third merger wave was 
mainly forced by the magic force of the financial synergies that were realized by means of a 
financial engineering tool and especially by using the P/E game model.615 
2. Misvaluation 
It has been previously mentioned during the discussion of the corporate valuation 
methods as a step in merger dynamics, which was strongly asserted that all the known valuation 
methods are highly subjective, and obviously do not always reflect the actual value of the 
corporation. In fact, the misvaluation results could be recognized on both sides of the spectrum 
i.e. it could be an overvaluation on one side or even an undervaluation on the other end of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
611 The difference between the estimated real value of a company and the actual price paid to obtain it. Acquisition 
premium represents the increased cost of buying a target company during a merger and acquisition. 
612 MILLER, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide, supra note 414, at 11. 2008; 
GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 35-36. 2002. 
613 MILLER, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide, supra note 414, at 10-11. 2008. 
614 GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 35. 2002. 
615 See supra p.42. 
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spectrum, and in both situations that inaccurate value may be an incentive to enter into merger 
transaction as it will be explained in that discussion. 
It could be easily claimed that misvaluation as an incentive to enter into merger 
transaction might be recognized in many cases: (1) in case that a corporation shares are 
undervalued thus acquiring these shares will be a good opportunity for other corporations, (2) in 
case that a corporation shares are overvalued then that might be a good opportunity for the 
corporation itself to acquire other corporations by using its own shares to finance the transaction, 
(3) in event that both situations happened at the same time i.e. the acquirer shares are overvalued 
and the target shares are undervalued, that will be the typical case in which the misvaluation will 
play a great role in inducing the acquirer to enter into the merger transaction in order to realize 
expected financial synergies.616 
It was also claimed that the misvaluation is not only one of the main incentives that 
drives the acquirer to enter into merger transaction but it might lead to the formation of a merger 
wave, and in that context it was also stated that the economic environment may be the reason 
behind the misvaluation, for instance the increased inflation and interest rates inevitably lead to a 
decrease in shares prices less than the value of the assets that are listed in the balance sheets i.e. 
the book value of the corporation.617 Moreover, it was maintained that the undervalued prices of 
the shares at a certain stock exchange in a certain country might induce the acquirer from other 
countries, where the prices of the shares are overvalued or even accurately valued to enter into 
cross-border mergers.618 
In that context, it is noteworthy that in order to verify that the valuation was not accurate 
and to determine whether there is an undervaluation or an overvaluation, James Tobin619 
developed what is known as Q-Ratio; the Q-Ratio is simply the ratio between the market price of 
a corporation’s shares to the cost of the replacement of its assets, and he also simply claimed that 
when the Q-Ratio is less than 1 the corporation is undervalued while on the other hand if the Q-
Ratio is more than 1 the corporation is overvalued.620 According to the Q-Ratio theory, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
616 Huck & Konrad, THE SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, supra note 584, at 107 (2004). 
617 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 9-10. 2011. 
618 Hopkins, Journal of International Management, supra note 2, at 215 (1999). 
619 James Tobin (March 5, 1918 – March 11, 2002) was an economist, and he received the Nobel Memorial Prize in 
Economics Sciences in 1981, and he served as a Professor at Yale University, and on the Council of Economic 
Advisors and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
620 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 9-10. 2011. 
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corporations with a Q-Ratio less 1 are always expected to be targets, while on the other hand 
corporations with a Q-Ratio more than 1 are expected to be acquirer. 
3. Managerial Purposes 
Management related purposes might be a strong incentive that induces the decision maker 
to enter into merger transaction. In that regard, it was reported that the most important of these 
management related incentives is the personal incentives that drives the managers or the decision 
makers to enter into the merger transaction, and that is known as “Hubris” and “Winner’s Curse” 
incentives,621 meanwhile there are other management related incentives like the improvement of 
the mismanagement practices and borrowing better corporate governance systems.622 That 
discussion will address both of these two categories of incentives, each in turn, as follows. 
a) Hubris and winner’s curse 
It has been reported that the results of analyzing the decision of the managers in several 
merger transactions revealed that most of the managers are highly biased like most of humans, 
and thus their decision are usually not just based on rational incentives, but are sometimes 
attributed to personal motives like hubris.623 In that regard, it was claimed that those biases could 
be categorized into three kinds of biases: (1) optimistic biases, (2) desirability biases, and (3) 
illusion of control biases.624 It was also held that those management biases always end up with 
overpaying problems, in order to acquire the target for personal purposes the manager or the 
decision maker might experience shame after winning the transaction along with losses or even 
failure, thus those incentives are known as “hubris” and “winner’s curse.”625 
According to the optimistic biases, the managers might believe that their performance 
will offset any overpaying, because they believe that their own valuation of the target and the 
transaction as a whole is very accurate, and the same for the expected future synergies, either 	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622 See generally David R. Kuipers, et al., The Legal Environment and Corporate Valuation: Evidence from Cross-
Border Takeovers, 18 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE 552 (2009). 
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624 For more details about these biases see generally Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, 
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121	  
operational or financial. While on the other hand the desirability biases refers to that the 
managers believe that certain events will happen in the future to put their expectation into effect, 
and finally the	  illusion of control refers to the fact that the managers believe that they will control 
all future events and disregard all risk and other factors that might put their expectations into 
question.626 
In most of the cases where those kinds of incentives drive the managers to enter into a 
merger transaction, and that is typically in a hostile takeover transactions, or whenever the 
transaction is done through a tender offer. The manager of the acquirer will win the contest 
because of the willingness to overpay, but the winner might experience winner’s curse because 
the decision might led to severe liabilities due to the fiduciary duty i.e. the manager’s decision 
will put himself into trouble because he was not taking into account the shareholder’s interest,627 
and it should be noted that these fiduciary duty issues are highly problematic and it is out of the 
scope of this dissertation. Meanwhile, in some other jurisdictions, for example Sweden, the 
directors and officers are protected from such liabilities under an insurance policy tailored 
especially to cover their liabilities in such circumstances.628 
b) Mismanagement 
Mismanagement could be realized in several management practices, but mainly in the 
case where the managers are focusing on their personal interests by improving the lifestyle, fake 
reputation, and job security, rather than the shareholders’ interests, which is definitely 
maximizing the share value, and that inevitably leads to the decrease of the price of the shares or 
even its value. Meanwhile, it was reported that in most cases the mismanagement practices push 
the situation toward the merger solution, in either way i.e. either as a target because the low price 
of the shares will be an incentive to the acquirers, or as an acquirer because managers will try to 
raise the price of the shares by acquiring a target with a low P/E, for example.629 
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In that context, Avi Eden, the Vice-Chair of a corporation based in the US, claimed that 
mismanagement is the main incentive to acquire a target, and by acquiring a mismanaged 
corporation his corporation could improve the management of the target and thus realize 
synergies to maximize the value of the shareholders, and he also added that his corporation will 
not acquire a target that is well performing or one in which its management could not be 
improved if acquired.630 On the other hand, the mismanagement could be corrected by acquiring 
a better-managed corporation in order to borrow its good management practices after replacing 
the mismanagement team with that better one.631 
In the same context, it was asserted that the most successful merger transaction driven by 
the mismanagement incentive is the merger where the acquirer is a large corporation with good 
management practices and system to follow, and the target is a small corporation that is typically 
a startup and is led by an entrepreneur with low to no management skills but with an innovative 
good or service. 632 Moreover, good management or better corporate governance practices might 
be as an incentive for the mismanaged corporation in order to offset their losses and maximize 
the value of the shareholders. 
Ironically, that in not always the case, mismanagement might even be misused, whereas 
the management team might decide to enter into a merger transaction in order to benefit from the 
mismanagement opportunities i.e. to avoid their obligations and liabilities towards the 
shareholders under the rules in their jurisdiction, in other words by entering into a merger 
transaction with a corporation in a jurisdiction where the rules are more tolerant or even friendly 
to mismanagement practices. This can be seen in some jurisdictions where the shareholders 
rights are highly protected under laws and regulation while in other jurisdictions the managers 
are secured against any liabilities toward the shareholders, for example under the insurance 
policies in Sweden, as it was just mentioned, decision makers may acquire a target in one of 
those permissible jurisdictions.633 
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632 GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 151. 2002. 
633 See generally Kuipers, et al., INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & FINANCE, supra note 622, (2009). 
123	  
4. Technological Alignment 
Generally speaking, owning technological advancements are one of the most important 
tools for a corporation to compete efficiently with other corporations in the same industry, 
especially when there are huge technological gap between various jurisdictions.634 Owning such 
technological advancement might be done in many ways, starting from developing it internally 
by the research and development (hereinafter R&D) internal unit, licensing, franchise, or any 
other growth alternatives to mergers as has previously been discussed. Meanwhile, it is not easy 
to develop such technological advancements internally through R&D, and using other growth 
alternatives might have disadvantages or at least do not grant the acquirer the same benefits or 
rights of the owner that are gained through the merger transaction. 
Accordingly, the alignment with the technological advancements could be one of the 
merger incentives, and the 73 billion US dollars merger transaction between GlaxoWellcome and 
SmithKline Beecham in 1999 to form GlaxoSmithKline635 is very good example to prove that the 
gains from mergers especially in the technological advancements field could be the main 
incentive for corporation to enter into merger transaction, and here the merger result was the 
merging of the two corporations R&D budgets, which is highly important in the pharmaceutical 
industry and inevitably led to realized expected gains.636 
It is undoubtedly true that the alignment with the technological advancement as an 
incentive for a merger transaction is not limited to certain industries like the pharmaceutical 
industry, meanwhile it is clear in some industries that the technological advancement is crucial 
not only to the growth of the corporation but is also considered as a surviving precondition, that 
could also clearly be identified in the telecommunications industry and all the other technology 
based industries, for instance the consumer electronics industry, internet based services, the 
internet providing services, etc.637 
It is noteworthy that on the cross-border mergers level, there is a special model for the 
technological advancement as an incentive for parties to enter into merger transaction; whereas 
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635 GlaxoSmithKline is one of the largest pharmaceutical corporation and for more information about its history 
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some countries have a comparative advantage638 in technology while others have a comparative 
advantage in labor costs, thus the model predicts that the gaps in both the technology and the 
labor costs, are incentives for corporations in both countries to enter mergers. Furthermore, the 
merger will be considered a tool for more specialization and realizing the synergies of mergers 
along with the other benefits of specialization, and that model is strongly supported by empirical 
evidences.639 
In addition to that, it was claimed that entering into a merger in order to acquire the 
technological advancements may serve different purposes other than just the growth or 
efficiencies, for instance it was held that corporation may enter into merger in order to own 
technological advancements for defensive purposes, for example eBay640 acquired Skype641 in 
2006 for the purpose to keep the technological advancements out of the hand of its competitor, 
which turned out to be wrong and eBay even resell Skype in 2009 and admitted its failure to 
realize the expected benefits.642 
5. Exchange Rates 
While the exchange rate is simply the rate at which one currency is exchanged for 
another, and that obviously will not induce a merger transaction that are concluded in the same 
jurisdiction or at least where all parties of the transaction are using the same currency, it was 
claimed that the exchange rate plays a strong role in inducing cross-border merger 
transactions.643 To better understand how the exchange rate might be considered as a cross-
border merger incentive the following example is always given; whenever the value of a certain 
currency in jurisdiction A is relatively less than the foreign currency in jurisdiction B, the 
corporations at country A will be an expected target to acquirers from B and vice versa. 	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Moreover, it was claimed that there was clear evidence in the US, that whenever the 
exchange rate of the US dollar is high relative to other foreign currencies, it is expected to see 
increasing activities and this may be a trend for US corporations to acquire foreign corporation 
from the jurisdictions where the exchange is low relatively to the US dollar, and during the 
periods where the US dollar is experiencing exchange rate difficulties, the US corporations will 
be a good opportunity for acquirers from the other countries with a better exchange rate 
relatively to the US dollar.644 
Unfortunately, these claims are not accurate because the mere differences between 
currencies value i.e. the exchange rate, is not the indicator of the purchase power of the 
currency,645 which is actually the factor that might be considered as an incentive to enter into 
cross-border merger. To elaborate more, whenever a corporation that holds a currency with 
strong purchasing power acquires a target, and the transaction is concluded in a weaker currency, 
in that case the acquirer corporation would expect to gain synergies from that transaction. 
In that context, it could be claimed that even the purchase power of currency has no 
clear-cut effect on the cross-border merger, because the gains that might be expected from the 
cross-border merger due to the differences in the purchasing power of the parties, may be offset 
by remitting the earnings of the target to the home country of the acquirer as the purchasing 
power of the earning currency will also be weak. To be more precise, the net wealth of the 
parties to the cross-border merger may be affected by the fluctuation of the purchasing power of 
their different currencies, and that should be of important consideration for them and may induce 
them to enter into the transaction.646 
6. Strategic and Market Incentives 
It is undoubtedly true that entering into a merger transaction is considered as a strategy 
itself toward the growth of the corporation; meanwhile some other strategic plans might induce 
the corporation to enter into a merger transaction, for instance a merger might help the 
corporation to capitalize on its main operations or even diversify, increase its market power, 	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provide the corporation with additional resources, and finally benefit from belonging to a 
successful parent corporation or group of corporations which is known as “parenting 
advantage.”647 
Furthermore, the diversifications of operations generally reduce risk and increase the 
borrowing capabilities of corporations.648 In that context, it was claimed that the strategy of 
expanding the operations to new products or markets with more expected returns is a good 
example to show how diversifications is risk reducing,649 and it was also maintained that 
diversifications on an international level across more than one economy might be more 
beneficial. 650  Accordingly, a corporate strategy to diversify operations by adding a new 
production line, in another country to minimize the risk profile, is good illustration to show how 
the diversification of operations might be an incentive for a corporation to enter into a cross-
border merger transaction.651 
One more clearer example to demonstrate how the corporate strategy might be an 
incentive for a corporation to enter into a cross-border merger transaction, is the case of a 
corporation operating in the consumer electronic industry and has a skilled marketing and sales 
teams, but it did not own patents of new products to satisfy consumers, in addition there is a 
recession in the market in its home country due to the high costs of production. That corporation 
may develop a strategic plan to decrease the costs of production and own new products, thus its 
strategic plan might encompass entering into a merger transaction with a corporation that already 
owns patents of new products, and into a cross-border merger transaction with a corporation that 
could produce these products at lower costs of production. 
In the same context, it was also claimed that corporation might develop certain 
competition strategy, and that strategy could be achieved through dominant position i.e. gaining 
enough market power to control the supply certain products or services, and that entering into 
one or even a series of merger transactions might be the best decision that could serve such 
monopolistic purposes, and accordingly the corporate competition strategy that might be an 
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incentive for the corporation to enter into a merger transaction.652 Such an incentive might raise 
an antitrust question,653 which will be addressed later during the discussions of the merger 
control.654 
In addition to that, it was propertied that not only the corporate strategies that are 
developed to gain market power are an incentive to enter into merger transaction, but also the 
market itself might be an incentive. The market itself as an incentive for mergers could clearly be 
realized in most of the cross-border merger transactions, whereas the differences between 
markets in different jurisdictions will give the merging parties the opportunity to realize the 
expected synergies, and therefore is considered as an incentive for the corporation to enter into 
mergers. To further illustrate this, a more lenient market policies or even deregulated markets in 
certain jurisdiction might induce corporation from another jurisdiction to enter into a cross-
border merger, in order to benefit from such polices instead of starting from the “ground zero” in 
that market or even using the other growth alternatives to enter such markets.655 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that it was claimed that the market itself as a factor might 
significantly induce and boost cross-border merger activities generally, or even in specific 
economy or industry, but it should not be considered as an incentive that drive specific merger 
transaction, and many examples were given in that regard to identify such market factors; for 
instance the accelerated technological advancements, the reduced communication and 
transportation expenses, the improvements in the quality of research and development, and both 
industry regulation and deregulation.656 In fact that claim is clearly incorrect, because if a certain 
factor will boost mergers generally, that certain factor might obviously induce certain transaction 
and therefore will be considered as an incentive for such transaction. 
7.  Tax Efficiencies 
As it has been previously mentioned during the discussion of structuring the merger 
transaction, taxes might significantly influence the structure of the transaction, as it might be 	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taxable or what is known as tax-free transaction.657 Taxes once again have a vital role in merger 
transactions because it is also considered an incentive that might drive corporations to enter into 
merger transaction.658 For instance, it was claimed that a corporation might gain benefits from 
entering into merger with another corporation in many cases due to the expected tax	  efficiencies, 
for example, it might be expected to benefit from; offsetting the loss by carrying forward the 
combined taxable income, from using the unused investment tax credits, offsetting depreciation 
expenses that might be changed due to a change in the book value of the assets after the 
revaluation is done during the merger transaction, among other tax efficiencies.659 
Meanwhile, in the same context, it was argued that in only a few cases, the expectation of 
realizing tax benefits might be considered as the incentive that induced the parties to enter into to 
the merger transaction.660 It was even reported empirically, that just announcing the expected tax 
benefits from the proposed transaction during the merger process, in the cases of offsetting the 
loss and carrying forward and using the unused tax credits, will inevitably affect the returns of 
the parties of the transaction significantly, during the process of the merger itself.661 
One more time, tax efficiencies as an incentive for mergers could clearly be shown in 
most of the cross-border merger transactions, whereas the differences between the taxing 
regimes in different jurisdictions will give the merging parties the opportunity to realize the 
expected synergies and therefore is considered as an incentive for the corporation to enter into 
mergers, for instance lower tax rates, more lenient taxing policies, or even tax-free jurisdictions, 
which are known as tax heavens, might induce corporations from another jurisdictions to enter 
into cross-border mergers in order to realize gains from such benefits under the foreign taxing 
regime instead of being attacked under the national taxing regime or even as a step in the plan to 
relocate to such jurisdiction. 
In that context, it should be noted that those tax efficiencies could be realized away from 
any tax evasion practices such as splitting profits within non-arm’s length662 corporations and 	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transfer pricing techniques,663 which might be controlled under bilateral treaties that are specially 
held between different jurisdictions to prevent such practices and domestic national regulation 
respectively.664 Moreover, returns might be taxable even if it were realized abroad according to 
the US taxing regime as well as many other “worldwide taxation” regimes,665 which means that 
entering into a merger with a corporation in a tax heaven might not be that attractive. 
Accordingly, it was claimed that whenever tax consequences after the conclusion of the 
transaction are significant the tax efficiencies might be the main incentive for the transaction; in 
other cases it might be considered as a secondary incentive or even a non-issue.666 
II. Mergers Efficiencies 
As it was previously mentioned, the parties of the merger transaction are almost taking 
their decision to enter into such transaction based on the expected gains, and it does not really 
matter what they are looking for, and even if it appears that they may have different focuses, it 
mainly comes down to one main goal which is growth, either to maximize the value for 
shareholders or even for personal purposes i.e. hubris. Actually, all the discussion concerning 
merger incentives was in fact addressed from a premerger point of view, but now the question 
that should be addressed is whether mergers are efficient, in other words do all mergers succeed, 
or do they all fail, or do some succeed and others fail. 
Other important questions are: what are the factors that lead to the success or even the 
failure of the mergers, who will gain the fruits in the case of success, the acquirer, the target, the 
employees, the consumer, or the whole society, and who might suffer losses out of the merger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
663 Transfer pricing technique means setting the price of certain products or services between two or more non-arm’s 
length corporations in order to allocate profits and losses, for more details about Transfer Pricing see generally 
WOLFGANG SCHO ̈N & KAI ANDREAS KONRAD, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING IN LAW AND 
ECONOMICS (Kai Andreas Konrad & Wolfgang Schön eds., Springer. 2012). For more details about Transfer Pricing 
in Practice see Id. at 159-256., for details about the approach of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (hereinafter OECD) to Transfer Pricing see Id. at 71-158. 
664 Most of the national taxing regimes regulates Transfer Pricing, for more information about the OECD countries’ 
transfer pricing profile see http://www.oecd.org/ctp/transfer-pricing/transferpricingcountryprofiles.htm, moreover 
the Egyptian income tax law No.91 of 2005 regulates the Transfer Pricing practices, and for more about the 
Egyptian system see Egypt Tax Guide 2012 at 4 (PKF International Limited April 2012)., meanwhile it is 
noteworthy that it is not easy to identify the effectiveness of the transfer pricing regulations as been indicated in 
ASSAF RAZIN & JOEL SLEMROD, TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY at 150-151 (University of Chicago Press 
Paperback 1992 ed. 1990). 
665 For example Philippine also have a worldwide taxation regime, Taxation of Cross-Border Mergers and 
Acquisitions: Philippines at 8 (Maria Georgina J. Soberano ed., KPMG International 2012); RAZIN & SLEMROD, 
Taxation in the Global Economy, supra note 664, at 2. 1990. 
666 ANDREW J. SHERMAN, Mergers & Acquisitions from A to Z, supra note 391, at 113-114. 2006. 
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success or failure. More importantly, one more question should be addressed in the same context, 
is there a clear-cut answer for any of these questions, and whether there are empirical findings 
that might support the answers to such question. The answers to all these questions will be for 
the purpose of answering the most vital question, is it really worth entering into a merger 
transaction or is it just a theoretical idea or myth. In the coming discussion, all these questions 
will be addressed in some details, as follows. 
1. Mergers Efficiencies in Theory and Empirical Findings 
There is a great debate concerning the mergers efficiencies,667 some scholars claim that 
mergers always fail, while others to the contrary claim that mergers always succeed, in the same 
context other claims that there are some factors for success and others for failure, and the success 
or failure depends on the conditions of each case, because it is undoubtedly true that not all 
mergers are the same and each transaction has its own conditions. Surprisingly, these 
contradicting claims are not only in theory but were also reported in empirical researches, as it 
will be shown in that discussion. 
Theoretically, it was maintained that mergers efficiencies could be generally categorized, 
into three main scenarios according to the incentives that induced the decision maker to enter 
into the transaction: (1) in the first scenario, the transaction is driven by incentives related to 
synergies and value creation, and it is expected in theory in that scenario that all the parties of the 
transaction will realize gains i.e. the value of the acquirer and the target will be increased, and 
accordingly the total value will be increased, (2) in the second scenario, the transaction is driven 
by incentives related to managerial purposes and misevaluation, and it is expected in theory in 
that scenario that the target will realize gains while the acquirer might suffer losses, and 
accordingly the losses might offset the gains, (3) in the third scenario, the transaction is driven by 
incentives related to mistakes such as these incentives might raise agency problems issues, and it 
is expected in theory in that scenario that the target might realize gains while these gains will not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
667 For more details about Efficiency gains from mergers from an economists point of view see Lars-Hendrik Roller, 
et al., Efficiency Gains from Mergers, in EUROPEAN MERGER CONTROL: DO WE NEED AN EFFICIENCY DEFENCE? 
(Fabienne Ilzkovitz & Roderick Meiklejohn eds., 2006). 
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compensate the losses suffered by the acquirer, and accordingly the total value of the parties will 
be decreased.668 
As it was previously shown, most of the merger transactions are expecting to realize 
gains, at least in theory, for all the parties to the transaction. Meanwhile, it has been held that 
some of the mergers patterns are not efficient, at least for the acquirer.669	  Additionally, from a 
practical point of view it was claimed that most of the mergers are efficient even for the 
acquirer.670 Indeed the history of the mergers waves, which was previously discussed during the 
discussions of the corporation history,671 might support the practical claims and put the other 
claims into a perplexing question, because it does not make sense that most of mergers are 
inefficient, while merger transactions are booming and setting records in both the number and 
the value of the transactions, and in almost all of the industries during the past century at least 
until now.672 
Despite the fact that there are great difficulties in accurately measuring most of the gains 
from the merger transactions,673 it could be argued that by using the empirical research the 
debate between the contradicting efficiency claims will come to an end, for instance by 
monitoring the prices of the shares of the merging parties it might be easier to identify any gains 
or losses to the parties. In that context, there are unprecedented volume of empirical evidences, 
derived from what is known as “event studies,” reported that in almost all merger transactions 
the target realized short run gains in the prices of its shares, and it was also reported that these 
gains might be on the long run in many cases.674 
Moreover, it was also reported that the gains that are realized by target in the form of the 
increased prices of its shares, are mainly due to the premium and usually starts from the date of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
668 WESTON & WEAVER, Mergers and Acquisitions, supra note 240, at 83-84. 2001. 
669 Id. 
670 James A. Fanto, Quasi-Rationality in Action: A Study of Psychological Factors in Merger Decision-Making, 62 
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 1333, at 1334 (2001). 
671 See supra p.42. 
672 Anju Seth, et al., Value Creation and Destruction in Cross-Border Acquisitions: An Empirical Analysis of 
Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Firms, 23 STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT JOURNAL 921, at 921 (2002); Kenneth J. Hamner, 
The Globalization of Law: International Merger Control and Competition Law in the United States, the European 
Union, Latin America and China, 11 THE JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY 385, at 386-387 (2002). 
673 ROSS, et al., Corporate Finance, supra note 401, at 845. 2002. 
674 Mueller, Efficiency Versus Market Power Through Mergers, supra note 413, at 69-70. 2004; BLACK, Conceptual 
Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 26. 2005; ROSS, et al., Corporate Finance, supra note 401, at 841, 844. 
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the announcement of the transaction and reaches its peak on the closing date.675 Accordingly, 
that obviously means that these argued gains might not be classified as merger gains, because it 
is mainly realized during the premerger period and it could be realized even if the parties fails to 
conclude the transaction at the designated date. In that context, it was claimed that these price 
fluctuations are just a product of “reshuffling of ownership that produces short-run … gains,”676 
and it was even reported that the parties of the unsuccessful merger i.e. not closed, usually 
suffers from decrease in the price of its shares.677 
In addition to that, it was even claimed that the increase of the prices of the shares of the 
target might be a mere result of management tactics usually used to raise the premium or to 
prevent certain acquirer from closing the transaction, such tactics are known as the poison pills, 
which are mainly used as a defense in a hostile takeover transaction, on the other hand it was 
reported that the acquirer would realize gains to the price of its shares if succeeded in acquiring 
the target in such a hostile takeover, more than the gains that might be realized if succeeded to 
acquire a target through a friendly merger transaction.678 
While it was just mentioned that there is a great difficulty in accurately measure most of 
the gains from merger transactions, that does not mean that there are no indicative empirical 
findings to measure such gains. For instance, some scholars directly examined and analyzed the 
accounting data to identify any gains to the value of the merging parties, instead of just watching 
the price of their shares, and that data revealed that actual increase in value, if any, is less than 
what is reflected in the price of the shares, while on the other hand some researchers using 
almost the same techniques of retrieving the findings directly from the accounting data, reported 
that the parties realized significant gains i.e. value creation, most importantly due to the change 
to better management or even through saving by “eliminate[ing] redundancies and overlapping 
positions.”679 
In that context, it was reported that whenever the acquirer is from a jurisdiction that is 
more concerned with shareholders rights and the target jurisdiction does not have the same 
concerns, that will usually drive the merger transaction to create value and realize significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
675 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 26. 2005; Mueller, Efficiency Versus Market 
Power Through Mergers, supra note 413, at 71. 2004. 
676 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 25. 2005. 
677 ROSS, et al., Corporate Finance, supra note 401, at 841. 2002. 
678 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 25. 2005. 
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gains, while on the other hand in the cases where the	  acquirer is from a jurisdiction that is more 
concerned with markets than the jurisdiction of the target, that will not drive the merger to create 
value as much as in the situation where the acquirer is from the shareholder rights oriented 
jurisdiction.680 
Furthermore, it is even reported that the empirical findings in most of cases revealed no 
evidence for costs reductions after mergers,681 and even claimed that mergers destroy value more 
than create value to its parties.682 However, it was stated that these empirical findings i.e. those 
studies that reported that there are no evidence for value creation, are virtually not accurate 
especially with concern to cross-border mergers, whereas most of those studies do not take the 
transaction incentives into consideration, whereas the merger incentives might not lead to 
immediate value creation or even that some mergers were driven by personal incentives like 
hubris and are not expected to realize gains on the corporate level at anytime.683 On the other 
hand, it was reported to the contrary of these findings that most of mergers create value for the 
parties and reduce costs.684 
It should be noted here that there is a great debate concerning the empirical findings of 
the cross-border mergers, and whether it proves that it is efficient, and if so, is it more efficient to 
enter into such kind of transaction than entering into a pure domestic transaction. In that context, 
it was reported that the empirical findings revealed that the gains realized from the cross-border 
mergers are significantly higher than those might be realized from the pure domestic 
transactions, but these gains are not attributed to certain factors but attributed to general 
differences between jurisdictions like the differences in the taxation regimes and exchange 
rates.685 
Meanwhile, on the other hand, it was also expressed that the empirical findings revealed 
that the gains realized from the domestic mergers are actually differ from those that might be 	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at 702-703 (2000). 
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realized from the cross-border merger transactions, but which gains are more beneficial for the 
merging parties will mainly depend on both the trade and merger policies adopted in the national 
and the foreign jurisdictions, and there are a lot of permutations and combinations in that regard 
that will end up with different results, for instance, more gains would be realized in pure 
domestic than in cross-border mergers if closed market policies were adopted on the national 
level and vice versa, and it was also reported that pure domestic mergers will benefit the national 
economy and will harm the foreign economy.686 
It should be mentioned that all these empirical findings are the result of observation and 
analysis of massive amounts of data, which is almost the same in empirical studies in any other 
field. However, the findings concerning the mergers’ efficiency are generally contradicting, and 
that is mainly due to number of variables: (1) each empirical research observes and analyzes 
different set of data concerning specific number of mergers, during specific period, financed by 
specific financial tools, mostly in specific jurisdictions, and in specific industries, (2) there are 
inherent limitations due to confidentiality issues, whereas the access to data might not be granted 
easily, (3) most of the researches was based on the idea that merger decision was a rational 
decision and does not take into consideration the different incentives of each transaction. 
Accordingly, the discussion was aiming to show how researches are contradicting in their 
findings without analyzing the numbers or arguing about its validity, as this is out of the scope of 
this discussion. 
Moreover, it should be also noted that those empirical findings depends mainly on how 
the researcher define failure and that significantly varies from one to another, some might 
attribute them to the accomplishment of the incentives, others only to certain financial goals, etc. 
For instance, in order to show how many factors are influencing the rationality of the merger 
decision, and that empirical researches should take incentives into consideration, some empirical 
researches reported that many psychological factors influences the decision of entering into a 
merger transaction, and that these factors affect the performance of the corporation after closing 
the merger transaction.687 Those psychological factors along with other factors will lead to the 
success or failure, and that issue will be addressed in the following discussion. 
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2. Factors for Success and Failure 
First, it should be noted that since the internal factors are mainly the factors that might 
affect the success or failure i.e. to meet the expectation of the parties after closing the 
transactions, this discussion will be limited only to these internal factors, while on the other hand 
the external factors will be addressed later in the discussion of the impediments of merger. That 
is mainly because, as it was previously mentioned, this section is concerned in the first place 
with merger efficiency and to answer the question of is it really worth it to enter into a merger 
transaction or is it just a myth or theoretical idea. The answer might help in answering the next 
question in cases where mergers are really worth it; what are the external factors that might 
impede it success. 
Examining the literature to determine the factors that led to the success or the failure of 
the merger transactions, revealed that there is no single factor that could be identified as the 
success or magic key, or as the doorway to failure, meanwhile there are a long list of factors that 
might be considered as factors for success, and another list of factors that might be considered as 
failure factors. Despite the fact that many of these factors could be listed in both lists, the failure 
list is not as long as the success factors list, as it will be shown in this discussion, as follows. 
The success factors list is a very long,688 however, these factors could be categorized into 
five main categories, each one is comprised of many factors. The first category is the cross-
border related factors, and that category includes the following factors: (1) add new distribution 
channels i.e. entering new markets, (2) improve existing distribution channels by circumventing 
trade barriers at the home country of the target and other countries to which that home country 
has special access such as in the case of common markets, (3) advantageous operational inputs 
i.e. better quality or cheaper production inputs, less expensive workforces or more trained 
employees, more advanced output tools, (4) regulatory advantages i.e. more lenient policies or 
deregulated industries, less tax rates, more political stability, better investment incentives, 
transparency and accountability, and easier licensing requirement or waiver conditions, and (5) 
exchange rates differences. 
The second category of success factors is the technology related factors, which includes 
the following factors: (1) acquire new IPR, (2) obtain new technology, (3) get new R&D 	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potentials, (4) fully exploit already owned technology, (5) fully exploit already owned IPR, (6) 
entering technology related industries, and (7) upgrade existing technological advancement. The 
third category is the management related factors, and it includes the following factors: (1) 
integration of several teams on all levels for instance the management, marketing, operational, 
sales teams, etc., (2) adopting new management strategies, (3) adopting better management 
practices, (4) adopting better corporate governance practices, and (5) adopting better corporate 
culture. 
The fourth category of success factors is the market related factors, which includes the 
following factors: (1) increase market share, (2) economy of scope advantages, (3) 
diversification advantages,689 (4) market power, and (5) fewer competitors. The fifth category of 
success factors is the financial related factors that include the following: (1) cost reductions due 
to economies of scale, (2) enhanced financial portfolio, (3) enhanced risk profile, (4) access to 
new financing resources, (5) enhanced borrowing capabilities, and (6) fully utilization of all 
resources. 
On the other hand, the list of failure factors includes three main factors, in addition to 
some success factors that might be considered as failure factors if not used properly and in the 
right direction and time, for example focusing on the integration between teams might lead to 
poor performance and then lead to failure.690 The first failure factor is overpaying i.e. paying a 
very high premium that no synergies might possibly offset,691 or at least could not easily be 
restored over long terms.692 The second factor is a failed, costly, or slow pace of the integration 
process i.e. integration between the different management policies, teams, operations, accounting 
systems, corporate culture, etc.693 The third factor is the mismanagement errors, which might 
occur due to practices that are mainly intended to satisfy personal purposes, such as mergers that 
are driven by hubris,694 or some other psychological factors. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
689 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 27. 2005. He claimed that some empirical 
findings reported that the more diversified operations are after closing the merger the less the gains would be 
realized by the acquirer. 
690 Fanto, OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL, supra note 670, at 1335 (2001). 
691 Hopkins, JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 2, at 213 (1999). 
692 For example a premium of more than 50% was proposed by the US corporation United Parcel Services (UPS) to 
acquire the Dutch corporation TNT-express in a 6.85 billion US dollars transaction, and UPS planned to spend 1.3 
billion euros for integration purposes, for more details about that proposed transaction see Anthony Deutsch, et al., 
UPS to Buy TNT for 5.2 Billion Euros (Anna Willard ed., Thomson Reuters 2012). 
693 DEPAMPHILIS, Mergers and Acquisitions Basics All You Need to Know, supra note 239, at 43. 2011. 
694 Mueller, Efficiency Versus Market Power Through Mergers, supra note 413, at 69. 2004. 
137	  
In that context, some empirical findings reported that there are some psychological 
factors that influences the decision of entering into the merger transaction, and that the factors 
affect the performance of the corporation even after closing the transaction. 695  Those 
psychological factors are mainly: (1) myopia: under such factor, thoughtless emotions would 
mainly drive the decision maker, (2)	   status-quo: under that bias, the fear to lose the current 
market power or position drives the decisions, (3)	  extremeness aversion: under such factor the 
decision maker opts for average strategies and results and keeps away from extremes even if it 
could lead to gains or avoid losses, (4) over optimism: under such factor, decisions are based on 
unrealistic expectation even if contradicting with solid norms and empirical statistics, and (5) 
anchoring heuristic: under that bias, decisions are based on an arbitrary selected “anchor” i.e. 
values that readily available, and the decision maker holds tight to that “anchor” despite the fact 
that it is contradicting with rational reasoning.696 
Finally, it should be noted that those lists of success and failure factors are not an 
exhaustive list of factors that might led to the failure or the success of merger transactions, and as 
previously mentioned that each transaction has its own unique conditions and factors, which if 
properly used and fully utilized will led to success and vice versa. Furthermore, addressing those 
factors and the empirical findings of mergers efficiency indeed did not give a solid answer or 
draw a full picture about mergers, as to whether it is efficient and worthwhile, and what are the 
impacts on the other parties in society, all these issues will be addressed in the following 
discussion. 
3. The Full Domestic Picture and Drawbacks 
The full picture of the merger efficiencies is not only the gains and losses to the parties of 
the transaction, but in the full picture other stakeholders or third parties should be considered in 
measuring the merger efficiencies, because the merging corporations are not living in a vacuum, 
they are many other parties and stakeholders that are living in society, and they might be affected 
by those merger transactions, even if they are not engaged as a party to the transaction or not 
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even as an antitrust authority, to be more precise there are consumers, competitors, new 
investors, employees, and other stakeholders might be affected generally by the economy. 
In one of his speeches, namely his speech before the conference of the “Merger 
Regulation in the EU after 20 years,”697 Joaquín Almunia, who was the Vice President of the EC 
and the Commissioner responsible for Competition Policy Competition in the EU, until 
November 2014, after listing some of the gains that are expected from mergers, he said that: 
“[t]he full picture is more complicated, because mergers can also harm consumers and the 
economy when, for example, they allow firms to have too much market power. Instead of 
locking in efficiencies, some mergers can lock out competition; and for a very long time.”698 
Despite the fact that the words of Joaquín Almunia should be examined and verified, it 
summaries not the full picture of the merger efficiencies but in fact one of the hottest debate in 
that industry, and indeed reflects on the concerns and the opinion of not only the government 
officials and antitrust authorities, but also most of scholars, that debate is namely the gained 
market power effects out of the merger transactions. In that mentioned picture, four parties could 
be identified as follows: the merging corporations, their competitors, the consumer, and the 
society in general i.e. the economy. 
However, the full picture still not complete, there is a missing fifth party, which is the 
employee. One might claim that this party was not intentionally missed in the picture, and what 
happened is that party was not on the agenda of that conference, but in fact that was not the case 
because that is not the first incidence not to consider the employee in the picture, and it was even 
reported that many government officials in many jurisdictions clearly mentioned that the 
employees issues in the merger industries are “not considered” at all.699 
The full picture also explicitly suggests that despite any efficiencies or gains that might 
be realized by the parties of the transactions, it is also expected that the other parties will 
experience drawbacks. Those drawbacks can be categorized into two main categories; the first 
category is the negative effects that might result from the market power gained through the 
merger or in other words the anticompetitive and monopolistic practices, and the second category 
is the negative effects that might be experienced by the employees. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
697 The conference was organized by the International Bar Association and EC, and was held on 9–11 March 2011 in 
Brussels.  
698 Joaquín Almunia, EU Merger Control has Come of Age at 2 (IBA Antitrust Committee and the European 
Commission ed., 2011).  
699 Efficiency Gains from Mergers: Report of EC Contract II/98/003. (2001). 
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Concerning the anticompetitive practices, it was claimed that the competitors of the 
merging parties may suffer from market power gained by the surviving corporation after the 
merger, whereas it might gain enough power to drive all of them or at least some of them out of 
the market.700 In the same context, but with regard to the monopolistic practices, it was 
maintained that the consumer would be mainly affected by the increasing of the prices due to the 
limitation on output, in the situations where the merging parties entered into monopolistic 
practices to maximize their profits.701 
To elaborate more in that concern i.e. on how limiting the output will harm the society, 
consider the following elaborations according to the following figure; in the case that 
corporations in the market are competing with one another, corporations will compete until they 
reach the equilibrium situation where they produce certain quantity of output (Q), which is 
determined by the market forces at the point where the supply or the marginal cost (MC) 
intersects with the demand curve (D), accordingly the corporations will offer that output at a 
price (P) equal to the marginal cost (MC) of that quantity of output (Q), and in that situation 
there will be a consumer surplus.702 
While on the other hand, if there is no actual competition between the corporations in the 
market, the concerned corporation or corporations will try to limit their production to certain 
quantity (Q1) according to its willpower, and that will be at the point where the marginal cost 
(MC) intersects with the marginal revenue (MR), and accordingly the corporation will offer the 
unit of that quantity of output at a higher price (P1), and accordingly the consumer will pay 
higher price and the corporation will decrease its output, these losses are generally known as the 
dead-weight loss or welfare loss.703 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700 Mueller, Efficiency Versus Market Power Through Mergers, supra note 413, at 66-67. 2004. 
701 Hamner, THE JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW & POLICY, supra note 672, at 388 (2002); BLACK, Conceptual 
Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 25. 2005. 
702 Consumer surplus occurs when the consumer is willing to pay more than market price to in the return for certain 
products or services. 
703 GAUGHAN, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings, supra note 238, at 138-139. 2002. 
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Figure 10: The conventional economic justification of antitrust rules 
In that regard, it could be claimed that the main goal of mergers is contradicting with that 
assumption, because the merging corporation will mainly be interested in expansion and 
reaching the gains or the expected synergies from the economies of scale i.e. efficiency.704 
Meanwhile, and based on that fact, the antitrust authorities are interested in investigation whether 
the merger will lead to certain effects in the market, not only the simple model of the sole player 
in the market who could determine the output for the market. Those effects are mainly classified 
into three categories: (1) unilateral or un-coordinated effects, (2) coordinated effects, (3) 
conglomerate effects.705 These effects will be addressed later in detail during the discussion of 
the foundational errors as a drawback of the merger control systems.706 
It was also claimed that the antitrust laws could be also justified in addition to the loss 
suffered by the consumer due to the output limitation by the corporation, there will also be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
704 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 18-20. 2005. 
705 Jonathan Green & Gianandrea Staffiero, Economics of Merger Control, THE HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION 
ECONOMICS 8, at 8 (2007). 
706 See infra p.235. 
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indirect losses that will be suffered by the consumer as result of the false messages sent to 
corporations in other industries that certain output is worth more than its actual price.707 
In that context it was held that according to the Chicago School of Economics,708 the 
consumer welfare model, which is in fact aiming to offset the consumer losses that might be 
realized due the limitation of the output by the corporation “productive inefficiency,” which was 
enabled to do that by means of the power gained under merger and restore the position where the 
consumer will realize consumer surplus “allocative efficiency,” means that the antitrust laws are 
mainly concerned with the efficiency issues.709 In fact that was not the only school with an 
economic justification of antitrust laws, but there were other schools like for instance the 
Harvard School, the Post-Chicago School and many others.710 
It was argued that realizing profits does not indicate that the merger is economically 
efficient or not,711 because economic efficiency is mainly concerned with decreasing “the level 
of wastage of society’s resources” i.e. allocative efficiency.712 On the other hand merger 
advocates are arguing that mergers would led to productive efficiency, and in that regard it 
should be noted that the productive efficiency of the merger is the least debated category of 
merger efficiencies, but in the same context it is considered as one of the main incentives that 
drives most of the merger transactions during the last decade.713  
The claim of merger productive efficiency is usually based on another claim, which is 
that the gains that might be realized out of the merger are unattainable under other growth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
707 COLINO, Competition Law of the EU and UK, supra note 185, at 9. 2011. 
708 For more details about the ideas and thoughts of the Chicago School as presented by one of its leaders see 
generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW 
REVIEW 925 (1979). 
709 W. Adam Hunt, Business Implications of Divergences in Multi- Jurisdictional Merger Review by International 
Competition Enforcement Agencies, 28 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 147, at 150-
151 (2007). 
710 For more details about the difference between the main schools of thought i.e. Chicago and Harvard Schools see 
generally; William E. Kovacic, The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm Conduct: 
The Chicago/Harvard Double Helix, 2007 COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW 1(2007); Max Huffman, Marrying 
Neo-Chicago With Behavioral Antitrust, 78 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 105, at 111-115 (2012); VIVEK GHOSAL & 
JOHN STENNEK, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST at 27, 32-34, 37-38, 44 (B. Baltagi, et al. eds., 
ELSEVIER. 2007); Posner, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, supra note 708, (1979). 
711 Stanley M. Besen, et al., An Economic Analysis of the AT&T-T-Mobile USA Wireless Merger, 9 JOURNAL OF 
COMPETITION LAW & ECONOMICS 23, at 38 (2013). 
712 JULIE CLARKE, INTERNATIONAL MERGER POLICY: APPLYING DOMESTIC LAW TO INTERNATIONAL MARKETS at 21 
(Edward Elgar. 2014).  
713 Neil Finkelstein & Michael Piaskoski, Do Merger Efficiencies Receive “Superior” Treatment in Canada? Some 
Legal, Policy and Practical Observations Arising from the Canadian Superior Propane Case, 27 WORLD 
COMPETITION 259, at 272 (2004). 
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alternatives.714 In the same context, it was reported in many jurisdictions that proving that the 
gains are not reasonably achievable under other growth alternatives but the merger is considered 
a perquisite, in different jurisdictions, to accept the claims of the merger efficiency.715 
Moreover, it has been contended that every efficiency that is realized after the merger is a 
merger-specific efficiency, while others maintained that any efficiency attributed to the merger is 
attainable under other growth alternatives and that no efficiency is a merger-specific efficiency, 
however both of these extreme opposing positions are mere theoretical, and in fact each merger 
transaction has its own outcome.716 From a practical point of view,717 the claim of merger-
specific efficiencies depends mainly on the market concentration and how it is expanding, and it 
was even claimed that merging parties “in a rapidly expanding market will have difficulty 
successfully asserting efficiency defenses … since the same result may be achieved fairly 
promptly through internal expansion.”718 
Furthermore, it was maintained that there are different types of efficiencies that are 
expected from mergers, and despite the fact that some of these efficiencies are considered “real 
cost-savings” and others are considered “pecuniary cost-savings,” all of these efficiencies could 
be categorized under the same category of cost-savings or cost reductions efficiencies.719 A good 
example of efficiencies that could be categorized under pecuniary cost-savings is the tax 
efficiencies and the efficiencies expected from exchange rates, which were previously discussed 
during the discussions of merger incentives.720 On the other hand, the productive efficiencies that 
could be categorized under the “real cost-savings” category are namely: (1) rationalization of 
output, (2) economies of scale and scope, (3) technological advancements, (4) purchasing 
economies, (5) reduce managerial slack.721 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
714 CLARKE, International merger policy: applying domestic law to international markets, supra note 712, at 21, 
2014. 
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To elaborate more, the rationalization of output means that merging parties are expecting 
cost-savings due to the optimal utilization of production by means of shifting the production to 
the party with the least marginal cost of production.722 As for the economies of scope, the 
efficiencies would be realized, as it was previously mentioned, based on the fact that the average 
cost will be less when the parties are operating together rather than shifting the production from 
one to the other. Meanwhile, in the case of the economies of scale, in addition to the gains 
realized from the short-run economies of scale, the main gains would be realized from the fact 
that merging parties usually invest in the long-run economies of scale.723 
Furthermore, the rationalization of output as an expected productive efficiency under 
mergers could be done through the utilization of different types of resources, these types of 
resources are namely: (1) tangible physical fixed assets like machineries and buildings, (2) 
natural resources like the raw materials, (3) intangible assets like patents and know-how, and (4) 
human resources.724 
The efficiencies realized under the technological advancements come in many flavors, 
such as the reduction of the production costs, the increasing the quality of the products at the 
same cost, and the diffusion of the know-how.725 Concerning the gains from the purchasing 
economies, it is expected that the merging parties gain more collective bargaining power towards 
their suppliers.726 In many cases, it is also expected that the merger would reduce the managerial 
slack result out of borrowing good management practices from one party to overcome the 
internal management inefficiencies that is known as “x-inefficiencies.”727 
As an obvious inevitable result of realizing any of the mentioned efficiencies, as a result 
of the merger, at least one of the merging parties will experience decrease in the average total 
cost, and thus a downward shift in the long-run supply curve. Accordingly, it is expected that if 
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the parties were not operating at the minimum efficient scale728 before the merger, as a result of 
the productive efficiency realized under the merger transaction they will reach the minimum 
efficient scale.  
In that context, it was claimed that in some market situations, like for instance where the 
market is growing by means of technological advancements, the expected productive efficiencies 
from merger or to be more precise from the rationalization of production, could also be 
achievable through the normal internal growth of parties, as result of the market competition, 
even if they are not engaged in a merger transaction, and that would also led to reaching the 
minimum efficient scale.729 However it was argued that even if the efficiencies are achievable 
without a merger, the realization of such efficiencies i.e. reaching the MES might be achieved 
faster through mergers.730 
In the same line, it was argued that in the case where the merger is just accelerating the 
achievement of efficiencies, only the value of the reduced delay is considered a merger-specific 
efficiency.731 In addition to that, it was reported that some merging parties’ efficiency claims are 
contradicting with their precompetitive claims. To elaborate more, the merging parties claim that 
new entrants will not experience barriers to entry as the result of the merger because those 
entrants are adequately efficient even if they are small. Meanwhile the merging parties claim that 
the merger would also increase their own efficiency, and that ironically means that they claim a 
humped-shape average cost curve instead of the conventional u-shape average cost curve.732 
Furthermore, the merger-specific productive efficiency could be also categorized into 
variable cost reductions and fixed cost reductions,733 and it is noteworthy here that it was 
reported that the variable cost reduction claims are more tolerable by the regulatory authorities in 
many jurisdictions such as Canada, US, and EU, and that is mainly based on the claim that the 
variable cost reductions will be realized by consumers in the form of price reduction, and even in 
a shorter term than the fixed cost reductions.734 	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In that context, it should be noted that in some jurisdictions, the gains from a merger 
transaction should “pass-on” to the consumer at the end, and that could be either in the form of 
price reduction or other benefits such as an enhanced quality of a good at the same price, and that 
is an additional precondition to consider the claim of the “merger-specific efficiency.”735 It is 
noteworthy that this “pass-on” precondition is widely accepted by many scholars, not only by 
regulatory authorities.736 Furthermore, the delay in “passing-on” the realized gains to the 
consumer might led to the result that the regulatory authorities will give the efficiency claim 
“less weight because they are less proximate and more difficult to predict.”737 
Moreover, it was argued that the “pass-on” requirement should be interpreted as whether 
the efficiencies passed-on to the consumer would offset the increase in the market power of the 
parties in addition to the plain meaning of the price reduction.738 And that is the case even if 
there will be a price increase in the short run.739 However, it could be obviously claimed that 
such a “pass-on” requirement might be considered as a precondition to prove that the merger is 
efficient only in the case in which consumer welfare is the end goal, while on the other hand if 
the goal is the total welfare, that “pass-on” condition would not be a precondition to consider the 
claim of merger-specific efficiency. 
To sum it up, the economic analysis of the merger efficiency is a matter of the adopted 
welfare standard, or the weight given to allocative inefficiency versus the productive efficiency. 
In the same context, it was argued that the courts should not adopt just a black and white 
linguistic legal analysis of the merger, but it should also consider the economic analysis of the 
merger efficiencies.740 In that context, Judge Robert Bork741 even claimed that the US courts 
over more than eighty years did not develop a comprehensive idea about the objective of the 
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antitrust policy in the US. 742  In addition to that there are numerous prominent scholars 
challenging those economic justifications of antitrust, and they argue for the repeal of antitrust, 
which will be addressed later in detail during the discussions of the different policies and 
enforcements as a drawbacks of the merger control systems.743 
Meanwhile, labeling the scholars as supporting or criticizing this or that economic 
justification of the antitrust rules or how it is enforced, is not the objective of this dissertation, 
but in fact identifying or pointing out the differences might be for the purpose of revealing that 
the merger control policies are different and even in situations where they are similar or typical, 
the enforcement itself is different, and that fact will inevitably lead to the result that merger 
control is an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers, as it will be discusses in more 
details during the discussion of the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings as drawback of 
the merger control systems.744 
It is undoubtedly true that the consumer surplus, the productive efficiencies and the 
deadweight loss should be taken into consideration, but not as the final goal of the antitrust laws 
by itself, but as “byproduct” of the competition dynamics in a free market.745 In addition to that, 
it was reported that not all mergers will have anticompetitive effects, but in fact some mergers 
might have a pro-competitive effects, whereas the merging parties may be induced to enter into 
the merger transaction in order to restore the inefficient performance of one or more of the 
parties and get them back on track with the competition and other efficient players in the 
industry,746 and that claim was supported by the US courts in the case of Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. 
United States.747 It should be noted here that those claims, concerning the anticompetitive and 
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monopolistic practices, are in the main core of this dissertation and will be addressed later in 
detail during the discussions of the merger control as an impediment.748 
On the other hand, concerning the employment issues, it was reported in most of the 
cases, as an inevitable result of the merger, that the number of employees were reduced,749 and 
that is obviously realized especially in the situation where the transaction was induced by the 
operational synergies incentives such as the economies of scale, whereas the parties might share 
common resources. One of those resources is the human resource, and that might happen on all 
levels and especially on the management level, for example, in most of the cases the surviving 
corporation will be managed by only one CEO. In that context, it was claimed the gains of 
mergers are mere “illusory … unjustified transfer of wealth from those dependent on the 
acquired firm (for example, employees) to its shareholders, or valuation errors by the stock 
market.”750 
Unfortunately, every factor in the full picture that might led to losses for certain party, 
might be twisted and used as gains at least for other parties, thus in general the gains might offset 
the said losses, and vice versa. For instance, concerning the unemployment losses specially in the 
case of economies of scale the transaction will lead to the reduction in costs of production, and 
will also increase the production efficiencies, and that will inevitably lead to an increase in both 
the profits and consumer surplus, accordingly it could be claimed that the aggregate or total 
welfare will be generally increased, and that will offset the unemployment losses.751 
In the same context, more examples could be identified, for instance; concerning the 
losses to the competitors of the merging parties, it was reported that as the prices of the shares of 
the merging parties increased the prices of the share of their competitors would also increase in 
most cases, unless the surviving corporation significantly increased its production efficiencies 
over the competitors, meanwhile it was claimed that no clear cut evidence or empirical data, 
other than the prices of the stock exchange, which might support both of those claims.752 
Finally, it was strongly argued that there is no clear cut comprehensive evidence to 
understand and theorize what is happening in the full picture, or to assert there are certain gains 
or drawbacks, but there is always a possibility for positives and negatives. Meanwhile, and 	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750 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 28. 2005. 
751 Neary, THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, supra note 3, at 1244 (2007). 
752 BLACK, Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 27-28. 2005. 
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according to the Pareto principle, 80% of the effects are from by 20% of the causes and vice 
versa,753 therefore if some drawbacks have been expected, according to the rule even if the 
chance of gains are small, those gains might exceed and offset or suppress most of the losses.754 
In that regard, it was claimed that it is worth it to continue further studies until an understanding 
on solid findings or evidences can help in developing rules,755 bearing in mind that full picture 
should be taken within the background of a global economy i.e. to the international level, and 
that will be the main issue of the following discussion. 
4. Mergers and the Semi-globalized World 
This discussion will mainly address the impact of cross-border mergers on the global 
economy, and to be more precise on the growth of the global economy. In that context, it should 
be noted that the increased number of researches and the overuse of the word globalization led to 
some sort of confusions and vagueness about the idea itself.756 Meanwhile, it was claimed that 
globalization is considered as an ideology, and further argued that it “masks more than it reveals 
of what is happening in the world …”, meanwhile, globalization is defined as the process 
whereas “a set of unequal exchanges in which a certain art[i]fact, condition, entity or local 
identity extends its influence beyond its local or national borders and, in so doing, develops an 
ability to designate as local another rival art[i]fact, condition, entity or identity.”757 
Despite that fact that globalization as an idea could be traced back to the first half of the 
20th century, and that it was implicitly mentioned as early as 1883, when Robert Louis Stevenson 
claimed that there are no foreign lands, and it is just the persons who could be considered as a 
foreigner,758 scholars did not give it a great attention until late 1970s,759 since then scholars 
increasingly directed their efforts in that regard, and for instance approximately 500 books were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
753 The Pareto principle was named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, because it was derived from his 
findings that 20% of the Italian people owns 80% of the Italian lands, for more about the Pareto principle, see 
generally RICHARD KOCH, THE 80/20 PRINCIPLE: THE SECRET OF ACHIEVING MORE WITH LESS (Doubleday. 2008). 
754 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 25. 2010. 
755 FABIENNE, et al., European Merger Control: Do We Need an Efficiency Defence?, supra note 667, at 241. 2006; 
Röller, et al., Efficiency Gains from Mergers: Report of EC Contract II/98/003, supra note 749, at 55. 2001; BLACK, 
Conceptual Foundations of Antitrust, supra note 242, at 28. 2005. 
756 Gerald K. Helleiner, Markets, Politics, and Globalization: Can the Global Economy Be Civilized?, 7 GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE 243, at 2 (2001). 
757 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Globalizations, 23 THEORY, CULTURE & SOCIETY 393, at 395-396 (2006). 
758 ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON, THE SILVERADO SQUATTERS at 96 (Chatto and Windus. 1883). 
759 For the origins and meaning of the word globalization see generally R. Walker Gordon & Mark A. Fox, 
Globalization: An Analytical Framework, 3 INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 375(1996).  
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published on that subject during the 1990s, and then the rate of publishing increased significantly 
to more than the double every one year and a half.760 
However, that increased attention does not mean that all the scholars are supporting the 
idea nor that they are all refusing it, but generally speaking most of them have fears against it. In 
that context, it was asserted that the increased number of studies and the overuse of the word 
globalization led to some sort of confusions and vagueness about the idea itself.761 Some even 
warned about that uncontrolled phenomenon i.e. globalization, for instance it was mentioned in 
the introduction of this dissertation, that even the Secretary General of the UN Mr. Kofi Annan 
realized that it was maintained by others that: “arguing against globalization is like arguing 
against the laws of gravity.”762 
To show how vague globalization is and that it is overuse consider that it was stated that 
multinational corporations are dominating the global economy by the means of globalization,763 
while to the contrary others claimed that both national corporations and multinational 
corporations will not have a place in the market if they do not “go global,”764 or at least all 
corporations shall prepare themselves for that reality.765 On the other hand, others claimed that 
anti-globalization circles are in fact exaggerating, whereas multinational corporations are less 
powerful than it was claimed, and the reason behind that is that they confusingly shuffle between 
the actual value of the multinational corporations and the volume of their sales.766 
Ironically, many anti-globalization movements have arisen during the recent decades, and 
they actually would not have the opportunity to accomplish their communications around the 
world, arrange their campaigns, protests in Seattle and elsewhere,767 publish their thoughts 
online, and even to appear before people, in the absence of the means offered by or resulted from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
760 PANKAJ GHEMAWAT, REDEFINING GLOBAL STRATEGY: CROSSING BORDERS IN A WORLD WHERE DIFFERENCES 
STILL MATTER at 10 (Harvard Business School Press. 2007). 
761 Helleiner, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 756, at 2 (2001). 
762 Andrew R. Klein, Foreign Plaintiffs, Forum Non Conveniens, and Consistency, SELECTED WORKS 1, at 2 (2007); 
Kofi Annan, Speech (Opening 53rd UN annual DPI/NGO conference ed., 2000). 
763 RODRÌGUEZ GARAVITO & CÈSAR A. SANTOS BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA, LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: 
TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY at 92-93 (Cambridge University Press. 2005). 
764 Theodore Levitt, The Globalization of Markets, THE MCKINSEY QUARTERLY 1, at 19 (1984), citing Christopher 
Lorenz, The Overselling of World Brands, FINANCIAL TIMES, July 19,1984. 1984. 
765 Levitt, THE MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, supra note 764, at 20 (1984). 
766 MICKLETHWAIT & WOOLDRIDGE, The Company: A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, supra note 27, at 176. 
2003. 
767 Daniel W. Drezner, Globalization and Policy Convergence, 3 INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW 53, at 53 (2001). 
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the globalization.768 In that context, and despite the fact that discussing whether globalization in 
itself is a good or bad thing is highly debatable,769 which is indeed out of the scope of this 
dissertation, it was argued that even if globalization is a real threat it could turn out to be a great 
opportunity, especially for blocks like the EU.770 Moreover, Francis Fukuyama argued in his 
book (The End of History and the Last Man), that while there are some societies that are resisting 
the globalization culture, “there is hardly a society in the world that does not embrace the goal 
itself.”771 
Now the discussion should be directed to identify the impact of mergers on the global 
economy and to see how they are both related or connected. First, it should be noted that the 
coming discussion will be limited to the cross-border mergers, because its connections and 
impact on the global economy is more clear than the pure domestic mergers. In that context, it is 
undoubtedly true that both the technological means and the globalization process are the main 
determinants of the growth of the global economy, and in the same time the outcome of the 
cross-border merger transactions which are the “global corporations” are in fact the main 
determinant of both the technological means and the globalization process.772 
It addition to those factors that determine the growth of the global economy, it is also 
contended that political power is also one of the main determinants, and that factor is expected to 
drive the world toward more globalization progress in both of its forms i.e. in the form of the 
convergence of national rules or in the form of eliminating the state regulations.	  773 Meanwhile, it 
could also be claimed that globalization forces are driving the political power towards the 
convergence of rules and the elimination of the state regulations. 
In fact, both of those claims might be true, but it mainly depends on how strong the 
political power is itself, whereas in the case of the developing countries, it is undoubtedly true 
that globalization is driving their policy maker to align with the system, and vice versa. In that 
context, it should be noted that it was empirically reported in one of the International Monetary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768 Godden, et al., PLI'S ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE, supra note 438, at 1121 (2001). 
769 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 12. 2003; Globalization and its impact 
were greatly debated during the Globalization of the Legal Profession Symposium, held at the Indiana University 
School of Law, on April 6, 2006. 
770 Neelie Kroes, Challenges to the Integration of the European Market: Protectionism and Effective Competition 
Policy at 6 (Competition Law Association - Burrell Lecture 2006 ed., 2006). 
771 FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN at 126 (Free Press; Maxwell Macmillan Canada; 
Maxwell Macmillan International. 1992). 
772 Levitt, THE MCKINSEY QUARTERLY, supra note 764, at 20 (1984). 
773 Drezner, INTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, supra note 767, at 53-54 (2001). 
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Fund studies, that despite the promising expectation in theory about globalization, “there is no 
proof in the data that financial globalization has benefited growth” in the developing countries.774 
While on the other hand, it was reported that cross-border mergers as a form of the 
globalization process was significantly benefiting the US economy, and that approximately one 
third of the workload at the DOJ was related to cross-border mergers, and it was also reported 
that for a full quarter of a year all the merger transactions that were reported to the US authorities 
under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act (hereinafter HSR)775 that at least one of the parties was an alien 
i.e. foreign party.776 To the contrary of that, it was reported that in the EU Member States most of 
the merger transactions were between domestic corporations,777 and that led inevitably the EU 
Parliament and Council to issue a special directive in order to encourage and to facilitate cross-
border transactions.778 
Generally speaking, the growth of the global economy needs technological means that are 
driven by capitalism,779 and in that context, it was conveyed that growth of the global economy 
during the last fifty years was driven by means of propagation of capitalism throughout the 
globe.780 Accordingly, that means that the spread of the investments across the globe is the main 
reason behind the growth of the global economy, but one might argue that these investments 
could be done through Greenfield FDI,781 and cross-border mergers is not the only way it could 
be accomplished. 	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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY 4319, at 4319 (2003); For further details about the impact of globalization on 
Egypt as it is classified as a developing country see generally Salaheldin Ismail Salaheldin, The Impact of 
Globalization on Operations Managment Activities in Egypt, 6 THE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS IN DEVELOPING NATIONS 
28(2002). 
775 Hart–Scott–Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (Public Law 94-435, known commonly as the HSR 
Act), it will be discussed later in detail in the discussions of the merger control as an impediment on page 186 infra. 
776 Douglas H. Ginsburg & Scott H. Angstreich, Multinational Merger Review: Lessons from our Federalism, 68 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 219, at 219 (2000), citing C. Benjamin Crisman & Matthew S. Barnett, Mergers & 
Acquisitions: Recent Trends in Antitrust Enforcement, 1049 PLI/CORP PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 379, at 402 
(1998). 
777 For more details see Caterina Moschier & Jose Manuel Campa, The European M&A Industry: A Market in the 
Process of Construction, WP-762 INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR FINANCIAL RESEARCH - IESE BUSINESS SCHOOL 1, 
at 1 (2008). 
778 See Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Cross-border Mergers of Limited Liability 
Companies, 27.07.2005, PE-CONS 3632/05 
779 FUKUYAMA, The End of History and the Last Man, supra note 771, at 126. 1992. 
780 Joseph L. Bower, et al., Global Capitalism at Risk: What Are You Doing About it?, September HARVARD 
BUSINESS REVIEW 1, at 5 (2011).  
781 Greenfield FDI is a form of FDIs, as distinguished from cross-border mergers; means that the investor is directly 
investing in a foreign country by establishing a new operational facility from scratch, and not by acquiring of readily 
available one. 
152	  
It is true that the FDI might be a Greenfield FDI, but in fact the empirical findings shows 
that during 2007 for instance, more than half of the FDI around the world were cross-border 
mergers not a Greenfield FDI and those cross-border mergers are more than 40% of the global 
activities in general.782 In addition to that, cross-border mergers assumes that there are already 
established targets to be acquired, and those targets were established through either domestic 
investment or Greenfield FDI, and in both cases the cross-border could happen, and in that 
context it was reported by UNCTAD, that Greenfield FDI waves are always followed by a cross-
border merger wave, and that is true in both the developed and the developing countries.783 
It is noteworthy, as it was previously mentioned, that during the last decade of the 20th 
century there was an important regularly active category of players in the field of cross-border 
mergers as an FDI; the SWF, and that it was reported that in 2007 the total value of the cross-
border merger transactions exceeded 48.5 billion US dollars,784 and the overall SWF across the 
globe were estimated by 6.5 trillion US dollars by the end of May 2014, the cross-border mergers 
also flows-in to the other way into the countries that own those SWFs, for example significant 
investments flows-in to the United Arab of Emirates (hereinafter UAE),785 and in the meantime 
UAE owns Abu Dhabi SWF, which is the second highest value among all SWFs in the world.786 
Even though most of the FDIs are Greenfield FDIs that will not negate the fact that cross-
border mergers are significantly influencing the growth of the global economy. But 
unfortunately, many scholars delved right ahead into the subject to answer questions, and 
contribute to the debate about the fears pertaining to globalization, but do not even think to put 
those questions into question i.e. the previously mentioned debate about globalization was one 
more step further from where it should be, the question that should be addressed is a preliminary 
question; is this a truthfully a globalized world, in other words has the globalization process 
reached its peak, or it is at a stage that needs more efforts to be added by all forms of FDI in 
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777, at 7 (2008); Neary, THE REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, supra note 3, at 1229 (2007). 
783 CÉSAR CALDERÓN, et al., GREENFIELD FDI VS. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: DOES THE DISTINCTION MATTER? 
at 1-2 § N° 173 (Banco Central de Chile. 2002); For more about cross-border data see generally DEVELOPMENT, 
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784 KALSI, Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 6, at 16-17. 2008. 
785 Anthony Richardson, et al., Cross-Border M&A, 9 ASIAN-MENA COUNSEL SPECIAL REPORT at 30-31 (2011). 
786 For more details and full profile of all SWF across the globe see http://www.swfinstitute.org last visited October 
1, 2014. 
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order to reach the expected progress, or it is just a mere myth and that globalization does not 
even exists. 
In that context, Thomas Friedman,787 who is one of the prominent writers in that field, 
claimed in one his books that the world is flat,788 but unfortunately, like many other scholars,789 
after reading that book it would be easy to identify that those claims about the globalized world 
are just success stories of some well-known multinational corporations, but nothing about 
figures, data analysis, or any empirical findings that might help understanding precisely where 
the world is since the globalization process, in order to plan for more integration and economic 
growth in the future, or at least to put the fears from globalization in its actual size, and to stop 
overstating an overestimated statement that does not even exists. 
In that regard it should be noted that one of the prominent economist, Professor Pankaj 
Ghemawat,790 has gone through extraordinary efforts to answer that said preliminary questions, 
and he ends-up with very interesting findings, after he used scientific methods of research, 
whereas he repeatedly analyze recent data from 139 country, which resemble an aggregate 
amount of 99% of the world’s Gross Domestic Product (hereinafter World GDP), and 95% of 
world’s total population, and he developed what he named as “The Depth Index of 
Globalization,” then he published an annual report in that regard, and the following map might 
help in illustrating his answer about to what extent the world is globalized.791 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
787 Thomas Friedman (July 20, 1953), is a American journalist, he writes a twice-weekly column for The New York 
Times, his writing is mainly devoted to the global trade, globalization, and the Middle East, for more into about his 
biography, writings, and thoughts see his official website http://www.thomaslfriedman.com. 
788 THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Farrar, Straus 
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Figure 11: The Globalization Index792 
In his article named “Why the Word isn’t Flat,” which was written in response to the 
book by Thomas Friedman, he revealed that the empirical evidence proves that the actual 
percentage of the cross-border activities, when compared to the total activities does not indicate 
that the world is flat or even that the global economy reached respectable steps in that regard, but 
that the world is still in its initial step and in fact not more than semi-globalized.793 For instance, 
the Depth Index of Globalization of 2013 shows that capital flows (stocks, FDI, portfolio equity) 
accounts for 35% of the total aggregate capital investments,794 while all the other cross-border 
activities like immigration (tourists, employees), communication (telephony and web traffic), 
and charities accounts for figures close to 10% of the activities on the national level, with the 
exception to trade activities which might account for a little less than 30%.795 
He finally concludes that: 
The world remains “semi globalized.” And yet, globalization has progressed to an 
extent that rapid growth in emerging economies—sharply increasing those 
countries’ share of global economic activity—has the potential to provoke a big 
shakeup. This is the essence of semiglobalization: an accurate understanding of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
792 This map along with details and full country’s profile are available at http://www.ghemawat.com/dig last visited 
October 1, 2014. 
793 Pankaj Ghemawat, Why the World Isn't Flat, FOREIGN POLICY 54, at 59 (2007). 
794 Ghemawat & Altman, Depth Index of Globalization 2013 and the Big Shift to Emerging Economies, supra note 
791, at 13. 2013. 
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the world requires an appreciation for both the still large effects of national 
borders and cross-country distances as well as the significant interactions across 
them. Weak macroeconomic conditions are contributing to faltering globalization, 
and the emerging economies’ slowdown adds to the gloom. However, a broader 
perspective suggests that—as tends to be the case sentiment has overshot reality. 
Even after the recent downward forecast revisions, the world economy is 
projected to grow at a compound annual rate of 3.8%— in real terms—over 2012-
2018. That is a higher level than it managed to achieve over the course of the 
1980s, the 1990s or, for that matter, the first decade of this century. The 
difference is driven by emerging economies [that] are now forecast to grow at a 
compound rate of 5.2%, versus 2.2% for advanced economies.796 
In the same context, it was even claimed that despite the fact that there are two millennia 
that separate us today from the origins of the corporation idea, and all the development added by 
the means of technology throughout the history, and the industrial advancements we have 
reached, corporations are still having the same patterns and organization as it was during the 
Roman Empire, and even the Romans, if exist nowadays, would not find our modern 
corporations unfamiliar to them.797 
Now it unmistakably appears that the global economy is open for more growth, and that 
will unquestionably drives the discussion to a more vital question; which is why there still is 
room for growth, in other words why the world is standing here and did not reached the 
globalization peak or end. One might say the answer to that question was the main interest of the 
countries in many forums whether under the auspices of GATT, the World Trade Organization 
(hereinafter WTO), the EU, and many other organizations that are concerned with the global 
economy and international trade. The debates revealed that the trade barriers generally and the 
tariffs specially are hindering the global economy growth, while all the other economy factors 
i.e. the four C’s:798 corporations, capital, communications, and consumers, have reached the 
position of a flat world, with exception to the free movement of employees.799 
In fact that is a wrong statement and is not based on solid evidence or actual figures, for 
instance, and according to a recent report from the World Economic Forum it was estimated that 	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LAW & ECONOMICS RESEARCH PAPERS 1, at 13 (2011). 
798 The concept of the four C’s was first developed by Kenichi Omae in his book, KENICHI OMAE, THE END OF THE 
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(Wharton School Pub. 2005). 
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if all tariffs are removed worldwide that would boost trade activates only as little as 10%, and 
that would led to a very modest growth in the global economy, which is estimated to increase the 
World GPD only by 0.7%, while facilitating and improving pure domestic trade activities will 
lead to larger gains.800 On the other hand, there is a list of various barriers that still hinder the 
growth of the global economy especially in the cross-border mergers industry.801 
It was claimed that those barriers to the growth of the global economy are mainly related 
to “policy fumbles rather than macroeconomic fundamentals,” and that the future might witness 
a good progress if those policies are positively changed to serve that end.802 In that context, 
unfortunately the contrary was reported, the cross-border merger transactions are struggling 
against protectionism policies during the last decade, and that was even more than what was 
witnessed during the late 1990s,803 which obviously means, at least from a cross-border merger 
perspective, that the national policies are not helping the world economy to move towards more 
progress or even to the right direction. 
In particular, there was a thoughtful plea that called for more researches to identify and 
address more serious barriers in field of the cross-border mergers like protectionism policies, 
culture differences, taxations issues, issues facing the management of the transaction, market 
related issues such as antitrust issues, etc.804 It should be notes here that all the following 
discussions will be devoted to identify these barriers or impediments to the cross-border mergers 
and how it could be demolished in order to witness the expected growth of the global economy 
and reach the peak of an actual globalization, and not just a semi-globalized world. 
III. Cross-border Mergers Impediments Overview 
While facilitating cross-border mergers is not a goal in itself; the end goal is the growth 
of the global economy or to be more precise maximizing the global welfare, that discussion will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
800 Ghemawat & Altman, Depth Index of Globalization 2013 and the Big Shift to Emerging Economies, supra note 
791, at 36. 2013, citing Bain World Economic Forum & World Bank Company, Enabling Trade: Valuing Growth 
Opportunities, (2013). 
801 For more details about barriers that of cross-border integration, See generally Pankaj Ghemawat, Borders, 
Differences, and the Law of Distance, in WORLD 3.0: GLOBAL PROSPERITY AND HOW TO ACHIEVE IT (2011). 
802 Ghemawat & Altman, Depth Index of Globalization 2013 and the Big Shift to Emerging Economies, supra note 
791, at 4, 25. 2013. 
803 Ghemawat, FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 793, at 60 (2007). 
804 Godden, et al., PLI'S ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE, supra note 438, at 1125-1126 
(2001).  
157	  
identify the barriers or impediments that face the parties in the cross-border mergers, as means of 
the growth of the global economy. Moreover, the discussion will be an overview of a dozen of 
those impediments in a nut shell, and then the next discussion will be directed and devoted to one 
of the main impediments, which is namely “merger control,” because merger control is typically 
one of the most complicated and influential impediments that hinders the cross-border mergers. 
Actually the list of the impediments that faces the parties in the cross-border mergers is a 
long list; however impediments could be classified or categorized according to different aspects. 
For instance, the list could be categorized according to the timeline of the transaction, whereas 
there are some impediments before the closing of the transaction, such as all the regulatory 
premerger issues that could be the premerger control, national security clearance, stock exchange 
approval or foreign investments authorizations. While other impediments appear after the closing 
of the transaction, such as all the integration related issues for example the accounting standards, 
culture, operations, and languages issues. There also exist those issues related to the third parties 
for example the assignments of the agreements concerning IPR, franchises, and licensing, and 
also taxation issues. 
Moreover, the list of impediments could be categorized according to the source of 
impediments, whereas some of the impediments could be attributed to the merging parties 
themselves such as all the integration related issues, others could be attributed to regulatory 
authorities such as all the differences between regulatory policies for example the merger 
control, specific-industry licensing, foreign investments authorizations,	   national security 
clearance, and stock exchange approval. Others could be attributed to other stakeholders such as 
those issues related to consumer protection, employees’ rights, and assigning the agreements 
with third parties. 
Furthermore, the list might be categorized according to the weight of the impediments 
towards the transaction i.e. according to the magnitude of its effect on the transaction, whereas 
some of the impediments might have modest effect, while others might have a significant effect 
that lead to the failure or termination of the transaction or even sometimes to bankruptcy. 
However, according to the previously mentioned Pareto principle, small problems that weight 
less than 20% might lead to the 80% of the problems, thus it would not be just difficult to 
classify impediments according to that criteria, but also it would not be useful to do so. 
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It could easily be claimed that the common feature between all the impediments that 
faces cross-border mergers is that if it does not lead to the failure or termination of the 
transaction, it is expected to lead to losses, either in the form of direct financial losses or indirect 
damages, and that is mainly because all of the impediments share the same following common 
characteristics: (1) all lead to uncertainties, (2) all are time consuming, (3) all require some sort 
of payments. It should be also noted that some of those impediments are not limited only to the 
cross-border mergers, but also applied to the pure domestic mergers. 
However, from a cross-border perspective it could be claimed that some of those 
impediments might form an additional layer added to the pure domestic transaction impediments, 
and that is because the merging parties will not just face some of those impediments, but will 
also face them in several fashions, whereas the transaction will be accorded under different legal 
systems, in all the concerned jurisdictions, and that will undoubtedly increase the uncertainty, 
cost, and time, and that will inversely lead to the increasing possibility of the failure for the 
surviving corporation or even closing the transaction. 
It is noteworthy that the uncertainty will increase and reach its peak in the cases where 
the transaction is directly connected to one of those jurisdictions which in addition to the legal 
and regulatory impediments is politically unstable, such as most of the jurisdictions in the 
Middle East, whereas most of them are always struggling with political uncertainty,805 and 
especially during these days, after the recent incidents of what is known as “Arab Spring” in 
most of the countries in the Middle East. 
Generally speaking, at least for the purposes of this discussion, all those classifications 
will not make any differences, whereas these classifications are just for the purpose of being 
more organized nothing more, and literally all the classifications are encompassing the same 
impediments. Therefore, the following discussion will address some of those impediments, and 
whenever possible, from a cross-border mergers perspective, and not accord to any of the said 
classifications, and it should be noted also that the order of addressing the impediments in the 
coming discussions will not mean or indicate any importance or weight of any of them, and it is 
simply arranged in an alphabetical order. 
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1. Employment Issues 
Despite the fact that the cross-border mergers or mergers in general, might have a 
negative impact on the employees of the merging parties, such as decreasing the number of 
employees and accordingly increase the unemployment rates,806 and that is an inevitable result of 
the failure of labor liberalization on the international level, that issue will be considered a fact 
and will be out of the scope of this dissertation. However, it should be noted that it was claimed 
that in a successful transaction, the employees, among other stakeholders, should be granted the 
opportunity to negotiate their share in the expected gains prior to closing the merger 
transaction.807 
In that context, many efforts were done to protect the employees’ rights in the merger 
transactions, specially the efforts done in the EU, which is in fact highly regarded,808 whereas the 
employees’ rights are protected under several directives and regulations, for example in the EU 
the employees are granted the right to take a role in the premerger negotiations,809 and in 
addition to that, the European Council issued a special directive810 to protect the employees’ 
rights also after the closing of the merger transaction. 
On the other hand, employment issues are also considered as an impediment to the 
success of the cross-border mergers, and those issues are ranging from the negative effect on the 
operations due to the psychological stress resulted from the uncertainties raised during the 
transaction, and the fear about their career plans and the future of the whole corporation, to the 
extent of more serious problems that might end up with great losses. Even the rights granted to 
employees in certain jurisdictions to participate in the premerger negotiations could be 	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considered as an impediment, because in fact it could be time consuming if the employees and 
the other decision maker are not in the same line.811 
One of those serious issues is what happens in some cases where the surviving 
corporation is controlled by SWF, and that might lead one to consider its employees as foreign 
government officials under the US Foreign Corruption Practices Act of 1977 (hereinafter 
FCPA),812 whereas according to that FCPA the bribery of foreign officials is prohibited and that 
might raise the liability of the surviving corporation.813 Accordingly, those employees despite the 
fact that they are working for a foreign government will be considered as foreign officials under 
the FCPA, and the surviving corporation might suffer from significant liabilities out of that issue, 
just because it is controlled by SWF or in other words because it engaged in a cross-border 
merger transaction. 
In addition to that, the acquirer should carefully investigate all the previous practices 
concerning the employees, otherwise that might raise future liabilities, or requires additional 
compliance costs, for instance those liabilities under some of the US legislations such as; the 
Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988,814 the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990,815 the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,816 and unprecedented number of 
federal and state laws and regulations concerning the prohibition of discrimination in the 
workplace, health and safety, compensation and retirement plans, etc.817 
Another significant employment issue in the merger transactions is the issues known as 
golden parachutes and golden handshakes,818 whereas some of the employees entered into 
agreements with their employer to be granted excessive payments if their employment contracts 
are terminated within a certain period after closing the merger.819 Similarly, there is another issue 
known as golden handcuffs, whereas some of the employees will be paid certain amounts in 
order to stay i.e. not to leave the corporation after closing the merger. It was reported that those 
kinds of agreements inevitably led generally to “pay inflation” i.e. excessive raise in the range of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
811 Lukanec, et al., EMPLOYMENT & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS LAW, supra note 594, at 14-15 (2009). 
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813 Aruna Viswanatha, U.S. Corporations Beg Clarity on Anti-Bribery Law (Thomson Reuters 2012). 
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salaries, and accordingly the surviving corporation will suffer losses that might be in hundreds of 
millions US dollars, in addition to the payments that will be made to satisfy the obligations under 
any of those agreements.820 
Ironically, when the US government decided to severely tax the payments under the 
mentioned kinds of agreements, in an effort to put an end to them, that step on the other hand 
triggered a great raise wave of the figures stipulated in those agreements, and actually the wave 
started and never ended, because the US government decided to harshly tax amounts that 
exceeded certain threshold, and accordingly most of amounts were increased to reach just below 
that threshold, while the norm before that was far less than the threshold.821 
2. Environmental Issues 
Neither the merging parties nor any other corporations were generally required to get an 
environmental clearance, before the late 1960s, or even to disclose any information about its 
hazardous wastes, but by the beginning of the 1970s, many countries required the disclosure of 
most of the information that related to the environmental issues, and in many cases it is a 
requirement to comply with certain defined standards and even to obtain certain licenses before 
releasing wastes. For instance, it is required under many federal and state laws in the US to 
disclose all the information related to the presence or use of hazardous materials, and to develop 
and report an “emergency and releasing plans” to the government authorities.822 
One might think that the environmental clearance issues are limited only to those 
corporations that operating in certain industries, which is involved in gaseous emissions or even 
discharging of hazardous wastes, but in fact environmental clearance might be required from any 
merging parties operating in any industry, for instance under the law of the State of New Jersey, 
the acquirer shall obtain a state approval of the cleanup plan or the cleanup process related to 
release any kind of wastes related to industrial or commercial operations.823 
To illustrate more, just consider how there is a web of laws in single jurisdiction i.e. the 
US, all the following laws might led to significant problems: (1) the Occupational Safety and 
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Health Act of 1970,824 (2) the Clean Water Act of 1972,825 (3) the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976, 826  (4) the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 827  (5) the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,828 (6) the 
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986,829 and the list here is full of 
many other laws.830 
Hence, those examples are just few examples concerning the laws on the federal level in 
the US, meanwhile the fact is that most of the states in the US have their own laws at the state 
level that will increase the picture more complexity. Moreover, in some other jurisdiction it is 
even required to obtain such	   environmental clearances not just in the case of typical merger 
transaction, but also if the corporation experiences other restructuring schemes such as spin-off, 
sale of asset, change of control, and in all cases other similar cases.831 
Accordingly, identifying the issues and allocate the liabilities that might develop under 
such a complicated web of different environmental laws in the different concerned jurisdictions, 
is undoubtedly considered an impediment to the cross-border mergers, because it is expected to 
be a very difficult task and it requires a specialized team of professionals to carry it out, during 
the due diligence process. Moreover, accomplishing those tasks is certainly time consuming and 
will use some financial resources, and ignoring it might led to losses and even the failure of the 
transaction, especially in cases that the acquirer failed to obtain the required environmental 
clearance, licenses, approvals, or even reporting information or plans. 
3. Foreign Currencies Related Issues 
The exchange rates were previously mentioned as an incentive that might play an 
important role in inducing the parties to enter into a merger transaction, and it was clearly 
mentioned also that the mere differences between exchange rates is not the actual indicator of the 
purchase power of the currency, which is actually the factor that might be considered as an 	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incentive to enter into cross-border mergers, whereas corporations holding a currency with 
strong purchasing power may expect to gain synergies by paying less, if it used a weaker 
purchasing power currency to finance the merger transaction. 
In addition to that, it was clearly mentioned that the purchase power of any currency has 
no clear-cut effect as an incentive to induce the parties to enter into the cross-border merger 
transaction, because the gains that might be expected from the differences in the purchasing 
power of the currencies of the parties may be offset by remitting the earnings of the acquired 
corporation to the home country of the acquirer, whereas the purchasing power of the earnings 
currency will also be weak. 
In that context, it should be noted here that even the process of remitting the earnings 
resulted from the target back to the home country of the acquirer is not that easy, and in most the 
jurisdictions are controlled by the government authorities, while in some other jurisdictions it is 
limited to certain amounts on an annual basis, that is considerably reported in the developing 
countries whereas most of them are aiming to target the foreign acquirer that will invest the 
earnings domestically instead of returning it back to its home country.832 
To illustrate more about the	  foreign currencies related issues, there are possibilities from 
time to time one will face a currency crisis like that happened in Mexico in December 1994; 
where the Mexican Peso devaluated by approximately 50% and then totally collapsed.833 
Therefore, the net wealth of the parties of the cross-border merger might be significantly affected 
by the fluctuation of the purchasing power of the different currencies used by them. Accordingly, 
the exchange rates issues should be of important consideration for the cross-border merger 
transaction, with high possibility that it will led to losses or even total failure of the transaction. 
In addition to that, buying foreign currency is controlled in some jurisdictions by the 
government agencies, which is most probably the central bank, and sometimes is limited to 
certain small amounts on an annual basis, even if the surviving corporation will use the foreign 
currency to pay its obligations. In that regard, it should be noted that some corporation enter into 
loan agreements with any of its subsidiaries or even a parent corporation abroad, in order to 
obtain the needed foreign currency to pay its debt, and in that way it will hit another target with 	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the stone which is remitting earnings beyond any defined limits, but usually most of the 
governments are monitoring and counterattacking such practices. 
For instance, the case in many jurisdictions like France, Japan, and Taiwan, is that the 
surviving corporation should apply for a government agencies approval in order to get the 
required amount of foreign currencies, especially in the case of loan agreements between a 
subsidiary and its parent corporation.834 Meanwhile, it was even argued that removing such 
control on foreign currency will not ruin the exchange rate management, and even if that issue is 
deregulated it is what is needed to harmonize the fiscal and monetary policies.835  
To sum it up, it is undoubtedly clear now that all those issues that are related to foreign 
currency might be considered as an impediment that could hinder the cross-border mergers, 
whereas it might led to losses: (1) in the form of losses due to the exchange rates and currency 
value fluctuations, (2) due to difficulties of obtaining the required foreign currencies in order to 
pay debt or any other financial obligations, (3) because of the failure to send earnings out of the 
jurisdiction either to the home country of the acquirer or anywhere else, and it is also possible 
that any of those issues might led to the failure of the merger transaction. 
4. Foreign Corruption Practices Issues 
The FCPA is considered one of the impediments that hinder the cross-border merger 
transactions.836 Under the US legal system, and according to the FCPA, all the US corporations 
are required not to use any means to pay a foreign government official in order to influence him 
to assist the corporation in maintaining or to obtain business opportunities, and in the same line 
the US parent corporation will be also liable for any violation by any of its subsidiaries for the 
same, and the mentioned business opportunities definitely include the opportunity of entering 
into a cross-border merger transaction. 
In fact that is not the case only in the US, but most of the jurisdictions worldwide are 
prohibiting the bribery of government officials, specially the countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (hereinafter OECD), but the case might be that the 	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fact is that the US is the jurisdiction that most rigorously apply its rule, in addition the FCPA 
gives the problem a more cross-border dimension, because the law could be enforced against a 
non-US citizen who manage an offshore or non-US corporation but is working for a US 
subsidiary.837 
In that context, it should be noted the DOJ started to enter into non-prosecution 
agreements in return for some payments, for example it was reported that the DOJ entered into 
such an agreement with Ralph Lauren Corporation to settle a violation for giving payments and 
gifts to an Argentinean government official with concern to custom clearance issues, and that 
was through one of its subsidiaries.838 Most importantly here is that there is no disclosure of the 
terms for that kind of non-prosecution agreements, in addition to that the fact that no clear policy 
exists, and therefore the uncertainty and unpredictability of the application of the law 
undoubtedly constitutes an actual impediment to the cross-border merger transactions. 
To add more ambiguity and unclear application of the FCPA, there is no clear definition 
to identify who might be considered as a foreign official, as it was previously mentioned in the 
discussions of the employees’ issues, if a US surviving corporation is controlled by SWF that 
might led to considering its employees as foreign officials, and that might raise problems 
concerning a violation of the FCPA rules, while in fact the employee is based in the US and 
working for the US corporation and does not belonging nor working for the government that own 
the SWF. 
To the contrary, in some other jurisdictions, it is not only legal and permissible to spend 
money on meals and entertainment for the purposes of acquiring a new corporation i.e. merger 
transaction, but 50% of the spending is also deductible from the taxed income, that case is 
typically the case under the tax law in Austria.839 Thus, the differences between different 
jurisdictions will add an additional dimension to the problem and that increase the possibility of 
being accused under the FCPA or similar practices and that might lead to the failure of the 
transaction or even just losses due to the fines to be paid. 
To illustrate more, assume that a US subsidiary based in Austria is planning to acquire 
another non-US corporation incorporated in Austria, and is controlled by an SWF of the 	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Norwegian government, and during the course of preparation for the transaction, the employees 
at the US subsidiary that is based in Austria, spend money on the entertainment of an employee 
at the other Austrian based corporation, there will be a great possibility that the DOJ officials 
will consider this as a violation to the FCPA and that might have an impact on the reputation of 
the merging parties and might have impacts on the price of its shares in the stock exchange, and 
even put the merger transaction to an end. 
5. Foreign Investment Authorizations 
In almost all the jurisdictions around the world, there are either national laws or 
regulations that have some limitations for foreign corporations to enter into investment activities 
without a prior government authorization,840 and that obviously encompass the cross-border 
merger transactions, as it will be shown shortly. It should be noted also that the limitation could 
come in many fashions i.e. could be in many forms, ranging from totally banning foreigner 
corporations from participating in certain investment activity, to the extent of requiring a prior 
authorization, and finally by just requiring the disclosure of some information after closing the 
transaction. 
For instance, as an example of the most restricted laws and regulations, is the countries of 
the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (hereinafter GCC),841 whereas foreign 
corporations are banned from operating or doing any kind of business activities on the national 
level, unless they have a national partner whom should hold at least 51% of such partnership.842 
Accordingly, foreign corporations are totally banned from entering into a cross-border merger 
transaction to acquire more than 49% of any national corporation, and thus the national laws of 
all the countries of the GCC is considered as a typical example of the foreign investments 
authorization impediment. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
840 Godden, et al., PLI'S ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE, supra note 438, at 1126 
(2001). 
841 The GCC countries are Kingdom of Bahrain, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, The Sultanate of Oman, Qatar, 
UAE, and for more information about the GCC see its official website http://www.gcc-sg.org/eng, last visited May 
31, 2014.  
842 For example Article No. 2 of the Law No. 13 of 2000 (The Law Regulating the Investment of Non-Qatari Capital 
in Economic Activities), for more details about the situation in the UAE see Richardson, et al., ASIAN-MENA 
COUNSEL SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 785, at 30-31 (2011); Boryana Damyanova & Thomas Singer, The Role of 
Multinational Companies in Dubai: Balancing Tradition and Modernization, 2 NIMEP INSIGHTS - TUFTS 
UNIVERSITY 100, at 102 (2006). 
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The same also could be recognized in several jurisdictions all over the globe, for example 
according to the Egyptian law concerning the importing registry, no foreign corporations are 
allowed to involve in any importing activities in Egypt,843 and in the same line is the Egyptian 
law regulating the ownership of real estate and the unoccupied lands by foreigners, whereas no 
foreigners are allowed to own real estate in certain geographic areas.844 Therefore, in Egypt the 
case is that foreign corporations are totally banned from entering into certain cross-border 
merger transaction, which violates any of the mentioned restrictions, and obviously those laws 
are considered as example of the foreign investments authorization impediment in certain 
industries. 
Moreover, the case is almost the same in other developed jurisdiction like Japan, whereas 
the direct merger transaction between a Japanese corporation and a foreign corporation is totally 
banned, even entering into a triangular merger between a Japanese corporation and a foreign 
corporation was also banned until recently, as it was allowed after a great debate ended on May 
1, 2007, and in addition to that the foreign corporations are banned from introducing their shares 
in return for acquiring a Japanese target in addition to several taxation problems with regard to 
the permitted triangular cross-border transaction.845 
Likewise, the case is almost the same in the US, whereas according to the International 
Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act of 1976,846 it is required to report any transaction 
in case where foreigners will acquire or acquired 10% or more of the voting shares of a US 
corporation whose worth is 1 million US dollars or more, or if the target has an annual sales, 
assets, or net income that is more than 10 million US dollars. In addition to that, many states in 
the US have enacted laws that are significantly influencing the foreign investment activities, and 
that has added a new dimension to the problem at both the state and the federal level.847 
As it was previously mentioned, the situation is also the same in almost all the 
jurisdictions around the world, for instance in Canada, according to the Investment Canada Act 
of 1985,848 there is a comprehensive regime tailored specially to conduct a prior review and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
843 Article No. 2 of the Law No. 121 of 1982 (Concerning the Importing Registry) 
844 Law No. 230 of 1996 (Law Regulating Owning a Real Estate or Unoccupied Lands by Foreigners) 
845 Gerstman, et al., INTERNATINAL LAWYER, supra note 436, at 768-770 (2009). 
846 The International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act, 22 USC Ch. 46 
847 Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate: Sovereign Wealth Funds: Laws 
Limiting Foreign Investment Affect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Various Enforcement Processes. pt. 1-
63 (2009). 
848 Investment Canada Act, R.S.C. 1985, I-21.8 
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authorization of any foreign investment that exceeds certain threshold.849 Furthermore, according 
the Australian Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act of 1975,850 which is governing the cross-
border merger transactions in Australia, any transactions to acquire a “substantial interest” (15% 
or more) of an Australian corporation, should be authorized by the Australian Treasury, if its 
value exceeds certain threshold.851 
In addition to those laws and regulation, it was reported that the government authorities 
in many jurisdiction, especially in most of the developing countries, may apply the rules in an 
arbitrary manner or even adopt certain measures that do not have any legal base, for instance it 
was reported that in China even if the foreign corporation followed all the rules, the cross-border 
merger transaction might not be closed as planned.852 That kind of practices could be considered 
as an impediment by itself and was classified as a bureaucratic impediment, and the merging 
parties found themselves on the horns of a dilemma, should they do what others do, for example 
bribe or even spend on entertaining government officials and violate the FCPA and the similar 
laws, or cause failure of the transaction or even not closing it successfully or according to the 
schedule.853 
In that context, it should be noted that while it is undoubtedly true that the case is just 
“where law ends … tyranny begins”854 in most of the developed countries, the situation is not the 
same in most of the developing countries, whereas tyranny is all encompassing no matter what 
the law is. For instance, it was reported in most of the GCC jurisdictions, that granting a 
government officials’ personal consent for any foreign investment activities is more important 
than following the rules,855 for example it could easily be observed by any professional in the 
GCC region that some blue chip corporations are violating the laws and operating on the national 
level without any legal base, and the government authorities are turning a blind eye to this. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
849 Subrata Bhattacharjee, Canada’s Foreign Investment Review Process at 219 (Financier Worldwide Booz & 
Company ed. 2008). 
850 Act No. 92 of 1975 (The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act) 
851 Matthew Latham & Weyinmi Popo, Australia’s Foreign Investment Framework: A More Challenging Landscape 
Emerging for M&A at 318 (Financier Worldwide Booz & Company ed. 2008). 
852 Guoping, How to Speed up M&A Deals in China, supra note 471, at 333, 2008. 
853 Renato Mazzolini, Creating Europe's Multinationals: The International Merger Route, 48 THE JOURNAL OF 
BUSINESS 39, at 43-45 (1975). 
854 William Pitt’s words from his speech on January 9, 1770, engraved in a stone at the DOJ building in Washington 
D.C. 
855 Eleanor Kwak ET AL., The Middle East as an Emerging Market at 361 (Financier Worldwide Booz & Company 
ed. 2008). 
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Whether the measure is law or regulation or even just arbitrary administrative decision, it 
could be justified under many reasons such as those similar to the stretchy notion of national 
security, which could easily encompass all and any actions at anytime, and that will be discussed 
shortly during the discussions of the national security as one of the impediments that faces the 
cross-border mergers.856 Meanwhile, unsuccessfully some professionals tried to justify that kind 
of impediments, by claiming that it is just an application of reciprocity provisions,857 meanwhile 
that could be easily refuted because that claim could be used to justify only the requirement of 
such authorizations as a reaction to the requirement in other jurisdiction, and not to justify the 
action in both jurisdictions or at least the jurisdiction that was first started. 
It was also held that such measures could be justified on public policy grounds, for 
instance due to the massive activities of the SWFs to purchase national corporations that are 
operating and serving basic needs to nationals, several jurisdiction especially from EU are 
attacking back those activities, for instance the Foreign Trade and Payments Act 
(Außenwirtschaftsgesetz) in Germany, require a prior authorization from the Federal Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Energy in order to acquire more than 25% of any German corporation, if 
the acquirer is non-EU corporation, and in that regard the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs 
has the authority to totally block the transaction.858 
It is undoubtedly true that requiring such authorizations by certain jurisdictions is 
generally mere protectionism i.e. safeguarding national industries and corporations against the 
competition with the foreign corporations, and even it is a fair competition, and there are many 
examples from reality that indicates that trend,859 and that is even known as “investment 
protectionism.”860 To sum it up, whatever the justification might be, all the reasons do not negate 
the fact that the requirement of such authorization is considered as an impediment to the cross-
border mergers. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
856 See infra p.175. 
857 Report to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate: Sovereign Wealth Funds: Laws 
Limiting Foreign Investment Affect Certain U.S. Assets and Agencies Have Various Enforcement Processes at 19. 
2009. 
858 Gasperis, et al., INTERNATINAL LAWYER, supra note 461, at 392 (2009). 
859 For examples about protectionism practices in the cross-border mergers industries within EU Member State, 
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It should be noted that sometimes that kind of impediments could be circumvented in 
many ways, and that range from for instance from using the corporate structure solutions such as 
incorporating a national investment vehicle to overcome some of those impediments, or 
acquiring a controlling share that is just under the threshold, to the extent of lobbying and 
arranging for campaigns to obtain the required authorizations. 861  In that same context, 
incorporating a foreign investment vehicle in a jurisdiction that have certain privileges of 
accessing other jurisdictions, under certain cooperation agreements, and that is typically the case 
in the EU, whereas a non-EU corporation could incorporate a corporation in one of the EU 
jurisdictions that are friendly with foreign corporations, and then use it as an investment vehicle 
to conclude cross-border merger transactions in any other EU jurisdiction, making use of 
privileges granted to EU Member States to access each other. 
6. Industry-Specific Limitations 
Cross-border mergers are limited to one extent or another in certain industries, and those 
industries are almost the same in most of the jurisdiction all over the world. Generally speaking, 
the limitations are mainly found in the following industries: (1) domestic transportations, 
specially shipping, aviation, and airport operations, (2) telecommunication, (3) energy, specially 
power plants, (4) agriculture, (5) banking, and (6) media. It should be noted also here that while 
it seems at first sight that the industry-specific issues are similar to those issues related to the 
foreign investment authorization, the fact is that both are impediments but are not the same, for 
instance a cross-border transaction might not trigger the threshold required for the foreign 
investment prior authorization, but may trigger an industry-specific limitation, and vice versa. 
For example, in Australia, according to the Shipping Registration Act,862 for a ship to be 
registered in Australia, nationals should own its majority i.e. 51% of its shares. Moreover, 
according to the Australian Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act of 1975,863 any foreign 
investment that will be involved in acquiring 5% or more of a corporation operating in the media 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
861 Godden, et al., PLI'S ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE, supra note 438, at 1122 
(2001); SWF owned the State of Qatar and this is an example of SWF that is using typically the pattern of acquiring 
controlling shares that are not triggering the threshold, for more details about this see Nair, Qatar Builds up Xstrata 
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862 Act No. 8 of 1981 (The Shipping Registration Act) 
863 Act No. 92 of 1975 (The Foreign Acquisitions and Takeovers Act) 
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industry, should be reported to the government regulatory authorities, and the same is with 
regard to the aviation industry, a prior authorization is also required to enter into a cross-border 
merger transaction, and that is mainly justified on grounds for verifying that the transaction is not 
contradicting with the national interests.864 
The paradigm in the US is almost the same, whereas according to the Jones Act of 1920, 
if a foreign corporation owns 25% of a vessel it will be deemed a foreign vessel and it is not 
allowed to carry cargo between two destinations in the US.865 In the agriculture industry, 
according to the Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978,866 all cross-border 
mergers should be disclosed after closing the transaction. In addition to that, there are many 
other examples in many other industries like aviation, automotive manufacturing, and mineral 
land leasing.867 
In the same line, according to the Egyptian Law of Establishing the Egyptian Electricity 
Authority,868 the government used to be the only party that was allowed to own corporations that 
build, operate, and maintain power plants, but that law was amended in 1996, by the Law No. 
100 of 1996, and according to that amendment the government could grant licenses to private 
sector parties, either national or foreign corporations, to build, operate, and maintain power 
plants. Meanwhile, no licenses were granted until now to any national or foreign corporation and 
that means that the government’s application of the law is arbitrary and could be considered as 
hindering cross-border merger transactions regarding that industry. 
In the same context, in the State of Oregon in the US, cross-border mergers in the utilities 
industry, and specially power plants, are also subjected to a prior authorization from the local 
authorities, and in most of the cases the authorization is not granted directly from any additional 
commitments, but in fact the authorization always encompass special tailored conditions, for 
example; not to sell certain assets in the future, and some other detailed commitments concerning 
the reliability of providing the services and not increasing the rates.869 
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865 The Merchant Marine Act of 1920, P.L. 66-261. 
866 The Agricultural Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1978, 7 U.S.C. 3501 
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869 Thomas C. Havens, Foreign Takeovers of U.S. Utilities - The British are Coming Again, THE METROPOLITAN 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (1999). 
172	  
Finally, it should be noted the industry-specific limitations are generally justified under 
the same reasons as the foreign investment authorization, and despite the fact that some or all of 
those reason could virtually justify the limitation, generally those limitations are based on a mere 
protectionism background, and the bottom line is that all proves and does not negate the fact that 
the industry-specific limitations are considered as an impediment to the cross-border merger 
transactions. 
7. Integration Issues 
It is undoubtedly true that the integration between the merging parties is one of the most 
crucial issues that faces the surviving corporation, whereas successful integration literally led to 
the success of the cross-border merger and otherwise it might lead to its failure, it is a matter of 
gaining the expected synergies or expecting losses, and accordingly it was claimed that “it is all 
about integration.”870 In that context, it should be noted that there are no straightforward answer 
to the question of how should the merging parties successfully integrate, whereas every 
transaction is a unique case in its own, and what worked for this might not work for that.871 
Meanwhile, breaking the integration process into small factors might help to identify the 
problems or the factors that led to consider the integration issues as an impediment to cross-
border mergers. In that context, those factors could be generally identified and classified into 
three main categories, the first category is the integration of the human resources, which might 
include the following tasks to be accomplished: (1) developing an integration strategy and plan 
for employees, (2) integrating people coming from different cultures, (3) integrating employees 
speaking different languages, (4) hiring highly skilled managers that could lead the integration 
process, (5) integrating different employees’ assessment schemes, (6) integrating different 
employees benefits and rewarding schemes, and (7) preparing the employees psychologically for 
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the integration process and to get rid of “nationalistic atavism” i.e. sticking to the old national 
environment, and shifting to the new cross-border multinational environment.872 
While it was claimed that the integration of the human resources and specially when they 
are coming from different cultures was not vital to the cross-border mergers,873 it was also 
claimed that it is the most important issue in terms of the integration issues that might face the 
cross-border mergers, whereas it was reported that it was the reason behind the failure in 
approximately 33% of the failed cross-border mergers.874 To show how that issue is important, 
consider for example the efforts done in that regard, during the integration process of the merger 
between Hewlett Packard and Compaq, there were 144 focusing group,875 and those focusing 
groups were conducted for two years in twenty two different jurisdictions.876 
The second category of factors that could be identified, are factors that are related to the 
corporate structure issues, whereas under the different legal systems, the corporate structures are 
almost different, even the name of the same corporate structure are different, for instance the 
“Commanditaire Vennootschap” in Netherlands is known as “Association en Participation” in 
Belgium and as Limited Liability Partnership in the UK.877 However, the typical differences are 
mainly concerning different structuring requirements, for registration, for control, for managing, 
for operating, for licensing, and for taxation; as it will be discussed in more details during the 
discussions of the taxation as an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers.878 
It is noteworthy that while it was claimed by a scholar that there are no cross-border 
difficulties at all and that it is just a myth, the same scholar himself clearly admitted that the 
structural issues under the different legal systems, especially when it comes to civil and common 
law systems, could be a serious issue that the merging parties would face along with other 
integration issues such as the different business and financial cultures, and he even gave 	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examples of the structure differences between the EU Member States, for instance under the 
French civil legal system, if the transaction is a stock-for-stock transaction, the presented shares 
should be valued by “Commissaire aux Apports,”879 while that is not a requirement in the 
common law legal jurisdictions in the EU.880 
The third category of integration factors that could be identified are the factors that are 
related to the integration of operations, particularly in the case where the merging parties will not 
operate autonomously, and that includes mainly the following issues: (1) developing an 
operation integration strategy and plan, (2) integrating the manufacturing plants, (3) integrating 
the distribution channels, (4) integrating the functional departments for example the marketing, 
sales, information technology, finance, human resources management, accounting departments, 
etc., (5) defining a geographic scale of the integration, (6) integration between business practices 
and standards prevalent in different jurisdictions, and (7) customers integrations, whereas 
sometimes in certain industries the customer used to be served in a specific way according to 
certain system.881 
An excellent example, in the context of integrating the business practices of the merging 
parties is the integration between the accounting standards, as it will demonstrate how the 
integration of the operations could be an impediment to the cross-border merger. In that context 
it should be noted first that almost each jurisdiction developed its own accounting standards, 
however by time and with the efforts to harmonizing those standards by the International 
Accounting Standards Board under the umbrella of the Foundation of the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (hereinafter IFRS), only two standards have become predominant in almost 
all the jurisdictions; the IFRS, and the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (hereinafter 
GAAP).882 
The differences between the IFRS and the GAAP standards are vital and sometimes lead 
to cross-border merger failures, in that context it was reported that in the case of the merger 
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between the German corporation Daimler-Benz and the American corporation Chrysler, due to 
the use of different accounting standards in both of corporations, and the listing disclosure 
requirements by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC), a 68 million 
US dollars of profits under the German accounting standards appeared as a 556 million US 
dollars of losses in 1993, and that significantly affected the price of the shares at the stock 
exchange, and accordingly Daimler decided to be unlisted because they though it was better than 
experiencing those losses as result of the integration process.883 
Finally, it should be noted that integration is not just about the general process, it is about 
all those issues as components of the process, whereas each of those integration components 
could be a success factor that contribute positively to the success of the cross-border mergers. At 
the same time it could be a serious issue that could negatively affect the pace of the integration 
process generally and accordingly the success of the merger transaction itself, and it might led to 
losses due weak performance, or even led to the total failure of that the concerned cross-border 
merger.884 
8. National Security Clearance 
As it was previously mentioned that most of the prior authorization of the foreign 
investment, with regard to the cross-border transactions, could be justified under the national 
security stretchy notion, and that under that notion the national authorities could easily block any 
cross-border merger at anytime, and that might be mere protectionism. It should be noted here 
that the national security clearance is an additional requirement that might be required from the 
parties of the cross-border mergers, and that clearance might be required in the following two 
cases. 
The first case is simply when the cross-border merger transaction is related to defense or 
national security industries, while the second case is just because an FDI is planning to acquire a 
national target that has particular significant in the national economy, or sometimes it could be 
just a national corporation. In fact the second case should be categorized as an economic security 
case not a notional security one, and in that context it was claimed that the term national security 	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is used in the US instead of the economic security,885 and even sometimes instead of political 
goals. 
For instance, according to the US legal system, under the Defense Production Act of 
1950,886 as amended by the Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007,887 the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (hereinafter CFIUS) is responsible of 
reviewing the cross-border mergers that are just an FDI whenever the target is a US corporation. 
The review that is expected to be done by CFIUS is mainly concerned with the national security 
dimension of the transaction, however it is not that straightforward of a review i.e. it is not just a 
national security issue because it might encompass political and economic issues as well, and a 
brief look on the history of the 2007 amendment to the Defense Production Act will reveal such 
fact. 
To elaborate more, the fact was that what triggered the amendment of the law was a 
cross-border merger transaction that did not constitute any threat to the national security, but it 
literally constitutes an economic security and protectionism. The story was all about a foreign 
corporation namely Dubai Ports World, which is owned by the UAE, and it was planning to 
acquire Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which has the right to run six US 
ports, and the transaction passed the national security review that was applicable before the 
amendments, and that in fact irritated the US legislator and led to the passing of an amendment 
to tighten the review for the FDI in general and accordingly to all the cross-border mergers.888 
It should be noted also that while the prior review of the cross-border mergers by the 
CFIUS is still voluntary, and that means that the parties might opt not to disturb their schedule 
and not to disclose too much information about it and thus close the transaction prior to the 
review. But in the same time they should be aware of the risks behind that choice, because in fact 
the CFIUS will have the authority to review the transaction, of its own even if it was not notified, 
and if it found any threat to the national security it might advise the US President to use his 
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note 885, (2007). 
177	  
power, as granted by the law, to enjoin the already consummated transaction, and in that case the 
surviving corporation might face dissolution.889 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the national security clearance requirement is not 
applied to all transactions, for instance the outbound transactions or the acquiring target in one of 
the passive investment industries are not exposed to such requirement.890 On the other hand, if 
the transaction is related to certain industries like the defense, security, and telecommunication 
industries, another form of the national security clearance impediment is waiting for the merging 
parties, whereas in most jurisdictions a prior authorization is required in such transactions that 
directly related to one those industries. For instance, according to the US legal system, the US 
Department of Defense has the right to review the merger transaction related to the defense 
industry.891 
Finally, it would be useful to limit the high discretionary and stretchy notion of the 
national security, and particularly to limit the arbitrary application of the law by the national 
authorities, whereas it has been expected that Canada will introduce guidelines in that regard to 
serve all the parties i.e. the parties to the transaction and even the government officials, and 
according to the guidelines the parties of the transaction might have a more solid base for the 
decision toward the transaction.892 Unfortunately, no guidelines were issued until now in that 
regard, and it should be noted that whatever the reasons might be behind any kind of national 
security clearance requirements, that will not negate that fact the of national security clearance 
requirements could be considered as an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers. 
9. Professional Services 
Despite that fact that the services provided by the professional such as the legal advisors, 
financial advisors, auditor and accountants, and management consultants, might be one of the 
success factors that could led to the success of cross-border mergers, those services providers 
could be an actual impediment to the transactions, and they might lead to poor performances or 
experiencing losses, or even the failure of the transaction. In addition to the heavy fees that could 	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be charged in return of such services, due to the complex nature of the cross-border mergers, and 
whether it is considered as an extra financial burden added to the cross-border transaction, if the 
services providers are not professional enough they will be an impediment that faces the cross-
border mergers. 
For instance, the legal advisor who will participate in the conclusion of the transaction 
must be fully aware of all the laws of the different legal systems in the different jurisdictions that 
are applicable to the transaction, not only that but how all those laws are interpreted and applied 
in real cases by both the government officials and the judges in courts, because one wants to 
avoid any fatal mistakes that could lead to future failure of the transaction or increase the 
liabilities of the parties, for example the transaction could be closed without having the required 
prior authorization from the concerned authorities and that in some cases might lead to 
dissolution, as it will be addressed in the discussions of the merger control as an impediment. 
Furthermore, the list of examples of the issues that might cause a consequence due to the 
lack of full awareness of the different legal systems is too long, and in that context it could be 
claimed that the legal advisors that are involved in cross-border mergers, as well as all the other 
professional service providers involved in the transaction, should have a comparative mindset 
that allows them first to accept the fact that there might be different systems that are adopted in 
jurisdictions around the globe, and then to understand the differences between those systems, and 
finally how to tailor solutions that will make the transaction acceptable among all those different 
systems simultaneously.	  
From a practical point of view, some of the professional service providers do not even 
except that there are different systems than their own national system, and that might be 
attributed to many reasons, one of those reason is the limited international exposures, and 
another reason is that the practicing of the legal profession as well as many other professions is 
limited to the nationals in most of the jurisdictions,893 and most importantly the lack of 
comparative education is on the top of that list. All of the concerned professional service 
providers should be fully aware and deeply understand that the fact is that the “[l]aw can no 
longer be looked at in national terms,” and it was even claimed that most of the law schools are 
strictly “tied to their national perspectives.”894 	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In the same context, it was argued that the legal advisor, as a law student, should be open 
to study comparative legal systems.895 In addition to the professional advisors of the parties, it 
could also be maintained that all the state officials should be open to that, or at least their skills 
should be upgraded to understand the new extra dimension of cross-border transactions. This is 
because they are engaged to a great extent in cross-border transactions, during the preparation 
phase or even after closing the transaction and they are directly involved in settling the disputed 
that might arise out of that kind of transactions. For example, it was claimed that judges are 
regularly the outcome of their national law schools, which focusing most of the time on that 
national legal system,896 therefore judges should receive some training, or at least be open to 
learn about the comparative judicial practices and administration of justice in other 
jurisdictions.897 
It is noteworthy that, in an attempt to contribute in solving that problem and not to be a 
part of it, many law schools designated comparative law departments that hold the mission to 
design special programs for law students to study different legal systems from all around the 
globe, from a comparative perspective. Remarkably Robert H. McKinney School of Law is one 
of those first law schools to be part of that initiative. Moreover, it should be also noted here that 
the issue of globalization of the legal profession is also a heavily debated issue, and remarkably 
also it was highly debated during the symposium of “Globalization of the Legal Profession” that 
was held on April 2006, at the Indiana University School of Law.898 
Finally, it is undoubtedly true that those	   professional service providers if they are not 
willing, not educated, or inexperienced with most of the different systems across the globe, and 
unaware of the “interactions and tensions” between them, they will be considered as serious 
impediment to the cross-border merger. Not only that, but also in addition they will lose the 
opportunity and will not have a chance to grow themselves, in the journey of that semi-
globalized world in the globalization process.899 
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10. Stock Exchange Issues 
In case that any of the merging parties are a public corporation i.e. its shares are publicly 
traded in the stock exchange, the rules applied to the concerned stock exchange might be 
considered as an impediment that faces the cross-border merger transaction. Generally speaking, 
the rules of the stock exchange can be an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers in two 
flavors, the first is in the case of the compliance towards those rules in different jurisdictions at 
the same time; whereas those rules might be contradicting to each other and led to serious 
problems, or even perplexing situation and consume resources if not contradicting to each other, 
and the second is the case when those rules are contradicting with other different set of rules that 
not even related to the stock exchange, as it will be explained in this discussion. 
In that context, it was claimed that most of the problems relating to the differences 
between the rules of the stock exchange are already resolved by means of the harmonization 
efforts done under the International Organization of Securities Commissions (hereinafter 
IOSCO),900 whereas more than 124 securities commissions from around the globe are members 
to the IOSCO and almost have adopted the harmonized rules.901 However, that claim could be 
refuted on the ground that the application of the rules by the different securities commissions, in 
the different jurisdictions, is the key to the problems, and the flaw is not just inherent in the rules 
itself, for instance the policies and the general environment in some jurisdiction might be more 
capitalist oriented, while other jurisdiction might be strictly oriented to the protection of the 
rights of the minority shareholders, thus the problems. 
The previously mentioned merger between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler is an excellent 
example of the stock exchange rules as an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers, 
whereas according to the disclosure rules of the SEC, Daimler Chrysler was required to disclose 
its financial information as a foreign issuer such as, the net income, profits, and that disclosure 
should in accordance with the GAAP accounting standards, while Daimler Chrysler was required 
to disclose the same information in Germany according to the IFRS accounting standards,902 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
900 For more details about the history of the IOSCO see generally PETTET, Company Law, supra note 125, at 329-
330. 2005; REED, et al., The Art of M&A, supra note 366, at 919-920. 2007; Braithwaite & Drahos, Globalisation of 
Corporate Regulation and Corporate Citizenship, supra note 43, at 20-21. 2003.  
901 To see the full list of the members of the IOSCO visit the official website at http://www.iosco.org/lists last visited 
October 1, 2014.  
902 See Wöller, DAJV NEWSLETTER, supra note 883, at 14-18 (2013). 
181	  
in that case the disclosure that was required under the filing of the form 20-F as per the SEC 
rules was almost the same to the disclosure required as the German rules.903 
However, the rule that require the disclosure is not the problem, and that is definitely not 
the case, the case is that in doing so according to the two standards one will consume resources 
because it all has to be done twice and in accordance with two different standards, in addition to 
that as it was previously mentioned the difference between those two standards was not 
marginal, but in fact a 68 million US dollars profits under the IFRS appeared as a 556 million US 
dollars losses under the GAAP, and that significantly affected the price of the shares in the stock 
exchange and it end up with Daimler Chrysler deciding to be unlisted rather than experiencing 
these losses that resulted from the obligations under different set of rules.904 
It is noteworthy that the securities commissions in some jurisdiction might apply the rules 
in a strict manner while in other jurisdiction the same rule could be waived, moreover and even 
in the same jurisdiction and the same authority officials could show tolerance to some transaction 
while rigidness to others, for instance it was reported that since 1990 the SEC is more friendly 
with the cross-border issuer that the domestic one,905 for example the SEC entered into 
negotiation with Daimler Chrysler with regard the accounting standards and the result was that 
the SEC allowed Daimler Chrysler to submit the financial reports every six months instead of 
quarterly, and even to submit the financial statements of the most recent two years instead of the 
required five years.906 
In addition to that, as it was just mentioned the stock markets exchange rules might not 
contradict only with each other, but in fact it might also contradict with different set of rules that 
are not even related to the stock exchange, and that will definitely consume more resources and 
sometimes might lead to the failure of the transaction. For instance, according to the rules of 
most the stock exchanges, the announcement of the offer to acquire shares from the market 
should be timed by the closing date, while in most of the cases of the cross-border merger 
transaction is required to be reviewed once announced by the concerned antitrust authorities, not 
in just one but in many jurisdictions, and that always takes long time, accordingly the offer will 	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lapse and making a new offer is not that easy due to the many complex issues such as the change 
in prices and even sometimes complying to a new set of rules adopted during the antitrust review 
period that usually takes six months.907 
Lastly, it was claimed that with the more difficult listing and the general market rules, the 
more the successful corporation would try to be listed accordingly to those rules, as that will 
inevitably enhance the risk profile and corporate governance scheme of the surviving 
corporation.908 On the other hand, it is undoubtedly true that the rules of the stock exchange is 
not only an impediment to the surviving corporation, but also to financing the transaction itself in 
the case that the merging parties were planning to finance the transaction by issuing stocks, 
either shares or bonds of any kind. 
11. Taxation Issues 
Taxation on the national level i.e. pure domestic transaction is a very complicated issue, 
in addition to that the taxation of the transaction has significant effects, starting from the 
incentive to enter into a merger and passing by the structuring of the transaction and finally as a 
success or failure factor. However, when it comes to the taxation of the international transactions 
and the multinational corporations as an outcome of the cross-border mergers, taxation issues are 
highly complicated, and it was even claimed that as the international system developed and 
moved towards a globalized world without giving the proper attention to an international 
taxation system.909 
In the same context, it was empirically reported that the tax consideration significantly 
affect the corporate restructuring decision,910 and that it has a crucial impact on the interests of 
the merging parties and thus they should be fully aware of the taxation consequences and of all 
the available structuring options before taking their final decision, that includes not only the 
different taxation systems in the concerned jurisdictions but also any tax agreements between 
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those jurisdiction.911 Therefore, it could be easily claimed that in all cases the taxation issues will 
at least consume the parties’ resources if not lead to huge losses or even failure. 
In the same context, it was empirically reported that the taxation policy significantly 
affected the general economic activities in the US,912 and regarding the FDI activities in the US a 
specialized empirical study also reported that the analysis of data revealed that taxation policy 
significantly affected the inbound flow of FDI i.e. to the US.913 In fact that is not the case in the 
US only, but in almost all jurisdictions, the taxation issues are highly complicated and adversely 
affect the cross-border mergers, even within the members of cooperation unions like the EU.914 
Moreover, the effect of the taxation policy in certain jurisdiction is not just limited to the 
economic activities in general and the cross-border mergers in that jurisdiction, but it also affects 
the taxation policy of other jurisdictions. For instance, it was recounted that the tax policy reform 
of the US in 1986, directly triggered the Canadian government to change its own taxation 
policies, in the same direction, and in response to the said tax reform in the US.915 That kind of 
simulative reaction on the international level is not limited to that instance and generally 
speaking is based on the fact that most of the countries are competing with one another to attract 
FDIs, and it was claimed that the race is always to same direction i.e. simplifying the taxation 
issues, in other words and to be more precise, the race is to the bottom.916 
Furthermore, the empirical findings reveal that the taxation policies also affect the R&D 
strategy of corporations, whereas there is evidence indicating that the R&D strategies directly 
respond to any change in the tax rates on the domestic level, and that was justified by the fact 
that the importation of technology is a substitute to the R&D activities of the corporations, thus 
any increase in the domestic tax rates will led to an increase in technology importation, which 	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inevitably means an outbound flow of investments and harming the domestic economy in 
general.917 
As it was previously mentioned that in certain jurisdictions like in the US and other 
countries that adopted a worldwide taxation policy, the returns of the national corporation are 
taxable even if realized abroad.918 Actually, that worldwide taxation policy added another 
dimensions to the taxation problems, whereas in many cases there will be an overlapping 
jurisdictions and that may led to double taxation, in addition the overlapping jurisdiction 
consumes the resources of the surviving corporation in order to comply with several tax systems 
and to administer the taxation issues before all the concerned jurisdictions.919 
Moreover, as it was also reported that most of the corporations invented their own 
practices to circumvent some of the taxation issues, especially double taxation and the taxation 
policies in unfriendly jurisdiction, and that was done mainly by spreading the profits among non-
arm’s length corporations and transfer pricing techniques. However, the governments use to 
counterattack those practices through bilateral treaties,920 and in the meantime continue their race 
to the bottom by entering into treaties to avoid double taxation, and that led the parties of the 
cross-border mergers to consider what is known as “treaty shopping” in order to decide where to 
incorporate and what kind of structure should be used. Then the governments fight back again, as 
always, by entering into special treaties to stop the treaty shopping practices.921 
The list of examples for the battle between multinational corporations and the 
government on the tax issues is too long, however sometimes there are extreme responses from 
both of them, and that is considered to be out of the conventional examples, for example the 
Indian authorities entered into a dispute before the High Court of Bombay on the disagreement 
of taxing the off-shore cross-border merger between Vodafone International Holdings BV (a 	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Dutch corporation) and Cayman Islands Holding Corporation (a Cayman Island corporation), 
because the transaction was alleged to have an indirect connection to Vodafone Essar Limited 
(an Indian corporation),922 on the other hand Starbucks Corporation paid millions of sterling 
pounds to the UK authorities just to end the public criticism of its practices toward tax issues.923 
Finally, despite the fact that addressing the issues that might result from the taxation 
policies in many jurisdictions and its effect on the cross-border mergers, or at least on the 
planning and structuring of the transaction, is not an easy task, but it could be easily claimed that 
in most of the cases the taxation issues are considered as an impediment that faces the cross-
border mergers.924 In that context, some scholars actively call for the harmonization of the 
international taxation policies, in order to avoid the negative effects of the contradicting policies, 
or at least to lessen that effect, on the cross-border mergers.925 
12. Successorship Issues 
Changing the control of any of the parties of the cross-border merger will lead in most of 
the cases to the escalation of many problems, for example the issues related to the assignment of 
the agreements with third parties, the issues related to the assignment of the rights or privileges 
that that were granted to any of the parties under certain regimes such as investment incentives 
and industry-specific licenses, issues related	  to the assignment of the title and rights to real estate 
and IPR, and identifying the borderline that defines the liabilities of both the surviving 
corporation and the target towards other stakeholders, such as customers and employees and to 
no ending list of third parties, as the case might be. 
For instance, under the legal systems of almost all jurisdictions, and according to the 
“change of control” clauses that are generally incorporated in most of the agreements, the 
assignment of rights and obligations to third parties due to the change of control, which might be 
the surviving corporation in that case, is prohibited unless otherwise authorized by the mutual 
consent of the parties or that might put the agreement itself to an end if not considered it a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
922 Gasperis, et al., INTERNATINAL LAWYER, supra note 461, at 394-395 (2009). 
923 Pamela Park, Corporate Governance Watch: Public Opinion Influences Corporate Decision Making (Thomson 
Reuters 2013). 
924 Godden, et al., PLI'S ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE, supra note 438, at 1127-1228 
(2001); Robert J. Peroni, A Response to Dean Thompson's Paper on the Impact of Code Section 367 and the 
European Union's 1990 Council Directive on Tax-Free Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 66 UNIVERSITY OF 
CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 1271, at 1275 (1998). 
925 Peroni, UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW, supra note 924, at 1281 (1998). 
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breach.926 Accordingly, the surviving corporation might lose the rights that were granted under 
those agreements, unless it got consent from the concerned parties, not only that but it might also 
bear unexpected liabilities out of the thin air such as in case where the assignment was 
considered a breach. 
Another example, is from the US, whereas when the target or the acquirer is a party to a 
classified contract with the US government agencies i.e. those are the types of contracts that 
require access to confidential information, the assignment of those contracts to the acquirer or 
any other merging party should be reported to the CFIUS, and the parties should take acceptable 
measures according to the standards of the concerned government agency to ensure that those 
contracts will remain classified after the conclusion of the merger transaction, and that is known 
as “Foreign Ownership Control or Influence Mitigation Plan.”927 
Moreover, according to the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 
1994,928 the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter FBI) has the right to access the 
systems of corporations operating in the internet providing services and the telecommunication 
industry, and therefore any merger transaction concerning the acquiring of a US corporation 
operating in any of those industries, the FBI will have to arrange with the expected acquirer to 
ensure that the surviving corporation will continue to grant the FBI the same access, otherwise 
the FBI might not clear the transaction.929 
Finally, it should be noted that those kinds of successorship issues are highly diverse and 
are not governed under the same rules or general principles in any single jurisdiction, therefore 
addressing those kind of issues will require unprecedented research efforts and it is out of the 
scope of this dissertation. However, it is undoubtedly true that arranging for handling those kinds 
of successorship issues will consume resources and might lead to losses or even to a merger 
failure, and thus are considered as impediments that face the cross-border mergers. 
IV. Merger Control as a Cross-border Merger Impediment 
The following discussion will prove that merger control is considered as an impediment 
that faces mergers generally, and even on the cross-border mergers level the case is worse; as it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
926 MILLER, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Step-by-Step Legal and Practical Guide, supra note 414, at 20. 2008. 
927 Epstein & Dempsey, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 891, (2004). 
928 The Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 USC 1001-1010 
929 Epstein & Dempsey, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, supra note 891, (2004). 
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will be revealed during the discussions, that merger control directly affect the success of cross-
border mergers. Moreover, the discussion will be divided into two main parts, the first part will 
be merger control at a glance, whereas it will address the merger control systems at number of 
jurisdictions; first to show how the merger control systems varies from one another, and second 
to show that those systems are almost contradicting. 
The second part of the coming discussion will mainly address the drawbacks of the 
different merger control systems, from a cross-border mergers perspective whenever possible. 
That part of the discussion will address the various drawbacks ranging from what might be 
considered as a foundational inherent fault in the system, to what is considered as an impediment 
that faces only or at least specifically the cross-border mergers, and finally to the negative effect 
of the differences between the systems adopted in the different jurisdictions that are concerned 
with the transaction, which might be none of the jurisdiction that are directly related or 
connected to the transaction, due the	  extraterritorial jurisdictional reach, as it will be shown in 
detail in the discussions of the US, EU, and Egyptian systems. 
1. Merger Control at a Glance 
Merger control is simply the process under which the competent authorities of a certain 
jurisdiction reviews certain merger transactions, in order to insure that the surviving corporation 
is raising an antitrust questions i.e. violations, and according to the results of that process the 
competent authority might block the transaction, require certain remedies to be done in order to 
authorize or clear it, or even enjoin the consummated transaction. In that context, it should be 
noted that if the review is prior to closing the transaction it is known as premerger control, while 
if the review is after closing the transaction it is known as post-merger control. 
In the post-merger control case, the review will be similar to a great extent to the typical 
antitrust review of any antitrust case i.e. the review of the behavior of a corporation that is not 
engaged in any merger activity; therefore the premerger control is mainly concerned with the 
merger transaction itself more than the post-merger control. However, and despite the fact that 
the premerger review might have a greater effect on the cross-border mergers, the coming 
discussion will address both of the two forms in some details, as follows. 
The merger control systems to be addressed in the coming discussion will be the US, EU, 
and the Egyptian merger control systems. As it previously mentioned during the introduction of 
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this dissertation, the main reasons behind the selection of those three systems namely is that the 
US merger control system was the first adopted merger control system in the world, in addition 
to that, both of the US and the EU jurisdictions are the most dynamic and active jurisdictions in 
that field.930 Moreover, the extraterritorial jurisdictional dimension of the application of the 
merger control, which uniquely characterizes both of the US and the EU systems, is an important 
reason, and more importantly both of the two systems are heavily imitated in many other 
jurisdictions around the globe. 
Meanwhile, the Egyptian system was also selected because Egypt is a leading country in 
the Middle East & North Africa (hereinafter MENA) region, and the Egyptian system is 
generally a typical model of the merger control system that is adopted in most of the developing 
countries, and more importantly the Egyptian laws are widely copied in almost all of the Arab 
countries. Moreover, both the US and EU systems are premerger review systems, while the 
Egyptian system is a post-merger notification system, and those are typically the two types or 
forms of merger control. 
Furthermore, the Egyptian legal system is considered to be a civil law system while the 
US is a common law system, and it will be more constructive to a comparison between the US 
system as a common law model and the Egyptian system as a civil law model. It should be 
finally noted that the discussion will just address each of those systems as is, but will not 
evaluate any of the values or goals behind them or the process of the review itself, and all the 
evaluations will come later in detail during the discussions of the drawbacks of the merger 
control systems. 
a) US premerger control 
In order to fully understand the US premerger control system one must evaluate its 
development over the period of a century and more, as it was previously mentioned that the US 
antitrust law i.e. the Sherman Act of 1890 might be considered the father of the modern antitrust 
laws, and that it was enacted to protect small businesses over the trusts of giant powerful 
businesses. It might be also held that the merger control system of the US was the first merger 
control system to be adopted in the world, whereas according to § 1 of the Sherman Act any 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
930 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 278-279. 2003. 
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merger that would restrain trade is prohibited, and according to § 2 any merger that would 
monopolize or attempt to monopolize trade or commerce is also prohibited. 
However the Sherman Act was rendered as incompetent to accomplish its mission, 
especially with regard to merger transactions, because the US courts found that not every merger 
that would restraint trade is prohibited under the law, but a narrower test i.e. “rule of reason”931 
should be applied in order to prohibit only of the mergers that are unreasonably restraining the 
trade.932 In that context, it could be claimed that under the Sherman Act the case was not a 
premerger control, but it was just reviewing the behavioral practices of the surviving corporation, 
as similar to all the other corporations that are not engaged in any kind of merger transactions, 
and therefore the premerger control had not yet developed in the US i.e. until the beginning of 
the 20th century. 
By the enactment of the Clayton of 1914, the US merger control system go one more 
step, whereas under the clear wording of § 7 of the Clayton Act, the merger transaction could be 
enjoined even before the occurrence of any actual anticompetitive behavior, but still that also is 
considered as post-merger control. In addition to that, there was a clear loophole in the wording 
of the Clayton Act, which was that it was limited to the purchase of shares and the merging 
parties could easily circumvent that by purchasing the assets of each other instead of the shares. 
Accordingly, the Celler-Kafeuver Act of 1950933 was enacted to amend § 7 of the Clayton Act 
and to close the mentioned loophole, and for that reason it was known as the “Anti-merger 
Act.”934 
Starting from the enactment of the HSR in 1976 the US merger control system started to 
be a typical premerger control system i.e. shifted from a consummated merger review to 
administrative premerger review,935 whereas according to HSR a new section (§ 7A) was added 
to the Clayton Act, and according to that if one of the merging parties’ value reached a certain 
threshold or if the proposed transaction value reached a certain threshold, the parties should file a 
notification of the transaction, and wait for a specified number of days before consummating the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
931 For more details about the “rule of reason” in antitrust context see generally Pertiz, HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL, 
supra note 203, (1989). 
932 Koutsoudakis, DAYTON LAW REVIEW, supra note 198, at 245-246 (2009). 
933 The Celler-Kafeuver Act of 1950, 64 stat. 1125 15 U.S.C. § 18 
934 Koutsoudakis, DAYTON LAW REVIEW, supra note 198, at 246 (2009). 
935 For more details about the transformation of the US merger control system to premerger review system see 
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OREGON 
LAW REVIEW 1383 (1998). 
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transaction. Moreover, according to § 7A(a)(2) of the Clayton Act, the FTC should revise and 
could possibly change those thresholds on an annual basis.936 
It should be noted that according to the HSR the waiting period before consummating the 
transaction might be extended in a case in which the authorities requested the submission of 
additional information from the parties, by issuing a “second request.”937 In that context, it 
should be also noted that according to the HSR, the merging parties are not literally required to 
comply with the “second request,” meanwhile the noncompliance and consummation of the 
transaction before a final approval, might lead to future enjoining of the consummated merger 
and that would unquestionably cost the parties more than compliance. 
In that context, it is noteworthy that the main reason behind the mechanism of premerger 
notification that was developed by the HSR was to create “a mechanism to provide advance 
notification to the antitrust authorities of very large mergers prior to their consummation, and to 
improve procedures to facilitate enjoining illegal mergers before they are consummated,”938 in 
other words to “win a premerger injunction … before … the merging firms are hopelessly and 
irreversibly scrambled together ….”939 It was claimed even that the intent of enjoining illegal 
mergers before they are consummated was not a new one,940 whereas the court in its decision on 
Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States in 1962, stated that the legislative intent of the Clayton Act 
was to “arrest mergers at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition … was still in its 
incipiency.”	  941 
Furthermore, as another development was added to the system, § 7 of the Clayton Act 
was then extended to include transaction between “persons” and not just between “corporations” 
such as partnerships and JV, and that was accomplished by the Antitrust Procedural 
Improvements Act of 1980,942 and according to that amendment the Clayton Act was broaden to 
include merger transactions that would affect interstate commerce even if the parties are not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
936 The latest thresholds was announce on January 23, 2014 to be effective on February 24, 2014, for more details 
about the original threshold and the most recent threshold visit the official website of the FTC at 
http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/premerger -notification-program/current-thresholds last visited October 1, 2014. 
937  An official template of the “second request” is available online at the DOJ website 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/242694.htm last visited October 1, 2014. 
938 S. Rep. No. 803, at 61 (1976) discussing the reasons for the enactment of HSR 
939 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1373, at 2637 (1976).  
940 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 145. 2010. 
941 Brown Shoe Co v. United States, 370 US 294 (1962), 317. 
942 The Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980, 94 STAT. 1154 Pub.L. 96-349. 
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engaged in commerce, and that was by adding the phrase of “or in activity affecting commerce” 
after the phrase of “engaged in commerce.”943 
When it comes to the administration of the system, it should be note that the US 
premerger control system is administrated by many government agencies. On the first place, on 
the state level, it is administered by state agencies, and that is in addition to the federal agencies 
on the federal level, and that obviously means that in a single transaction if the merging parties 
are involved in operations in more than one state, the transaction will be investigated in all the 
concerned states on the state level in addition to the federal agencies on the federal level. 
On the state level, the US State Attorneys, under the directions of the State Attorneys 
General, are granted the right to enforce the provisions of the Sherman Act, under § 4, by 
initiating proceedings before the federal and state courts to prevent or even restrain any 
violations thereof. On the other hand, on the federal level, the DOJ was granted the same rights 
to enforce the provisions of the Sherman Act, under § 4, by initiating proceedings before the 
courts to prevent or even restrain any violations thereof. 
In addition to that, according to the broad language of § 5 and § 45 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1914,944 the FTC is also involved in the enforcement of the Sherman Act 
through civil actions;945 therefore both the DOJ and FTC are responsible for the enforcement of 
the Clayton Act and premerger notification system on the federal level.946 Meanwhile, and to be 
more precise, the DOJ are granted the power to bring an action before the federal district courts 
for criminal penalties, recover damages,947 or to obtain injunctions for violations to the Sherman 
Act and the Clayton Act,948 while the FTC might only bring an action before the federal district 
courts to obtain injunctions, and that is also pending on the completion of all the administrative 
proceedings.949 
By the same token, it should be noted that in order to cutback such overlaps between the 
agencies, either between the state and federal agencies or between the federal agencies 
themselves, two initiatives were developed; the first was that both the DOJ and the FTC entered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
943  ROBERT S. SCHLOSSBERG & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES at 2-6 (ABA, Section of Antitrust Law 3rd ed. 2008). 
944 The Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C §§ 41-58 
945 See FTC v Motion Picture Adver. Co, 344 US 392 (1952); FTC v Cement Inst., 333 US 683, 691 (1947) 
946 15 U.S.C. § 21 granted the FTC its authorities, and 15 U.S.C. § 25 granted the DOJ its authorities 
947 15 U.S.C. § 15a  
948 15 U.S.C. § 25  
949 § 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 
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into cooperation protocols with the State Attorneys General in order to improve the level of 
communication and coordination between the agencies, those protocols are known as the 
Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations Between the Federal Enforcement Agencies 
and the State Attorneys General or shortened as “Compact.”950 The second initiative is that the 
FTC and DOJ entered into a memorandum of agreements concerning the adoption of clearance 
procedures for investigations in order to reduce the overlap between both of them.951 
From the organizational point of view, the FTC is mainly organized as bureaus and 
offices, and one of those bureaus is the Bureau of Competition, under which there are four 
mergers divisions and each is designated to certain industry, and there is one Premerger 
Notification Office (hereinafter PNO) that receives the HSR notifications.952 On the other hand, 
the DOJ is mainly organized as divisions and offices, and one of those divisions is the Antitrust 
Division, under which there are offices and sections, one of those offices is the Office of 
Operations, and under that office there is Premerger Notification Unit.953 The following diagram 
might also help in understanding the hierarchy and cooperation between the different agencies 
that administer the premerger control system in the US. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
950 An official template of the Protocol for Coordination in Merger Investigations Between the Federal Enforcement 
Agencies and the State Attorneys General is available online at the DOJ website 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/1773.htm last visited October 1, 2014. 
951An official template of the Memorandum of Agreement between the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust 
Division of the United States Department of Justice Concerning Clearance Procedures for Investigation is available 
online at the DOJ website http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/10170.htm last visited October 1, 2014. 
952 For more details about the merger divisions of the Bureau of Competition in the FTC see the official organization 
at http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-competition/inside-bureau-competition last visited October 
1, 2014. 
953 For more details about the offices and sections under the Antitrust Division in the DOJ see the official 
organization at http://www.justice.gov/atr/about/sections.html last visited October 1, 2014. 
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Figure 12: US antitrust system954 
To show how the premerger control in the US process flows, consider the following 
typical HSR premerger control steps, if threshold was met: (1) filing and submitting the required 
notification forms along with the filing fees, to the FTC, the DOJ, and all the concerned State 
Attorneys General, (2) the Federal agencies will consult to determine which one will investigate 
the transaction, and that is known as the “clearance process,” and that agency might enter into a 
Compact with the concerned State Attorneys General, (3) the parties should wait for a certain 
period, during which the competent agency will start its investigations and gather information 
from the merging parties and other third parties,955 (4) the investigation agency might response 
as follows: early termination of the process before the waiting period elapses, or wait until it 
elapses, or issue a “second request” to gather additional information, (5) in the case of the 
“second request,” the waiting period will be extended to an additional waiting period but might 
be extended for more than that by agreement between the merging parties and the concerned 
agency, (6) before the elapse of the waiting period the competent agency may enter into an 
agreement with the merging parties to settle for restorations of the competition which is known 
as “consent decrees” or “remedies,” (7) in case that the waiting periods elapsed without any 
challenges or remedies, the parties may continue forward to consummate the transaction, (8) if 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
954 Data was derived from the previous discussions. 
955 For more a general idea about the how the FTC and the DOJ review the merger transaction, and the assessment 
criterion see Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 107-112. 2010. 
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the merging parties did not agree for the remedies, or the agency found violations that are not 
restorable, the agency may start its procedures to obtain injunctions for violations or even to 
enjoin the consummated merger as the case might be.956 
To sum it up, the premerger control process will start by the notification of the merging 
parties and will end with a decision of the competent agency, and that decision might be one of 
the four following possibilities: (1) early termination of the process before the end of the waiting 
period if no violation was found, (2) passive decision if no violation was found, i.e. no action 
was taken by the agency until the end of the waiting periods,957 (3) negotiating a consent decree 
if there are restorable violations, or (4) challenging the transaction before the courts. The most 
important issue to be noted here is that the agencies could not enforce the merger-control by 
itself but it should resort to the courts to do so. 
In that context, it was claimed that the courts mainly depend on the guidelines issued by 
the agencies themselves in order to determine the legality of the merger transaction rather than 
the case law, and the role of the courts and the judicial review is just “symbolic,” and that the 
courts not only follow the agencies in its findings but also the review process practically does not 
exist,958 and in the meantime others claimed that there are judicial review process and even that 
review is heavily based on the “economic reasoning.”959 
It was even maintained that the enforcement of the Clayton Act, literally by the federal 
agencies, led to the development of a highly complicated premerger control system, it was even 
reported that the FTC director admitted that the premerger control system has become 
comparable to the systems of taxation and securities complexities.960 Those complexities were 
the main reason behind issuing guidelines, and the first version of the guidelines were issued by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 For more details about the federal premerger control process see ILENE K. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION 
OF ANTITRUST LAW GOTTS, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO FEDERAL MERGER REVIEW 
(Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association 3rd ed. 2006); ANTHONY W. IMUS NEIL W. AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW SWISHER, PREMERGER NOTIFICATION PRACTICE MANUAL (ABA Section 
of Antitrust Law 4th ed. 2007)., and for more details about the merger control in the US and other jurisdictions see 
ILENE K. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW GOTTS, THE MERGER REVIEW PROCESS: A 
STEP-BY-STEP GUIDE TO U.S. AND FOREIGN MERGER REVIEW (ABA, Section of Antitrust Law 4th ed. 2012). 
957 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 147-148. 2010. 
958 Waller, OREGON LAW REVIEW, supra note 935, at 1394-1395 (1998). 
959 Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need to Be Modernized?, 21 THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 155, 
at 155 (2007)., and it is noteworthy that the author of that article was Deputy Assistant Attorney General for 
Economic Analysis and as a Commissioner on the Antitrust Modernization Commission, which was established by 
the Congress in 2002 to investigate whether the antitrust laws and their administration needs to be modernized. 
960 Hugh Latimer, A Case of Runaway Notification Premerger Notification, 3 AEI JOURNAL ON GVOERNMENT AND 
SOCIETY 46, at 46 (1979). 
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the DOJ in 1968,961 and it was then revised in 1982, and then non-horizontal merger guidelines 
were issued in 1984,962 and then both of the FTC and DOJ jointly issued new guidelines in 1992 
which was then revised in 1997,963 and finally they also jointly issued new guidelines in 2010.964 
In that context, it was claimed that in the case that the merger is contested before the 
court, the guidelines would not be legally binding to any party i.e. the agency itself, the merging 
parties, and the court.965 On the other hand, as it was previously mentioned that there are claims 
that the courts mainly depend on rather then issued guidelines to determine the legality of the 
merger transaction, and the role of the courts and the judicial review is just “symbolic,” which 
means that the guidelines are practically binding. 
It is undoubtedly true that the merging parties and the competent agency are always keen 
to resolve any issues amicably before resorting to any judicial procedures, and in that regard the 
agencies designed a special route, which is negotiating remedies that might resolve the expected 
violations. The remedies in that regard can be classified under two categories, the first category 
is the behavioral remedies, in which the parties will consummate the transaction but under a 
commitment not to engage into certain operational behaviors that are expected to led to antitrust 
violations, and it officially known in the US systems as “conduct remedies.”966 
On the other hand, the second category of remedies is the structural remedies, under 
which the merging parties agree to the divestiture of certain assets, or business units, or even 
rights like IPR, and in that context it was reported that the asset divestiture is considered the most 
popular structural remedy.967 Furthermore, and since the remedies are always negotiable between 
the agencies and the merging parties it could be a hybrid remedy between those two 	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962 U.S. Department of Justice Non-horizontal Mergers Guidelines, (June 14, 1984), available at the official website 
of the DOJ http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm last visited October 1, 2014. 
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http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm last visited October 1, 2014. 
964 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (August 19, 2010), 
available at the official website of the DOJ http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html last visited 
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965 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, The Antitrust Laws: A Primer, supra note 178, at 65. 2001. 
966 For more details about behavioral remedies see DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION UNITED STATES, 
ANTITRUST DIVISION POLICY GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES at 12-18 (U.S. Dept. of Justice, Antitrust Division. 
2011). 
967 Jo Seldeslachts, et al., Settle for Now but Block for Tomorrow: The Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy Tools, 52 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 607, at 631 (2009); RICHARD G. BALTO DAVID A. UNITED STATES FEDERAL 
TRADE COMMISSION PARKER, THE EVOLVING APPROACH TO MERGER REMEDIES (Federal Trade Commission. 2000). 
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categories.968 It that context, it could be claimed that the agencies might resort first to the court in 
order to gain negotiating power or position over the parties i.e. referring the transaction to the 
court will put the parties under pressure while they negotiate the remedies to accept the agency 
proposal.  
In fact the remedy agreements do not replace the judiciary role, whereas the according to 
Tunney Act of 1974,969 those kind of consent agreement are also subject to the judicial review 
before being effective. In the same context, it should be noted that third parties as well as all the 
competent agencies might challenge consummated merger transaction, for instance despite the 
fact that the transaction was not challenged by the FTC or DOJ, or in case that the merging 
parties have entered into a consent agreement with the FTC or DOJ, a State Attorneys General or 
a third party who meet the standing requirement before the courts might challenge the 
transaction,970 and it was even reported that State Attorneys General have shown a growing 
keenness to challenge merger transactions that were already approved by the federal agencies.971 
The most important characterization of the US premerger control system, which directly 
affects the cross-border mergers, is that the US premerger control system is characterized by its 
extraterritorial effect, whereas the US courts may apply the US antitrust laws to any transaction 
that is conducted in any other jurisdiction, and even between non-US corporations. That 
extraterritorial effect was first introduced in the case known as Aloca case, in that case the 
“effects doctrine” was developed, and under that doctrine the US courts could apply the US 
antitrust laws to any transaction that is expected to affect the US trade or commerce.972 
The effects doctrine was then softened in the case of Timberlane, whereas the court 
decided to apply the rule of “reason comity”973 i.e. the court decided to give consideration to 
comity for the foreign defendant,974 and then one more development took place, under the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
968 For more details about hybrid remedies see UNITED STATES, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger 
Remedies, supra note 966, at 18-19. 2011. 
969 The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, 15 U.S.C. § 16 
970 Nathan R. Viavant, Agreeing To Disagree?: Continuing Uncertainties in Transatlantic Merger Clearance Post-
EC Merger Regulation, 17 TULANE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW 177, at 194-195 (2008). 
971 GOTTS, The Merger Review Process: A Step-by-Step Guide to Federal Merger Review, supra note 956, at 283. 
2006. 
972 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
973 For more details about comity rule see generally Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICHIGAN LAW 
REVIEW 9 (1966). 
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Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 975  where the law required that the 
transaction should have “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on the US trade 
or commerce in order to apply the US laws, but it was argued that that law did not introduce a 
new clear rule that would end the debate of the effects doctrine and the rule of comity.976 
That claim was actually supported by the decision of the court in the case of Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, whereas the court limited the application of the comity to the cases 
where there existed a “true conflict” between the US and the foreign laws,977 moreover that 
decision in the Hartford Fire case and the previous claim was supported again by the decision of 
the court in the case of United States v. Nippon Paper Industries, where here the court 
emphasized that the rule of comity is “more an aspiration” than a rule.978 
It should be noted here that the merger control system in the US is not just a premerger 
system, but also a post-merger control system, whereas the federal and state agencies are also 
competent to challenge any consummated merger, in cases that have not triggered the threshold 
or even if the merger was reviewed in the premerger stage and no violations were found, but the 
surviving corporation was engaged in anticompetitive behavior, or even in the situation where 
the surviving corporation breached the remedies agreement. 
Finally, a recent example of the post-merger control in the US, is the merger between two 
corporations in the online reviews and ratings industry, namely Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews, 
whereas according to the fact that the transaction did not reach the threshold and the parties 
consummated the merger on June 12, 2012, but after six months the DOJ brought an action 
before the courts alleging that the merger violated § 7 of the Clayton Act, and the court held that 
the transaction violated the antitrust laws on January 8, 2014, and ironically the ruling did not 
considered some of the information derived from consumers while it did consider a quote by the 
CEO of one of the parties that indicated the transaction will allow them to take out their only 
competitor in the market.979 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
975 Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 6a 
976 PAPADOPOULOS, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, supra note 181, at 67. 2010. 
977 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).  
978 United States v. Nippon Paper Industries Co. Ltd et al., 109 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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b) EU premerger control 
The EU premerger control system was not a longstanding system like the US system, as it 
was previously mentioned during the discussion of the “trust and antitrust law” that the first step 
of the EU to consider antitrust rules was taken on March 25 1957, under the EEC, and then from 
that time on the antitrust system or set rules were generally considered as “a fundamental 
provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the [EU] and, in 
particular, for the functioning of the internal market.”980 
Moreover, the antitrust rules in the EU were mainly articulated in the Articles 85 and 86 
of the EEC, which then become Articles 81 and 82 of the TEC, and currently become Articles 
101 and 102 of the TFEU.981 In that context, it was claimed that the adoption of and the EU 
antitrust rules was a result of both economic and political necessity,982 while others maintained 
that it was mainly to serve the common market goals.983 On the other hand, other scholars argued 
that the idea behind the union and its treaties was namely to establish “an ever closer union 
among the peoples of Europe”984 and not only the establishing of a single market.985 
It should be noted that the mentioned antitrust rules articulated in the TFEU does not 
mean that there exists a premerger control system in the EU, however those rules could be used 
as a post-merger control system, whereas if the surviving corporation engaged into 
anticompetitive behaviors, its behavior might be challenged as if it is a corporation that did not 
engaged in a merger transaction. Starting from September 21, 1990, which was the effective date 
of the first EU premerger control Council Reregulation,986 the EU joined the premerger control 
club by establishing its premerger control system that requires prior notification and review of 
certain merger transactions. 
During the period from 1957 and until 1990, the EC tried to utilize the antitrust rules on a 
broad scale as a tool to challenge any merger transaction that would affect the markets in the EU, 
and in 1963 a group of experts were invited by the EC to study the negative effect of the issues 	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982 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 30. 2003. 
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of concentration of the market shares due to the merger transaction, and that group published its 
report which was known as the “Memorandum on the Concentration of Enterprises in the 
Common Market,”987 and they advised the EU to adopt a premerger control system in order to be 
more effective in protecting the markets, accordingly the EC proposed the adoption of a 
premerger control system in 1973, which was not adopted until 1989 by the Council Regulation 
No. 4064 of 1989.988 
During that period i.e. form 1973 until issuing the Council Regulation No. 4064 of 1989, 
there was a great debate about the expansion of the EC powers to control merger transactions in 
the EU, and it was claimed that the debate was mainly due to the hesitation of the EU Member 
States to expand the EC powers in general and specifically in the merger control field.989 
Meanwhile, the EU Court of Justice rendered in one of its decisions in 1973 that Article 86 of the 
EEC could be applied to the merger transaction,990 while the application of the Article 85 of the 
EEC did not apply until its decision in another case almost fourteen years later in 1987.991 
Finally the debate was officially settled to adopt a premerger control system in the EU, 
and the EC became the only body that is responsible for administering and enforcing the EU 
premerger control system, whereas any merger transaction that reached a certain threshold and 
are considered as having an EU dimension should be notified and approved first before being 
consummated. Moreover, after almost another fourteen years after the	  Council Regulation No. 
4064 of 1989 was drafted,992 the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004993 significantly revised the 
1989 Council Regulation, and many scholars considered that revision as a paradigm shift i.e. a 
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turning point in the EU premerger control system toward the US model,994 as it will be addressed 
shortly during the discussion of the merger control drawbacks.995 
Furthermore, it was reported that after 2004 the EC role in enforcing the premerger 
control witnessed a significant increase due to the increased number of merger activities, 
especially in the “liberalized” industries during that period, such as the telecommunication, 
transportation, and energy industries, as the Commissioner Neelie Kroes recognized it,996 when 
she was responsible for Competition Policy from 2004 until 2009.997 More recently, the 
Commissioner who was responsible for Competition Policy until November 2014, Joaquín 
Almunia, mentioned in many occasions that the EC is seriously interested in going further with 
additional steps to expand its role to encompass the pre-review or control of the transactions 
even if it is concerning the acquisition of non-controlling minor shares.998 
Mirroring the issue of the overlapping jurisdictions between the agencies in the US on 
both the state and federal levels, the EU premerger control system also trigger some issues 
concerning the overlap of jurisdictions between the national authorities of Member States and the 
EC, whereas according to the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004 the general rule is that the 
merger transaction that has reached a certain threshold and have an EU dimension will 
exclusively be reviewed by the EC, but there are many exceptions to that general rule. For 
instance, according to the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004, the parties may provide the EC 
with “reasoned submission” to assert its jurisdiction to review the merger transaction in 
situations where three Member States or more have jurisdiction over the same transaction, 
despite the fact that it did not reach the threshold requirement for the EC jurisdiction.999 
Another example that did not follow the general rule of the jurisdiction of the EC over the 
merger transactions, is also according to the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004, here the EC 
might refer the merger transaction to the competent authority of a Member State, despite the fact 	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that the EC has jurisdiction over the transaction, and it is mainly in the cases that the concerned 
parties provided the EC with a “reasoned submission” that indicated that the Member State 
should review the transaction distinctly.1000 Moreover, according to the preamble of the Council 
Regulation No. 139 of 2004, referring to the review of the merger transaction from the EC to the 
competent authority of a Member State and vice versa should “take due account of legal 
certainty and the ‘one-stop shop’ principle” to avoid any overlap of jurisdictions.1001 
In the same context, a working group known as “EU Merger Working Group” was 
established in Brussels in January 2010, that group consists of representatives from the EC and 
the national competent authorities of the antitrust enforcement from the EU Member States. On 
November 8, 2011, that working group adopted a set of best practices guide regarding the 
cooperation between the EC and the national antitrust authorities with regard to the multi-
jurisdiction or cross-border merger control, and among those best practices was the set of 
practices that concerned the obtaining a of wavier from the merging parties to disclose 
confidential information to the EC or to the national competent antitrust authorities.1002 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the EC is also as active as the DOJ and FTC with 
regard to issuing guidelines concerning the assessment criteria that are used in reviewing merger 
transactions, whereas it issued horizontal merger guidelines in 2004, 1003  and additional 
guidelines for the non-horizontal mergers in 2008,1004 a notice concerning the definition of the 
“relevant market” for the purposes of applying the EU antitrust rules,1005 a notice on the 
transaction referral between the EC and the national authorities,1006 and lastly a notice on the 
procedure for treatment of the merger transaction that does not raise antitrust concerns.1007 
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In addition to that, the EC published two handbooks concerning all the rules that are 
applicable to the merger control system, the first one was in April 2010,1008 and the second was 
in July 2013,1009 both of the handbooks are devoted to being comprehensive of all the rules that 
are applicable on the merger transactions during the merger control process, such as guidelines, 
best practices, and also some practical information. Furthermore, the EC has published special 
annual reports concerning the “competition policy” in the EU, starting from its first report in 
April 1972 and the most recent report was publishes in May 6, 2014.1010 In addition to that, the 
EC has even published a glossary of the terms that are used in EU antitrust and merger control, 
in July 2002, in order to harmonize the use of the terms within the EU.1011 
Before addressing the typical steps of the EU premerger control process, a preliminary 
issue should be addressed first, which is defining the transactions that should be notified to the 
EC. In that concern there are two situations in which this applies, each case shall satisfy certain 
conditions; the first case is the case where: (1) the worldwide turnover of all the merging parties 
is more than 5 billion euros, and (2) the EU-wide turnover for each of at least two of the merging 
parties is more than 250 million euros, and (3) no more than two thirds of the EU-wide turnover 
of each party of the merging parties is within one and the same EU Member State. 
The second case is the case where: (1) the worldwide turnover of all the merging parties 
is more than 2.5 billion euros, and (2) the combined turnover of all the merging parties is more 
than 100 million euros in each jurisdiction of at least three Member States, and (3) a turnover of 
over 25 million euros for each party of at least two of the parties in each jurisdiction of the three 
Member States included under 2, and (4) the EU-wide turnover for each of at least two merging 
parties is more than 100 million euros, and (5)	  no more than two thirds of the EU-wide turnover 
of each party of the merging parties is within one and the same EU Member State. 
Now in order to show how the EU premerger control process flows, consider the 
following typical premerger control process, in a case which the EC is competent: (1) filing and 	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submitting the required notification form to the EC, free of charge, (2) the EC will investigate the 
merger transaction during a waiting period of twenty five days and during that period the EC will 
start its investigations and gather information from the merging parties and from other third 
parties that period is known as “phase I investigation,” (3) the EC might decide to response as 
follows: unconditionally or conditionally clear the transaction, before the waiting period elapses, 
or just at the end of that period, or block the merger transaction, or require it to do an additional 
in-depth analysis in a “phase II investigation,” (4) the EC has ninety working days of phase II’s 
investigation to reach its final decisions, which is one of the same alternatives in phase I.1012 
It should be noted that a conditional clearance of the merger transaction means that the 
EC found that there was a restorable violation of the antitrust rules, and that the merging parties 
offered an acceptable remedy to restore that expected violation, and those remedies the same as 
was previously mentioned in the US premerger control system could come in two forms, either 
behavioral remedies or structural remedies.1013 It is also noteworthy that the period of phase II’s 
investigation could be extended to more than ninety working days in two cases: (1) for an 
additional fifteen working days in cases where the merging parties offered a remedy after the 
fifty fifth working day of the original ninety working day period, (2) for an additional twenty 
working days upon the request of the merging parties or with their agreement.1014 However, as it 
was also previously mentioned the parties might agree to extend the waiting period to avoid any 
risks of enjoining the transaction in the future. 
In addition to the differences between the premerger control in the EU and the US, from a 
policy perspective and its final goal, which will be discussed later during the discussion of the 
merger control drawbacks,1015 there are differences between the processes in both of those 
systems from a procedural perspective that could easily be identified as follows: (1) unlike the 
US system, there is no filing fees in the EU, (2) unlike the US authorities, the EC issues a final 	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ANTITRUST MANUAL OF PORCEDURES: INTERNAL DG COMPETITION WORKING DOCUMENTS ON 
PROCEDURES FOR THE APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 101 AND 102 TFEU. (2012). 
1013 Articles 6(2) and 8(2) of the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004, and for more detailed analysis and discussions 
about the remedies in the EU see generally Robert A. Lipstein & Werner Berg, Merger Remedies in the US and 
Europe. (Global Legal Group 2009); and for more details about the classification of the merger remedies see 
generally Stephen Davies & Bruce Lyons, Mergers and Merger Remedies in the EU: Assessing the Consequences 
for Competition, (2007), for a template of structural remedy agreement see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU 
Competition Law: Rules Applicable to Merger Control: Situation as at 1st July 2013 at 321-333. 2013. 
1014 Article 10 of the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004 
1015 See infra p.187. 
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decision concerning the merger transaction autonomously without referring the challenges to the 
judiciary for approval, 1016  (3) unlike the US system, the EU review system is less 
complicated,1017 (4) unlike the US system, the enforcement of the EU premerger control is not 
litigation oriented, whereas the EC has the authority to impose a fine directly on the merging 
parties and also periodic penalty payments.1018 
Despite the fact that the enforcement of the antitrust rules in the EU, and the premerger 
control system are not litigation oriented like in the US, it should be noted that all the decision 
issued by the EC during the review process or even concerning the enforcement of those rules 
are subjected to the judicial review by the Court of Justice of the EU. Accordingly, the merging 
parties may challenge any of the EC decisions during the course of the premerger control 
process, any of its decision concerning the imposing of fines or periodic penalties, or even 
cornering its final decision to block the transaction. On the other hand any third party could also 
challenge the EC final decision to clear the transaction, or even join the merging parties in their 
challenge of blocking a decision.1019 However, the ex-post review of the EC decision gives it 
advantage over the US authorities, with regard to its power to negotiate over the remedies.1020 
Moreover, the issues of the extraterritorial reach pop-up once again in the EU premerger 
control system, it was reported by the EC in one of its reports that the extraterritorial reach was 
first raised in a EC decision on the case of Grosfillex-Fillistorf in 1964,1021 whereas the EC was 
the first EU authority to apply the antitrust rules on non-EU parties despite the fact their behavior 
was even conducted outside of the EU territory, and that was due to the fact that the behavior 
was affecting the EU internal market.1022 
On the other hand, others claimed that the extraterritorial reach first arose in the decision 
from the EU Court of First Instance1023 (hereinafter CFI) in the case of Wood Pulp,1024 and in that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1016 For more an overview of the EC decision during the period from 1957 until 2008 see RUSSO, et al., European 
Commission Decisions on Competition: Economic Perspectives on Landmark Antitrust and Merger Cases, supra 
note 988, at 10-16. 2010., and for more details and analysis of the EC decision on merger control see generally Id. at 
312-384. 
1017 Eleanor M. Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY at 340-341, 
(Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson eds., 1997).  
1018 Articles 14 and 15 of the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004. 
1019 Para 17 of the Preamble and Article 16 of the Council Regulation No. 139 of 2004. 
1020 Keith R. Fisher, Transparency in Global Merger Review: A Limited Role for the WTO?, 11 STANFORD JOURNAL 
OF LAW, BUSINESS, AND FINANCE 327, at 333 (2009). 
1021 Commission Decision of 11 March 1964 " Grosfillex-Fillistorf"; OJ No. 58 of 9 April 1964, at 915 
1022 Commission of the European Communities, Eleventh Report on Competition Policy, Brussels, 1982, at 36. 
1023 The name of the court was changed to the General Court by the treaty of Lisbon of 2007. 
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case the EC enforced the antitrust rules against non-EU corporations, and when the decision was 
challenged before the court, the court decided that the antitrust rules could be applied against 
non-EU parties only if the conduct itself was a violation that happened within an EU territory.1025 
However, the extraterritorial reach of the EC is now a fact, and the EC has the authority to 
enforce the EU antitrust rules on any merger transaction regardless of the parties’ domiciles, 
whenever the transaction reached the threshold and has an EU dimension, as it was previously 
mentioned. 
In that context, it should be noted that the EC has entered into a cooperation agreement 
with the US in 1991, in order “to promote cooperation and coordination and lessen the possibility 
or impact of differences between the [p]arties in the application of their [antitrust] laws.”1026 
Unfortunately, that agreement was signed between the EC and the US, and that was then 
challenged by France before the European Court of Justice (hereinafter ECJ), and the ECJ 
annulled the agreement on the ground that the EC lack the capacity to conclude an agreement 
with foreign countries, and accordingly the agreement entered into force on April 10, 1995 after 
the adoption of joint decision between the EU Council and the EC,1027 as it will be addressed 
later in detail during the discussions of the bilateral cooperation among other reform 
proposals.1028 
Finally, it should be noted that clearing the merger transaction by the EC means that the 
merger transaction itself was declared as not violating the antitrust rules, but it does not mean 
that it was granted immunity against any future antitrust review, because the EC will always has 
the authority to review any suspected behaviors that might raise an antitrust question. In other 
words, in order to be more precise, the EC clearing of the transaction means it is only giving a 
green light for the parties to consummate the merger transaction, and that there are no violations 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1024 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 31 March 1993. - A. Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission 
of the European Communities. Joined cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-
129/85. 
1025 Joseph P. Griffin, EC and U.S. Extraterritoriality: Activism and Cooperation, 17 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL 
LAW JOURNAL 353, at 378-379 (1993); DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 176. 
2003. 
1026 Article I (1) of the Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Commission of the 
European Communities Regarding the Application of Their Competition Laws, 23 September 1991, O.J. EUR. 
COMM. L 95/47; 30 I.L.M. 1487 (1991). 
1027 Case C-327/92, France v. Commission, 09.08.1994 [ECR] 3641. 
1028 See infra p.263. 
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of the antitrust rules based on the structure of the surviving corporation, and that any other future 
reviews will be concerned only about behavior not the structure. 
c) Egypt post-merger control 
As a matter of fact, the foundation of the Egyptian antitrust system was established 
before the EU antitrust system, whereas anticompetitive behaviors were criminalized as early as 
1937, under Articles 345 and 346 of the Egyptian Penal Law.1029 However, that does not have 
any indication to a solid antitrust system in Egypt, whereas Egypt as well as many other 
jurisdictions in MENA region, are not enforcing their antitrust rules seriously, if not at all, and it 
could be considered as one of those jurisdictions that are “antitrust havens.”1030 
Moreover, as it was previously mentioned that Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon him, 
forbid monopolistic behavior that would led to an increase in prices, some scholars also claimed 
that the antitrust origins and early development are associated with Islam and the Muslim World 
in general, and that even the roots of antitrust rules in Islam could be traced to the 7th century.1031 
Meanwhile, it is surprising to find that those early foundations are not reflected currently in the 
Egyptian system, as one of the countries with a Muslim majority population, or any other 
country with a Muslim majority population in general. It was even reported that the word 
“competition” appeared in the rules of the GCC, as the only union resembling the EU in the 
Arab-Muslim countries, only three times; ironically one of them was concerning the competition 
in sports.1032 
However, in February 2005, Egypt adopted a new specialized law that is devoted to the 
protection of competition and prohibiting monopolistic behaviors1033 and that was followed by 
executive regulations promulgated by the Egyptian Prime Minister’s decree of 2005,1034 but in 
fact none of them stipulated any rules concerning merger transactions or a merger control 
system. In that context, it was maintained that many countries have adopted antitrust laws during 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1029 The Penal Code promulgated by Law No. 58 of 1937, Issue 71 August 5th  
1030 David J. Gerber, Afterword: Antitrust and American Business Abroad Revisited, 20 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND BUSINESS 307, at 312 (2000); DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, 
supra note 9, at 3. 2003. 
1031 DABBAH, Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East, supra note 353, at 19. 2007. 
1032 Id. at 196. 
1033 The Law of Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practices, promulgated by Law No. 3 of 
2005. 
1034 The Egyptian Prime Minister Decree No. 1316 of 2005, August 16th 2006 
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the same period only for the purpose of fulfilling their obligations under the framework of the 
WTO.1035 
On August 22, 2008, the said law was amended, by adding a second section to Article 19, 
and according to that section it become mandatory to submit a post-merger notification to the 
Egyptian Competition Authority, in situations where any of the merging parties turnover reached 
a certain threshold, which is 100 Million Egyptian Pounds, which is approximately equivalent to 
13 Million US dollars, as it appears in its most recent budget, and that notification shall be 
according the rules and procedures to be stipulated by the executive regulation.1036 Surprisingly, 
the executive regulations did not addressed the issue until more than two years later on 
November 13, 2010, and in addition to that it does not stipulate any rules or procedures 
concerning the submission of the post-merger notification except that it should be submitted 
within thirty days from the date of closing the transaction.1037 
Accordingly, the current Egyptian merger control system is classified as a post-merger 
control system, which in fact obviously means that there is no special set of rules that are 
designated to review merger transactions. In other words the antitrust review is not concerned 
about the structural issues of the transaction because it is more interested in reviewing the 
behavior of the surviving corporation, in the same manner as any other corporation that is not 
involved in a merger transaction. The Egyptian Competition Authority even mentioned that: “the 
Law does not provide for mergers control. However, [it] is responsible for receiving notifications 
from [parties] about any mergers or acquisitions, which they have conducted.”1038 
Based on the fact the Egyptian merger control system is a post-merger control system, the 
following facts characterizing the Egyptian system: (1) the are no merger control review process 
to be conducted, (2) there are no waiting periods for the parties to consummate the transaction, 
(3) the authority did not issue any guidelines concerning the merger control review, (4) there is 
no possibility to block the transaction, (5) there is no possibility to clear the transaction under a 
structural remedy, (6) neither the antitrust authority nor third parties have the rights or even the 
standing to challenge a merger transaction before the courts, (7) there is no possibility to enjoin a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1035 DABBAH, Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East, supra note 353, at 209. 2007. 
1036 Article 19(2) of the Law of Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practices, as amended by 
Law No. 190 of 2008. 
1037 Article 44bis of the Prime Minister Decree No. 1316 of 2005 as amended by the Decree No.2975 of 2010. 
1038 That was an answer to one of the frequently asked question; does the law regulate Mergers and acquisitions? 
Available on the official website of the Egyptian Competition Authority at http://www.eca.org.eg last visited May 
31, 2014. 
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merger transaction after it is consummated, and finally (8) there are no filing fees to be paid to 
the authority. 
It is noteworthy here that the Egyptian antitrust law granted the Egyptian Competition 
Authority exclusive enforcement of the antitrust rules, and in that regard the authority was 
granted the rights to review and investigate all alleged anticompetitive behaviors, and in case of a 
violation it might order the parties to restore any caused harm or to discontinue the 
anticompetitive behavior, in addition to that the authority might start criminal procedures after an 
authorization from the Prime Minister, and in the situation the criminal court found a violation it 
could impose a fine ranging from 100 to 300 thousands Egyptian Pounds.1039 
Regarding the criminal procedures, it was claimed that due to the lack of an in-depth 
knowledge about the antitrust field, especially from the judges at the criminal courts, the criminal 
rulings depends heavily on the review and the investigation done by the antitrust authority.1040 
On the other hand in an interview with a Senior Judge at a criminal court in Egypt, he disclosed 
that referring the case to a technical expert in order to draw a complete picture about all the 
technical facts before deciding on the case is not only widely accepted but possibly a trend in the 
Egyptian judiciary system. 
He also added that concerning the criminal proceedings in general, the right to refer the 
case to an independent expert was clearly granted to the court under Article 292 of the criminal 
procedures law,1041 and that right is heavily used in cases concerning the technical issues like 
those related to antitrust laws.1042 Moreover, in the line with those arguments, it is not just about 
referring the case to a technical expert, but in addition to that a specialized economic courts were 
established in Egypt by the means of Law of Economic Courts in 2008,1043 the main aim behind 
establishing those courts was to decide on the cases that are related to economic issues, and 
among those issues is the antitrust issues, and was clearly stipulated by the law in Article 4(14) 
of the Law of Economic Courts. 
Regarding all the other decisions made by the Egyptian Competition Authority i.e. that 
are not concerning the criminal procedures, as a general rule it could be challenged before the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1039 Articles 20-26 of the Law of Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practices. 
1040 Firas El Samad, Egypt, in THE MERGER CONTROL REVIEW at 156, (lene Knable Gotts ed. 2012).  
1041 The Criminal Procedures Law promulgated by Law No. 150 of 1950. 
1042 The full original manuscript is on file with the author. 
1043 The Law of Economic Courts promulgated by Law No. 120 0f 2008. 
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Egyptian State Council,1044 and also that includes its passive decisions, such as the implicit 
decision to not investigate or challenge certain anticompetitive behavior. The courts at the 
Egyptian State Council may wholly or partially annul the decisions of the authority; wholly 
annulling the decision is in the case of a procedural violation which means that the authority has 
to start the decision process again and take into account the procedures as stipulated by the court 
in its ruling. While partially annulling the decision is in the case of a substantive violation to the 
law and it means that the authority shall reissue its decision as per the interpretation of the law 
that was rendered by the court in its ruling.1045 
Concerning the issue of whether the Egyptian antitrust law has an extraterritorial reach; 
the Egyptian system has an extraterritorial reach similar in some extent to that of the US and the 
EU, whereas there is an extraterritorial reach in the event that the authority found that the 
anticompetitive behavior lessen, restrict, or harm the competition in the Egyptian markets, even 
if the behavior was conducted abroad.1046 
However, it was not reported that the Egyptian Competition Authority enforced the 
Egyptian antitrust laws over any abroad anticompetitive behavior and obviously any merger 
transactions domestically or abroad. Analyzing all the announced decisions of the authority 
would reveal that more than 95% of the investigations ended up by dismissing the complaints if 
it was submitted by third parties or terminating the procedures if it was initiated by the authority 
itself,1047 and it was even reported that the submitted notifications concerning the merger 
transaction are just saved in the archives and nothing more.1048 
Finally it could be easily held that Egypt as well as many other jurisdictions are merger 
control heavens, and those jurisdictions are not just in the developing countries but there are also 
examples from the developed countries, for instance many developed countries like	  Australia, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, and UK do not adopt a premerger control system, at least on the 
national level. In the same line, the adoption of a post-merger control in a handful of developing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1044 The Egyptian State Council is an independent judiciary institution, responsible for settling disputes where the 
government, acting in its public capacity, is party to the litigation. 
1045 The Supreme Administrative Court, Case No. 8409/56, June 22nd 2013. 
1046 Article 5 of the Law of Protection of Competition and Prevention of Monopolistic Practices. 
1047  All the decisions are announced on the official website of the Egyptian Competition Authority at 
http://www.eca.org.eg/ECA/Resolution/List.aspx?CategoryID=1 last visited on May 31, 2014.  
1048 Cross-Border Merger Control: Challenges for Developing and Emerging Economies: Roundtable on Cross-
Border Merger Control held at the Global Forum on Competition in February 2011, (2011). 
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countries does not affect the competition in the markets, as it was reported in an empirical study 
that the competition in both the developing and the developed countries are almost the same.1049 
2. Drawbacks of Merger Control 
Ironically, it was claimed that the US is no longer monopolizing the merger control 
system,1050 and despite the fact that a handful of jurisdiction were adopting merger control 
systems during the development of the merger control history i.e. during the 20th century, it was 
reported that more than 110 jurisdictions have adopted a merger control system by 2010.1051 In 
the same context, it was also reported that Hong Kong was the latest jurisdiction to adopt a 
merger control system, whereas in 2013 it adopted a merger control system that is only limited to 
the merger transactions in the telecommunication industry.1052 
As a general rule, each system of those widespread merger control systems around the 
globe are considered as an impediment to merger transactions, and in fact it does not matter that 
the transaction was concluded in a jurisdiction where that system was adopted or not, as it was 
previously mentioned, that there is extraterritorial reach in almost all kinds of the merger control 
systems either the premerger or even the post-merger systems. In addition to that, and based on 
the fact that there are foundational flaws in the antitrust system, and that the merger control 
system is based on the antitrust ideology, those flaws are accordingly reflected in the merger 
control system. 
Moreover, in case that the merger transaction is subjected to more than one of those 
merger control systems, the case will be more complicated and there will be more serious effects 
that are attributed to the system drawbacks, and in fact that is typically the case in a cross-border 
merger transaction. It is undoubtedly true that the combination of more than one merger control 
system constitute an additional layer of drawbacks that is supporting the claim that the merger 
control is considered an impediment that faces merger transactions. Thus, the coming discussion 
will address some of the drawbacks of the merger control systems pertaining to merger 
transactions, from a cross-border merger perspective. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1049 UNCTAD, The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Economic Development: The Appropriate Design and 
Effectiveness of Competition Law and Policy at 14 (2010).  
1050 Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Antitrust, 86 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL 1527, at 1585 (2011). 
1051 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 142. 2010. 
1052 PaRR 2013 Global Antitrust Trends. (2013). 
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It should be noted that the merger control drawbacks could be classified under many 
categories, for instance as a foundational and secondary drawbacks, and also could be 
categorized according to their weight i.e. their impact on the transaction and how much is the 
loss expected from it, or even according to its origins was it a result of the formalities and 
procedural requirements or a substantive issues. However, the order of addressing those inherent 
or foundational flaws and the drawbacks during the coming discussions will not indicate any 
specific importance or weigh, and it will be just arranged according to the alphabetical order.  
a) Costs 
At the first glance, someone might think that filing a merger notification according to the 
merger control system will cost only the filing fees as required per the concerned system or even 
systems, and in case that no filing fees is required, like for instance in EU,1053 there merger 
control process will cost nothing. Unfortunately, that is undoubtedly a very superficial daydream, 
because in fact the cost of the merger control is not limited to the filing fees, and the list of cost 
factors is a very long one, and the costs are almost always very significant in many cases.1054 
Furthermore, that is very important to the extent that it might lead to the claim that the cost is 
considered as a tax on cross-border mergers.1055 
It is noteworthy that the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee 
(hereinafter ICPAC) was the first to submit a report that addressed the cost of merger control, 
and that report was submitted to the US Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for 
Antitrust in 2000.1056 Meanwhile, PricewaterhouseCoopers1057 carried out an important survey 
study in 2003 (hereinafter PwC Survey),1058 which was commissioned by the International Bar 
Association and the American Bar Association, to determinate in detail the cost of merger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1053 Some of the other jurisdictions that did not impose filing fees are: Belgium, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, 
Iceland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey. 
1054 Cross-Border Merger Control, Roundtable on Cross-Border Merger Control, supra note 1048, at 12 (2011). 
1055 Report on the Costs and Burdens of Multijurisdictional Merger Review. (2004). 
1056 The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee was formed at the DOJ in November 1997 in order 
to address the international antitrust problems of the 21st Century, and after it submitted its final report to the 
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, on February 28, 2000, and it was officially 
disbanded in June 2000. 
1057 PricewaterhouseCoopers is one of the well-known professional service provider firms, with offices in 157 
countries over the world, and for more information about the firm visit its website at http://www.pwc.com last 
visited May 31, 2014. 
1058 PWC, et al., A TAX ON MERGERS? SURVEYING THE TIME AND COSTS TO BUSINESS OF MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL 
MERGER REVIEWS (PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS. 2003). 
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control, concerning the cross-border transactions. Since then, many other reports and studies 
followed, for instance the International Competition Network (hereinafter ICN)1059 published a 
report concerning the merger notification filing fees in 2005, and it was mainly based also on a 
survey that was carried out by one of the working groups at the ICN.1060 
The long list of the cost factors actually begins with the cost of the hiring professionals 
from different industries for instance legal and financial advisors among other, not to help the 
parties closing the transaction, but in fact to provide them with their professional services in 
order to finalize the merger control process. According to the findings of the PwC Survey, the 
typical average value of a cross-border merger is 3.9 billion euros, and the parties file for 
premerger control in eight jurisdictions, and the average costs is 3.3 million euros, and it was 
also reported that the professional services costs “escalate dramatically” in cases where a 
violation is suspected by the authorities, and especially in cases where the authorities request an 
in-depth analysis,1061 like the “phase II investigation” in the EU system or the “second request” 
in the US system. 
The cost of the professionals starts from determining the jurisdictions that the parties are 
required to notify,1062 and actually that is not an easy task, as it was previously shown that the 
transaction might not have any direct relation to a jurisdiction but the extraterritorial reach might 
lead to unexpected complexities. Therefore, the parties should carefully select competent 
professionals, with excellent knowledge about almost all the merger control systems, over the 
globe. The same is true as well for calculating the thresholds, because it is a complex task, as it 
will be addressed in some detail shortly. In that context, it was reported the legal services are the 
most expensive services, as it is illustrated in the following chart. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1059The International Competition Network is a specialized network for the competition law enforcement, its 
members are the national competition authorities over the world, and its goals, role, and achievements will be 
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and for more current activities visit the official website at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org last 
visited May 31, 2014. 
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INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 233, at 241-242 (2000); Dane Holbrook, International Merger Control 
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note 709, at 154 (2007). 
213	  
Figure 13: Average merger control cost segmentation1063 
The costs of compliance with different procedural and substantive rules is undoubtedly a 
cost factor to be considered in the list, such as submitting documents in different languages, like 
for instance it was reported in one of the cross-border mergers that the parties were required to 
submit filing in the following languages: Czech, English, German, Polish, Portuguese, Russian, 
Spanish, and Turkish.1064 Moreover, that type of compliance costs range from just translating 
documents and rescheduling the transaction timing to handle those requirements, to the extent of 
a more complex issue might occur and put the transaction to an end, for instance in cases of 
different tender offer timing requirements or in the case of different accounting requirements. In 
addition to that, there are internal costs, which includes the costs of time of the employees, 
managers travel expenses, and miscellaneous overheads, and the average of those internal costs 
in the PwC Survey was 326,000 Euros per transaction.1065 
Regarding the cost of the filing fees, it should be noted that it is not only about the 
amount of the fee itself which might reach up to 280 million US dollars and only to file in one 
jurisdiction like the US, or the fact that the parties may pay fees for many jurisdictions, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1063 Data retrieved from, PWC, et al., A tax on mergers? Surveying the Time and Costs to Business of Multi-
jurisdictional Merger Reviews, supra note 1058, at 21. 2003. 
1064 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 385. 2010. 
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can sometimes be more than thirty jurisdictions and six continents,1066 like the transaction of 
ExxonMobil.1067 Calculating the fees is not that easy, because the fees are not always flat and it 
was reported that it could suddenly amount to more than fourteen times of what was estimated by 
the parties.1068 
For instance, the initial filing fees	  in Switzerland are a fixed amount, but in case of an in-
depth investigation the parties will pay fees on an per-hour rate, calculated according to the 
services provided and the level of experience of the officer involved in the review process, and it 
is even more complicated in Germany, whereas the fees are calculated according to the actual 
expenses and the “economic significance” of the transaction.1069 Mentioning the expenses of the 
review process grabbed attention to a new cost factor in the list, which is the cost of running the 
concerned authority, specially the costs that are directly spent to conduct the merger control 
process or carry out the merger control enforcement task. 
In that context, it was documented that some authorities consider the filing fees as 
“significant source of revenue.”1070 However, in some case the cost will be fully paid by the 
merging parties like in Switzerland, but the case will not be the same if there are no filing fees or 
the filing fees are less than the actual costs, like in the case of filing before the EC, in those cases 
the costs will be incurred by the taxpayers. The fact is conducting the process of merger control 
is pricey, for instance, it was reported that that cost of reviewing a merger transaction in the UK 
ranges from 262,000 to 524,000 sterling pound per transaction.1071 Meanwhile, it was also 
reported that in most of the jurisdictions, the antitrust authorities are not even able to precisely 
calculate the cost of running the merger control process.1072 
Another cost factor to be added to the list is the cost incurred by third parties to respond 
to the request of the authorities, in order to submit information concerning the merger 
transaction, and those third parties are most probably competitors to the surviving corporation, or 	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1068 Holbrook, UCLA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1062, at 353 (2002). 
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even a consumer at the corporate or individual level and they do not gain any direct benefit for 
complying.1073 It could be asserted that the cost would be minimal in that case, but in fact 
responding to more than one antitrust authority, in different jurisdictions, in different languages, 
within certain deadlines, and sometimes disclosing confidential information, means that it 
consume a lot of resources not just minimal cost. 
The list also includes the case where an antitrust authority blocked the cross-border 
merger due to an actual violation of its national rules, while that transaction was pro-competitive 
on the global scale i.e. globally efficient, the aggregate welfare will be decreased, and that could 
be at a significant cost.1074 Obviously, the cost of the lessening the aggregate welfare would be 
worse in case where positive errors existed i.e. wrong assessments that led to blocking of a pro-
competitive merger transaction, which is known as “type I errors.”1075 
On the other hand, in the case of the clearance of the transaction whenever the authorities 
found that there are no violations and the transaction is pro-competitive, all the listed costs above 
will practically be incurred by the consumer at the end, and that is in addition to the cost of 
deferring the gains that are expected from that pro-competitive transaction. Obviously those 
types of costs will be increased in cases with negative errors i.e. wrong assessments that lead to 
clearing an anticompetitive merger transaction, which is known as “type II errors.” 
Blocking a globally efficient merger transaction might have additional costs, for instance 
the cost will be expanded to include the costs of losing the expected increase of welfare, due to 
the deterrence effect that occurred for third parties by blocking a transaction that they expected 
to be a successful model.1076 In addition to that, blocking such transactions might lead to political 
costs,1077 for instance it was reported that in the cases of McDonnell Douglas/Boeing and 
GE/Honeywell transactions, which were both blocked by the EC while cleared by the US 
agencies, the US government officials rigorously attacked the “EC Commission’s competence 
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Reviews, supra note 1058, at 18-19. 2003. 
1074 Andrew T. Guzman, Is International Antitrust Possible, 73 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1501, at 1517 
(1998); Hunt, Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, supra note 709, at 156 (2007); Clarke, The 
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and credibility.”1078 In addition to that, the antitrust issue was placed on the agenda of the Doha 
round of the WTO in the same year.1079 
Finally, challenging the merger transaction before courts in the judicial oriented systems 
like for instance in the US, will add costs to the list, and those costs are actually quite high 
because the parties will try to spend as much as they can afford to win the race, which will be 
administered under unclear antitrust rules.1080 The case is almost the same in the other non-
litigation oriented systems, whereas there is also a possibility that the merging parties or even 
third parties would challenge the decisions of the authorities before competent courts, like for 
instance in the EU system. To sum it up, in all cases, it is undoubtedly true that the costs of the 
merger control are incurred by the society i.e. all the parties, the judiciary institutions, the 
enforcement authorities, the taxpayers, the consumers, and the merging parties and even their 
competitors. 
b) Different policies and enforcements 
The problem of the different policies and different enforcements begins usually at a very 
early stage during the merger transaction, namely when calculating the threshold that trigger the 
merger control process, whereas a variety of threshold determinants methods are adopted in 
different jurisdictions. For instance, despite the fact that it is always maintained that the antitrust 
policies are focusing more on the structures of the transactions that would distort the markets 
concentration i.e. market shares, very few merger control systems consider the market share as a 
threshold that triggers the merger control.1081 
In the same context, it should be noted that some jurisdictions mainly consider two 
factors, the first is the turnover and the second is the market share, and some other jurisdictions 
are adopting a very complicated threshold, for instance the threshold was determined on the 
value of the worldwide assets, and the transaction should go through with the merger control 
review if the value exceeds 100,000 times the monthly minimum wage as been determined 
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(2004). 
1079 Fisher, STANFORD JOURNAL OF LAW, BUSINESS, AND FINANCE, supra note 1020, at 331-332 (2009). 
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domestically,1082 while on the other hand most of the jurisdictions are just concerned with the 
turnover as a threshold.1083 
The fact that almost each jurisdiction have enacted a merger control system to serve 
particular interests lead to an inevitable result, which is that every policy is different, and even if 
the same policies are adopted, it will not be interpreted in the same context and it will always be 
enforced in a different manner. In that context, it was also claimed that defining the merger 
control policy is highly problematic due to the complexity of the rules and the vagueness of 
enforcement standards in almost all the cases,1084 as it was previously mentioned that the general 
rule is that “where law ends … tyranny begins.”1085 However, in the case of cross-border merger 
transactions it is not just suffering from tyrant enforcing the policies but also from contradicting 
polices and enforcements, as it will be shown in the following discussion. 
First and foremost, there are a set of different goals or objectives that stand behind the 
design of the antitrust policies in general, and its enforcement with respect to merger control 
specially, those objectives that aim to protect and promote of any of the following factors, either 
distinctly or in a combination with one another: (1) consumer welfare, (2) small businesses, (3) 
common market or single market integration, (4) economic freedom ideology, (5) fairness in 
markets, (6) social welfare, (7) environment protection, (8) political parties, (9) strategic 
planning, (10) trade policies, and (11) international relations.1086 
It is noteworthy that in order to show how the policies are based on different objectives, 
scholars are always making a comparison between the objectives of the US and the EU policies, 
and in that regard it was claimed that the EU system is more oriented to protect the competitors 
in the market in order promote the market integration.1087 This was clearly announced in the 
TFEU, and it was even argued that Jean Monnet1088 himself believed that promoting the 
competiveness within the EU would lead to a common market that competes with the 	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counterparts across the Atlantic and would give them the opportunity to overcome their war 
history and “national identity politics.”1089 
Meanwhile, others asserted that the EU system is shifting and developing towards the 
same goal of the US system, which is the protection of consumer welfare, and that has clearly 
been recognized since the issuance of the merger regulation and the horizontal merger guidelines 
in 2004,1090 despite the fact that promoting the competition was the main goal of the EU merger 
regulation. For instance just reading the merger regulation of 2004 will reveal that, even the 
language of the regulation itself revealed that concept, whereas the phrase “common market” 
was mentioned fifty nine times, while the word “consumer” does not appear more than five 
times.1091 
Moreover, concerning the claim that the US system is more oriented to protect and 
promote consumer welfare, it was previously discussed and shown during the discussion of the 
history of antitrust, that the main objective of adopting the antitrust laws in the US was to protect 
small businesses against trusts.1092 In that context, Judge Robert Bork even contended that the 
US courts for more than eighty years had not even developed a comprehensive idea about the 
objective of the antitrust policy in the US.1093 
It could be claimed here that many schools emerged in the US, and that was mainly to fill 
the gap between the policy and its objectives and the enforcement, and even the most popular 
school in that regard was developed by Judge Robert Bork himself, which was the Chicago 
School which was mainly based on the ideology of the “economic efficiency” of laws.1094 In fact 
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that was not the only school but there were other schools like for instance the Harvard School, 
the Post-Chicago School and many others.1095 
Similar to the shifting of the EU system, it was also claimed that the US antitrust rules are 
not just shifting or developing with time, but also are significantly affected by the laws enacted 
at different times during more than a century of developments, each of them was enacted in 
different circumstances and to serve special goals. 1096 For instance, as it was previously 
mentioned, the HSR system was enacted as “a mechanism to provide advance notification to the 
antitrust authorities of very large mergers prior to their consummation, and to improve 
procedures to facilitate enjoining illegal mergers before they are consummated,”1097 in other 
words to “win a premerger injunction … before … the merging firms are hopelessly and 
irreversibly scrambled together …”,1098 not to protect the small businesses from the trusts as the 
case was in the Sherman Act. 
Studying the literature that tried to identify the objectives and goal of the different 
antitrust policies, which analyzed not only the policies of different jurisdictions, but also the 
enforcement of the policies by the different agencies and judiciary institutions, revealed that they 
are always trying to justify what they observe, and that they are always contradicting, it was even 
reported that they use technical terms like “consumer welfare” to indicate “economic welfare” 
and vice versa.1099 
Meanwhile, labeling every policy as a good or bad policy, or even the scholars as 
supporting or criticizing this or that antitrust policy or how it is enforced, is not the objective of 
this dissertation, but in fact identifying or pointing out the differences is just for the purpose of 
revealing that the merger control policies are different and even in cases where they are similar 
or typical, the enforcement itself is different, and that fact will inevitably lead to the result that 
the merger control is an impediment that faces the cross-border mergers. 
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When combining the problem of the contradicting merger control policies and 
enforcement with the extraterritorial reach of those systems, the inevitable result will be the 
blocking of most of the cross-border transactions in a way or another, and that was clearly 
mentioned during one of the speeches of the Chairman of the FTC, whereas he argued that the 
differences between the merger control systems will directly lead to the result that corporations 
would restrict their merger activities to those activities that are acceptable to all the systems over 
the globe at the same time.1100 Furthermore, it is undoubtedly true that the impact of the 
differences might be very expensive for all parties in many cases, as it might consume time in 
order to reconcile between them or in some cases the transaction is totally blocked. 
It could be claimed here that cooperation between the authorities of the different 
jurisdictions may ease that problem, and that many jurisdictions nowadays are already parties of 
bilateral cooperation agreements, for instance the agreement between the EU and the US. 
Meanwhile, that claim could be easily refuted, and indeed those cooperation agreements do not 
mean that the problem is solved or even eased, for instance despite the fact that there is a 
cooperation agreement between the EU and US, that agreement did not prevent the contradicting 
decisions issued by the authorities in those jurisdictions concerning some cross-border mergers. 
Ironically, it was argued that the EU and US by entering into such cooperation 
agreement, was just “agreed to disagree.”1101 A good example of those contradicting decisions, is 
when the EC announced that the proposed merger between McDonnell Douglas and Boeing 
violating antitrust rules, while it was already cleared by the FTC on July 1, 1997, it was not 
further cleared by the EC until Boeing accepted to enter into a remedies agreement concerning 
the commercial jets industry for its European competitor Airbus,1102 many other examples could 
be mentioned in that regard, such as the merger between General Electric and Honeywell in 
2001. 
In the case of General Electric and Honeywell, the EC blocked the transaction on July 3, 
2001, while again it was already cleared by the FTC, and the EC commissioner at that time 	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Mario Monti1103 claimed that the EC and the US authorities were working closely on the 
investigation of that merger transactions because it is in their common interest, but the different 
results could be considered a rare case, and it was just an outcome of different interpretations of 
the facts, and that it is not the pattern, and that was not due to political reasons or other different 
policy issues.1104 More recently, the EC blocked the merger transaction between NYSE Euronext 
and Deutsche Börse AG, while it was already cleared by the FTC.1105 
Finally, it should be noted that the differences in the enforcement does not mean that in 
cases where the authorities approved the transaction there will not be a problem, that in fact is 
inaccurate, for instance, in the merger transaction between the US subsidiary of the Japanese 
Corporation Sony and Bertelsmann Music Group Music (BMG),1106 the reviewing authorities in 
both the US and EU approved the transactions but a third party challenged the EC decision 
before the CFI and the court annulled the EC approval decision,1107 which obviously consumed 
vast resources in order to challenge the ruling and restructure the deal, and in some other cases 
that might require additional costs attributed to the remedies agreement with the authorities. 
c) Ex-ante is an additional layer 
As it was previously mentioned that some jurisdictions are adopting a premerger control 
system like the US and EU, while others adopt post-merger review system like Egypt, and it was 
also mentioned that in the jurisdictions adopting a premerger control systems that does not mean 
that the authority are deprived from running an ex-post review in addition to the ex-ante review. 
Therefore, what distinguish the merger control review or the premerger control system, from the 
typical antitrust review or the post-merger control system, is not just the former is ex-ante regime 
while the latter is an ex-post one, but that the ex-ante review is an additional layer added to the 
ex-post or the typical antitrust review system. 
It was also mentioned that the reason behind adopting the HSR, as an ex-ante merger 
control system, was to create “a mechanism to provide advance notification to the antitrust 	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was appointed as the Italian Prime Minister. 
1104 Commission Decision of 3 July 2001, Case COMP/M.2220, General Electric and Honeywell, 2001 O.J. (C 
1746). 
1105 Commission Decision of 1 February 2012, Case No COMP/M.6166, Deutsche Börse AG and NYSE Euronext, 
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authorities of very large mergers prior to their consummation, and to improve procedures to 
facilitate enjoining illegal mergers before they are consummated,”1108 in other words to “win a 
premerger injunction … before … the merging firms are hopelessly and irreversibly scrambled 
together …”1109 Indeed, that reason is not an exclusive reason for the adoption the HSR, but it 
was used to justify the adoption of the ex-ante merger control in other systems. 
For instance in the EU, the same reason was mentioned in a General Court ruling as it 
stated that:  
[T]aking into account the objective of the [antitrust] rules, as stated in paragraph 
22 of this judgment, their application cannot depend on whether the market 
concerned has already reached a certain level of maturity. Particularly in a rapidly 
growing market, Article 102 TFEU requires action as quickly as possible, to 
prevent the formation and consolidation in that market of a competitive structure 
distorted by the abusive strategy of an [corporation] which has a dominant 
position on that market or on a closely linked … market, in other words it requires 
action before the anti-competitive effects of that strategy are realized.1110 
Despite the fact of the rationality appealing reasons disclosed by both the EU and the US, 
to justify the adoption of an ex-ante merger control system, which is literally the same reason, 
that reason could not justify it. To elaborate more, even after clearing the merger transaction by 
the authorities, the merger might be enjoined, ironically even after “scrambled together.” For 
instance, a third party might challenge the decision of the EC if it cleared the transaction before 
the competent court, and that is what actually happened in the case of the merger transaction 
between Sony and Bertelsmann Music Group, and even on the other side of the Atlantic, a State 
Attorneys General might bring an action to enjoin a merger that has already cleared by the FTC. 
In addition to that, the ex-ante review results are not 100% accurate in predicting the 
behavior of the surviving corporation or the market after consummating the transaction, and 
there are empirical findings to support that, and those findings are spelled out by the FTC itself. 
Whereas during the 1990s the FTC, DOJ, and the California Attorney General lost a total of six 
merger challenges in the health care industry namely hospitals before the courts, and thus the 
FTC decided to develop a “Hospital Mergers Retrospectives Project,” under which retrospective 
research was conducted to study some consummated merger transactions in California, in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1108 S. Rep. No. 803, at 61 (1976) discussing the reasons for the enactment of HSR 
1109 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1373, at 2637 (1976).  
1110 Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB., 17.02.2011 at 108 
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to update and evaluate the ex-ante assessment system, and to evaluate the impact of those 
transactions on the competition in the health care industry. 
The FTC study concluded that there is “empirical evidence that the mergers were 
followed by substantial post-merger price increases that cannot reasonably be attributed to other 
causes,”1111 and in addition to that the study cited previous works that support those same 
findings. Accordingly, that study proved that the assessment criteria by the FCT might be right, 
but that is not the case, the case here is the failure of the ex-ante merger control system as whole, 
because in that case the US system is litigation oriented, the judiciary institution was a part of the 
ex-ante enforcement system and it decided in favor of the merger consummation even after 
providing the analysis or the reviewed reports that were created by the competent authorities. 
Moreover, and in the same line of the FTC’s study findings, other empirical researches 
revealed that ex-ante review not only lead to the clearance of anticompetitive merger 
transactions, “type II” errors, but it is also highly predictable to block pro-competitive merger 
transactions, “type I” errors.1112 The most important question here is who will bear the cost of 
those errors, as well as all the other factors of cost that were previously identified, without 
delving into the discussion of is it the consumer welfare or the producer welfare, it is 
undoubtedly at the expense of the total welfare. 
In that context, it could be claimed the rational decision to decide whether to opt for an 
ex-ante regime or an ex-post one, should be based on empirical findings that calculate the costs 
of the ex-ante enforcement policy, which includes all factors of costs, and the estimated 
opportunity cost or the losses that might result from losing the expected gains in “type II” error 
cases, and the anticompetitive effect that might be realized in “type I” errors cases. It was even 
reported that the success of the antitrust authorities to block a merger “breads confidence” i.e. the 
authorities would find it an easy task to challenge transactions just by stating similar claims, and 
even without providing solid evidence derived from the analysis of an accurate data.1113 
Furthermore, not only does “success breads confidence,” and even assume that the 
notifying parties did not incur any losses, and that the process was at the cost of zero expenses, 
the success also breads deterrence i.e. the effect of blocking a merger transaction that was even 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1111 Joseph Farrell, et al., Economics at the FTC: Retrospective Merger Analysis with a Focus on Hospitals, 35 REV. 
IND. ORGAN. REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 369, at 369-385 (2009). 
1112 GHOSAL & STENNEK, The Political Economy of Antitrust, supra note 710, at 344. 2007. 
1113 Melissa Maleske, How Antitrust Authorities View Mergers and Acquisitions at 2 (InsideCounsel 2013). 
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wrongly expected by other corporations to realize gains would cost and lead to losses, and again 
those losses will be at the expense of the total welfare. In that context, it was held by George 
Stigler that the decrease in the number of merger transactions during the 1950s was attributed to 
the deterrence effect from the vigorous antitrust laws enforcement during that period.1114 In the 
same line, it was also reported empirically that antitrust enforcement actions have a deterrence 
effect on a number of the merger transactions.1115 
In the same line, even the language that is used by the authority officials pointed out that 
they clearly threaten their future victims i.e. merging parties, for instance Joaquín Almunia, in 
his speech before an antitrust conference in New York, said that: “I would like to remind the 
lawyers in this hall and their colleagues elsewhere that playing one authority against the other 
does not pay … [and] it will only complicate the review for everyone.”1116 Surprisingly, some 
scholars are supporting that and even claimed that the antitrust policy should not only block 
transaction for its harmful effect, but it should also do so for the sake of the deterrence effect as a 
purpose itself.1117 
One empirical finding might put that debate to an end, whereas even in a voluntary 
merger control systems, namely Australia, it was found that “the notifying parties experience 
lower abnormal returns than those that choose not to notify.”1118 To elaborate more, assuming 
that the ex-ante review was 100% accurate, and even after excluding all costs that might be 
incurred due to the ex-ante review process itself, and after excluding all type of errors, and 
neutralize any deterrence effect, just announcing that the parties notified authorities about the 
transaction and they expected a review process will lead to losses, even if the ex-ante review is 
voluntary and the merger was then cleared, nothing more than just announcing that the 
transaction will go through an ex-ante review. 
The only claim that could be argued in that case; is that all those losses and costs might 
be less than the losses of the anticompetitive effect of a merger transaction that is not reviewed if 
the ex-post system is adopted. Actually, that argument could be easily refuted, because adopting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1114 See generally George J. Stigler, The Economic Effects of the Antitrust Laws, 9 JOURNAL OF LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 225(1966). 
1115 Jo Seldeslachts, et al., Journal of Law and Economics, supra note 967, at 630-631 (2009). 
1116 Joaquín Almunia, Policy Objectives in Merger Control at 5 (IBA Antitrust Committee and the European 
Commission ed., 2011). 
1117 Jo Seldeslachts, et al., JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 967, at 607 (2009). 
1118 Chongwoo Choe & Chander Shekhar, Compulsory or Voluntary Pre-Merger Notification? Theory and Some 
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an ex-post regime does not mean one is permitting an anticompetitive behavior, and simply the 
anticompetitive behavior would be challenged but under rules similar to any other 
anticompetitive behavior of a corporation that is not engaged in a merger transaction. 
One more time someone could argue by saying that, by putting an anticompetitive 
behavior to an end in cases where that the transaction was consummated would led to much more 
losses than if it was blocked before “scrambled,” that claim was previously refuted on the basis 
that the claim is ignoring that fact the ex-ante regime is not granting immunity from scrambling, 
as it was previously mentioned that under the US ex-ante regime the scrambled transaction is 
uncovered and it might be challenged even after it is cleared by agencies, and accordingly the 
claim could be limited to just lessening the number of consummated mergers to be challenged. 
However, that will be also refuted later in detail during the discussions of the foundational errors 
in the antitrust system as an ideology.1119 
d) Exclusion of behavioral antitrust 
The conventional or the neoclassical economic approach assumes that all humans are 
rational, and obviously the rationality of all human decisions, they believe that humans are just 
interested in profit maximization and all their decisions are based on that rational assumption, 
and to serve only that interest.1120 Meanwhile, on the other hand some prominent psychologists, 
who are extensively interested in studying human behavior and how humans make decisions, are 
focused on discovering the systematic departures from the standard models of rational choices, 
and that field of study is now known as behavioral economics.  
In addition to the fact that the economic analysis of law is considered as one of the most 
appreciated improvements in legal intellectual “since the code of Hammurabi – since the very 
idea of having laws,”1121 other scholars started to apply their findings from the behavioral 
economics in the field of the economic analysis of law, and then in a more focused step some 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1119 See infra p.235. 
1120 Reeves & Stucke, INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, supra note 1050, at 1532 (2011). 
1121 NICHOLAS LEONIDAS GEORGAKOPOULOS, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: BASIC TOOLS FOR 
NORMATIVE REASONING at 3 (Cambridge University Press. 2005). 
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scholars started to use those behavioral economics findings in the field of antitrust and merger 
control, which is now known as behavioral antitrust.1122 
Professor Avishalom Tor was the first scholar to apply the behavioral economics findings 
in the field of antitrust as early as 2002, whereas he revealed for the first time that certain rules of 
the antitrust are not accurate due to the exclusion of findings of the behavioral economics, those 
rule of antitrust are namely: (1) barrier to entry, (2) predatory pricing,1123 as it will be discussed 
in more detail shortly. Indeed that first work opened the door for other scholars to continue their 
efforts in the same direction; some of those prominent scholars are: Oren Bar-Gill,1124 Maurice 
E. Stucke,1125 Amanda P. Reeves,1126 Max Huffman,1127 and William J. Rinner.1128 
The impact of the findings from the behavioral economics on the antitrust rules in general 
and specifically on the merger control process, did not draw only the attention of those scholars, 
but also some official government authorities showed the same interest in learning from those 
findings or even studying the rationality of the human decisions by themselves, for example it 
was reported that the UK Competition and Market Authority1129 and the EC in the EU,1130 and 
even the FTC and DOJ in the US, are remarkably interested in behavioral economics or at least 
show signs that they are considering the behavioral economics result in the merger control 
process.1131	  For instance, a special section was designated in the DOJ guide to merger remedies 
of 2011, for the behavioral remedies.1132 
To illustrate how the exclusion of the behavioral economics findings make the results of 
the merger control inaccurate, it would be rational to address first how the antitrust enforcement 	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(2010). 
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1129 The competition authority in the UK was the Office of Fair Trading and Competition Commission until it was 
closed on April 1, 2014, and then its functions were transferred to the Competition and Market Authority. 
1130 Reeves & Stucke, INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, supra note 1050, at 1530-1531 (2011). 
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and the current assessment of the merger transaction depends mainly on the neoclassical 
economic approach. Indeed, the neoclassical economic approach does not have any roots in the 
early history of the antitrust rules, for instance the Congress in the US never supported either the 
neoclassical economic approach or the use of the economic analysis in the merger review, during 
the enactment of any of the antitrust laws.1133 Meanwhile, and to the contrary of that, most of the 
enforcement authorities in the EU and the US heavily depend on the neoclassical economic 
approach, in antitrust generally and in the merger control process specifically.1134 
For instance, according the FTC and DOJ horizontal merger guidelines both assume the 
rationality of the merging parties and they mainly focus on that during the merger control 
process, whereas “[i]n evaluating how a merger will likely change a firm’s behavior, the 
Agencies focus primarily on how the merger affects conduct that would be most profitable for 
the firm.”1135 Furthermore,	   in the EU, since 2004 the EC shifted toward a more economic 
analysis approach, in one way or another that is similar to the US approach,1136 as it was also 
previously mentioned that the EU system was shifting toward the US antitrust policy goals. In 
addition to that, the judiciary as a part of the enforcement system is also involved in adopting the 
neoclassical economic approach. 
For instance, that is the case in the US, whereas the courts used to refuse any claims that 
seemed or were deemed irrational, even if the claim is reflecting the reality, or to be more precise 
the claims that do not make “economic sense” are not accepted by the court.1137 In earlier cases, 
before adopting the economic analysis of Chicago School, the courts in the US used to apply the 
per se rule i.e. that certain facts are automatically considered as violating the antitrust rule, and 
then that changed and the courts departed to the rational economic analysis, mainly because 
courts assume that the per se rule sometimes led to false positives, and they believe that adopting 
the economic analysis is less harmful i.e. false negatives are less harm than false positives.1138 
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In that context, it was claimed that the US courts, by adopting the neoclassical economic 
approach or the Chicago School ideas, it was just shifting from using the per se rule of 
considering certain structures or behaviors as illegal i.e. violations to the antitrust laws, to using 
the per se rule in the other direction by considering certain structures or behaviors as legal or 
compatible with the antitrust laws, such as the shifting from considering the vertical agreements 
between the parties of the vertical merger transactions as per se illegal to pre se legal.1139 
The problem is actually getting more complicated when it comes to the judiciary 
institutions, as a part of the enforcement of the merger control policies, whereas it was stated that 
judges assume that the management of the merging parties are always taking rational choices to 
maximize their profit, and even if that assumption is true, the fact is that most of judges does not 
have the tools to comprehensively understand what might be the rational choice from a business 
perspective, and that is due to several reasons.1140 That claim is obviously true, not only because 
of the fact that judges might lack the businesses experiences, or that they do not have the 
corporate mindset, but also because they are not considering the irrational behaviors of the 
corporate management like the hubris as an incentive for the merger transaction. 
The important question here should be why the neoclassical economic approach is not 
accurate, or to be more precise does the exclusion of the behavioral economics led to inaccuracy 
or false errors. Professor Coase himself,1141 who was regarded as the founder of the conventional 
economic analysis of law, rejected the traditional model of thinking that the man is rationally 
maximizing his profits.1142 Judge Posner1143 himself in his response to other scholars, regarding 
their claims on the direct relation between the economic analysis of the law and behavioral 
economics,1144 after insisting that his idea of that the behavioral antitrust is not a theory, he 
clearly admitted that “[he] did not doubt that there is something to behavioral economics, and 
that law can benefit from its insights.”1145 
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In their response to Judge Posner, the same scholars published a paper, and they claimed 
that Judge Posner claims concerning that the irrational behavior is just a result of the lack of 
future data is totally wrong, because if that was the case then irrational behavior should not be a 
systematic one while the reality is that the irrationality of the human behavior is systematic.1146 
In the same context, it is noteworthy that one of the most important findings of the behavioral 
economics is that the irrationality of the human behavior is systematic, and the human behavior 
is predictably irrational, for instance consumers are not taking the decision to buy certain goods 
at a certain price that will maximize their profit, but instead of that they just follow their pervious 
experiences blindly, and that actually explain the fact that some consumers are loyal to certain 
brands.1147 
The case of Whole Foods1148 is considered as good example to demonstrate that the 
exclusion of the behavioral economics led to inaccurate results, either type I positive errors or 
type II negative errors. In that case, the evidence presented to the court was mainly based on the 
neoclassical economic approach, whereas the test was that if the merger led to prices increase by 
5% the consumer would shift to alternative goods or not, and the answer was yes and that means 
that the merger is not raising antitrust questions, and therefore the lower court rejected to block 
the transaction, meanwhile in appeal the court reversed the ruling, because according to the 
behavioral economics findings, the demand curve is not actually elastic which means that some 
of the consumers will not rationally react toward the price rise, and they will keep buying the 
products because they just consider it as a lifestyle essential.1149 
Another example of the positive type I errors i.e. blocking a merger transaction that has a 
pro-competitive effect on the markets, as a result of the exclusion of the behavioral economics 
findings, is the case where the courts are applying the barrier to entry rule, in such case the court 
will block the transaction if it was expected that the merger transaction will give the surviving 
corporation certain market powers and new entrants will face some difficulties that might 
prevent them from entering the market. For example the capital required for investment is 
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considered a barrier to entry,1150 some scholars support that principle,1151 while others do not 
consider the capital as barrier at all, like Stigler for instance.1152 
On the other hand as an example of the negative type II errors, based on the neoclassical 
economic approach, is the courts in the US are considering that the expected predatory pricing 
behavior is not a rational decision to be expected from the surviving corporation, because that 
decision if taken will be a clear invitation for other competitors to enter the market and share the 
high profits, and therefore it did not consider it as a barrier to entry and accordingly it would 
clear the transaction if it was challenged on that ground, while on the other hand according to the 
behavioral economics findings, the expected predatory pricing behavior might be an indication 
of a significant market power that might lead to maximize the status quo biases of the new 
entrants and make them hesitant to enter the market, and thus it would be considered as barrier to 
entry, in some cases.1153 
Someone might argue here that the behavioral economics is just about the same 
preferences of the deregulatory thinking, which means preferring the negative type II errors over 
the positive type I errors. Indeed, that claim is not true, the case here is about how the exclusion 
of the behavioral economics findings will lead to the ill-informed enforcement of the merger 
control rules, in other words deciding on the case without having the right data, and it is all about 
the enforcement or the assessments that should be based on empirical findings rather than just 
assuming economic rationality under the neoclassical economic approach.1154 
Moreover, that discussion revealed that there are type I errors as well as type II errors in 
the merger control system due to the exclusion of the behavioral economics from the equation. It 
is undoubtedly true now, that the psychological findings of the behavioral economics are useful 
in the field of merger control, and it would help reach almost accurate results out of the 
assessment conducted during the merger control process, or at least give a clearer picture of the 
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expected behavior of the surviving corporation and the market reaction towards that behavior or 
in other words the structure of the transaction.	  1155 
However, behavioral economics cannot take the whole role of the economic analysis in 
the merger control process,1156 and in that regard what was suggested by Max Huffman parallels 
here very well; whereas he suggested a marriage between the neoclassical economic approach 
and the behavioral economics, and that marriage will not lead to contradicting results or rules, 
but the rational result should led to a more “economically informed antitrust” that could 
maximize the gains from the merger transaction and minimize the losses due to both types of 
errors in the same time.1157 
e) Extraterritorial reach 
It was previously shown that there is extraterritorial reach in almost all the merger control 
systems; either premerger control systems or even in the post-merger control systems, and now 
the effect of that extraterritorial reach will be addressed here. First and foremost, it is 
undoubtedly accurate that every jurisdiction designed or even copied a merger control policy that 
serve its own interests, but in fact the “everyone for himself” approach combined with the 
extraterritorial reach led to the inventible result that every jurisdiction is deciding for others not 
only for itself, for instance blocking cross-border mergers in certain industries will even effect 
that industry abroad, and that definitely means that the outcome of the overlapping 
extraterritorial reaching systems is that the corporation will settle for the “lowest common 
denominator” between the different systems, which is unfortunately not the expected optimum 
from the globalization.1158 
In reality the case is worse, because it would not be just settling for the lowest common 
denominator, because due the fact that interaction between the different jurisdiction in the 
modern world is based on the notion of imperialism, i.e. that the most powerful jurisdiction used 
to enforce their policies and extending its enforcement in other jurisdictions by using all means 
from diplomacy to even military force. The reality is that the powerful jurisdictions are always 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1155 Reeves & Stucke, INDIANA LAW JOURNAL, supra note 1050, at 1545 (2011); Reeves, ANTITRUST SOURCE, supra 
note 1126, at 5-7 (2010). 
1156 Werden, et al., JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL ECONOMICS (JITE) / ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR DIE 
GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFT, supra note 1122, at 139 (2011). 
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1158 Crane, CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 397, at 148 (2009). 
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enforcing their policies over other jurisdiction, and that could be easily identified from the 
following two incidents: (1) none of the developing countries have ever blocked a transaction in 
a developing country, (2) most of the contradicting issues are happening only between the most 
powerful countries, for instance the US and the EU. 
However, the other jurisdictions where the extraterritorial reach will take effect are not 
always idly, and it should be noted that in many cases the extraterritorial reach was 
counterattacked by those jurisdictions. For instance, in that context, three types of counterattacks 
were identified: the first one is the “diplomatic protest” and that was reported for more than 
twenty times in cases against the use of the US for its use extraterritorial reach, and the second 
one is legislative blocking under which legislation is enacted to put the extraterritorial reach to 
an end, and finally the third one is the judiciary blocking under which the courts blocks the 
application of the foreign jurisdiction rules on the national transactions.1159 
It was claimed that the reason behind the problems that might rise from the 
extraterritorial reach is the absence of cooperation agreements between the different 
jurisdictions, and that the absence of that kind of agreements led to uncertainness in cross-border 
transactions and sometimes even to “political frictions.”1160 Meanwhile, that concept could be 
easily refuted, whereas despite the fact that there are a cooperation agreements between the US 
and EU, as it was previously mentioned, there still are problems in some cases and there are 
contradicting decisions, and in addition to that there are many other bilateral cooperation 
agreements and that does not solve the problem. 
The case of the merger transaction of Gencor Ltd, will hit three birds with one stone, 
whereas it will show: (1) that the cooperation agreements did not solve the problem, and (2) that 
the extraterritorial reach may be used to the contrary i.e. to conclude such agreements, and (3) 
the reaction towards the extraterritorial reach. In that merger transaction, Gencor Ltd (South 
African corporation) proposed to jointly with Lonrho (a corporation incorporated in UK), acquire 
Implats (a South African corporation), most of the operations of those corporations were in the 
mining industry, and then the parties notified both the South African authorities and the EC, and 
the transaction was cleared by the South African authorities and blocked by the EC.1161 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1159 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 187-190. 2003. 
1160 Massimiliano Montini, Globalization and International Antitrust Cooperation at 4 (1999). 
1161 EC Decision 97/26/EC of 24 April 1996 Case No IV/M.619 — Gencor/Lonrho) (OJ 1997 L 11, p. 30) 
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It was reported in that high-level government officials from South Africa intervened 
politically to convince the EC to clear the transaction,1162 but as it was expected due to the fact 
that the EU is more powerful than South Africa, there was no result in that direction, and thus 
Gencor Ltd challenged the EC blocking decision before the CFI, and it contended that the EC 
has no authority to decide on that transaction because it concerns the acquisition of a South 
African corporation by another South African corporation, and all are operating only in South 
Africa, and that the transaction will even be concluded in South Africa, however the court 
rejected all those claims and ruled for the EC.1163 
After just a few months, exactly in June of the same year of the CFI ruling on the Gencor 
Ltd case, South Africa joined the list of countries that have a bilateral treaty with the EU; those 
treaties at least contain rules to govern the antitrust issues if not dedicated only to that issue.1164 
At first glance of Articles 35 through 44 of the agreement between the EU and South Africa, an 
impression is given that the agreement was to avoid any future contradiction or extraterritorial 
reach, meanwhile a deep understanding of those articles reveal that the EU was just confirming 
its extraterritorial reach and imposing on South Africa the obligation to adopt antitrust rules 
within three years, and those expected rules should obviously be compatible with the language of 
the agreement, which is in fact similar to that used in the EU regulations. It was even claimed 
that this kind of agreements is known as “convergence through much cross-fertilization.”1165 
In that context, it was held that the extraterritorial reach has an adverse effect in almost 
all of the jurisdictions, and it is considered as reason behind the fact that there are no incentives 
to enter into cooperation agreement or harmonization initiatives of the antitrust laws.1166 That 
claim is not an accurate one, because the fact is that the number of cooperation agreements have 
increased significantly in the last decade, and for example despite the fact that the EU heavily 
exercises its extraterritorial reach, it has also entered into cooperation agreements that at least 
include provisions concerning the antitrust rules with almost ninety jurisdictions, and the most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1162 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 177-179. 2003. 
1163 Case T-102/96, Gencor Ltd V. Commission, 25th March 1999 
1164 Agreement on Trade, Development and Co-operation between the European Community and its Member States, 
of the one part, and the Republic of South Africa, of the other part, Council Decision of 29 July 1999, (99/753/EC) 
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recent agreements were with Indian and Switzerland in 2013,1167 and it could be maintained here 
that the EU put pressure on those jurisdictions by using their extraterritorial reach and argued it 
would be easier for others to reshape their antitrust rule to be similar to the EU model or at least 
to be as an EU oriented model. 
As it was previously mentioned, there are some jurisdictions that are not idle towards the 
extraterritorial reach and are counterattacking it by using legislative blocking, for instance the 
UK enacted the Protecting of Trading Interests Act of 1980 to serve as a “blocking statute.”1168 
According to that Act, the UK limited the extraterritorial reach of the foreign laws in general by 
limiting the impact of decisions taken by foreign authorities that would affect trade in the UK, as 
well as limiting the obligation of parties to respond to any foreign request for disclosing 
information or handling documents, and even limiting the enforcement of foreign judgments.1169 
Furthermore, there are also examples from the UK that use the judiciary as a blocking 
tool to counterattack the extraterritorial reach of the US, for instance as early as 1952,	  the Court 
of Appeal in one of its rulings1170 ordered the parties not to comply to the order issued by the US 
courts,1171 and that was mainly based on the fact that the US used to extend the enforcement of 
its national laws to other jurisdictions based on the concept of extraterritorial reach which is not 
recognized by the UK judiciary system.1172 
Surprisingly the extraterritorial reach is not only concerning the enforcement of the 
merger control system against anticompetitive behavior, but it is also about granting protection 
for the export associations antitrust violation, and that is typical in the US, whereas in 1918 the 
Webb-Pomerene Act was enacted to provide such protection for export associations.1173 
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EC at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/international/bilateral/index.html last visited October 1, 2014. 
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Meanwhile, the application of that Act was refused by the ECJ.1174 That in fact led to a 
very strong claim that every jurisdiction is just looking after its own interests and is even 
protecting anticompetitive behavior of its national corporations in other jurisdictions, and the 
unanswered question will remain; why not block cross-border mergers that have anticompetitive 
effects on the global scale?1175 
In that context, it should finally be noted that there are no justification for such 
extraterritorial reach other than nationalism as it is clearly apparent. It is noteworthy that even 
the US justification of its extraterritorial reach developed over the history to cope with the public 
and the international relations, for instance it was reported that at first the justification was to 
protect US-based exporting corporations, and then it turned out to be the protection of 
consumer.1176 Ironically, protecting the consumer is predictably a convincing justification, and it 
always works better than any other justification. 
f) Foundational errors 
The merger control is mainly based on antitrust as an ideology, and since there was a 
great debate about antitrust as an ideology, and even many scholars has refuted antitrust totally 
and called for the repeal of the antitrust, and most of those calls are actually based on both 
logical and empirical justifications,1177 which is might obviously be considered as a foundational 
error inherent in the merger control regime. However, that discussion will not address all those 
repealing calls and their justifications, but will be limited to some of those ideas that are directly 
related to the merger control regime. 
To be more precise, the discussion will be limited to the assessment or tests done by 
competent authorities during the merger control process. In that context it should be noted that 
the tests begin with defining the market to which the output of the surviving corporation is 	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belonging, in order to assess whether it is expected that the transaction will affect the 
competition within that market. The step of defining the market is vital and highly problematic, it 
is vital because according to that definition the whole process will be done and problematic 
because there are no clear systematic criteria or approach to accomplish that task.1178 Despite the 
fact that that problem is vital, it will not be addressed here, because it is more related to errors in 
application and not as a foundational error. 
Directly after the market definition, and in the case of horizontal mergers, the next step 
will be to calculate the concentrations in that identified market, and how much the proposed 
merger will make a change in the concentrations, in almost all the jurisdictions that is done by 
using the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (hereinafter HHI).1179 According to the HHI, the market 
concentrations are calculated by squaring the market share of each corporation competing in the 
identified market, and then summing all the result, for example, certain market X is consisting of 
five firms with shares of 10, 15, 20, 25, and 30% of that market, the HHI is 2,250 (102 + 152 + 
202 + 252 + 302 = 2,250). 
Almost all the merger control authorities are not only using the same HHI method in 
calculating, but also almost interpret the results the same way. For instance, and according to the 
FTC and DOJ horizontal merger guidelines, a market with an HHI below 1,500 is an un-
concentrated market, while a market with an HHI between 1,500 and 2,500 is a moderately 
concentrated market, while a market with an HHI more than 2,500 is a highly concentrated 
market.1180 Meanwhile, according to the EC guidelines for the assessment of horizontal mergers, 
the EC depends more on classifying the effect or the impact of the merger on the HHI of the 
market.1181 
The next step in the merger control process is to find out how much the HHI of the 
market is expected to increase as a result of the proposed merger, which is simply by 
recalculating the HHI of the market again and finding the difference between the old and the new 
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HHI of the market and the result is known as “Delta,” or in another way just by doubling the 
product of the multiplication of the shares percentage of the merging corporations, for example if 
corporation X, which has a 25% market share, propose to acquire corporation Y, which has a 
15% market share, the expected increase in the HHI of the market will be 750 (25×15×2).1182 
Depending on the results of those calculations, the authorities will decide whether the 
transaction is not raising an antitrust question and accordingly it should be cleared, or that it 
might be likely to raise an antitrust question and needs further investigations. For instance in the 
US, if the expected future HHI of the market is still within the range of un-concentrated markets, 
there will be no need for further investigation and the transaction should be cleared, and if the 
Delta is less than 100 HHI the merger is unlikely to raise antitrust question, and in case the Delta 
is ranging between 100 and 200 HHI it potentially requires more investigation, while if the Delta 
is more than 200 HHI in a highly concentrated market, that is considered as primary evidence 
that the proposed transaction will enhance the market power of the merging parties.1183 
Before advancing furthermore in the process of the assessment of the horizontal mergers, 
it should be pointed out here that those classification of the markets that range from un-
concentered to highly concentrated markets, and the implications or the effects of the results i.e. 
Delta are not based on any scientific methods or empirical findings, despite that the fact the 
calculations of the HHI is mathematical itself. That was even clearly mentioned in the FTC and 
DOJ horizontal merger guidelines, that all those classification and implications are based on the 
“experiences” of the authorities.1184 It is undoubtedly true, that just the “experiences” of the 
authorities is not an accurate or even reliable source of information, and it undoubtedly not free 
from biases or are objective enough to develop standards for market concentrations. 
The question simply here should be as follows; what are the tools that the enforcement 
authorities, whether that be the competent agencies or even the judiciary, have in order to decide 
that if Delta is 201 HHI, for any type or category of products or services, in any industries, and at 
anytime, is considered enhancing the market power. While if Delta is 200 HHI, the case is not 	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the same, and one needs to ask is that decision based on any verified theory, empirical evidence, 
or even an economic rationale? The answer is clearly no; it is purely a claim of the “experiences” 
is indicating so. Ironically, the experiences of the authorities did not ever consider the high Delta 
HHI as an indication of the efficiency that is expected from the merger of the two successful 
corporations. 
In addition to that, and regardless of the label or classification of a concentrated market or 
not, and that the HHI method might not work for every case, or that the merger is horizontal or 
not, the issue of the foundational errors are much more deeper, whereas it found its roots in the 
violations that the authorities search for in almost every merger transaction, during the 
assessment process. In other words, the foundational errors are namely what the authorities are 
looking for during the merger control process. The antitrust authorities are mainly looking for 
certain effects on the market, and those effects are mainly classified into three categories of 
effects: (1) unilateral or un-coordinated effects, (2) coordinated effects, (3) conglomerate effects. 
Non-coordinated effects can come simply in two flavors, the first is the case of enhancing 
the market power of a single corporation to gain a dominant position, and the second flavor is to 
reduce the competition constrains in an oligopoly market,1185 but without any coordination 
between the merging parties and other players.1186 On the other hand, the coordinated effects 
simply means enabling or increasing the probability of the coordination between the corporations 
in the market to engage in anticompetitive behavior, and it does not matter if the coordination 
will be between the merging parties or the other players in the market and even without entering 
into any kinds of agreements.1187 
In order to enable or increase a sustained coordinated effect, that simply requires three 
preconditions: (1) coordinating corporations should be able to monitor the loyalty of the parties 
to the coordination terms, (2) there should be a “credible deterrent” in case of violation to those 
terms, and (3) the coordination should not be disturbed by any third parties,1188 on the other hand 	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the non-coordinated effect requires at least a third precondition which is the non-disturbance of 
any party other than the monopoly owners. 
Accordingly, the sustained occurrence of any of these effects either coordinated or non-
coordinated, are based on the assumption that there is a barrier to enter into the market, otherwise 
the coordinated effect or the non-coordinated effect will not sustain and one ends up with losses 
to the merging parties. In that context, the antitrust authorities used to assess whether an entry to 
the market could be “timely, likely, and sufficient” to counterattack the effects of the proposed 
merger transaction.1189 
As it was previously shown, the rules towards the barrier of entry, as the antitrust 
authorities and the courts applied them in the US, are not based on the reality of the markets. In 
that concern, it was strongly asserted that the only actual barrier to entry that could be claimed by 
the antitrust proponent is that the capital required to enter to the market, and as it was previously 
mentioned that even capital required to enter the market is not a barrier, and the only barrier that 
might be considered in some cases is the cost of attracting the required capital,1190 and even that 
cost is expected to return back shortly in a high profit market taken by the merging corporations. 
In addition to that, why the authorities are not taking into consideration the cases where 
the barrier to entry is a result of a legal barrier, like for instance other regulation issued by the 
government, for example requiring certain license to be granted by the government agencies 
before entering the market. Furthermore, it has never been claimed by the antitrust proponent 
that requiring a certain license is a barrier to entry, especially in the case where the licenses are 
limited in number, such as the license required in the telecommunication industry to enter the 
market of mobile phone operators or internet services providers, etc. 
ExxonMobil is indeed a prime example to demonstrate that the coordinated effect might 
be just myth, whereas the daily coordination between the ExxonMobil branches or even 
subsidiaries in almost every country over the globe is undoubtedly more than the expected 
coordinated effect from an average merger transaction or even illegal cartels.1191 Accordingly, 
the case is about the behavior and its implication or affects in the market not just the structure 
and what is expected from the structure. The antitrust authorities are simply claiming the same, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1189 U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (August 19, 2010), at 
27-29 
1190 For more about the barrier to entry in the US courts see generally Werden & Froeb, THE JOURNAL OF 
INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, supra note 1151, at 525-526 (1998). 
1191 Easterbrook, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, supra note 742, at 1-2 (1984). 
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for instance Joaquin Almunia mentioned that his “main message is that market reality, and 
market reality alone, must lie at the core of our merger analysis.”1192 
However, the reality is very different, but not from the expectation about the success 
percentage of the merger transaction, it is different from what the government officials are 
claiming, the authorities actually keep looking for any evidence that might support their claim 
that there are antitrust violations, even out of thin air. For instance, Jude Bork himself cited 
“pressures” within the authorities to “extend” the reach of antitrust laws.1193 It was even claimed 
that whenever the administrative authorities did not support the judiciary with convincing 
arguments, the judiciary helped, by refuting their arguments therefore the authorities keep 
improving their justification every time, in the same way the courts showed them in its previous 
rulings.1194 
To elaborate more, consider the following example of the blocking of the merger 
transaction between Cadbury and Kraft, the EC announced that the parties own a high market 
share in Ireland, Poland, Romania, and UK, and that both corporations are competing in the 
Polish and Romanian markets and that would lessen the competition, while there is no 
competition between them in the UK and Irish markets.1195 In that case, it was clear that the EC 
was just trying to justify the remedies of divesting the operation in Poland and Romania as a 
precondition to clear the transaction. The interpretation of the whole picture might support that 
claim, because there was some news concerning a plan to relocate all the manufacturing 
facilitates from UK and Ireland to Poland and Romania, for the purpose of savings by using 
cheaper labor.1196 
Another example is the homogenous product industries, like cement for example or any 
other construction materials, whereas there are no significant differences between products other 
than the prices, it would be very easy to make a coordinated effect, and it is even a very well-
known practice that is called Hardcore Cartel.1197 In those industries and despite the fact that it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1192 Almunia, EU Merger Control has Come of Age, supra note 698, at 4. 2011. 
1193 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF at 415 (Basic Books 2nd ed. 
1993). 
1194 Donald G. J. R. Kempf, Merger Litigation from the Birth of General Dynamics to the Death of Section 7, 65 
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 653, at 653-654 (1997). 
1195 Villarejo, Recent Trends in EU Merger Control, supra note 859, at 5-6. 2011. 
1196 For news concerning the plan of relocating the manufacturing facilities of Cadbury form Bristol, UK to Poland 
see http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8507066.stm last visited on October 1, 2014. 
1197 UNCTAD, The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Economic Development: The Appropriate Design and 
Effectiveness of Competition Law and Policy, spura note 1049, at 15. 2010. 
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might be controlled or regulated by the antitrust laws, what is happening in the reality is that the 
regulatory authorities themselves turn a blind eye on such coordination practices, or the 
authorities might even promote coordination between the producers or service providers, and that 
is what typically happens in different industries like the telecommunication industry, whereas the 
authorities require coordination between the service providers. 
As an example of the conglomerate effect myth, the merger transaction between Intel1198 
and MacAfee,1199 whereas the EC even after it decided that two corporations were operating in 
two different markets, it decided that those two markets are “neighbouring” and 
“complementary” markets which do not compete with each other, in other words it is a 
conglomerate merger, but it raised antitrust question concerning the conglomerate effect, for 
instance Intel might limit the McAfee products to its chips or even hamper its products when 
running on any other chips not produced by Intel, and the transaction was not cleared until the 
approval of some remedies.1200 
The EC in that case had not cleared the merger transaction until Intel committed to ensure 
that all the other corporations operating in the industry of technology security software will have 
the same access to the information that Intel might support McAfee with, and that McAfee 
products will be able to run effectively on devices that are not using Intel processors.1201 As it is 
simple and clear, those preconditioned remedies means that both Intel and McAfee should not 
violate the antitrust laws in the future, and the question here is should the antitrust authorities 
impose a commitment to abide the law, or it is just showing its power to postpone the transaction 
and that it is protecting the main competitor of Intel i.e. AMD, which is almost the only 
competitor in the semiconductor industry in the world. 
Another noteworthy foundational myth, is that it has always held that the reason behind 
the antitrust laws are increasing the consumer welfare, and it has been shown several times 
before in the legislative intent, in almost all the jurisdictions, that they are not targeting the 
welfare of consumer, at anytime during the antitrust history. Moreover, despite the fact the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1198 Intel is a well-known US corporation specialized in semiconductor chips industry, for more information about 
the corporation visit its official website at http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/company-overview/company-
overview.html last visited October 1, 2014. 
1199 McAfee is a well-known US corporation specialized in technology security software and is now wholly owned 
subsidiary of Intel, for more information about the corporation visit its official website at 
http://home.mcafee.com/Root/AboutUs.aspx last visited October 1, 2014  
1200 Almunia, Policy Objectives in Merger Control, supra note 1116, at 3. 2011. 
1201 Villarejo, Recent Trends in EU Merger Control, supra note 859, at 8-9. 2011. 
242	  
enforcement of antitrust rules does not inevitably lead to the decrease in prices or even 
preventing the prices from increase, it could be assumed that the antitrust enforcement led to 
such result. But does that mean consumer welfare, no it does not, whereas the happiness 
economics1202 literature strongly asserted that consumer welfare is based on many factors; some 
of them are material like income, housing, wealth and others factors are related to the quality of 
life like health, social status, skills, education, security, and environment.1203 
Based on the assumption that the antitrust enforcement would successfully decrease the 
prices sustainably, that success could be contribute only to the material factors of welfare, which 
is already enhanced to an average satisfying level in the jurisdictions that are leading the antitrust 
law ideology i.e. the developed countries, and to the contrary most of the developing countries, 
which is deeply in need of those material improvements, the laws do not have any enforcement 
in reality and those jurisdictions are considered as antitrust heavens.1204 
Moreover, the idea of maximizing the consumer surplus is very material, and even 
sometimes offering the goods or services at a lower price is not for the good of the consumers, 
consider for example the case of cigarettes or even fast food and many other examples that 
demonstrates the rationale behind the antitrust laws might be the consumer surplus but that does 
not mean the consumer welfare.1205 Furthermore, in some cases the consumer welfare is a 
relative concept and it is measured according to similar peers, and even sometimes the welfare 
might be achieved by having the ability to purchase very expensive goods that others could not 
easily afford.1206 Accordingly, the most contended goal behind the antitrust laws appeared to be 
non-achievable by the means of the enforcement of the antitrust policies. 
Meanwhile, there are other social effects that could not be ignored like for instance the 
impact of the merger transactions on employment,1207 whereas it was previously mentioned that 
the merger might gain by sharing common teams, starting from the senior management levels to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1202 Happiness economics is that field of study that mainly focus on quantitative and theoretical study of happiness, 
well-being, quality of life, life satisfaction and related concepts, and typically require the combination 
between economics and other fields of study, for ex: psychology and sociology. 
1203 For more details see generally Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Better Life Initiative: 
Compendium of OECD Well-Being Indicators, (2011). 
1204 Stucke, FORDHAM LAW REVIEW, supra note 745, at 2625-2626 (2013). 
1205 CAROL GRAHAM, THE PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AN ECONOMY OF WELL-BEING at 11 (Brookings Institution Press. 
2011); Stucke, FORDHAM LAW REVIEW, supra note 745, at 2637 (2013). 
1206 For an excellent comprehensive analysis of the effect of antitrust policies on the consumer welfare see generally 
Stucke, FORDHAM LAW REVIEW, supra note 745, (2013). 
1207 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 41-42. 2010. 
243	  
all levels of workers, and that might led to an increase in the unemployment rates. However, it 
could be hesitantly claimed that from the total surplus perspective, the unemployed people 
themselves will share some of the gains, but that might be after struggling for some time. 
The antitrust authorities and proponents maintained that there are harmful effects on the 
economy from the monopolistic behaviors i.e. unilateral effects, and they always cite some 
empirical researches that support their claims, in fact those empirical researches are not accurate 
and were heavily criticized by scholars.1208 To the contrary of that, there are other empirical 
researches that revealed that the antitrust laws itself have a negative impact on the economy.1209 
At least such contradicting empirical results raise a point that the foundational assumptions of the 
harmful effects on the economy from the monopolistic behaviors are not a constant, and there is 
a probability of being just a myth. For instance, there are industries in the US that are exempted 
from the antitrust laws but are doing well such as insurance corporations and corporations in the 
baseball industry.1210 
Furthermore, the authorities are investigating to find out everything out of thin air, and 
even if a certain transaction is expected to raise a certain violation and parties accordingly try to 
structure the transaction in a way that might fix that, unfortunately they will be able to easily 
figure out what the authorities are preparing for them. For instance, Joaquín Almunia admitted 
that the antitrust authorities have a “toolbox” of rules, and accordingly every time the parties 
might be surprised about which tool they decided to use in order to ruin the transaction.1211 
In the same line, and according to the Parker doctrine,1212 and the Local Government 
Antitrust Act of 1984,1213 and because the errors are highly expected from the government 
officials during the merger control process and the antitrust reviews in general, the officers of the 
antitrust authorities were granted immunity against damages claims based on or related to the 
harm that they might cause to the parties while making decisions regarding their transactions.1214 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1208 ARMENTANO, Antitrust: The Case for Repeal, supra note 712, at 44-45. 1999, citing Stephen C. Littlechild, 
Misleading Calculations of the Social Costs of Monopoly Power, 91 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 348 (1981). For a 
statistical criticism of concentration-profit studies see EUGENE M. SINGER, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL 
ANALYSIS at 31-33 (Grid Pub. 1981). 
1209 DiLorenzo, INTERNATINAL REVIEW OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 180, at 73 (1985). 
1210 For more details about the exemption of the baseball industry from the antitrust laws see J. Gordon Hylton, Why 
Baseball's Antitrust Exemption Still Survives, 9 MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW 391(1999). 
1211 Almunia, Policy Objectives in Merger Control, supra note 1116, at 5. 2011. 
1212 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 [1943] 
1213 Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984, H.R. 6027 (98th). 
1214 ARMENTANO, Antitrust: The Case for Repeal, supra note 712, at 46. 1999. 
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In addition to that, the fact is that the 21st century is witnessing the biggest shift from the 
industrial economy to a technology-oriented economy, and the intellectual capital is replacing 
the physical one, and that obviously means that IPR is a very important issue, to be more precise 
the protection of those rights is the key issue.1215 The fact that protecting IPR means granting 
certain exclusive rights to the owners is highly contradicting to the antitrust ideology, which is 
mainly considered to be about the anticompetitive effect of the use of such exclusive rights, and 
that might be considered as one of the foundational flaws of the antitrust that does not survive in 
the age of the technology-oriented economy. 
Meanwhile, someone could claim that there is no relation between the IPR and the 
foundational errors of the merger control systems, but in fact they are directly interrelated to each 
other. To elaborate more, consider the fact that Google1216 acquired Motorola1217 for 12.5 billion 
US dollars, and the main incentive of the transaction was to collect the IPR of 17,500 patent and 
7,500 pending patent application through that transaction, and the EC cleared that transaction 
after Google committed not to abuse the use of those IPRs.1218 
Actually, that example raised a big question: what if the transaction was blocked for its 
expected antitrust violation, could the antitrust authorities actually prevent Google from 
acquiring those IPRs by means of purchasing all of them or getting license to use them. If the 
answer is yes then the IPR does not affect the foundation base of the merger control, but if the 
answer is no then the inevitable result should be that protecting IPR is contradicting with the 
rationale of antitrust rules and accordingly with the enforcement of the merger control system, 
and in fact the answer is no. 
Meanwhile, the said conclusion does not mean that the antitrust authorities do not have 
the right to attack or challenge any future behavior of the merging parties, like for instance if the 
surviving corporation abused those rights that were granted under the IPRs, but to put everything 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1215 SIEBERT, The World Economy a Global Analysis, supra note 1175, at 402. 2007; SHENEFIELD & STELZER, The 
Antitrust Laws: A Primer, supra note 178, at 85. 2001. 
1216 Google is a well-known US corporation specialized in internet-related products and services and products; 
which includes online advertising, search engines, cloud computing, and software, and for more information about 
the corporation visit its official website at https://www.google.com/intl/en/about last visited October 1, 2014 
1217  Motorola is a well-known US corporation specialized the mobile communications industry, for more 
information about the corporation visit its official website at http://www.motorola.com/us/About-
Motorola/Corporate-About-Motorola.html last visited October 1, 2014  
1218 Diane Bartz & Foo Yun Chee, Google Wins US, EU Approval for Motorola Mobility Buy (Alexei Oreskovic 
ed., Thomson Reuters 2012). 
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in its right context, the authorities will challenge those behaviors not the structure of the 
surviving corporation, in other words that will be an ex-post not ex-ante.1219 
On the other hand, others asserted there are no contradictions between the IPR and the 
antitrust rules as it might seem at first sight, but seeing the accurate whole picture will reveal that 
both are complementary.1220 Both of the two laws and their ideologies are complementary might 
be a correct claim to some extent, which is that both of them are protecting someone right to 
survive in the market, but in fact they are contradicting. 
For instance, the proponent of the claim that the IPR and the antitrust laws are not 
contradicting, do not have any explanation to the fact that protecting the IPR grants the owner 
the right to exploit the patent for example exclusively. While on the other the patent itself might 
be considered as a market, for instance if there is only one drug that cures an epidemic disease, 
that drug could be considered as a market, the	   exclusively granted right will give its owner a 
dominant position in that market and the patent itself might be considered as a barrier to entry. In 
the same context, it is noteworthy that others even claimed that the IPR laws should be repealed, 
not only the antitrust laws.1221 
g) Political influence 
It is undoubtedly true that the political power is considered a commodity, and any party 
that wishes to possess some of that power, for the purpose of serving its interest, should buy it 
from the market and negotiate a deal with the owner, that owner is usually the political parties. 
The political party would bargain the political power in exchange for money, whereas it needs 
money for its operations, campaign, and elections, which is called in a misleading manner 
financing the elections. 1222  Meanwhile, if the case is that the owner is the government 
administration i.e. the political party in charge, and using its power in favor of a private party is 
known as “rent seeking.” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1219 For ideas to solve this issue and to draw a separation line between the IPR and antitrust laws see what was 
suggested in Wolfgang Fikentscher, The Draft International Antitrust Code (DIAC) in the Context of International 
Technological Integration - The Institutional and Jurisdictional Architecture, 72 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 533, 
at 540-541 (1996). 
1220 SHENEFIELD & STELZER, The Antitrust Laws: A Primer, supra note 178, at 88. 2001, citing Atari Games Corp. 
V. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
1221 Carlton, THE JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES, supra note 959, at 165-166 (2007). 
1222  George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 3, at 12 (1971). 
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Furthermore, if the owner of the power is a regulatory authority, and that authority, 
regardless of the public interest, is taken over by the private interests of the players in the 
industry that it was empowered to regulate, that is known as “regulatory capture.” It is was even 
argued that the antitrust enforcement in general is costly, and the merger control process is an 
expensive process, and that increases the possibility to be subjected to regulatory capture, and 
accordingly it is highly expected to be used as a tool to serve goals other than consumer welfare, 
such as the political goals to serve the private interests.1223 
The case is a typical one in the field of antitrust generally and the merger control 
especially, whereas almost all the scholars cited political goals as a goal of the antitrust 
policies.1224 However, as it was noted that the political goals are not always for self-interest of 
the policy designer or the decision maker, and it was even claimed that the political goal of the 
antitrust policy might be the protection against any expected “excessive concentration of 
economic power [that] will breed antidemocratic political pressures,”1225 in other words to 
prevent the political powers of the corporations that might be gained as a result of its economic 
power.1226 
In that context, it should be noted that it has been purported that the Chicago School was 
the first to argue that the antitrust regimes were developed to serve political goals through 
principles that seem “neutral on their face,” which might be of course the popular consumer 
welfare justification or any other legitimate goal.1227 In fact, that claim is true and it might also 
simply answer the question of why there are different enforcement approaches notwithstanding 
the fact that the rules might be the same, whereas the different enforcement approaches are due 
to the different interpretation by the different administrations that is always affiliated to certain 
political party looking after different political goals. 
The issue of the influence of political goals on the merger control enforcement have a 
special implications in the case of cross-border mergers, whereas political goals do not only vary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1223 GHOSAL & STENNEK, The Political Economy of Antitrust, supra note 710, at 344. 2007. 
1224 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 3, 50, 52-54. 2003; Stucke, FORDHAM 
LAW REVIEW, supra note 745, at 2603, 2637 (2013). 
1225 Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 1051, at 
1051 (1979). 
1226 Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIFORNIA LAW 
REVIEW 1580, at 1582-1588 (1983). 
1227 Huffman, Neo-Behavioralism?, supra note 1127, at 1. 2010; COLINO, Competition Law of the EU and UK, 
supra note 185, at 11. 2011. 
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over the time within the same jurisdiction, but also varies simultaneously between the different 
jurisdictions, and obviously the probability of effect on cross-border merger is much higher than 
in domestic transaction.1228 For instance, it was cited for many times that the EC politically 
blocked cross-border mergers, like for example the merger between McDonnell Douglas and 
Boeing or the merger between General Electric and Honeywell.1229 
Someone could claim that the EC decision to block cross-border mergers was mere 
protectionism, in other words blocking cross-border transaction in order to protect the European 
corporations from their foreign competitors, such as protecting Airbus in the case of McDonnell 
Douglas and Boeing. However, that could be easily refuted because the decision is not just based 
on protectionism, but in fact the protectionism within the EU context also has a political end, 
which is the	  integration of the Member States. In that context, it was also accurately claimed that 
the reason behind the foundation of the EU antitrust system was mainly the political and 
economic integration,1230 and that could be clearly identified in both the policy and the 
enforcement, at least more easily than other systems like the US system.1231 
Even reading the mandate of Joaquín Almunia as an EC Commissioner, will reveal that 
he understood his mission in the context of the political vision of the EU, whereas he said that: 
“[m]y vision for competition policy in Europe is linked to my political vision of Europe as an 
area of peace and stability, freedom and democracy.”1232 Accordingly, it would be obvious to 
claim that the EC while making a decision in a merger review is considering the integration of 
the European community as a whole and it might block a cross-border merger transaction to 
protect the interest of European corporations, regardless of any expected pro-competitive effect 
of the transaction. 
In the same context, it should be noted that while the EC succeeded to block cross-border 
mergers that would not serve the political goal of the EU, it did not fully succeed to serve that 
same goal in the cross-border transaction done within the community level. For instance, there 
are many cases whereas the national authorities blocked or at least conditionally cleared cross-
border transaction that were already cleared by the EC, for example; the merger transaction 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1228 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 61. 2003. 
1229 Hunt, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS, supra note 709, at 151 (2007); GHOSAL 
& STENNEK, The Political Economy of Antitrust, supra note 710, at 241. 2007. 
1230 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 30. 2003. 
1231 Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, supra note 1017, at 350. 1997. 
1232 Joaquín Almunia mandate is available on the official website of the EC at http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-
2014/almunia/about/mandate/index_en.htm last visited on October 1, 2014. 
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between Autostrada1233 and Abertis,1234 which was cleared conditionally by the Italian authorities 
while it was cleared by the EC.1235 
In the US, the case is simply that there are different administrations, which are affiliated 
to different political parties, and that led to different enforcement approaches under the same set 
of rule, mainly to serve the political goals of those parties, for instance, it was reported 
empirically during the presidency period of the President George H.W. Bush,1236 that the 
enforcement of the antitrust laws was much weaker than during the presidency period of 
President Bill Clinton.1237 
Furthermore, in a relatively more recent empirical research in 2012, it was also reported 
that President Barack Obama1238 administration strengthened the merger control enforcement.1239 
Particularly, it could be easily claimed that the weaker enforcement during Bush administration 
could be attributed to the pro-capitalism ideology of the Republican Party to which President 
Bush belong, and the strengthened enforcement could be also attributed to the modern liberalism 
ideas of the Democrats Party to which both Presidents Clinton and Obama belongs. 
In the same context, but to the contrary of the mentioned empirical findings, other 
contradicting results were also derived from empirical studies, whereas it was reported that there 
were no differences between the enforcement during President Bush administration and 
President Clinton administration,1240 and even the same could be argued concerning the President 
Obama administration.1241 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1233 Autostrade is an Italian toll road operator corporation, for more details about the corporation visit its official 
website at http://www.autostrade.it/en/chi-siamo last visited on October 1, 2014. 
1234 Abertis is a Spanish toll road operator corporation, for more details about the corporation visit its official 
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For instance, a former FTC Chairman tried to justify the contradicting results of the 
empirical studies that were conducted to answer the question of whether there were differences 
in enforcement between the different administrations, and he pointed out the fact that the number 
of transactions that were notified was different during the different administrations, and 
accordingly he concluded that there were more chances of enforcement and to challenge the 
transactions during the higher rate of notifications, and he also noted that there was a merger 
wave during President Clinton administration.1242 That justification could be easily refuted, 
because the results was not based on the number of transactions, but the results were basically 
calculated, similar to all the results in the empirical studies, based on the percentage, not on the 
numbers. 
The political influence on the cross-border mergers is not just coming from the 
enforcement authorities; basically it could come from outside i.e. political intervention from 
foreign countries to influence the competent authorities, typically in order to clear a transaction. 
An example of the outside political effect was the previously mentioned incident of the political 
intervention to clear the Gencor transaction. Furthermore, the political influence would not affect 
only the merging parties, but it might also lead to political frictions and sparks between the 
different jurisdictions to which the parties belong, like for instance between the US and the EU 
as it was also previously discussed. 
Accordingly, the political influence has some implications within the cross-border 
mergers especially when the case is accompanied by the application of the extraterritorial 
reach.1243 However, it could obviously be realized that both the political influence on cross-
border mergers and the extraterritorial reach are limited to only the powerful government 
authorities, and that might explain the fact that problems always occur when the US and the EU 
are the most connected jurisdictions to the transaction, and it also explains that most of the 
developing countries are considered as merger control heavens. To be more precise, the extent of 
exercising the political power simply depends on the power of the intervening party itself, as a 
result of imperialism. 
Finally, it was even held that a better understanding of both antitrust policies and 
enforcement generally, and of merger control specifically, requires a good understanding of 	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political science as well as the legal and the economics side of the field,1244 and that led some 
voices to call for establishing independent authorities that could enforce the policies in a less 
subjective and politically oriented environment.1245 Ironically, the political power that designed 
the policies or contributed to the enactment of laws, might be misused or even monopolized,1246 
and despite the fact that there might be checks and balances to put any violations to an end, there 
are no government authorities that are granted the rights to control the misuse of the political 
power, through an ex-ante process. 
h) Privacy and data related issues 
One of the most important categories of problems that might be considered as a drawback 
of the merger control system are those issues related to the data and privacy, in addition to any 
accuracy problem thereof, those issues could be identified as follows: (1) the cost of gathering or 
disposing the required data or information by the merging parties or even by third parties like 
consumer and competitors, (2) breaching the privacy of the merging parties, (3) disclosing the 
data or information to public, or competitors, or even sharing it with other authorities. All those 
issues are problems at least from the merging parties’ perspective, regardless of the legal point of 
view, and regardless of whether any action in that regard was considered a violation or even is 
permissible under law. 
The privacy issues are not even addressed by the law in many jurisdictions, mainly in the 
developing countries, for instance neither Egypt nor any of the G.C.C. countries enacted any law 
to protect the privacy of data or even the right to access to public information. Meanwhile, in 
most of the developed jurisdictions the disclosure of confidential data or information, or 
breaching the privacy of the parties might lead to serious legal problems, and based on that fact 
some of those developed jurisdictions have enacted special laws to grant the antitrust authorities 
the power to share some of the data and information at least with the other antitrust 
authorities.1247 	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For instance, according to the confidentiality article i.e. Article VIII of the cooperation 
agreement between the US and the EU, no party is obliged to disclose any information with 
regard to antitrust issues in case that the disclosure is forbidden by law or if the disclosure is not 
in the interest of the party who possess the information, without any reference to the interests of 
the merging parties or any other third parties. Meanwhile, and for the purpose of circumventing 
any laws that prohibit the disclosure of the information to foreign authorities with regard to the 
antitrust or merger control investigation, the US enacted the International Antitrust Enforcement 
Assistance Act of 1994,1248 in order to be able to share the information and data with other 
foreign antitrust authorities who are parties to one of the cooperation agreements with the US.1249 
As an example from the US on breaching the privacy of the employees of the merging 
parties, is the case of the merger transaction between Bazaarvoice and PowerReviews, as it was 
previously mentioned that the court held that the transaction violated the antitrust laws, without 
making any consideration to the data derived from the consumers, while it had extraordinary 
consideration for a quote made by the CEO of one of the parties in an email, that was sent by 
him internally, under which he indicated that the transaction will allow them to take out their 
only competitor.1250 
In the same context, in an interview with one of the senior management staff member of 
one of the biggest corporation in the State of Indiana in the US, he revealed that as a response to 
those types of practices by the government authorities, they issued internal instructions in that 
regard to the employees, under which they should limit the use of the emails to only formal level 
of communications, and they designed and developed an internal policy to clean the email 
accounts of the employees periodically.1251 
One more dimension of the problem is the fact that many of the merger control 
authorities are currently using social media in their announcements, for instance the FTC, DOJ, 
and EC have accounts on Twitter. That trend might be beneficial for some people, for instance it 
would be much easier for journalists or researches to follow-up with latest news, and it might be 
also helpful for consumers to get some tips or guidelines from time to time. Meanwhile, it might 	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not be acceptable from the merging parties side, to find the authorities announcing the blocking 
of their transaction instantly on the social media, or that they are requiring a second request or 
remedies negotiations, especially in the cases where any of the merging parties are listed in the 
stock exchange, whereas that might lead instantly to losses or even pressure the parties into 
accepting certain remedies proposed by the authorities. 
Some authorities might explain that on the ground that the trend of using the social media 
is a part of fulfilling their obligation according to the transparency policies or as imposed by laws 
with concern to the right to access to information, but what about the confidentially of the details 
of the transaction, does the authorities have the right to reveal all the details or just to a certain 
extent and many other problematic issues in that regard. As an example from Canada, the 
Canadian Competition Bureau started by the end of 2011 to publish a monthly list of the 
reviewed mergers, and the Canadian Bar Association maintained that the Competition Bureau is 
not entitled to do so, and in addition to that it is also violating the law.1252 
It is undoubtedly true that announcing information about the transaction in certain stages 
might harm the merging parties, or put them under pressures to conclude the transaction with 
certain commitments, or led them to put it to an end, and that is certainly a drawback of the 
merger control system, especially in case of blocking the transaction while the parties did not 
engaged in any actual anticompetitive behavior. Ironically, it could be claimed that by revealing 
information about the transaction and the parties thereof, whether in social media or in a monthly 
report, or by any means that could reach the competitors of the merging parties might harm the 
competition in the market, and could be considered as anticompetitive behavior done by the 
antitrust authorities. 
i) Remedies 
As it was previously mentioned that in most of the cases the authorities are using the 
remedies option as a precondition to clear the transaction, and in the EU the EC has the power to 
enter directly into such agreements. Meanwhile, the case in the US is not the same, because it is 
more judiciary-oriented system, and that depends mainly on how powerful the competent 
antitrust agency is itself, for instance according to the Federal Trade Commission Act,1253 it is 	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much easier for the FTC to meet the requirement for obtaining a preliminary injunction against 
merger transactions than for the DOJ.1254 Accordingly, it could be argued that the FTC is using 
that open door to the court to put the merging parties under pressure to accept certain remedies or 
even gain a more powerful position in negotiating the remedies. 
It was also previously mentioned that are two types of remedies, the behavioral remedies 
and the structural remedies. In that context, it was reported that when deciding whether to 
impose structural or behavioral remedies, the antitrust authorities tends to impose structural 
remedies, and it was rightly asserted that the choice is almost based on the fact that behavioral 
remedies are not as easily monitored by the authorities.1255 It is noteworthy here that it was 
claimed that the structural remedies are generally preferred in cases that there is strong evidence 
that indicates the problem is due the structure rather than the behavior of the players in the 
market.1256 
Regarding the behavioral remedies, it could be maintained that the type of remedies are 
in fact a mere commitment to abide by the law and not to violate the antitrust rules, as the 
authorities see or interpret it, in the future. Accordingly, we can come to a conclusion that the 
premerger control itself could be used as a more easier tool to control the future behavior of the 
corporations in the market than monitoring the behaviors of the corporations in the market on 
daily and continues basis. In other words, the whole economy may pay for the cost of the merger 
control process, in addition to the costs of type I and type II errors, in order to save the efforts or 
even just the laziness of the antitrust authorities. 
To be more precise, the behavioral remedies are undoubtedly a drawback of the 
premerger control systems, whereas it might have negative effects on the performance of the 
merging parties or on the market in general, while it did not bring any additional benefits to be 
added to the enforcement of the antitrust laws in general. In addition to that, the authorities do 
not opt for imposing such category of remedies unless it seems that the structural remedies are 
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not acceptable by the parties and the transaction is not considered an actual threat to the 
competition in the market. 
In the same context, in some cases the authorities prefer the behavioral remedy if it is 
beneficial for the performance of the national corporations. In an attempt to revamp the 
behavioral remedies, some prominent scholars suggested that the merging parties might enter 
into an “incentive contracts” with the authorities, under that agreement that the price increase or 
production decrease should be linked to mutual penalties and rewards.1257 That suggestion 
appears to be valid on its face, but undoubtedly it does not add anything new to the idea of the 
behavioral remedies other than paying incentive rewards to the merging parties to keep their 
obligation to abide by the antitrust laws, or the “incentive contracts” provisions in their proposal. 
On the other the hand, the structural remedies are also considered as a merger control 
systems drawback, because it turned out to be ineffective from the practical point of view. That 
claim is mainly based on the findings of a study that was conducted by the FTC in 1995 to 
evaluate the structural remedies, whereas according to the findings; (1) the merging parties tend 
to look for a weak buyer who is acceptable to the authorities, and accordingly it would easy to 
compete with him in the future and even plan for his failure, and (2) most of the buyers are not 
well informed to make the purchase decision or even the future operational decisions to run the 
divested asset or unit.1258 
Accordingly, in a typical structural remedy the merging parties will either arrange to 
engage into future collusions with the buyer, which is certainly a behavior that will be ex-post 
challenged under the antitrust laws, or they might make use of the fact that the duration until 
closing the remedies agreement is virtually long, and thus focus on how to put impediments 
before ones success or even to make sure that one will fail by time. In both of those two 
assumptions the structural remedies is neither effective nor efficient, and in an effort to justify 
that failure the EC tried reluctantly to improve the criteria upon which it accepts the buyer.1259 
It undoubtedly true that the EC according to those improvements also hit another target 
with the same stone, which is selecting a European buyer to better serve the political goal of the 	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integrated community, for example the merger transaction between a European and US 
corporation, namely EMI1260 and Universal.1261 The transaction was approved by the Canadian, 
Japanese, New Zealand, and US authorities, but the EC required a long list of structural remedies 
which was mainly the divesture of the EMI entities in ten EU Member States and most of the 
music labels owned by EMI,1262 while they claimed that the transaction affects the EU market in 
general in addition to the markets in twenty six EU Member States.1263 
If the case was that the EC decision was only concerned about the expected 
anticompetitive behavior from the merger structure, it would be expected to negotiate the 
divesture of all the business units or operations in the EU, and may be even those outside the EU, 
but in fact the EC based the decision apparently on the reason that the required divestures are 
adequate to restore the competition in the markets to the premerger period.1264 That justification 
seems to be valid on its face, but unfortunately that was not the case because the EC does not 
have the tools that give the accurate results, like for instance to divest the assets in eleven not in 
ten EU Member States, whereas economists rightly held that there is no “systematic econometric 
evidence on the question of whether ordered remedies achieve what they are supposed to achieve 
. . . .”1265 
In the US the case was almost the same, whereas the FTC tried to cover its face by 
issuing statements on negotiating merger remedies in April 2003 and in January 2012, in both of 
the two statements the FTC tried to mention clearly its policy and best practices in	  negotiating 
merger remedies, but it was clear that they were trying to appear more efficient by requiring an 
acceptable buyer who is “competitively and financially viable,” and that to be decided by the 
FTC.1266 In that context, it was reported that since 2007 all the merger transactions in the 
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pharmaceutical industry that were cleared under remedies, the FTC required that the divesture 
should be for a certain buyer of its choice.1267 
However, those statements of the best practices and the claims therein will not resolve the 
failure of the structural remedies because the cautiousness in the acceptance of the buyer will not 
negate the said assumptions of future collusions or the planned failure, and the fact that the 
parties might sell the asset or the business units in question apart from the remedies negotiations. 
Furthermore, the structural remedies did not lead to anticompetitive behaviors in case of the 
expected collusions, in some other cases it actually lead to the loss of the expected gains from the 
whole merger transaction and accordingly losses to the total surplus in the economy. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that both the structural and behavioral remedies are 
neither effective nor efficient because both of them are missing three of the four elements of a 
good remedy, which are; (1) efficiently maintaining the same level of competition prior to the 
merger transaction, (2) minimizing the loss of the expected gains from the merger transaction, 
and (3) efficient reallocation of assets.1268 Meanwhile the only element that might be successfully 
ensured was the fourth element, which is minimizing the cost of the merger control enforcement. 
j) Time consuming 
First, it should be noted that the discussion here will be limited to the time consuming as 
a drawback of the premerger control regimes, and not with regard to the post-merger control 
regimes. As it was previously mentioned during the discussion of the merger control systems, the 
waiting time factor for the final decision of the competent authorities in the premerger control 
process is almost determined in all the systems by the antitrust laws and regulations.1269 
From a practical point of view, in most of the cases the merging parties will not obtain a 
final decision during the time that is stipulated by the antitrust laws and regulations, and literally 
in those cases the merging parties are not required to wait for more time in order to consummate 
the transaction and they can proceed to the next step. However, consummating the merger 
transaction before obtaining a final approval, might led to future enjoining of the consummated 
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merger and that might be at a significant cost for the parties, and in most of the cases it would 
cost them more than the cost of the additional waiting time. 
In addition to the timing stipulated by the antitrust laws, some authorities announced time 
standards according to it the merging parties should expect to get a final decision, according to 
those standards the time of the process fluctuates according to the complexity of the merger 
transaction. For instance the Canadian Competition Bureau issued the Fees and Services 
Standards in 2010, and updates it from time to time, according to which the filing process might 
be finished as short as fourteen calendar days in the cases of the “non-complex” transactions, and 
it might be finished in forty five calendar days in the cases of the “complex” transactions, in 
addition to the standards of period for filing, there are standards also for giving a written opinion 
on the transaction.1270 
Again those standards might be extended and the merging parties should rationally wait 
to obtain a final approval, and the case will be highly problematic if the concerned authority was 
very passive and did not respond to the premerger notification in a proper timing that fits the 
merging parties, or even not respond at all. In Egypt, as it was previously mentioned, the parties 
might resort to the courts of the State Council and challenge the passive decision of the 
authorities, and the court in those types of cases might rule for the merging parties and impose an 
obligation on the authorities to proceed in the process, and it might also grant them damages. 
It is noteworthy that the real average duration for the review process,	   according to the 
PwC Survey, ranges from two months in some cases to seventeen months in other cases.1271 
Moreover, there was an interesting finding in the PwC Survey, which was that neither correlation 
nor causality was identified between the number of jurisdictions to which the merger transaction 
was under review and the total duration of the merger control process,1272 but that does not also 
mean that merger control process will not take a longer time in a cross-border transaction. 
The problem also is more complicated in the cross-border mergers because in almost all 
of the cases the approval of more than one authority is required, some might clear it, and others 
might conditionally clear it, and even others clear conditionally but for different condition, and it 	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might be totally blocked by others. The problem is not only because of the contradicting 
decisions, but also because those different decisions probably will not be announced at the same 
time, but in fact during a period of time, during which there will be uncertainties and that 
undoubtedly that will led to losses in most of the cases.1273 
Despite the fact that the merger control authorities have different review timing, and the 
fact that the laws also determine different timing, an interesting empirical study reported that the 
review of cross-border merger transactions takes almost the same time in all the jurisdictions, but 
what might led to reaching a final decision in different times with some other external factors 
that are not related to the review process itself.1274 For instance, there might be different time 
frames for the merger process itself in the concerned jurisdictions, for example obtaining a 
foreign investment approval or national security authorization might take some time and delay 
the merger control decision. 
In all events the time is vital and very important, and it does not matter whether the 
transaction will be cleared or not, undoubtedly the time creates uncertainties, and that might 
significantly affect the daily operations of the merging parties.1275 For instance, in the event that 
the merger was cleared but after a time that exceeded the expected timing, the flow of the overall 
progress of the merger transaction will be delayed, and that will lead to uncertainties, and it 
would be a good opportunity for the competitor to attract some customers or even the employees 
of the merging parties.1276 
In addition to that, the merger control process also consumes the time of the employees of 
the merging parties, and according to the PwC Survey, which tried to identify the time spent by 
the employees who are engaged in the merger control process, the time consumed ranged from 
three hours per week, to seventy five hours per week, during the whole merger control process 
duration.1277 Finally, the time of the employees that might be consumed during the merger 
control process, starts as early as before the notification, by helping the professional advisors to 
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identify the jurisdictions that should be notified, and then in preparing and filing documents, the 
never ending meetings in order to follow-up and sometimes negotiate with the authorities for 
remedies, and that end by the last step in the merger control process, which might be before the 
courts. 
IV. Conclusion 
There are many conclusions that could be mentioned here as an outcome of the previous 
discussions, the first conclusion is that there are many incentives that drives the corporations to 
enter into merger transaction, and some of those incentives are myths and even others are 
personal and those might be considered the reasons behind the failure of some of the transaction, 
whereas measuring the success or failure of the transaction depends on what were the incentives 
of the transaction and that varies in each case. 
The second conclusion is that most of the empirical findings are not accurate enough to 
be generalized as a rule for all cases, and that the mergers might be efficient and adds to the total 
welfare if it was fixed and guided to that direction, while the success factors were improved and 
the failure factors were eliminated. The third conclusion is that there are multiple success factors 
and failure factors of the mergers, and that those factors should not be wrongfully weighted, 
because what might be categorized as having a small effect could lead to the total failure of the 
transaction and vice versa, and that could be explained under the Pareto principle of 80/20. 
The fourth conclusion was a very surprising one, which is the fact that the world in not 
that flat, because the old shibboleths and all the concerns and fears from the globalization 
monster appeared to be myths, and the fact is that the globalization process was not measured 
enough to know how far the world is actually globalized, and how humanity could benefit from 
such a process in order to improve the quality of life and the general welfare on the planet, and 
undoubtedly the more the FDI is encouraged the more the benefit will be maximized, and that 
could be achieved by means of facilitating the cross-border mergers. 
The fifth conclusion is that in addition to the complexity of the merger transaction 
dynamic that was addressed in the first part, merger transactions might face unprecedented 
amount of impediments, and thus any corporation planning to enter into any kind of transaction 
should be ready and equipped with all the tools and resources that are required not only to 
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successfully consummate the transaction but also that will lead to realize the expected gains in 
the most efficient way. 
The sixth conclusion is that not only the corporation should be interested in success of the 
mergers, but also all the members of the society should be interested in reaping the fruits of the 
general welfare, and thus they should be engaged in initiatives that serve that end. For instance 
law schools should be ready to equip their graduates with the modern comparative legal mindset 
to take on their role in cross-border transactions. Meanwhile, that does not mean that the society 
should sacrifice the employees, as almost the only drawback of successful mergers, but that the 
state should also be engaged, and its role towards the merger should be also reinvented to protect 
that sublime goal. 
The seventh conclusion is that the premerger control system is an actual impediment that 
faces the pure domestic mergers as well as the cross-border mergers, but the case is far worse in 
the latter, and that the system is full of inherent flows and drawbacks that have developed 
throughout the history, and those flaws and drawbacks of the system will at least offset some of 
the expected gains from the transaction if not all, and that is definitely at the cost of society or 
the general welfare. 
The eighth conclusion was not surprisingly in fact as much as it is important to be pointed 
out, the merger control authorities are mainly concerned with consumers protection, and even 
they are not taking into consideration accurate review standards that could lead to serving the 
consumer welfare or even the general welfare. For instance, the behavioral antitrust is a 
promising field of studies that might help the regulators to better understand the economy and 
maximize the general welfare. 
The ninth conclusion is that each jurisdiction is only concerned with its own internal 
market, as far as the issue is related to the mergers, and none are concerned with the global 
market and to the contrary the countries are encouraging the exporting cartels and 
anticompetitive behavior on the global scale as long as it will influence the internal domestic 
markets. In addition to that, the EU is very active and putting forth effort to shape and fertilize 
the domestic merger control systems across the globe according to its own system, and both of 
the EU and US are using their power to extend or impose their own preferences on merger 
transactions in different jurisdictions.  
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Chapter Three: Proposals for Reform 
The previous discussions addressed the origin of the corporation and its development 
throughout the history, and the relation between it and the state, and it also showed that cross-
border mergers might be one of the tools that could help all the society members in reaping the 
fruits of the economic growth. In addition to that, it was revealed that there are impediments that 
face the merger transactions generally and the cross-border mergers specifically, and one of 
those impediments is the merger control generally, and mainly the premerger control scheme. In 
the coming discussion the main issue that will be addressed is the possibility of adopting 
reforming proposals, in order to mitigate if not to overcome all the previously discussed 
drawbacks of the merger control system. 
It should be noted that most of the literature that discussed or even introduced proposals 
for reformation, in the merger control field, were generally limited to a great extent to the 
reformation of the antitrust rules and not merger control as an issue of its own. However few 
scholars have tried to introduce proposals for the reformation of the merger control system, and 
those proposals were mainly devoted to overcome the impediments in the field of the cross-
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border mergers. Accordingly, the coming discussion will address both kinds of those proposals, 
from a cross-border mergers perspective, whenever that is possible. The proposals that will be 
addressed could be classified under many criteria; for instance, it could be classified according to 
the number of the expected participants to the adoption of the proposal to bilateral, regional, and 
multilateral solutions. 
However, in that discussion the solutions will be classified and addressed according to its 
profoundness into two main categories, in the first category there will be procedural proposals, as 
modest solutions, which are namely: (1) jurisdictional rules, (2) common online filling system, 
and (3) mutual recognition. While in the second category there will be other proposals that are 
concerned by both the procedural and substantive aspects of the current systems, as radical 
proposals, which are namely: (1) bilateral cooperation agreements, (2) international merger 
control rules, (3) supranational premerger control institution, and finally (4) merger deregulation. 
Each one of those procedural proposals and radical proposals will be addressed in turn. 
Each proposal will be tackled from two aspects; the first aspect is the description of the 
proposal itself and any previous attempts to introduce it, if any. The second aspect to be tackled 
in each proposal is the assessment of the proposal, in order to understand to what extent those 
proposals would actually contribute to the reformation of the current merger control systems. 
Accordingly, a preliminary issue should be addressed before delving in this discussion, which is 
developing the assessment criteria that will be used in the evaluation of each one of those 
proposals. 
Firstly, the assessment criteria will be derived from the problem itself i.e. the drawbacks 
of the merger control system itself, accordingly the factors of the assessment will mainly be 
based on the previously identified drawbacks, and that means that each proposal will be assessed 
to identify its impact in solving each of those drawback. For instance the effectiveness of the 
proposal will be measured by identifying the effect of the proposal on each of the drawbacks, 
and the effect could be a negative effect; which means that the proposal will not help in 
overcoming the drawback or it will make it worse, or a positive effect; which means that the 
proposal will help to overcome the drawback or just improve the system. 
Secondly, each of the proposals will be assessed not only according to its effectiveness, 
but it will be also assessed according to the following five standards: (1) adequacy: in case that 
the proposal has positive effect, is it expected to totally resolve the issue, (2) time: the expected 
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effect will be realized instantly, (3) efficiency: does it require and additional resources more than 
the current situation to realize the expected effect, (4) fairness: are the benefits of the expected 
effect serve the interest of all the parties equally, like for instance in both the developing and the 
developed countries, and finally (5) flexibility: is the proposal flexible to overcome the drawback 
and could it be easily changed or amended in the future if required. 
To sum it up, the assessment of each of the proposals will be according to six standards; 
those five standards and in addition to that the first primary standard i.e. its effectiveness, and 
that will be assessed with regard to each of the ten drawbacks that was addressed in the previous 
part, and that means that each proposal will be tested under sixty different questions. It should be 
noted also here that regarding the answers for those sixty questions it would be more accurate 
and easier if based on the “Yes” or “No” methodology. 
To be more precise, in order to assess the proposal the following method will be applied, 
simply “Yes” will be the answer to the question in case it has a positive effect, and that will 
equal the score of one, while “No” will be the answer to the question in case of the negative 
effect, and that will score zero, and at the end of each assessment the total of all the results of the 
sixty questions will be summed up, and accordingly it would be easy to the rank the proposals 
according to their scores, in order to identify which proposal will most improve the current 
merger control systems, and consequently will facilitate the cross-border mergers. 
I. Bilateral Cooperation Agreements 
1. Proposal Description 
The bilateral cooperation agreements is one of the most cited proposals as a solution to 
overcome the problem of the multijurisdictional merger control systems that faces the cross-
border mergers, and it was simply stated as a bilateral agreement “to promote cooperation and 
coordination and lessen the possibility or impact of differences between the [p]arties in the 
application of their [merger control systems].”1278 It should be noted that this kind of bilateral 
agreements could also be devoted to the cooperation in the procedural matters, as well as the 
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provisions that enhance the cooperation in the merger control review process itself, to be more 
precise to cooperate with regard the technical issues of the process. 
In that regard, it was also claimed that the bilateral cooperation agreements is just a soft 
law instrument, and it is mainly used as one of the best alternatives for the harmonization 
mechanisms of the different laws on the international level, especially in the field of the 
enforcement of the antitrust laws.1279 Moreover, it was maintained that the EU heavily used that 
form of agreements to harmonize the antitrust laws around the globe according to its 
standards,1280 as it will be addressed shortly. On the other hand, it was correctly asserted that 
those agreements if limited to the procedural issues could be generally considered as the well-
known Mutual Legal Assistance Agreements, and nothing more than that.1281 
The bilateral cooperation agreements should encompass and address the merger control 
issue from more than one dimension, first it should address the notification mechanism that will 
be used between the authorities, second it should address the comity issues, third it should also 
address the exchange of information between the authorities, fourth it should set a mechanism to 
cooperate in the investigating the merger transaction, fifth it should address the issues of the 
mutual recognition for some of the procedural decisions and its enforcement like for example the 
request of certain documents from the parties, etc., all these issues are among other general 
issues such as the periodical meetings between the officials and the predominant national laws of 
the parties. 
One of the most important issues in that type of agreement is the issue of comity, in that 
regard two kinds of comity should identified; the negative comity means that whenever a party 
found that investigating a merger transaction is in the interest of the other party the former will 
not investigate it and leave the transaction to be investigated by the later, and the positive comity 
means that whenever a party expect that a merger transaction within the other party’s jurisdiction 
but found it will affect the former jurisdiction, that former might request from the later party to 
investigate the transaction.1282 
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In the same context, it should be noted that due to the weight of the issue the parties 
might enter into a special agreement to govern and set rules for the comity issues, for example 
the EU and the US entered into an agreement in 1998, to that effect, and in order to enhance the 
cooperation between the two parties generally. According to that agreement a broad meaning of 
the positive comity was added to the bilateral cooperation agreement and for example it become 
permissible to request the imposition of remedies to restore the expected results from the 
transaction, even in the case that the remedies were not in the same line with the rules under the 
national laws of the requesting party.1283 It was expected that the positive comity provisions in 
the bilateral cooperation agreements or the positive comity agreements will put the 
extraterritorial reach to an end,1284 while it was previously shown that that was not true. 
Another crucial issue is the exchange of information, as it was previously mentioned 
during the discussion of the privacy and data problems as a drawback of the merger control 
system.1285 In the context of the bilateral cooperation agreement, it should be noted that the issue 
was addressed in most of the cooperation agreements, for instance in the agreement between the 
EU and the US, but that literally is more than imposing an obligation on the authorities to 
provide another authority the information whenever that is permissible under the former 
authority’s national laws, and that disclosure should not even contradict with the interest of the 
disclosing authority, as it was previously addressed. 
One more dimension of the bilateral cooperation agreement is the technical assistance, 
which is simply exchanging the technical experiences between the parties to support each other 
from time to time. However, that dimension could be achieved without that kind of agreement, 
for instance it was reported that the EC is a very active party in arranging and even sponsoring 
projects to enhance the expertise of the government officials in other jurisdictions even if there 
are no cooperation agreements.1286 Meanwhile, it could be claimed that organizing and financing 
that kind of projects is not for free, and the EC is trying to fertilize the foreign jurisdictions with 
its own enforcement rules or criteria through those projects. 
As an example in that regard, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the EU offered 
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antitrust laws, under the PHARE program, and that undoubtedly led to the fact that those 
countries adopted antitrust laws similar to those adopted on the EU level.1287 That attempt is 
logically accepted on its face, because the assistance that was offered by the EU was for the 
purpose of supporting those countries to join the EU as members, but that does not exclude the 
fact that they could otherwise have the chance to join the EU without even adopting an antitrust 
laws like for instance both UK and Luxembourg are EU members but neither of them have 
adopted a premerger control systems. 
It was argued that the procedural bilateral cooperation agreement solution could be 
developed by time to form a more comprehensive solution, whereas it simply starts as a bilateral 
agreement between the competent merger and the control authorities to first improve the 
cooperation between them, but then that will inevitably led to plurilateral agreements i.e. many 
agreements each of them is concluded between a limited number of parties, and those 
agreements will include to some extent similar set of rules, and if then by time a minimum 
standards or set of merger control rules were developed and incorporated in those agreements, in 
addition to a dispute scheme, it will be considered as a complete solution to the problem.1288 
The early attempts of using the bilateral cooperation agreements as a solution could be 
traced to 1959, whereas the US investigated a “patent pool” in the Canadian radio and television 
industry that was structured to get rid of the US corporations in that industry from the Canadian 
markets, and the Canadian government reacted vigorously toward the US investigation, and that 
issue led to settle the problem by strengthening the cooperation between the two jurisdictions not 
in the form of actual bilateral agreement but under what was known at that time as the Fulton-
Rodgers Understanding of 1959.1289 
It should be noted that the solution is currently adopted in many jurisdictions, and there 
are a huge number of bilateral cooperation agreements, for example as it was previously 
mentioned that there are more than ninety cooperation agreements between the EU and other 
countries that at least include a provision in that regard if not devoted to cooperation in the 	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merger control field. Meanwhile, there have been modest attempts on the other side of the 
Atlantic from the US in that regard, whereas it has entered into agreements with only thirteen 
jurisdictions, starting with Australia in June 1982 and the EU in September 1991, and finally 
with Colombia in September 2014.1290 
In that concern it could be claimed that the sedentary policy of the US in entering into 
such bilateral cooperation agreement is attributed to the fact that the US is powerful enough to 
impose the enforcement of its decision or in other words use its extraterritorial reach. Moreover, 
that explanation is in the same line with the fact that the US limited its bilateral cooperation 
agreements to some powerful jurisdictions like Canada, the EU, Germany, and Russia, and some 
other close trade partners such as Japan and China from Asia, and Brazil, Chile, and Colombia 
from South America. 
The case was almost the same in the EU i.e. they were so selective in the jurisdictions 
that they enter into cooperation agreement with, and that was clearly announced by Jean-
Francois Pons, who was the Deputy Director General for the Competition in the EC, clearly said 
that: “[w]hile we have considered going further and concluding further bilateral agreements, we 
are not inclined to do so where it would be a waste of scarce resources, particularly for countries 
with whom we would only co-operate concerning one or two cases a year.”1291 However, that 
ideology was changed and to the contrary the EU then became very active in order to serve its 
goal of spreading the EU merger control ideas. 
Furthermore, no other jurisdictions are as active in that regard like the EU or even the 
US, for instance with regard to the MENA region, no cooperation agreements were concluded 
between any of its jurisdictions, and that was mainly attributed to the freshness of the adoption of 
antitrust systems.1292 On the other hand that claim is not accurate, because for example Egypt 
adopted its antitrust system even before the EU, but the fact is that countries in the MENA region 
are not enforcing their laws in a way that causes problems especially in the merger control field, 
and it was previously mentioned that it could be deemed as an antitrust or merger control 
heavens. 	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Finally, it should be noted here that the implementation of that kind of agreements led to 
some practical conflicts between the parties, especially in investigating merger transactions, and 
the inevitable result of that was the development of another type of instrument to settle those 
conflicts, or to be more precise to set out the best practices in cooperation between the parties of 
the cooperation agreement. For instance, best practices rules in investigating merger transactions 
was issued concerning the cooperation agreement between the EU and the US in 2002,1293 and 
more recently a similar one was issued concerning the cooperation agreement between Canada 
and the US in March 2014.1294  
2. Proposal Assessment 
Based on the addressed description and on the previous attempts to adopt the bilateral 
cooperation agreement as a proposal to improve the current	  multijurisdictional merger control 
systems, in order to overcome the drawbacks of that system, and all the improvement that could 
be added to such proposal in order to enhance it, that proposal will be assessed in the coming 
discussion, and then the discussion will be followed by a table that displays the answers to all the 
assessment question, in just “yes” or “no,” as the most simple approach and then the table will be 
followed by a chart to show the final assessment result and the percentages of the expected 
positive effect and negative effect of that proposal. 
First concerns the cost issue, the bilateral cooperation agreement is effective, whereas it 
is expected to decrease the cost of running the antitrust authorities especially in the case of 
sharing the gathered information, and reviewing the transaction in one of the two jurisdictions. In 
the case of positive comity, however it is not considered as adequate because it will not affect all 
the other factors of the merger control costs. Moreover, the cost reduction will be recognized 
instantly as soon the parties entered into the bilateral agreement. Furthermore, that proposal will 
be efficient in reducing the cost, because it will not consume additional resources to have the 
cost reduction effect. 
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Meanwhile, it is expected that not all the parties will benefit from that said cost reduction, 
for instance some countries might suffer from the costs of its obligations under the agreement, 
starting with the burden of adopting a merger control system or amending its own system to cope 
with the agreement, and even reviewing the transaction in the case of positive comity while that 
jurisdiction might not have been interested in reviewing such transaction. Moreover, that 
proposal is not flexible i.e. it will not be easily changed in order to be improved in the future 
because the renegotiating and amending of a bilateral agreement needs time and the case will be 
worse in the event of changing many bilateral agreements. 
Second is concerning the different enforcement issue, the proposal will not have any 
effect on the issue of the different enforcement that has resulted from the different goals of the 
different jurisdiction, because each party of the agreement might end up with different results, as 
it was previously shown in the cases of the contradicting results or decisions rendered by the EC 
and the US agencies despite the fact that there were cooperation agreement between them, and an 
agreed best practices in cooperation in the merger control process, and a detailed agreement 
devoted to govern the positive comity requests. 
Third is concerning the ex-ante review issue, that proposal also will not have any effect 
on the drawback of reviewing the merger transaction before it is consummated, and the merger 
control will remain an additional layer to the general antitrust investigations of the 
anticompetitive behavior of the corporations not engaged in a merger transaction, and in addition 
to that the transaction will also remain uncovered and might be enjoined at anytime even after 
“scrambled.” Fourth is concerning the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings, that 
proposal will not have any effect in that regard, and the merger control systems will continue 
exclude those valuable findings. 
Fifth is concerning the extraterritorial reach issue, the proposal might be effective, 
whereas the agreement generally and specially the positive comity provisions that could be 
incorporated therein might help to lessen the extraterritorial reach of the parties, but that it is not 
adequate as it will not put the problem to an end because not all the jurisdiction will be bound by 
the same set of rules and they might circumvent the comity rules in order to serve their own 
interests by using the means of power and imperialism. Accordingly that proposal will not be fair 
in granting its benefits to all the parties because the more powerful jurisdiction will gain over the 
less powerful jurisdiction. Moreover, that effect of the proposal could be realized instantly, but it 
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is not flexible i.e. it will not be easily changed in order to be improved in the future because the 
renegotiating and amending of a bilateral agreement needs some time and the case will be worse 
in the situation of changing many bilateral agreements. 
Sixth is concerning the foundational errors issue, nothing in that proposal will lead to 
affect those errors, because the merger control rules will remain based on the antitrust faulty 
ideologies. Seventh is concerning the political influence issue, the proposal might be effective 
and lessen the political friction of the extraterritorial reach, but it will not be adequate because it 
will not have any effect on the political influence towards the merger control systems, whereas it 
will remain the same after entering into a bilateral cooperation agreement. 
Eighth is concerning the privacy and data issue, the proposal will be effective because for 
instances gathering the data might be easier and also exchanging the information between the 
authorities might be permissible, but the proposal will not be adequate in overcoming the whole 
issue because the fact that the exchanging of the information is permissible does not negate the 
fact that the practice might be harmful and lead to losses of the parties. On the other hand all the 
parties will realize the expected effects from the proposal instantly, but it will need some 
additional resources such as enacting national domestic laws in order to realize those effects. 
Ninth is concerning the remedies issue, the proposal will not change or negate the fact 
that both the behavioral and structural remedies are missing the main preconditions that are 
required for the good effective and efficient remedy. Tenth is concerning the time consuming 
issue, that proposal might be effective and reduce the time that is required to finish the merger 
control process, but it will not be considered as adequate to overcome the issue because its effect 
on reducing the time is minimal, meanwhile the time reduction might be recognized instantly, 
and it will be fair because all the parties will benefit from the time reduction, but it is not flexible 
because it will not be easily changed in order to be improved in the future because renegotiating 
and amending a bilateral agreement needs some time and the case will be worse in the case of 
changing many bilateral agreements.  
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                    Standard 
Issue  
Effectiveness Adequacy Time Efficiency Fairness Flexibility  
Cost Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Different enforcements No No No No No No 
Ex-ante review No No No No No No 
Behavioral antitrust No No No No No No 
Extraterritorial reach  Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Foundational errors  No No No No No No 
Political influence No No No No No No 
Privacy and data issues Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Remedies No No No No No No 
Time consuming Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 2: Bilateral cooperation agreement – assessment 
As general remarks on the proposal of the bilateral cooperation agreements, as it could be 
clearly identified from the previous table, that proposal has a positive impact on only four 
drawbacks, and even that impact was not adequate in any case, and the proposal was not fair in 
almost all the cases, which means that the most powerful jurisdictions will benefit the most from 
it while the other jurisdictions are expected to suffer from losses or costs, whereas the 
administration of the expected network of cooperation agreements might consume its resources, 
in addition to that, it is expected that those bilateral cooperation agreements might be drafted in a 
way to serve the developed or the most powerful countries over the other, as an inevitable result 
of the imperialism. Moreover, that proposal is not flexible because it will not be easy to change 
it, in order to be improved upon in the future. 
Finally, and according to the result revealed in the previous table there are only thirteen 
instances during which the proposal of the bilateral cooperation agreement has a positive effect 
on the drawbacks of the current merger control systems, and there are forty seven instances 
during which the proposal has a negative effect	   on the drawbacks of the multijurisdictional 
merger control systems, which means that the proposal might improve the current situation by 
21%, as shown in the following chart. 
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Figure 14: Bilateral cooperation agreement – assessment 
II. International Merger Control Rules 
1. Proposal Description 
The proposal of the international merger control rules could be simply described as the 
adoption of a binding set of rules to govern the merger control process, and those rules are 
adopted on the international level, either under the patronage of an international institution or 
just as an international treaty. It should be noted here that the binding international set of rules 
were always proposed in the field of antitrust generally, but not with regard the merger control. 
That kind of proposal or approach to overcome the multijurisdictional contradicting systems is 
generally known as the harmonization or even the globalization of law. 
Surprisingly, and despite the fact that almost all the countries around the globe agreed to 
attack the corporations in general and to control it, the same countries do not agree on a common 
set rules on how to attack the anticompetitive behavior of those corporation,1295 as it was 
previously shown that each jurisdiction has its own different goals and different policies that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1295 Karl M. Meessen, Competition of Competition Laws, 10 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & 
BUSINESS 17, at 22 (1989). 
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serve these goals, different set of antitrust rules, different merger control regimes, and finally 
different enforcement and implementation of those rules and policies. 
In that context it was claimed that in order to adopt such a harmonized set of international 
rules in the field of antitrust three preconditions should be satisfied,1296 and those preconditions 
could be identified in the field of merger control by means of analogy as follows: (1) political 
consent on the rightfulness of the cross-border mergers and on the right of the authorities to 
control those mergers, (2) common answers to perplexing questions like for instance whether to 
opt for ex-ante or for an ex-post regime, what should be the threshold, and what technical 
standards should be used for the review, etc., and (3) the creation of an independent agency that 
decides on the cases whenever there are contradicting results in different jurisdictions. 
In addition to those preconditions, a more important preliminary condition could be 
added here, which is political will. For instance it was reported that the US is always opposing 
any attempts to harmonize the antitrust laws on the international level, and that was attributed to 
the fact that it finds it advantageous to use its own political and economic power to impose its 
own rules rather than enter into such kind of international commitment.1297 Moreover, some 
other countries are also find it better to be survive without international commitment, for 
instance Russia is one of those countries, and it was even reported that it withdrew from 
international treaties like for example its withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty in July 
2009.1298 
In addition to that most of the developing countries are skeptical about any attempts to 
adopt a harmonized law, as they considered it as an attempt to control their national systems.1299 
Furthermore, it was argued that the harmonization might lessen the benefit of the learning 
experience that could otherwise be gained from the different jurisdictions.1300 Meanwhile, and on 
the other hand, other countries are welcoming the harmonization attempts especially in the 
antitrust field, and they are even active in that regard, namely the EU.1301 As it was previously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1296 Crane, CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 397, at 151-154 (2009). 
1297 Foster, EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, supra note 1249, at 498 (2001). 
1298  RAFAEL LEAL-ARCAS, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT LAW: MULTILATERAL, REGIONAL, AND 
BILATERAL GOVERNANCE at 6 (Edward Elgar. 2011). 
1299 Sweeney, MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1284, at 385 (2004). 
1300 Henrik Horn & James Levinsohn, Merger Policies and Trade Liberalisation, 111 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 244, 
at 270 (2001). 
1301 Foster, EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, supra note 1249, at 471 (2001). 
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shown, the EU is entering into a huge number of bilateral cooperation agreements in order to set 
its own standards in that field and to become the most acceptable standards around the globe. 
It was also purported that political consent should also accompanied with social consent, 
and even the rules should be widely discussed before adopted,1302 and the discussion should be 
flexible and open to suggestions from all the stakeholders. In the same context, it was reported 
that nine groups might help in adopting new laws or set of rules in general, and those groups are: 
(1) bureaucrats and civil servants, (2) corporations, (3) elected representatives and government 
officials, (4) policy experts, (5) political parties, (6) pressure groups, (7) professional 
consultancies, (8) think tanks, and (9) supranational and regional institutions.1303 It would be 
obvious to claim that all those groups should be invited to participate in the discussions and the 
process of adopting the proposed set of rules.1304 
The proposed set of rules might cover only the merger control procedures or it might be 
expanded to encompass both the procedural and the substantive rules. In that context, it was 
claimed that limiting the rules to those dealing with the procedural issues are easier to be adopted 
on the international level, because it will reduce the costs and time of the review process and it 
will not be opposed under sovereignty claims,1305 in addition to that it will not delve into the 
debate between the different goals. Meanwhile, by limiting the scope of the proposal to the 
procedural rules the proposal will not help in overcoming the issues of contradicting decisions as 
a main result of the different substantive rules i.e. review standards. 
Accordingly, those set of rules should encompass both set of rules, but the substantive 
rules should be drafted as a “linking principles of constitutional generality, built on a strong base 
of roots-up convergence,”1306 which means that those set of rules will deal with the more general 
principles and review standards in order to draw the framework that the national laws and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1302 Kathryn Gordon, Rules for the Global Economy: Synergies Between Voluntary and Binding Approaches, No. 
1999/3 OECD WORKING PAPERS ON INTERNATIOINAL INVESTMENT, at 14 (2000). 
1303 David P. Dolowitz & David Marsh, Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary 
Policy-Making, 13 GOVERNANCE 5, at 10-11 (2000). 
1304 BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, THE RISE OF THE GLOBAL LEFT: THE WORLD SOCIAL FORUM AND BEYOND at 
183-184 (Zed Books. 2006). 
1305 Holbrook, UCLA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1062, at 370-375 
(2002); Ginsburg & Angstreich, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, supra note 776, at 230-231 (2000). 
1306 Fox, THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1165, at 13-15 (1997). 
275	  
authorities decisions will abide, and thus the national laws will continue to be applied, but the 
enforcement will be within the supremacy of the constitution like set of rules.1307 
That approach is to a great extent similar to the approach that is used in many other 
fields, like for instance in successfully harmonized rules in the field of labor rights under the 
International Labour Organization (hereinafter ILO),1308 and in the field of the IPR under the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (hereinafter TRIPS).1309 
Moreover, the proposed approach is more similar to that used in the EU directives, whereas the 
directives push down the rules to be implemented by the national authorities, and is more 
dedicated to the issues of the cross-border dimension.1310 In that context, the almost successful 
implementation of directives in the EU as a harmonized set of rules is a good example to be 
followed in the field of rule harmonization.1311 Meanwhile, it was claimed that as the proposed 
rules goes deeper to address the details of the enforcement it will be significantly difficult,1312 
and it will lose its flexibility to keep pace with the economic developments.1313 
It is noteworthy here that despite the fact that the proposed harmonized set of rules will 
induce the change from above to below not from below to above,1314 and that might be similar to 
the other policy transfer mechanisms such as the imposition and diffusion. But unlike the 
harmonization the imposition and the diffusion are not deliberate mechanisms i.e. either dictated 
by a more powerful party in the case of imposition or unconsciously imitation of that powerful 
party.1315 In that context the previously mentioned technical assistance is a good example of the 
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(2002). 
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note 763, at 84. 2005. 
1309 Sweeney, MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1284, at 418 (2004). 
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1311 Sappideen, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE, supra note 1168, at 451 (2006); Almunia, EU Merger Control has 
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1315 See generally Helge Jörgens, Governance by Diffusion: Implementing Global Norms through Cross-National 
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diffusion mechanism, and that could be achieved be means of organizing and financing 
workshops and through conferences.1316 
In the same context, it could be maintained that the proposed set of rules could be non-
binding like for instance the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers in the UK, which is 
practically binding but with no legal effect,1317 but in fact that claim is not true because in order 
to avoid any arbitrary implementation if should be binding.1318 Meanwhile, for the purpose of the 
ease of the implementation it might be more appropriate to introduce an obligation that impose a 
gradual change in the national laws to be compatible with the proposed set of rules within a 
certain period, like for instance the obligation on Russia to adopt laws that are compatible with 
those that are adopted in the EU.1319 
Accordingly, the current proposal should be implemented gradually,1320 in a progressive 
approach that begins with encouraging the different jurisdiction to adopt and enforce its national 
merger control rules, and then in the next step is to identify the common rules that are shared 
between most of them to be the base of negotiating and drafting the unified binding rules. The 
next step is to expand the scope of the unified rules to encompass the previously debated issues, 
and in the final step to adopt a dispute resolution mechanism or supranational supervisory 
institution.1321 In the same context, it was reported that while there are significant differences 
between the two main merger control systems namely of the US and the EU, there are enough 
common rules that could lead to the development of a proposed harmonized set of rules.1322 
It should be noted that determining what are the rules to be adopted, or in other words the 
selection of the set of rules that will most fit all the countries is a highly problematic task. That 
will even start from determining the authority that will carry out that task, in a democratic way 
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1317 For more details about the City Code on Takeover and Mergers see Jeffery Roberts, et al., The City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers -- An Introduction; PETTET, Company Law, supra note 125, at 393-395. 2005.  
1318 Jacqui Hatfield, Global Harmonised Standards -- Are they Achievable? (Thomson Reuters 2012).  
1319 Council and Commission Decision of 30 October 1997 on the conclusion of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and the Russian 
Federation, of the other part, Official Journal L 327, 28.11.1997, p. 1–2. 
1320 Montini, Globalization and International Antitrust Cooperation, supra note 1160, at 16. 1999. 
1321 Foster, EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, supra note 1249, at 495 (2001). 
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that is less effected by imperialism.1323 Meanwhile, it will be easier if the negotiations and the 
adoption of such set of rules are sponsored by an already established international organization, 
in that regard it was claimed that the WTO might carry out the role of introducing such set of 
rules on the international level,1324 and others held that it could be any other supranational panel, 
whether international or multinational or even regional institutions like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (hereinafter NAFTA) and the OECD.1325 
The early attempts of the harmonization or the globalization of law in general could be 
trace back to the Lax Mercatoria that was developed during the middle ages, whereas it was used 
as an international law of commerce.1326 On the other hand, with regard to the antitrust law, it 
was argued that the first attempt to introduce an international antitrust was under the patronage 
of the UN,1327 however that claim was not accurate and the first attempt was the within the 
framework of the protection of patents and other industrial property under Article l0 bis of the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1883,1328 and that article was even 
added in 1900 to the Brussels Revision of the Paris Convention.1329 
The second attempt was initiated by the US, whereas in 1945 it called for the formation 
of the International Trade Organization (hereinafter ITO), and that was under the patronage of 
the Economic and Social Council of the UN (hereinafter ECOSOC), whereas the ECOSOC 
adopted a resolution in February 1946 to draft the charter of the ITO, which was known then as 
the Havana Charter,1330 chapter V of that charter was mainly devoted to a set of unified binding 
antitrust rules, but it failed due to the opposition from the US Congress on the basis of 
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sovereignty. The US and Canada among others tried to introduce an international agency as an 
alternative to that chapter in 1953, which led Norway to suggest that the GATT take that role in 
1958, but all those efforts were to no avail.1331 
The third attempt was in 1980, at the conclusion of the UN Conference on Restrictive 
Business Practices, which was held under the patronage of the UNCTAD, the Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practice,1332 were adopted for the first time after thirty years of continuous effort.1333 Those rules 
were mainly	  devoted to a set of unified binding antitrust rules, but it failed due to the lack of a 
binding legal base, whereas it takes the form of recommendations.1334 In that context, it is 
noteworthy that efforts of the UN Conference on Restrictive Business Practices have not stopped 
until now, whereas it is held every five years to review the mentioned set of rules, which means 
that it was already met six times and the seventh is planned to take place on July 6, 2015.1335 
The fourth and the most recent attempt, is a draft of international antitrust rules that were 
prepared by a group of scholars known as the Munich Group,1336 and it was known as the Draft 
International Antitrust Code (hereinafter DIAC), and they presented their proposal i.e. the DIAC 
to the Director General of the GATT, literally the DIAC is the most comprehensive unified set of 
antitrust rules that are administrated by an autonomous institution.1337 
There were also other previous attempts to harmonize the antitrust laws but on a regional 
level, in that regard the EU cross-border merger regulation is the most notable attempt,1338 and 	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there were also some modest attempts within the trade partners of NAFTA,1339 whereas only five 
articles under Chapter 15 of the NAFTA are imposing a minimal obligation to adopt national 
antitrust rules.1340 On the other hand, with regard to the Arab countries, and despite that fact that 
almost all the members of the Arab League are considered as antitrust heavens. They did not 
implement their antitrust laws seriously, there was a draft of unified antitrust laws that were 
prepared under the patronage of the League’s Economic and Social Council,1341 and meanwhile 
there are no similar attempts on the GCC level as it was previously discussed. 
2. Proposal Assessment 
Based on the addressed description and on the previous attempts to adopt international 
merger control rules as a proposal to improve the current multijurisdictional merger control 
systems, in order to overcome the drawbacks of that system, and all the improvements that could 
be added to such proposal in order to enhance it, that proposal will be assessed in the coming 
discussion, and then the discussion will be followed by a table that displays the answers to all the 
assessment question, in just “yes” or “no,” as the most simple approach. A chart to show the final 
assessment result and the percentage of the expected positive effect and negative effect of that 
proposal will then follow a table. 
First is concerning the cost issue, the international merger control rules are expected to be 
effective with that regard, whereas it is expected to decrease the cost of running the regulatory 
authorities especially in the case of sharing the gathered information, similarly in the case of 
reviewing the transaction in only one jurisdiction under the positive comity. Meanwhile, the 
effect of the international merger rules is not considered as adequate, because it will not affect all 
the other factors of the merger control costs. Moreover, the cost reduction will take time. In order 
to be recognized each jurisdiction will need time in order to change its national law to be 
compatible with the international rules. 
In addition to that, it is expected that not all the parties will benefit from that said cost 
reduction, for instance some countries might suffer from the costs of its obligations under the 
new system, starting from the burden of adopting merger control system or amending its own 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1339 Wood, DEPAUL LAW REVIEW, supra note 1249, at 1294 (1995).  
1340 For more a general idea about the antitrust rules under the NAFTA see Trebilcock, JOURNAL OF WORLD TRADE, 
supra not 1325, at 92 (1996). 
1341 DABBAH, Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East, supra note 353, at 13. 2007. 
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system to cope with the new one, and even reviewing the merger transactions in case of positive 
comity while that might not be of the interest of the reviewing jurisdiction. 
Second is concerning the different enforcement issue, the proposal might be effective, 
whereas it could help to entirely overcome the different enforcement issues because that set of 
international rules might adopt a dispute resolution mechanism that could put the contradicting 
decisions to an end, and accordingly it is adequate to resolve the issue, but it might need time to 
settle any disputes before the competent agency or authority. Moreover, it is expected to be 
unfair because the least powerful developing countries might take into consideration the political 
and economic consequences before making a decision to enter into a dispute with a more 
powerful country, and in situations where the corporation itself will have a stand before the 
competent agency or authority, it should also do the same. 
Third is concerning the ex-ante review issue, it is not expected that the current proposal 
has any effect on the issue that the ex-ante review is considered as an extra layer to the merger 
control. Fourth is concerning the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings, the proposal is 
effective, whereas it might significantly help to overcome the drawback of the exclusion of the 
behavioral antitrust findings by taking into account those findings while drafting the new rules, 
and undoubtedly that will be adequate to overcome that drawback if it encompassed all the 
findings in that regard. Conversely that effect will take some time to be realized, at least time to 
change the national laws to be compatible with the new international rules. In addition to that, it 
is expected that all the parties will benefit from overcoming such drawback equally. 
Fifth is concerning the extraterritorial reach issue, that proposal might be effective, 
whereas it could help in completely overcoming the issue of the extraterritorial reach by 
incorporating rules to identify the competent jurisdiction to review the transaction, and it might 
also include a dispute settlement mechanism in that regard, and accordingly it will be adequate to 
resolve that issue, but that effect might take time to be realized especially to adopt national laws 
and to avoid any judicial decision to the contrary or even time to settle any disputes. Moreover, 
that proposal will not be fair in granting its benefits to all the parties because both the 
corporations and less powerful jurisdictions should take into consideration any consequences of 
entering into a dispute with more powerful jurisdictions in cases that extend its competencies 
over the cross-border merger transactions. 
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Sixth is concerning the foundational errors issue, nothing in that proposal will have an 
effect on or lead to overcome those errors, because the merger control rules will remain based on 
the antitrust faulty ideologies. Seventh is concerning the political influence issue, the proposal 
might be effective and lessen the political friction of the extraterritorial effect in addition to rent 
seeking problems because the new set of rules will be binding, but it will not be adequate 
because still the influence will not be totally eliminated and the implementation of the rules 
might be subjected to regulatory capture. Moreover, the effect of the proposal on the political 
influence issues might be realized instantly, but one more time it will not be fair because both the 
corporations and less powerful jurisdictions should take into consideration any consequences of 
entering into a dispute with more powerful jurisdictions in case in which it extend its 
competencies over the cross-border merger transactions. 
Eighth is concerning the privacy and data issue, the proposal might be effective, whereas 
for instance, gathering the data might be easier and also exchanging the information between the 
authorities might be permissible, but the proposal will not be adequate in overcoming the whole 
issue because the fact that the exchanging of the information is permissible does not negate the 
fact that the practice might be harmful and lead to losses for the parties, and in addition to that, 
realizing that modest effect will take some time, at least in order to change the national laws to 
permit the exchange of information with the other authorities. On the other hand, all the parties 
will realize the expected effects from the proposal in the same way, which means that the 
proposal is fair in that regard. 
Ninth is concerning the remedies issue, the proposal will be effective, whereas it will help 
in overcoming the remedies issue by avoiding it totally, for instance no remedies are required if 
the new system adopts the clear or block approach, and accordingly it will be also adequate, and 
the effect could be realized instantly as soon as the use of remedies is banned under the new 
rules. All the parties will realize the benefits from that change equally, which means that the 
proposal will be fair. 
Tenth is concerning the time consuming issue, that proposal might be effective, whereas 
it might reduce the time that is required to finish the multijurisdictional merger control process, 
but it will not be considered as adequate to overcome the issue because its effect on reducing the 
time is minimal. Meanwhile, the effect of the time reduction might be recognized instantly, and it 
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does require time to realize it, and in addition to that the proposal might be considered fair 
because all the parties will benefit from the time reduction equally. 
Finally, that proposal is considered as inefficient with regard to all the issues, because it 
will always require additional resources in case where it is effective, and that is either due to the 
changing of the national law and enforcement systems or to benefit from the rules itself, like for 
instance to overcome the different enforcement drawback by using the dispute settlement 
mechanism. In addition to that, the proposal is also considered as not flexible with regard to all 
the issues, because it cannot be easily changed for improvement in the future, because the 
renegotiating and amending that set of international rules and the national laws will face 
difficulties and at least it will need some time. 
                 Standard 
Issue 
Effectiveness Adequacy Time Efficiency Fairness Flexibility  
Cost Yes No No No No No 
Different enforcements Yes Yes No No No No 
Ex-ante review No No No No No No 
Behavioral antitrust Yes Yes No No Yes No 
Extraterritorial reach  Yes Yes No No No No 
Foundational errors  No No No No No No 
Political influence Yes No Yes No No No 
Privacy and data issues Yes No No No Yes No 
Remedies Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Time consuming Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Table 3: International merger control rules – assessment 
As general remarks on the proposal of the bilateral cooperation agreements, as it could be 
clearly identified from the previous table, that the proposal has a positive impact on almost all 
the drawbacks except for the foundational errors of the antitrust ideology. The effect is adequate 
in most of the cases, most of the effects need time to be realized and it is fair in some cases while 
unfair in others. Moreover, that proposal is not flexible because it will not easily be changed, and 
it is not efficient because it always needs additional resources in order to adopt new merger 
control regimes or even amend the existing one, as it was previously mentioned. 
Finally, and according to the result revealed in the previous table there are only nineteen 
instances during which the proposal of the international merger control rules has a positive effect 
on the drawbacks of the current merger control systems, and there are forty one instances during 
which the proposal has a negative effect on the drawbacks of the multijurisdictional merger 
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control systems, which means that the proposal might improve the current situation by 32%, as 
shown in the following chart. 
Figure 15: International merger control rules – assessment 
III. Supranational Premerger Control Institution 
1. Proposal Description 
The proposal of supranational institution could be simply described as the adoption of a 
unified set of premerger control rules. To create an independent supranational premerger control 
institution to enforce and administer those rules over the cross-border merger transactions that 
proposal could be adopted through a new international agreement or by the means of making use 
of one of the already existed international institutions like for instance the WTO, or one of the 
UN agencies for example the UNCTAD, the OECD or the ICN, and according to that proposal, 
the national authorities role will be limited to act as a national enforcement arm for that 
supranational institution. 
That proposal is based on the fact that the harmonization of the laws through a unified set 
of international rules is not effective enough to overcome the drawback of the multijurisdictional 
merger control systems, because the enforcement of such unified rules by the different 
32%	  
68%	  
Positive	  effect	   Negative	  effect	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authorities will lead to contradiction or at least different results, and that will not overcome those 
drawbacks, and it might be considered as “convergence” not a true harmonization. On the other 
hand in order to achieve the true harmonization benefits the enforcement of those set of unified 
rules should be carried out by an independent institution on the international level, in other 
words, that proposal should address the three components of the harmonization; the procedural 
issues the substantive issues, and the institutional issues.1342 
Despite the fact that the supranational institution will be more efficient to carry out the 
merger control task, and creating such a institution will lead to uncountable benefits such as: (1) 
economy of scale regarding the review process,1343 (2) eliminate the extraterritorial reach, (3) 
eliminating any chance for nationalistic atavism, and (4) decrease the uncertainty rate due to the 
expected uniform application of the unified rules,1344 it is expected unfortunately that the creation 
of the proposed supranational institution could face strong opposition. 
The first and most important ground for opposition is that creating the proposed 
supranational institution will disturb the international political order which is based on the old 
notion of sovereignty,1345 which was established under the treaties of the Peace of Westphalia in 
1648,1346 whereas it was claimed that the parties would lose their control over the merger review 
on the national level without even realizing any actual gains.1347 However, that assertion could 
easily be refuted, whereas retaining the current merger control regimes that are mainly 
characterized by its extraterritorial reach is already contradicting with the sovereignty claims. 
Moreover, the parties will not lose its sovereignty at any time because it could withdraw 
from whatever instrument that was used to create the supranational institution, at any time. 
Furthermore, and to cut it short sovereignty is a relative concept that has its own limitations, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1342 Crane, CHICAGO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 397, at 151, 156 (2009). 
1343 Holbrook, UCLA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 1062, at 361 (2002). 
1344 Ginsburg & Angstreich, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, supra note 776, at 223 (2000). 
1345 For an excellent detailed discussion about the sovereignty and the international antitrust policies see DABBAH, 
The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 139-158. 2003, citing all the previous literature on the 
same topic most notably: Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer Sovereignty: A United Theory of Antitrust 
and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 713 (1997); Susan Beth Farmer, Altering the Balance 
Between State Sovereignty and Competition: The Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Antitrust State Action Immunity 
Doctrine, 23 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 1043 (1997); Susan Beth Farmer, Balancing State 
Sovereignty and Competition: An Analysis of the Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Antitrust State Action Immunity 
Doctrine, 42 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW 111 (1997); Joseph P. Griffin, When Sovereignties May Collide: In the 
Antitrust Area, 20 CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL 91 (1994); Steven L. Snell, Controlling Restrictive 
Business Practices in Global Markets: Reflections on the Concepts of Sovereignty, Fairness, and Comity, 33 
STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 215 (1997). 
1346 PAPADOPOULOS, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, supra note 181, at 47. 2010. 
1347 Ginsburg & Angstreich, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, supra note 776, at 225 (2000). 
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which means that it should be exercised within its framework and with the total respect of others’ 
sovereignties i.e. within the rules of the public international law, and finally to sum it up any 
harm to “sovereignty [should be] horizontal, not vertical,” and that undoubtedly means that when 
the countries are granting a supranational institution delegation or power those countries will not 
relinquish their sovereignties on the horizontal level.1348 
In that context, it was maintained the countries are responding differently to the 
unification of each of the three components of the harmonization, whereas the procedural issues 
are the easiest issues to be unified because it seem to has a modest sovereignty concerns, while 
the substantive issues might trigger more serious sovereignty concerns from most of the 
jurisdictions, and finally the institutional issues will seem as a significant threat to 
sovereignty.1349 It is noteworthy here that limiting the proposal of the supranational institution to 
a dispute resolution agency, as was suggested by ICPAC in its report.1350 This idea might not 
find the same magnitude of opposition but it will also only address some drawbacks and while 
ignoring most of the others. 
Furthermore, it was claimed that the best approach to adopt such a kind of proposal is the 
spill-over approach as explained under the neofunctionalism theory,1351 which mainly utilizes the 
successful creation of the EU as an example to design hypotheses that work for other regional or 
supranational institutions. Whereas according to the spill-over effect the initial task is granted to 
a supranational institution and then the economic interests of the parties of the institution will 
drive the institution to expand its tasks, and the parties representatives in institution or its 
employees will be more involved and engaged until they are “creating their own logic” that 
support their existence and power.1352 
The second possible ground for opposition might be the fact that while the transaction 
might have a precompetitive effect in a jurisdiction but conversely at the same time have an 
anticompetitive effect in another jurisdiction, and in such cases that might lead to one of the two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1348 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 146-147. 2003. 
1349 Crane, Chicago Journal of International Law, supra note 397, at 157 (2009). 
1350 The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of Justice, final report to the 
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, on February 28, 2000, at 57. 
1351 Neofunctionalism was built on the works of the German political scientist Ernst Bernard Haas (1924 – March 6, 
2003), for more details about neofunctionalism and the spill-over theory see Ernst B. Haas, International 
Integration: The European and the Universal Process, 15 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 366 (1961); Rafael Leal-
Arcas, Theories of Supranationalism in the EU, 8 THE JOURNAL OF LAW IN SOCIETY 88(2007). 
1352 Haas, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 1351, at 372 (1961). 
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possibilities; the first it to clear the transaction and that will not be considered as fair, at least 
from the perspective of the jurisdiction that expected to suffer losses from that transaction, and 
the second is to block the transaction and that also will be considered as unfair from the stance of 
the jurisdiction that is expecting to gain from that transaction.1353 In other words, it might be 
expected, according to those claims that the supranational institution will most probably opt for 
the second option and will end up settling the cross-border transactions based on the “lowest 
common denominator” of the interests of the concerned jurisdictions. 
However, the case might not be that bad, because the institution might make use of some 
economic principles in order to lessen the harm that is expected to affect all the parties. For 
instance, according the Pareto Efficiency principle,1354 the supranational institution might decide 
to clear the transaction in a way that will not cause any harm to any jurisdiction and in the same 
time the other jurisdictions will still gain efficiency by using both kinds of remedies. For 
example, if both kinds of remedies are not enough to avoid any harm or to ensure gaining 
efficiencies the institution might use the Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency principle,1355 according to 
which the parties who experience gains should be willing to compensate the parties who suffer 
losses, and that might be similar to the idea of “incentive contracts,”1356 which was previously 
addressed during the discussion of the remedies as a drawback of the merger control systems.1357 
Running the proposed supranational institution requires funds, and despite the fact the 
some of the cost that will be saved from running the national premerger control will be offset by 
the costs required to run the proposed institution. The filing fees could significantly contribute to 
granting the continuous smooth running of the institution, as it was previously shown that some 
national authorities depend mainly on the filing fees. In that context, it was suggested that such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1353 Ginsburg & Angstreich, ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL, supra note 776, at 226 (2000). 
1354 The Pareto Efficiency principle was named after the Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto, for more details about the 
Pareto Efficiency principle see generally Vijay K. Mathur, How Well Do We Know Pareto Optimality?, 22 THE 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION 172 (1991). 
1355 The Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency principle was named after both the economists Nicholas Kaldor and John Hicks, 
for more details about the Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency principle see generally PETER NEWMAN, THE NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW at 417-421 § 2 (Palgrave Macmillan. 2002); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare 
Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 549 (1939); J. R. 
Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, see id. at 696. 
1356 The incentive contracts was first suggested by Gregory J. Werden (Senior Economic Counsel at the Antitrust 
Division in the DOJ) and other scholars in their article Werden, et al., Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research 
Papers, supra note 1257, (2005). 
1357 See supra p.252.  
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institution could be financed by the member states in a way similar to the UN system, and that 
could be in addition to a scaled filing fees according to the volume of the transaction.1358 
One more important question here should be whether the proposed institution would have 
jurisdiction over all the merger transactions or only the cross-border mergers; in that regard it 
was claimed, in the field of harmonizing contract laws, that limiting the harmonization solution 
to the cross-border transactions is considered a vital contribution to solve the problem.1359 
Despite the fact that limiting the proposal to cross-border mergers might be limiting its benefits, 
but in the meantime it will avoid some other drawbacks if it is extended to encompass all the 
transactions, for instance it will be difficult if not impossible to review such huge amount of 
transactions by just one institution, which will definitely increase the process time. In addition to 
that, in most of the pure domestic transaction the international link or dimension that could 
justify the referral to the proposed international institution will be missing. 
It should be noted that the proposal here is not about a regional institution, whereas a 
regional institution will not help in overcoming the multijurisdictional merger control systems 
even if it is a successful institution, and the existence of the EC is proof of that. Meanwhile the 
formation of the proposed supranational institution might benefit from the efforts that are already 
done on many regional levels. In that context, some might think that the EC is the only example 
while the fact is to the contrary and there are many efforts that are already in place,1360 but it 
might be the most successful and powerful regional merger control system. 
The most cited forum to carry out the task of the international antitrust tasks is the WTO, 
and in that regard many reasons were cited, and those reasons start by mentioning that the 
Havana Charter was an attempt to create the ITO as it was already addressing the antitrust issues, 
followed by the Uruguay round,1361 and finally the Doha round,1362 as it was previously shown as 
a response to the contradicting decision between the EU and the US. In addition to those reasons, 
the success of the WTO breeds confidence in its system, for instance the success of negotiating 
and adopting the TRIPS was consider an indicator to the success of similar future attempts in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1358 Hunt, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS, supra note 709, at 164 (2007). 
1359 Commission European, Green Paper from the Commission on Policy Pptions for Progress Towards a European 
Contract Law for Consumers and Businesses, (2010). 
1360 For a list of more than fifteen regional communities that already adopts antitrust provision see DABBAH, 
Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East, supra note 353, at 325. 2007. 
1361 Daniel Steiner, The International Convergence of Competition Laws, 24 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL 577, at 614 
(1997). 
1362 Fisher, STANFORD JOURNAL OF LAW, BUSINESS, AND FINANCE, supra note 1020, at 331-332 (2009). 
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closely related fields i.e. the antitrust and the TRIPS.1363 In the same line, the opponents towards 
the selection of the WTO as forum for the supranational institution agreed that the harmonized 
set of rules could be adopted under its patronage but the enforcement should be left to the 
national institutions.1364 
Moreover, the WTO even has a good experience in reviewing the antitrust policies, 
whereas it reviewed all the antitrust policies that are submitted by the countries as during the 
accession procedures.1365 Furthermore, it was over-cited that the WTO has a well-designed 
dispute settlement mechanism,1366 and that even the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO 
(hereinafter DSU) was already engaged in antitrust disputes, at least for one time, and that was 
based on a complaint from the US against Mexico. The DSU established a panel in that regard 
and the panel submitted its report on April 2, 2004,1367 and the parties then reached an agreement 
on June 1, 2004 to comply with the report findings.1368 
The OECD is amidst the institutions that were suggested to take on the role of the 
supranational antitrust institution. Some argued that the limited membership of the OECD to the 
most industrialized trading countries is an advantage because all of them already have antitrust 
rules in place;1369 meanwhile its agenda and funding sources might lead to a fear of bias towards 
its founding developed countries, at least from the developing countries point of view.1370 
Accordingly, it is not surprisingly that the US is promoting the selection of the OECD to adopt 
such proposal,1371 but was surprising is that it is not the stance of EU. 
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1364 The International Competition Policy Advisory Committee, U.S. Department of Justice, final report to the 
Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust, on February 28, 2000, at 278-279. 
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Secretariat, WT/ACC/1 (95-0651), Mar. 24, 1995, § II (2) (e), a copy of the note is available on the official website 
of the WTO at last http://ecampus.wto.org/admin/files/ACC/E/M1/WTACC1.pdf visited on October 1, 2014. 
1366 Hunt, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS, supra note 709, at 163 (2007); Ernst-
Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for the GATT-MTO World Trade and Legal Systemx, 27 
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1368  For more a summary of the dispute timeline visit the WTO official website at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds204_e.htm last visited on October 1, 2014, and for a more 
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1371 Foster, EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, supra note 1249, at 500 (2001). 
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In that context, it was reported that the EU opposes the OECD as a proposed forum for 
international antitrust law for the same reasons of unfairness or biases toward the developed 
countries, despite the fact that it members belongs to the developed countries, and in addition to 
that reason the EU also opposes the OECD on the ground of it missing a dispute settlement 
mechanism.1372 The EU justification is not convincing, and it could be claimed here that use of 
the over-cited lack of the dispute settlement mechanism and the unreasonable fear of bias against 
the developing countries is plainly to justify its stance against the suggestion that supported by 
the US, and that might be because the EU does not have a better weightiness in the OECD over 
the US. 
It should be pointed out here that the fact is that the lack of the dispute settlement 
mechanism is over-cited not only with regard to the OECD, but also for all the other proposed 
institution,1373 with the exception of the WTO because it has a dispute settlement mechanism in 
place. However, the efforts required to create a new dispute settlement mechanism, similar to 
that of the WTO or even a more enhanced mechanism, is not comparable to the efforts required 
to adopt the proposal of the supranational merger control institution. Therefore, it could be 
claimed that the lack of the dispute settlement mechanism is not a prerequisite to adopt the 
proposal, while it is still a precondition to the success of the institution in carrying out its tasks. 
Despite the fact that the UNCTAD has made continuous efforts in the field of the 
international antitrust rules, as it was previously shown during the discussions of the proposal of 
the international merger control rules,1374 it was not often suggested to be a supranational 
premerger control institution.1375 Regardless of the fact this effort is not binding, the developed 
countries did not show tolerance towards this effort under the umbrella of the UNCTAD, 
because combing the two roles of supporting the development and guarding the competitiveness 
in the market might be led “schizophrenia,”1376 in other words the developed countries fear the 
bias treatment towards the developing countries.1377 
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1374 See supra p.272. 
1375 Steiner, MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL, supra note 1361, at 604 (1997). 
1376  Mark R. Joelson, Harmonization: A Doctrine for the Next Decade, 10 NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 133, at 138 (1989). 
1377 Foster, EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, supra note 1249, at 497-498 (2001). 
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The ICN also could be a possible forum, whereas it was mainly founded as a gathering 
venue for all the antitrust authorities around the globe, and despite the fact that the ICN does not 
have any binding authority over its members, no one can ignore its role in the development of the 
antitrust rules around the globe, at least when compared to role of the WTO.1378 It should be 
noted here that despite that non-binding nature of the ICN most of its members are showing at 
least some readiness to be part of progress in the field of merger review, for instance Charles A. 
James, who was Assistant Attorney General in charge of the DOJ antitrust division in 2002, 
clearly stated that: “if we are true to our calling, we will identify new ways in which we can 
work together to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of merger review around the 
world.”1379 
Furthermore, it was also reported the EC commissioner Mario Monti was also an 
important proponent to the creation of the ICN.1380 In addition to the general framework of the 
ICN, it has a special working group for the merger control issues and its main task is to enhance 
the merger control rules in order to eliminate uncertainties in the process, and it is already 
working on two of the three dimension of the real harmonization, namely the procedural and the 
substantive issues,1381 which means that the ICN is just missing the third	  institutional dimension 
to some extent, because it already has some sort of structure, at least a de facto presence within 
the international community. 
Finally, it should be noted that the proposal of the supranational premerger control 
institution could be implemented under the patronage of any of those institution, and it is not a 
prerequisite that the same institution carry out the task itself, but it could be just a forum for 
discussion, because the discussion itself is a vital issue, as it was previously mentioned that it 
should be a political willingness to understand that there are drawbacks of the current 
multijurisdictional merger control systems and any unilateral solution will not work, and then 
they decide to select the most appropriate venue for the implementation of the proposal itself. In 
the same context, it is undoubtedly true that even the corporation or at least multinational 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1378 Hunt, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS, supra note 709, at 160-161 (2007). 
1379 Charles A. James, Guiding Principles and Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review at 8 
(U.S. Department of Justice 2002). 
1380 PAPADOPOULOS, The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy, supra note 181, at 249. 2010. 
1381 DABBAH, The Internationalisation of Antitrust Policy, supra note 9, at 256-257. 2003. 
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corporations should be represented and has a role in the discussion because they are a party to 
the issue.1382 
2. Proposal Assessment 
Based on the addressed description of the proposal to adopt a supranational premerger 
control institution, as an attempt to improve the current multijurisdictional merger control 
systems, in order to overcome the drawbacks of that system, that proposal will be assessed in the 
coming discussion, and then the discussion will be followed by a table that displays the answers 
to all the assessment question, in just “yes” or “no,” as the most simple approach and then table 
will be followed by a chart to show the final assessment result and the percentage of the expected 
positive effect and negative effect of that proposal. 
First is concerning the cost issue, the creation of the supranational institution is expected 
to be effective with that regard, whereas it is expected to decrease the cost of running the 
national regulatory authorities because it will take on the role of reviewing all the cross-border 
transactions and it will not be reviewed in more than one jurisdiction, but it is not considered as 
adequate because it will not influence all the other factors of the merger control costs and even 
its creation requiring funding. Meanwhile, the cost reduction will not take time and will be 
realized instantly, and it will be fair because all the parties will benefit from that said cost 
reduction. 
Second is concerning the different enforcement issue, the supranational institution 
proposal is considered effective, whereas it will help to entirely overcome the different 
enforcement issues because that it will adopt a unified set of international rules and a dispute 
resolution mechanism that could put any decisions regarding its own competency to an end, and 
accordingly it is adequate to resolve the issue, the expected effect could be realized instantly 
upon the creation of the	   institution. Meanwhile, the expected effect will not be realized fairly 
because as was previously mentioned it will not be easy for the institution to decide in cases 
where some parties are expecting gains while other might experience losses. 
Third is concerning the ex-ante review issue, the proposal of the	  supranational institution 
will not have any effect, whereas it will be mainly created to be a premerger control authority. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1382 Philip Lowe, Keynote Address, 14 GEORGE MASON LAW REVIEW 871, at 876 (2007). 
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Fourth is concerning the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings, the proposal might be 
effective, whereas it could take into consideration those findings either in the unified rules or 
during the merger review process, and undoubtedly that will be adequate to overcome that 
drawback, and the effect will be realized instantly upon the creation of the institution. In addition 
to that, it is expected that all the parties will benefit from overcoming such drawback equally i.e. 
the proposal is expected to be fair in that regard. 
Fifth is concerning the extraterritorial reach issue, that proposal will be effective, whereas 
clear rules will identify its competency to review the cross-border mergers, and it might also 
include a dispute settlement mechanism in that regard, and accordingly it will be adequate to 
resolve that issue, and that effect will be realized instantly upon the creation of the institution. 
Moreover, that supranational institution proposal is expected to be fair in granting its benefits 
with regard to overcoming the extraterritorial reach issues to all the parties equally. 
Sixth is concerning the foundational errors issue, nothing in that proposal will have an 
effect on or lead to overcome the those errors, because the premerger control rules will remain 
based on the antitrust faulty ideologies. Seventh is concerning the political influence issue, the 
proposal will be effective and eliminate the political friction of the extraterritorial effect in 
addition to rent seeking problems because the new set of rules will be binding and will be 
administered by a supranational authority, and accordingly it is considered as adequate. 
Moreover, the effect of the proposal on the political influence issues might be realized instantly, 
and it will be fair in granting its benefits with regard to the overcoming of the political influence 
issues to all the parties equally. 
Eighth is concerning the privacy and data issues, the proposal might be effective, whereas 
for instance, the exchanging of information between the authorities might be permissible and 
regulated by the unified set of rules, but the proposal will not be adequate in overcoming the 
whole issue because the fact that the exchanging of the information is permissible does not 
negate the fact that the practice might be harmful and led to losses to the parties, and in addition 
to that, realizing that effect will take some time at least in order to change the national laws to 
permit the exchange of information with the proposed supranational institution. On the other 
hand, all the parties will realize the expected results from the proposal in the same way, which 
means that the proposal is fair in that regard. 
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Ninth is concerning the remedies issues, the proposal of the supranational institution will 
not be effective in that regard, whereas if the institution is conducting a premerger control and it 
needs at least one type of remedy in order to clear the transaction that is expected to be efficient 
in certain jurisdictions, and in the same time will restore any expected harm to other jurisdiction 
from the same transaction. 
Tenth is concerning the time consuming issue, that proposal of the supranational 
institution might be effective, whereas it might reduce the time that is required of the premerger 
control process, but it will not be considered as adequate to overcome the issue because there 
still are time requirements to finish the process and get a final decision. Meanwhile, the effect of 
the time reduction might be recognized instantly, and it does require time to realize it, and in 
addition to that the proposal might be considered fair because all the parties will benefit from the 
time reduction equally. 
Finally, that proposal of the supranational institution is considered as inefficient with 
regard to almost all the issues, because it will always require additional resources in case it is 
effective, and that is mainly because of the additional funding required to create and run the 
institution. In addition to that, the proposal is also not flexible with regard to all the issues, 
because it will not be easily to be changed to be improved in the future, because the renegotiating 
and amending the international agreement that created the institution and the unified set of rules 
will face difficulties and at least be time consuming. 
                   Standard 
Issue 
Effectiveness Adequacy Time Efficiency Fairness Flexibility  
Cost Yes No Yes No No No 
Different enforcements Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Ex-ante review No No No No No No 
Behavioral antitrust Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Extraterritorial reach  Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Foundational errors  No No No No No No 
Political influence Yes Yes Yes No Yes No 
Privacy and data issues Yes No No No Yes No 
Remedies No No No No No No 
Time consuming Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Table 4: Supranational institution – assessment 
As general remarks on the proposal of the supranational institution, it could be clearly 
identified from the previous table that proposal has a positive impact on most of the drawbacks, 
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but the effect is not adequate in many of those cases. Meanwhile the effects are almost realized 
instantly and it does need time to be realized, and it is fair in some cases while unfair in other. 
Moreover, the proposal is not flexible because it will not be easy to change, and it is not efficient 
because it will always need additional resources in order to fund the creation and running of the 
institution, as it was previously discussed. 
Finally, and according to the result revealed in the previous table there are only twenty 
two instances during which the proposal of the supranational premerger control institution has a 
positive effect on the drawbacks of the current merger control systems, and there are thirty eight 
instances during which the proposal has a negative effect on the drawbacks of the 
multijurisdictional merger control systems, which means that the proposal might improve the 
current situation by 37%, as shown in the following chart. 
Figure 16: Supranational institution – assessment 
IV. Procedural Proposals 
The following proposals could be considered as minimal proposals because they are all 
tackling the drawback from a procedural perspective, and those kinds of procedural proposals 
could be adopted more easily than other proposals encompassing substantive issues, and that is 
37%	  
63%	  
Positive	  effect	   Negative	  effect	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from both aspects i.e. the negotiation as well the drafting. Meanwhile, that does not mean or 
indicate any weight of any of them, whereas each of those proposals might contribute to 
overcome the drawbacks of the current multijurisdictional premerger control systems as is 
similar to the other proposals encompassing the substantive issues. 
1. Jurisdictional Rules 
a) Proposal Description 
The proposal of the jurisdictional rules is simply tackling the drawbacks of the current 
multijurisdictional merger control systems from the private international law perspective, 
whereas a set of rules will be adopted to define the jurisdiction that will review and decide on the 
cross-border merger transaction, and those set of rules could be adopted through an international 
agreement under the patronage of one of the international institution. However, it could be more 
appropriate if the adoption of such rules was under the patronage of the Hague Conference on 
Private International Law, which is a multilateral organization specialized in the cooperation in 
the cross-border civil and commercial matters, to be more precise it specializes in the 
harmonization of the rules of private international law.1383 
It should be noted that this proposal was not suggested before in literature as a solution to 
overcome the drawback of the multijurisdictional merger control systems, but it was developed 
by a way of analogous from a previous proposal concerning the harmonization of the private 
international law rules, and that proposal was mainly for the purpose of solving the problem of 
determining the nationality of the corporation, and whether it is a foreign or national corporation, 
and to determine the applicable law on the merger transaction.1384 Meanwhile, the current 
proposal of jurisdictional rules addresses the issue of determining the jurisdiction that will 
review and decide on the cross-border merger transaction, either as the most connected 
jurisdiction to the transaction or the most affected jurisdiction, or any other criteria the parties of 
the international agreement may opt for. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1383 The Hague Conference on Private International Law encompasses more than 140 countries, and for more 
information about it visit its official website at http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=text.display&tid=26 last 
visited on October 1, 2014.  
1384 Mathias M. Siems, The European Directive on Cross-Border Mergers: An International Model?, 11 COLUMBIA 
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN LAW 167, at 167-168, 176 (2005). 
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Finally, it is undoubtedly true that negotiating and drafting the details of this proposal is 
problematic, and it might not be easy to get an international consensus in order to be a workable 
proposal. In addition to that, and in order to ensure the precise and accurate implementation of 
those jurisdictional rules, a dispute settlement scheme should be adopted, and that could be done 
through creating a new institution for that purpose or even to grant one of the already existing 
institutions the right to deciding on such disputes, like the DSU	  for instance. 
b) Proposal Assessment 
Based on the addressed description of the jurisdictional rules control as a proposal to 
improve the current multijurisdictional merger control systems, that proposal will be assessed in 
the coming discussion, and then the discussion will be followed by a table that displays the 
answers to all the assessment question, in just “yes” or “no,” as the most simple approach and 
then a table will be followed by a chart to show the final assessment result and the percentage of 
the expected positive effect and negative effect of that proposal. 
First is concerning the cost issue, the proposal is expected to be effective with that regard, 
whereas it is expected to decrease the cost of running the regulatory authorities because it is 
expected to review the transaction by only one jurisdiction, but it is not considered as adequate 
because it will not affect all the other factors related to the merger control costs. Moreover, the 
cost reduction will be realized instantly after adopting such rule without requiring any additional 
resources, and it is expected that all the parties will benefit from that said cost reduction equally. 
Second is concerning the different enforcement issue, the proposal will be effective, 
whereas it will help to entirely overcome the different enforcement issues because that set of 
jurisdictional rules will identify a single authority to decide on the transaction, and accordingly 
that effect is also adequate. Meanwhile, it might be inefficient to overcome that drawback 
because it might require additional resources to run the dispute resolution mechanism that will 
resolve the disputes regarding the contradicting decisions on which authority is competent, and 
accordingly it is expected to be unfair because the least powerful countries will take into 
consideration the political and economic consequences before making a decision to enter into a 
dispute with a more powerful country, and in the case that a corporation itself will have a stage 
to settle the disputes it should also do the same. 
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Third is concerning the ex-ante review issue, the proposal might not have any effect on 
the issue of that the ex-ante review as it is considered an extra layer to the merger control 
because that set of rules might lead to changes in the national systems that adopt a premerger 
control regime. Fourth is concerning the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings, the 
proposal will also not have any effect on the national systems that exclude the	   behavioral 
antitrust findings. 
Fifth is concerning the extraterritorial reach issue, that proposal will be effective, whereas 
its main purpose is to completely overcome the issue of extraterritorial reach by identifying the 
competent jurisdiction that will review the transaction, and accordingly it will be adequate to 
resolve that issue, and that will be realized instantly upon adopting those rules. Meanwhile, it 
will be inefficient in some cases because it might require additional resources to run the dispute 
resolution mechanism that will resolve the disputes regarding the contradicting decisions on 
which authority is competent, and accordingly it is expected to be unfair, as it was just 
previously shown during the discussion of the different enforcement issue.1385 
Sixth is concerning the foundational errors issue, nothing in that proposal will have an 
effect on or lead to overcome the those errors, because the merger control rules will remain 
based on the antitrust faulty ideologies. Seventh is concerning the political influence issue, the 
proposal might be effective and lessen the political friction of the extraterritorial effect, but it 
will not be adequate because there still is influence and that will not be totally eliminated and the 
national merger control rules and the review standards might be effected by the problems of rent 
seeking and the regulatory capture. Meanwhile, the effect of the proposal on the political 
influence might be realized instantly, without requiring any additional resources, and will be 
realized equally to all the parties. 
Eighth is concerning the privacy and data issue, the proposal might be effective, whereas 
for instance, there will not be a reason to exchange information between the authorities, but the 
proposal will not be adequate in overcoming the whole issue because it will change the fact that 
the practice might be harmful and lead to losses for the parties of the transaction, but that effect 
will be realized instantly and will not require any additional resources to be realized, and all the 
parties will realize the expected effects in the same way, which means that the proposal is fair 
concerning the privacy and date issue. 	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Ninth is concerning the remedies issue, the proposal will be not have any effect in that 
regard, because the remedies are a substantive issue of the national laws. Tenth is concerning the 
time consuming issue, that proposal might be effective, whereas it will reduce the time that is 
required to finish the merger control process to the time of the process in only one jurisdiction, 
but it will not be considered as adequate to overcome the issue because the process will still take 
time to be finished. Meanwhile, the effect of the time reduction might be recognized instantly 
upon adopting the rules, and it will require additional resources to realize that effect, and in 
addition to that the proposal might be considered fair because all the parties will benefit from the 
time reduction equally. 
                   Standard 
Issue 
Effectiveness Adequacy Time Efficiency Fairness Flexibility  
Cost Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Different enforcements Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Ex-ante review No No No No No No 
Behavioral antitrust No No No No No No 
Extraterritorial reach  Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Foundational errors  No No No No No No 
Political influence Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Privacy and data issues Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Remedies No No No No No No 
Time consuming Yes No Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 5: Jurisdictional rules – assessment 
As general remarks on the proposal of the jurisdictional rules, as it could be clearly 
identified from the previous table, the proposal has a positive impact on many of the drawbacks, 
but the effect is not adequate in most of the cases, but on the other hand whenever it is effective 
it does not need time in order to be realized. Meanwhile, the effects will not be realized to all the 
parties fairly in many of the cases, and the proposal is not flexible, because it will not easily be 
changed, and it is not efficient in some cases because additional resources might be required to 
settle any disputes concerning the implementation of the rules. 
Finally, and according to the result revealed in the previous table there are only twenty 
two instances during which the proposal of the jurisdictional rules has a positive effect on the 
drawbacks of the current merger control systems, and there are thirty eight instances during 
which the proposal has a negative effect on the drawbacks of the multijurisdictional merger 
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control systems, which means that the proposal might improve the current situation by 36%, as 
shown in the following chart. 
Figure 17: Jurisdictional rules – assessment 
2. Common Online Filing System 
a) Proposal description 
The proposal of the common online filing system could be simply described as the 
adoption of one filing system that is a comprehensive an harmonized notification form, filing 
procedures, and filing time, and that the common online filing system should be adopted on the 
international level i.e. in all jurisdictions around the globe. The proposed common online filing 
system could be adopted through an international agreement and administered autonomously in 
each jurisdiction, or it might be administrated through a supranational agency, that supranational 
agency could receive all the notifications and review the formalities and then feed them into the 
national systems in order to review the transaction itself.1386 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1386 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 463. 2010. 
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It should be noted that the proposal of the common filling system was already suggested 
by some scholars in the literature, and in addition to that it was also suggested on the institutional 
level by some institutions like for instance the OECD published a report that suggested the 
adoption of a common filing system,1387 and the American Bar Association (hereinafter ABA), 
whereas the ABA issued a report in 1991 on the international merger control systems and it 
which it suggested the adoption of harmonized filing requirements and timing as a solution to 
overcome the multijurisdictional merger control system.1388 
It was reported that there was a previous attempt, in September 1996, to adopt a 
harmonized filing form and procedures in France, Germany, and UK, but unfortunately it was 
maintained that the idea was not successful, because for instance the coordination between the 
national authorities in those jurisdictions with regard the filing time led to a delay in some cases, 
and it was even reported that the form was used only one time in Germany, and that is due to the 
fact that the filing requirement in Germany is much easier than the other common filing 
requirements.1389 
Meanwhile, this is the first time that the common filing system was suggest to be an 
online system, and that is mainly to keep pace with the technological advancement and to make 
the process more efficient while saving time and money. To be more precise, the common filing 
system could be designed as an online server where the parties of the transaction could log in and 
complete all the required forms and information and submit the supporting documents, and the 
competent merger control authority will be granted access to such information. 
In the same context, it was claimed that the common filing system should be designed to 
include the forms and all the procedures required in the two stages of merger review,1390 because 
the merger control systems in most of the jurisdictions are designed as a two stage process, for 
instance “phase I investigation” and “phase II investigation” in the EU system, and the “second 
request” in the US system, as it was previously addressed during the discussions of both of the 
two systems.1391 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1387 For more details about that report see DIANE P. WOOD & RICHARD P. WHISH, MERGER CASES IN THE REAL 
WORLD: A STUDY OF MERGER CONTROL PROCEDURES (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; 
OECD Publications and Information Centre. 1994). 
1388 Special Committee on International Antitrust Report Working Draft. (1991). 
1389 QC & Campbell, Multi-jurisdctional Merger Review: Is it Time for a Common Form Filing Teaty?, supra note 
1072, at 18. 1999. 
1390 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 479. 2010. 
1391 See supra p.187. 
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Finally, concerning the language of the filing, as an analogy of the International Patent 
System under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the parties of the transaction might chose to submit 
the notification in any language used in the UN if the receiving office is a common receiving 
office, otherwise it should be in the national language of the domestic offices.1392 On the other 
hand, it was claimed that there was no need to determine a common filing language because it 
will not be easy	  for the different countries to agree on a single filing language and that even the 
cost of translating the filing documents to different languages is “legitimate” and the parties of 
the transaction should bear it.1393 
b) Proposal assessment 
Based on the addressed description of the common online filing system as a proposal to 
improve the current multijurisdictional merger control systems, in order to overcome the 
drawbacks of that system, that proposal will be assessed in the coming discussion, and then the 
discussion will be followed by a table that displays the answers to all the assessment question, in 
just “yes” or “no,” as the most simple approach and then table will be followed by a chart to 
show the final assessment result and the percentage of the expected positive effect and negative 
effect of that proposal. 
First is concerning the cost issue, the proposal is expected to be effective with that regard, 
whereas it is expected to decrease the cost for parties to notify all the competent jurisdictions 
according to one common online filing systems, but it is not considered as adequate because it 
will not affect all the other factors of the merger control process’s costs. Moreover, the cost 
reduction will be realized instantly after adopting such common online filing systems and 
without requiring any additional resources, and it is expected that all the parties will benefit from 
that said cost reduction equally, which means it will be fair. 
Meanwhile, the proposal will be not have any effect on the drawbacks from the second 
until the ninth, because the proposal is literally limited to the notification form, procedures, and 
timing, therefore it will not influence any aspect of the other drawbacks of the multijurisdictional 
merger control systems. Tenth is concerning the time consuming issue, that proposal might be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1392 The official languages that are used at the United Nations are: Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and 
Spanish. 
1393 Clarke, The International Regulation of Transnational Mergers, supra note 8, at 476. 2010. 
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effective, whereas it will reduce the time that is required to file a notification according to the 
different systems in all the competent jurisdictions, but it will not be considered as an adequate 
to overcome the issue because the process will still take time to be finished in all the 
jurisdictions. Meanwhile, the effect of the time reduction might be recognized instantly upon 
adopting the common system, without any additional resources, and it will be considered as fair 
because all the parties will benefit from the time reduction equally. 
                    Standard 
Issue 
Effectiveness Adequacy Time Efficiency Fairness Flexibility  
Cost Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Different enforcements No No No No No No 
Ex-ante review No No No No No No 
Behavioral antitrust No No No No No No 
Extraterritorial reach  No No No No No No 
Foundational errors  No No No No No No 
Political influence No No No No No No 
Privacy and data issues No No No No No No 
Remedies No No No No No No 
Time consuming Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 6: Common online filing system – assessment 
As general remarks on the proposal of the common online filing system, as it could be 
clearly identified from the previous table, that proposal has a positive impact only on cost and 
the time drawbacks, and even the effect is not adequate on both drawbacks, but on the other hand 
the expected effect does not need time or additional resources in order to be realized. In addition 
to that, expected effect will be realized equally to all the parties, and the proposal is will be 
flexible whereas the parties might easily agree to changed it in the future for improvements, 
because it is highly expected that the different countries could agree to a harmonized procedural 
issues easy. 
Finally, and according to the result revealed in the previous table there are only ten 
instances during which the proposal of the common online filing system has a positive effect on 
the drawbacks of the current merger control systems, and there are fifty instances during which 
the proposal has a negative effect on the drawbacks of the multijurisdictional merger control 
systems, which means that the proposal might improve the current situation by 17%, as shown in 
the following chart. 
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Figure 18: Common online filing system – assessment 
3. Multilevel Monitoring System 
a) Proposal description 
The proposal of the multilevel monitoring systems is a three level hierarchical system, 
under that system the highest level is the global level, at that level there will be a supranational 
global institution as a dispute settlement body, and it will be entitled to receive complaints 
regarding the merger control decisions issued by the lower levels with regard to the transactions 
that have global dimension, and that institution will be empowered to prohibit any restrictive or 
discretionary practices by the authorities in the lower levels. In the second level, which will be 
the regional level, there will be a number of supranational regional institutions that cover the 
world, those institutions will be similar to the global one but they will be concerned only with the 
transactions that have a regional dimension. 
The third level will be the national level, at that level the national competent authorities 
will conduct the merger control review according to the national laws, but the process should be 
done in accordance with any previous decisions rendered by the regional and the global 
institutions. The multilevel monitoring systems could be adopted through an international 
17%	  
83%	  
Positive	  effect	   Negative	  effect	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agreement, and it could be done under the patronage of one of the already existed institutions 
such the WTO, or the whole system might be created within the WTO itself. It should be noted 
that that proposal was created by a way of analogy from the proposal of the German Professor 
Wolfgang	  Kerber, who suggested the creation of multilevel system but his idea was that the 
institutions at each level of the system would be competent to review certain transactions, which 
is not the case here in that	  multilevel monitoring system.1394 
In addition to that, the proposal of the multilevel monitoring system could be enhanced 
by the adoption of the unified merger control rules, as it was explained under the proposal of the 
international merger control rules. However, it was generally claimed that as an alternative to the 
harmonization of laws, whereas the harmonization of the rules thought to be unrealistic and 
unattainable, the mutual recognition agreements1395 are good options to be adopted in order to 
harmonize the enforcement of the antitrust rules.1396 
Therefore, the mutual recognition agreement could be added to the multilevel monitoring 
system, whereas all the countries that are parties of that agreement, and members of the system, 
will mutually acknowledge the filing system and the review standards of each other, or in other 
words acknowledge the decision taken by the competent authority with regard to the formalities 
of the notification in addition to the results of tests done during the merger control process, but 
for the purposes of sovereignty the national authorities will retain the right to conduct its own 
review and even reach a new outcome. 
b) Proposal assessment 
Based on the addressed description the adoption of the multilevel monitoring system as a 
proposal to improve the current multijurisdictional merger control systems, in order to overcome 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1394 For more details about the multilevel system that was proposed by Prof. Wolfgang see Wolfgang Kerber, 2003, 
An International Multi-Level System of Competition Laws: Federalism in Antitrust, In: Drexl, Josef, and Peter 
Behrens. The Future of Transnational Antitrust: From Comparative to Common Competition Law, (Berne: 
Staempfli & Kluwer), at 269-300. 2003. 
1395 The mutual recognition agreements are a well-known concept, and are used as an agreements between the trade 
partners, and it became more common with regard the technical standards, specially under Article 2.7 of the WTO 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, and also is well known in the EU whereas a special directive was issued 
regarding the mutual recognition of professional qualifications (Directive 2005/36/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications, Official Journal L 255/22, 
30.09.2005, p. 22-142), for more an evaluation study about conducted mutual recognition agreements see generally 
Productivity Commission, January 2009, Review of Mutual Recognition Schemes, Research Report, Canberra. 
1396 Meessen, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS, supra note 1295, at 21 (1989). 
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the drawbacks of that system, and the improvements that could be added to such proposal in 
order to enhance it, that proposal will be assessed in the coming discussion, and then the 
discussion will be followed by a table that displays the answers to all the assessment question, in 
just “yes” or “no,” as the most simple approach and then table will be followed by a chart to 
show the final assessment result and the percentage of the expected positive effect and negative 
effect of that proposal. 
First is concerning the cost issue, the multilevel monitoring system is expected to be 
effective and decrease the cost of running the regulatory authorities especially in the case of fully 
utilize the mutual recognition agreements, but it is not considered as adequate because it will not 
affect all the other factors of the merger control costs. Moreover, the cost reduction will take 
time in order to be recognized because the different jurisdiction will be bound by the decision of 
the others. 
Second is concerning the different enforcement issue, the proposal might be effective, 
whereas it could help to entirely overcome the different enforcement issues because the system 
will be used as a dispute resolution mechanism that could put the contradicting decisions to an 
end, and accordingly it is adequate to resolve the issue, but it might need time to settle any 
dispute brought before the regional or global institution. Third is concerning the ex-ante review 
issue, it is not expected that the current proposal has any effect on the issue of that the ex-ante 
review as it is considered as an extra layer to the merger control. Fourth is concerning the 
exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings, the proposal is not also expected to have any effect 
on the drawback of the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings. 
Fifth is concerning the extraterritorial reach issue, that proposal might be effective, 
whereas it could help in completely overcome the issue of the extraterritorial reach by referring 
the jurisdictional issues to the regional or the global institution as the case might be, and 
accordingly it will be adequate to resolve that issue, but that effect might take time in order to be 
realized to settle the disputes in that regard. Sixth is concerning the foundational errors issue, 
nothing in this proposal will effect on or lead to overcome those errors, because the merger 
control rules will remain based on the antitrust faulty ideologies. 
Seventh is concerning the political influence issue, the proposal might be effective and 
lessen the political friction of the extraterritorial effect, but it will not be adequate because there 
still influence will not be totally eliminated and the implementation of the rules might be 
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subjected to regulatory capture and rent seeking. Moreover, the effect of the proposal on the 
political influence issues might require some time in order for it to be realized because it is 
expected to take time in case of the mutual recognition and in the case of disputes. Eighth is 
concerning the privacy and data issue, the proposal will not have any effect in that regard. Ninth 
is concerning the remedies issue, the proposal will not also have effective on the remedies issue. 
Tenth is concerning the time consuming issue, that proposal might be effective, whereas 
it might reduce the time that is required to finish the multijurisdictional merger control process, 
but it will not be considered as an adequate to overcome the issue because its effect on reducing 
the time is minimal. Meanwhile, the effect of the time reduction might require some time in 
order to be recognized, for instance the time required to settle the disputes before the regional or 
the global institution. Meanwhile, the proposal might be considered fair because all the parties 
will benefit from the time reduction equally. 
Finally, that proposal is generally considered as inefficient with regard to all the issues, 
because it will always require additional resources, both to create and run the global and the 
regional institutions and even to use the dispute settlement mechanism. In addition to that, the 
proposal is also considered as not flexible with regard to all the issues, because it will not be easy 
for it to be changed for improved in the future, because the renegotiating and amending of that 
kind of international agreements will face difficulties and at least it will need some time. 
Moreover, it is expected that the proposal will be unfair because the least powerful developing 
countries might take into consideration the political and economic consequences before making a 
decision to enter into dispute with a more powerful country, and in cases that the corporation 
itself will have a stand before the dispute settlement body, it should also do the same.  
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                   Standard 
Issue 
Effectiveness Adequacy Time Efficiency Fairness Flexibility  
Cost Yes No No No No No 
Different enforcements Yes Yes No No No No 
Ex-ante review No No No No No No 
Behavioral antitrust No No No No No No 
Extraterritorial reach  Yes Yes No No No No 
Foundational errors  No No No No No No 
Political influence Yes No No No No No 
Privacy and data issues No No No No No No 
Remedies No No No No No No 
Time consuming Yes No No No Yes No 
Table 7: Multilevel monitoring system – assessment 
As general remarks on the proposal of the multilevel monitoring system, as it could be 
clearly identified from the previous table, that proposal has a positive impact on some of the 
drawbacks, which are mainly procedural related issues, and the effect is adequate in most of the 
cases, and in most of the cases the effects need time to be realized, and it is unfair in almost all 
the cases. Moreover, that proposal is not flexible because it will not be easy to change, and it is 
not efficient because it always needs additional resources in order to create and run the global 
and the regional institutions and also to refer and settle the disputes before both of them. 
Finally, and according to the result revealed in the previous table there are only eight 
instances during which the proposal of the multilevel monitoring system has a positive effect on 
the drawbacks of the current merger control systems, and there are fifty two instances during 
which the proposal has a negative effect on the drawbacks of the multijurisdictional merger 
control systems, which means that the proposal might improve the current situation by 13%, as 
shown in the following chart. 
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Figure 19: Multilevel monitoring system – assessment 
V. Mergers Deregulation 
1. Proposal Description 
The proposal of the merger deregulation could be simply described as repealing the 
merger control system in all the countries that adopt such system, and accordingly the merging 
parties will not be required to notify any jurisdiction, before or after they consummate their 
transaction anymore and the proposal could be adopted through an international agreement to 
that effect. However, the merging parties will not be granted immunity from further 
investigations with regard to their future behaviors, in case that they violate the antitrust laws. In 
addition to that, the international agreement will include some rules to impose on the national 
antitrust authorities to take into consideration the behavioral antitrust findings whenever they 
challenge any future behavior as violating its national antitrust laws. 
Accordingly, the merger deregulation proposal as portrayed varies from the merger 
control conventional wisdom in two main aspects; the first is that both of the merger control 
systems will be repealed, and the second is that the national antitrust authorities will be 
committed to take into consideration the behavioral antitrust findings as a general obligation. It 
13%	  
87%	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should be noted here that some scholars claimed that the technical meaning of the “regulations” 
should be limited to the industry-specific regulation while with regard to antitrust the word 
“policy” should be used, and that is mainly to differentiate between those different set of rules. 
They even claim that deregulation means a shift from the industry-specific regulations to 
enforcement of only the antitrust policy.1397 
That claim might be true, however, regarding the current proposal the meaning of 
deregulation is not too far from that, whereas adopting the proposal will lead to shifting from the 
merger control system to the conventional enforcement of the antitrust rules. Furthermore, it 
should also be noted that the repealing of the merger control system will not mean the repealing 
of the merger control as a part of the antitrust policy, because the policy here will be the adoption 
of the deregulation approach instead of the premerger review regime. 
It is noteworthy here that even deregulation will be accorded under the supervision of the 
judiciary, which means that the courts will warrant that the authorities will not intervene or 
hinder the merger transactions. Not only this, but the third parties should be granted rights to 
challenge the merger transaction on the basis of the antitrust rules, because it is undoubtedly true 
that whenever third parties are granted a stage to challenge the mergers they will seek to weaken 
their opponents power in the market, in other words they will focus on limiting the competition 
rather than promoting it.1398 
Literally, there is no need for creating a new dispute settlement mechanism, it is already 
in place, whereas in most of the systems the administrative decision could be challenged before 
the courts, as it was previously shown in Egypt and the EC, and even under the Administrative 
Procedure Act1399 and the Hard-Look doctrine,1400 the courts in the US shall review the decision 
of the administrative agencies and ensure that it is not arbitrary or unreasoned. Meanwhile, based 
on the fact that the judicial system in the common law systems could be considered as a 
regulatory institution, due to the fact that whenever the courts did not find a statute or to be more 
precise a clear act, it might give the experts and the politicians room to help decide the case,1401 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1397 Christian Kirchner, Competition Policy vs. Regulation: Administration vs. Judiciary, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
HANDBOOK OF COMPETITION at 306, 308-309, (Manfred Neumann & Jürgen Weigand eds., 2004). 
1398 Easterbrook, TEXAS LAW REVIEW, supra note 742, at 39 (1984). 
1399 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S .C. 55-551, et seq. 
1400 For more details about the relation between the deregulation and the Hard-Look doctrine see Cass R. Sunstein, 
Deregulation and the Hard-Look Doctrine, 1983 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW 177 (1983). 
1401 Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Courts, 5 JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT 517 
(1986). 
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and the case is almost the same in the civil law systems under the administrative judiciary 
institution, the deregulation should be clearly binding and no decision should be taken towards 
the merger transaction as a tool of restructuring the corporations. 
In fact the merger control is an application of the state regulatory role that started during 
the end of the 19th century, and even the antitrust laws started to flourish during that very period, 
and that step to take that role was triggered by many factors as it was discussed before during the 
discussion of the history of antitrust laws.1402 That regulatory role of the state is highly debatable 
in general, whereas from a liberal perspective it is considered as a “triumph of democracy,” 
while on the other hand, from the conservative perspective, it is considered as “counter 
productive.”1403 
In that context, the scholars of the Chicago School, which could be coined as a 
conservative school, maintain that regulations are mainly designed to control the competition in 
the market by keeping the profits high for the players in the markets and minimize their risk, and 
that is mainly to serve the rent seekers or the regulatory capture, which will not be a success by 
any chance in granting the benefits that are comparable to those benefits under the market 
forces.1404 As an example of how the regulatory practices is even harming the competition in the 
markets, is the coordination or “collision” that is required or at least permitted between the 
licensees, in certain industries,1405 like the telecommunications for instance. 
Actually, the deregulatory ideology or at least the refusal of the regulatory notion is as 
early as the age of Adam Smith, whereas the essence of the deregulation could easily be 
identified in what he said in his book in 1776, as he clearly said that:  
People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, 
but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible, indeed, to prevent such meetings, by 
any law [that] either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and 
justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1402 See supra p.33. 
1403 Horwitz, THEORY AND SOCIETY, supra note 359, at 139-140 (1986). 
1404 See generally Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND 
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE 335 (1974); George J. Stigler, THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT 
SCIENCE, supra note 1222, at 3 (1971); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 JOURNAL 
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 211 (1976). 
1405 Christopher C. DeMuth, Deregulation Review, 53 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL 189, at 189 (1984). 
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sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such 
assemblies; much less render them necessary.1406 
Adam Smith is clearly supporting the idea that the market forces will drive the players in 
the market to the general welfare, and he also was realistic and understood that the players in the 
market might enter into some arrangement form time to time, but he was also claiming that the 
law would not be cable of putting such arrangement to an end. However, he was not supporting 
or encouraging the laws to take the role of hindering such arrangement that would be against the 
free market ideology nor “facilitating” it, which means he was not endorsing the regulatory role 
of the state.1407 
Moreover, the merger control authorities are usually justifying the merger control costly 
system according to the same regulatory reasoning, which was claimed to have six reasons, but 
there are in fact only five reasons: (1) protecting the legitimate interests or rights of certain 
groups, like for example the employees’ rights or any of the previously discussed merger control 
goals, (2) achieve redistribution goals, which might be the redistribution of wealth or power, (3) 
prevent parties from causing harm to themselves “paternalistic,”	   such as changing consumer 
decisions to be more rational, (4) responding to interest groups’ pressure, like for instance the 
farmers pressure to enact the Sherman Act, and (5) substitute the market forces in order to offset 
any harm that might be caused to the society.1408	  In addition to that it was held that the main 
incentive for the merger is the getting rid of the competitors and that should be controlled 
through the merger control,1409 and even the liberalized policies will not lead to growth.1410 
Those justifications could easily be refuted under the very interesting findings of one of 
the most important empirical studies done on mergers consummated in a voluntary merger 
control systems, whereas the merging parties have the option to go for an ex-ante merger control 
by notifying the transaction before its consummation and get cleared or blocked, or otherwise to 
consummate the transaction, and in that situation the authorities might investigate the transaction 
and challenge it, and that is typically the case in Australia, where that research was conducted. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1406 SMITH, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, supra note 112, at 183. 1976. 
1407 ARMENTANO, Antitrust: The Case for Repeal, supra note 712, at 105-106. 1999. 
1408 Kirchner, Competition Policy vs. Regulation: Administration vs. Judiciary at 313. 2004; Sunstein, JOURNAL OF 
POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 1401, at 518-520 (1986). 
1409 George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 
176, at 177 (1955). 
1410 MANUEL AGOSIN & DIANA TUSSIE, TRADE AND GROWTH: NEW DILEMMAS IN TRADE POLICY at 26 (St. Martin's 
Press. 1993); The Global Governance of Trade: As if Trade Really Mattered. (2001). 
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The findings of that study revealed the following facts: first, under the voluntary merger 
control system the following facts were observed: (1) mergers that have insignificant gains for 
both the merging parties and social welfare, the parties opt for premerger control of the 
transaction and they are cleared under remedies, (2) mergers that have insignificant gains for 
merging parties and significant gain for social welfare, the parties opt for not post-merger 
control, and if investigated it is unconditionally cleared, (3) mergers that have significant gains 
for the merging parties and insignificant gains for social welfare, the parties opt for post-merger 
control, and if investigated it will be challenged; second, the results is the same under the 
compulsory premerger control system but with an additional costs for running the system.1411 
In addition to that, there are some other arguments that might support the merger 
deregulation proposal, some of those arguments are mainly: (1) the drawbacks of the merger 
control systems are insufficiently justified, if not considered as unjustified at all, (2) the merger 
control system impedes innovation and leads to the decrease of productivity, 1412 (3) the 
regulation enforcement is always fluctuating to serve different groups at different times,1413 
which leads to uncertainties, (4) the authorities are not just using technical standards in its 
review, but its decisions are always politically influenced,1414 (5) the empirical research findings 
are confirming that the high market power or even the dominant position are “no longer bad 
news,” the use of that power in a manner that violates the law is the issue, i.e. it is the behavior 
not the structure.1415 
It could be also claimed that the empirical findings revealed that deregulation would lead 
to a high probability that foreigners will control certain types of assets or even whole 
industries.1416 That claim could be easily contested because the issue here should be directly 
addressed by putting a limitation on the purchase of assets by foreigners or certain groups, 
regardless of the legitimacy of that purpose, but not by imposing a merger control system. In the 
same line, it was claimed that there is no empirical evidence that supports the idea that there is a 
link between the international trade and the taking of an international action towards the merger 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1411 Choe & Shekhar, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 27 (2010). 
1412 Sunstein, JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 1401, at 519 (1986). 
1413 Peltzman, JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 1404, at 227 (1976). 
1414 Sunstein, JOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, supra note 1401, at 521 (1986). 
1415 George F. Kopits, Dividend Remittance Behavior within the International Firm: A Cross-Country Analysis, 54 
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 339, at 347 (1972). 
1416 Stacey Kole & Kenneth Lehn, Deregulation, the Evolution of Corporate Governance Structure, and Survival, 87 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 421, at 424 (1997). 
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control, while on the other hand the same scholar reluctantly affirm at the end of his research that 
his research “does not consider the possibility of multinational firms as only purely domestic 
mergers are analy[z]ed. Relaxing this restriction would complicate the analysis, but would be an 
important advance since international mergers are an increasingly important policy concern.”1417 
In addition to that it was correctly claimed the antitrust rules are more concerned with 
giving new entrant and access to the market, but if and only if that will be precompetitive, which 
means by default that the antitrust rules could be considered as a limitation to free trade policies 
that have a wider goal, which is granting the access to the markets for all players at all the times. 
Therefore, it could claimed that the merger control rules as an application of the antitrust rules 
are hindering the free trade and access to the markets,1418 in other words the state replaced the 
tariffs at the gate by non-border barriers from inside.1419 
To be more precise while trying or claiming the removal of the private anticompetitive 
barriers it created its own barriers, and it was even claimed that in order to keep pace with the 
free trade principles the competition policies and the merger control should be adopted on the 
global scale, for instance exporting cartel should be allowed no more.1420 It is noteworthy here 
that it was reported that the physical barriers i.e. borders or even bad infrastructure are hindering 
free trade when the gates are opened only at the doors.1421 
In that same context, it could be easily proved that the process of merger control itself is 
considered as fiscal and non-fiscal barrier according to the WTO. To elaborate more, conducting 
the merger control review process, with all of its complexities, costs, and time consuming, will 
undoubtedly make the trade more difficult and more expensive, and that is clearly violating 
Article XI of the GATT, and that violation could not be justified under any of the justifications 
that are allowed under the Article XX of the GATT. It does not make sense that while it is 
expected that that semi-globalized world will take more steps everyday toward the economic 
progress and reaping the fruits of the globalization process under the WTO and other similar 
initiatives, the corporations are expecting to experience such kind of barriers. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1417 Horn & Levinsohn, THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, supra note 1300, at 269-270 (2001). 
1418 Sweeney, MELBOURNE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 1284, at 377, 414 (2004). 
1419 Id. at 380. 
1420 Foster, EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, supra note 1249, at 479-484 (2001). 
1421 For example see the comparison between the change in trade rates after the broke of Czechoslovakia into Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, and similarly after the unification of West and East Germany in PANKAJ GHEMAWAT, 
WORLD 3.0: GLOBAL PROSPERITY AND HOW TO ACHIEVE IT at 44-45 (Harvard Business Review Press. 2011). 
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Furthermore, the rationale behind the deregulation proposal could be identified in the 
following points: (1) the empirical findings are that the deregulated industries are experiencing 
gains and that led to a total surplus and offset any harm caused to the members of the full 
picture,1422 (2) the regulations are not economically rational because they are always enforced by 
the administrative bureaucratic institutions,1423 which always consume taxpayers resources in 
order to keep it running, or the merging parties resources to deal with it, (3) deregulation 
encourages innovation and that will lead to production efficiencies,1424 (4) it was empirically 
reported that the deregulation led to the demolishment of the cartels formed under regulations, 
and that inevitably led to an increase in competition in the market,1425 and (5) market forces are 
efficiently serving the interests of all the parties in the society. 
In that context, it was claimed that the impact of deregulation on the unemployment rates 
is clear, and the increase of the unemployment rates was attributed to the weakening of the labor 
unions as an inevitable result of the deregulation.1426 Even the average compensation of the 
employees is decreased in order to keep pace with the cost reduction and the competition in the 
markets.1427 Accordingly, the merger deregulation may have some drawbacks on employees and 
even on the shareholders of the inefficient corporations, those drawbacks are mainly a result of 
the merger itself not the repealing of the merger control systems, because the merger control 
system in fact was never concerned with the employment issues. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1422 Kole & Lehn, THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note1416, at 422 (1997); Randall S. Kroszner & Philip 
E. Strahan, What Drives Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, 
114 THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 1437, at 1457 (1999); Stigler, THE BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 
AND MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, supra note 1222, at 10 (1971); Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, Airline 
Deregulation and Public Policy, 245 SCIENCE 707, at 711 (1989); Patrick Massey, Competition and Deregulation: A 
Review of the Irish Experience, 47 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 716, at 744 (2002); for detailed information and empirical 
findings about many successful deregulated industries (airline, trucking, railroads, banking, and 
telecommunications) in the US see Horwitz, THEORY AND SOCIETY, supra note 359, at 149-164 (1986); Ernst R. 
Berndt, et al., Cost Effects of Mergers and Deregulation in the U.S. Rail Industry, 4 THE JOURNAL OF PRODUCTIVITY 
ANALYSIS 127 (1993); Kenneth D. Boyer, Equalizing Discrimination and Cartel Pricing in Transport Rate 
Regulation, 89 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 270 (1981); Henry McFarland, The Effects of United States 
Railroad Deregulation on Shippers, Labor, and Capital, 1 JOURNAL OF REGULATORY ECONOMI 259 (1989); Wesley 
W. Wilson, Market-Specific Effects of Rail Deregulation, 42 THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 1 (1994); 
Barry T. Hirsch, et al., Earnings and Employment in Trucking: Deregulating a Naturally Competitive Industry, in 
REGULATORY REFORM AND LABOR MARKETS (James Peoples ed. 1998). 
1423 Horwitz, THEORY AND SOCIETY, supra note 359, at 148, 169 (1986). 
1424 Elizabeth E. Bailey, Deregulation: Causes and Consequences, 234 SCIENCE 1211, at 1211-1212, 1216 (1986). 
1425 Horwitz, THEORY AND SOCIETY, supra note 359, at 167 (1986). 
1426 Id. at 164-165. 
1427  Kevin E. Henrickson & Wesley W. Wilson, Compensation, Unionization, and Deregulation in the Motor 
Carrier Industry, 51 JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 153, at 173 (2008). 
315	  
In the context of designing solutions for the employment issues, it should be noted that 
solution especially with regard to employment issues should be tailored carefully to fit the 
different jurisdictions, whereas each jurisdiction has its own characteristics, and what works for 
some countries might not work for others, for instance the developing countries should get 
different unconventional care that takes into consideration the very low standard of living.1428 
Finally, and despite the fact that it could be claimed that repealing the merger control 
system would be considered a milestone in the race between the different jurisdiction to attract 
FDI generally and the cross-border mergers specifically, which is known as the race to the 
bottom, and that race to the bottom will end up by “demolition of society.”1429 However, it the 
contrary that could be claimed, i.e. that the merger deregulation will be an actual milestone but 
towards recovering from the drawbacks’ effects that were experienced under the merger control 
system, as an application of the regulatory state theory, and it will undoubtedly help all the 
jurisdictions to reap the fruits of globalization. 
2. Proposal Assessment 
Based on the addressed description to repeal the merger control system and deregulate 
mergers, to improve the current multijurisdictional merger control systems, in order to overcome 
the drawbacks of that system, and all the improvement that could be added to such proposal in 
order to enhance it, that proposal will be assessed in the coming discussion, and then the 
discussion will be followed by a table that displays the answers to all the assessment question, in 
just “yes” or “no,” as the most simple approach and then table will be followed by a chart to 
show the final assessment result and the percentage of the expected positive effect and negative 
effect of that proposal. It could be claimed that by repealing the system no drawbacks are 
expected, and there is no need to assess the proposal because it will score 100% improvement, 
but the fact is that some of the drawbacks are not an original result from the merger control 
system, but they are inherited from its predecessor i.e. antitrust flaws. 
First is concerning the cost issue, the merger deregulation proposal is expected to be 
effective regarding the cost issues, whereas it is expected not only to decrease the costs but it will 	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remove it all, therefore it will be considered as adequate because it will not affect all the other 
factors of the merger control costs. In addition to that, the cost elimination will be realized 
instantly upon adopting the proposal, and it will be recognized equally in all jurisdictions, which 
means that it will be fair in that concern. 
Second is concerning the different enforcement issue, the proposal will be effective, 
whereas it will entirely overcome the different enforcement issues because obviously there are 
no decisions at all to be contradicting, and accordingly it is adequate to resolve the issue instantly 
and fairly. Third is concerning the ex-ante review issue, the proposal removes the extra layer of 
the premerger control approach, and undoubtedly that will be adequate to overcome the 
drawback, and it will be also realized instantly and equally in all jurisdictions. 
Fourth is concerning the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings, the proposal will 
be effective, only if the general obligation of considering the behavioral antitrust findings was 
incorporated in the international agreement, and in that case it will totally overcome the 
drawback of the exclusion of the behavioral antitrust findings and undoubtedly that will be 
adequate, but that effect might take some time in order to be realized, at least the time required to 
change the national laws to be compatible with the new international rules. However, it is 
expected that all the parties will benefit from overcoming such drawback equally. 
Fifth is concerning the extraterritorial reach issue, that proposal will be effective, whereas 
it will totally eliminate the extraterritorial reach because no decision will be rendered concerning 
a merger transaction in other jurisdictions or even domestically, and without any need to run a 
dispute settlement mechanism in that regard, and accordingly it is considered adequate to resolve 
that issue, and the effect will be realized upon the adoption of the international agreement. Sixth 
is concerning the foundational errors issue, nothing in that proposal will have effect on or lead to 
overcome the those errors, because the post-merger control rules i.e. the antitrust rules will 
remain as it is, based on its faulty ideologies. 
Seventh is concerning the political influence issue, the proposal might be effective and 
lessen the political friction of the extraterritorial effect and the different enforcement issues, but 
the rent seeking and regulatory capture problems will remain, accordingly it will be considered 
as inadequate, but the effect will be realized instantly and fairly by all the parties in all 
jurisdictions. Eighth is concerning the privacy and data issue, the proposal will be effective, no 
information will be gathered by any means from the merging parties, third parties, and even the 
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authorities in other jurisdictions, and no announcement will be made regarding the transaction 
from a merger control perspective, accordingly the proposal will be also adequate and the effect 
will be realized instantly and equally by all the parties in all jurisdictions. 
Ninth is concerning the remedies issue, the proposal will be effective, whereas it entirely 
eliminates the need for remedies, accordingly under that proposal the parties will avoid it totally, 
with regard to the transaction itself, and does not negate that the national systems may impose 
any penalties and restoring measures to restore any anticompetitive behavior in future, that are 
not related to the structure of the transaction. Moreover, that effect will be realized instantly and 
fairly to all the parties in all jurisdictions. 
Tenth is concerning the time consuming issue, that proposal might be effective, whereas 
no time is required in order to go through the multijurisdictional merger control processes, and 
the merging parties will consummate the transaction right away according to their schedule, 
without any time delay that resulted from the merger control process, accordingly it will be 
considered as adequate to overcome the issue. Meanwhile, the effect of the time reduction will 
be recognized instantly upon the adoption of the international agreement, whereas it could be 
also applied to the pending transactions before the enforcement authorities, and in addition to 
that the proposal is fair because all the parties will benefit from the time reduction equally in all 
jurisdictions. 
Finally, that merger deregulation proposal is considered as efficient with regard to all the 
issues, because it will not require any additional resources in order to be effective, it even does 
not need a monitoring institution or a dispute settlement mechanism. The proposal is also 
considered as flexible with regard to its effect in all the cases and it has positive effects, because 
any parties of the international agreement might withdraw from the agreement at anytime to opt 
for a better solution or even for its old premerger control system.  
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                   Standard 
Issue 
Effectiveness Adequacy Time Efficiency Fairness Flexibility  
Cost Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Different enforcements Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ex-ante review Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Behavioral antitrust Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Extraterritorial reach  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Foundational errors  No No No No No No 
Political influence Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Privacy and data issues Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Remedies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time consuming Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 8: Merger deregulation – assessment 
As general remarks on the proposal of the merger deregulation, as it could be clearly 
identified from the previous table, that proposal has a positive impact on almost all the 
drawbacks except the foundational errors that are based on the antitrust ideology, and the effect 
is adequate in almost all the cases except the political influence because the rent seeking and 
regulatory capture will still have a role in society, and almost all the effects will be realized 
instantly	   and it could be applied on the pending cases before the antitrust enforcement 
authorities, and all the effects of the proposal will be fair and realized equally in the cases. 
Meanwhile the effect of the proposal on the behavioral antitrust issues might require some time 
to be realized, because it might require some time to enforce the behavioral antitrust findings on 
the national level. 
Moreover, the merger deregulation proposal will be flexible, whereas it could easily be 
changed in the future, because for instance any party of the international agreement could 
withdraw at anytime and shift back to the old merger control system. In addition to that, the 
proposal will be efficient because it will not require any additional resources, at anytime, in order 
to adopt the merger deregulation international agreement or even to implement it, because of the 
fact that there will not be any merger control system to be enforced. 
Finally, and according to the result revealed in the previous table there are fifty two 
instances during which the proposal of the merger deregulation has a positive effect on the 
drawbacks of the current merger control systems, and there are only eight instances during which 
the proposal has a negative effect on the drawbacks, those negative effects are closely related to 
the antitrust flaws and do not repealed merger control systems, which means that the merger 
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deregulation proposal might improve the current situation by 87%, as shown in the following 
chart. 
Figure 20: Merger deregulation – assessment 
V. Conclusion 
Many conclusions could be identified from that third chapter of this dissertation, the first 
one is that there are many proposal that could be useful to improve the current multijurisdictional 
merger control systems, some of them have a minimal effect while others are promising, and 
there were even previous attempts to adopt some of them, not specially for the merger control 
but at least on the antitrust scale. However, there are no previous attempts to assess the effect of 
any proposal on the current merger control systems, and all discussions in that regard was limited 
to only a narrative discussion that addresses the advantages and the disadvantages of the proposal 
without developing any assessment criteria, under which a comparison could be effective. 
The second conclusion is that the ranking of the proposal is as follows: the least 
successful proposal is the common online filing system because it scored only 17%, and that 
proposal was followed by the proposal of the bilateral cooperation agreements, whereas it scored 
21%, while the proposal of the international merger control rules, the proposal of the 
87%	  
13%	  
Positive	  effect	   Negative	  effect	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jurisdictional rules, and the proposal of the supranational institution, were within the same range 
whereas they scored 32%, 36%, and 37% respectively, and in the first place is the merger 
deregulation, as it was expected to be the most promising solution, whereas it was expected to 
significantly improve the current merger control systems, whereas it scored 87%. 
The third conclusion is that any of the discussed proposals could be improved, and that 
could be by considering certain enhancing success factors such as adopting dispute settlement 
mechanism, and it even could be accomplished by combining a proposal with one another i.e. 
hybrid solutions, and generally speaking all the proposals will require time, not only to realize 
their effect in cases that they have effected, but also to adopt them on international scale. 
However, before the time required, the preliminary issue to be resolved is the political will of the 
parties, which seems to be the most impediment towards the adoption of a solution on the 
international scale, and that is mainly attributed to the fact that each jurisdiction is more 
concerned with its own interests not the interests of the general welfare on the global scale. 
The fourth conclusion is that the merger deregulation will lead almost to similar 
protective results that are expected under the premerger control system but at no cost to anyone, 
but it will not lead to 100% improvement for the current multijurisdictional merger control 
systems, as it seems to be at the first glance that by entirely repealing the system it will lead to 
instantly overcoming all the drawbacks, but the fact is that the considering of the behavioral 
antitrust findings, which in fact might be a solution to part of the antitrust foundational errors, 
will require some time and efforts, because a lot of research efforts are required in that field in 
order to build up a more solid real basis for the antitrust. 
The fifth conclusion is the fact that the mergers might have negative effects on 
employment rates or that the industry-specific deregulation might have negative effects on the 
employees’ rights in general, it does not mean that the merger deregulation have any direct effect 
on employees’ rights or on the unemployment rates, because the fact is that the premerger 
control does not have any effect or even concern in employment related issues, accordingly its 
repeal will not have any effect in that regard.  
Moreover, and to the contrary, the mergers will be consummated in all the cases whether 
there is merger control or not, and that means that in the case of merger control the merging 
parties would be more inclined to offset their losses under that process by any means, which will 
most probably be either by increasing prices or reducing the number of employees. Accordingly, 
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both the consumer and the employees should be the main focus of the regulatory authorities, and 
all the efforts of society should be directed to adopt the appropriate measures or laws to protect 
them. 
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Conclusion and Recommendations 
Out of clutter, find simplicity. From discord, find harmony. In the middle of 
difficulty, lies opportunity. 
– Albert Einstein 	  
Firstly, it should be noted here that that final conclusion will not sum up and repeat each 
single conclusion that was mentioned in the previous conclusions that were mentioned at the end 
of each chapter, but it will address the question of “so what,” what are all those conclusions 
about, and what are the general ideas they left behind, in other words what did this dissertation 
add to the legal literature in general, and to the literature in the cross-border mergers field 
specifically, and what are the recommendations suggested for the public policy designer and the 
decision maker, at all levels around the globe. 
Throughout this dissertation, the discussions addressed and tackled the very deep origin 
of the corporation as one of the most successful institutions throughout the history, how it 
proliferated and developed, contributed to the success and failure of the economy, used as a tool 
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for good and for war, and how it was struggling from times when it is heavily used or regulated, 
in the past and the present, but it seem it is ready to rebound for a future toward that hovers on 
new horizons. Instead of imaging the corporation as gigantic monster that will put the human 
dreams of prosperity to an end, the reinvention of the corporation as a tool for human prosperity 
is imaginable. 
It was also clear throughout the whole dissertation that the corporation was	  invented and 
developed for the good of people, but at several times, it was wrongfully used, sometimes by 
people as managers or shareholders, other times by the state. On the other hand, there is always a 
tension between the state and corporations, and tension is not always for the good of people, and 
it is not even rationally justified in most of the cases. Moreover, the most important fact was that 
the globalization process will lead to the prosperity of the humanity, but the pace of that process 
is not as much expected, or at least as always been presented by anti-globalization proponents. 
The good news is that there are opportunities to come, and the current global economy is 
far from being globalized, but unfortunately the attention of almost all the countries was not 
towards seeing these opportunities, and they even considered the flat world as a granted fact, and 
thus they were very busy during most of the 20th century discussing and negotiating how they 
could divide the pie after removing the tariff barriers, because they were thinking that removing 
the tariff barriers was the best solution that will lead to reach the peak of the economic growth, 
and it will be enhanced by removing some of the non-tariff barriers. 
As it was mentioned before that removing the tariff barriers was not that significant and 
that just improved border administration and logistics infrastructure will lead to more than 
double the effect of the tariff barrier removing. In addition to that, the obligation to remove non-
tariff barriers was carefully designed to appear as removing all the barriers, but what happened 
was prohibiting the application of those non-tariff barriers in a discriminatory or arbitrary 
manner. That means that the state could legitimately hinder trade or the provision of services as 
long as it is hindered equally for both nationals and foreigners, or not in an arbitrary manner, and 
it was justified under any one of the flexible justifications of Article XX of the GATT. 
On the other hand, the	  opportunities or to be more precise the possibilities are waiting on 
the other side, experiencing torture from the state i.e. the FDIs and specially if they are not a 
green field like for instance cross-border mergers are not welcomed. Despite the fact that the FDI 
in general is more promising to accelerating the progress of economic growth, and in the right 
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direction of serving the general welfare of the humans, and even the fact that the cross-border 
mergers is one of the best option that the FDI can offer, the state in different jurisdictions were 
not welcoming to the possibilities offered and they even counterattack it under the merger 
control system, in addition to many other impediments that were also designed by the state. 
While those possibilities are promising, no one could ignore the negative effects of the 
cross-border mergers on the society, like for instance the bad effect on employment and also 
some undesirable practices that make use of the consumers’ biases. Meanwhile, the other fact 
that could not be ignored is the that the regulatory approach is highly debatable, some claimed 
that it is not working anymore, and others argued for deregulation, but the debate should be 
turned to the question of when regulations could be used, and in what direction it should be used 
i.e. what are the interests that should be to severed. 
All that means is that the state could regulate corporations but the public policy should be 
designed to give the state a super role in many directions at both ends of the spectrum, at one end 
of the spectrum the state should be required to give a hand and facilitate entry to domestic 
markets, not only by means of deregulation but also by offering real help and support, and in that 
regard all the members in the society should be encouraged to engage in that process, and at the 
other end of the spectrum there is a crucial unanswered question of how the law could efficiently 
empower the state to monitor and challenge those practices before the courts, whenever they 
cause harm to employees or consumers. 
In fact that is not a new invention of solution out of the box, it is already there in the box, 
it is an already existing old solution, at least from the Islamic perspective, whereas the state is 
regarded as the overseer that should not intervene in markets unless certain practices will lead to 
the total collapse of the markets, otherwise it should be left to self-correct mechanism,1430 by the 
means of the invisible hands, as it was then articulated by Adam Smith, and endorsed by most of 
the conservative scholars. Accordingly, role of the state should be reinvented, not only on a 
notional domestic scale but also on the global scale; the pie itself could be expanded before even 
dividing it. 
Based on what Max Huffman claimed with concern to the marriage between the 
neoclassical school of economics and the behavioral antitrust, now it could be argued that the 
state should be divorced from the influence of the regulatory theory, and it should always take 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1430 DABBAH, Competition Law and Policy in the Middle East, supra note 353, at 24. 2007. 
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good care of employees and consumers to protect them from any harm that might be caused by 
corporations. Moreover, all the members of society, the state; the corporations; the people 
whether they are employees, researchers, or consumers; education and research institutions, 
should be considered as one family living under the same roof, and each member should identify 
and carry out his tasks in order to win his portion of the pie in the race to the top, in other words 
every member of the family will contribute to the growth and increase welfare for all the other 
family members. 
One more separation should be done, which is the separation between the state as a public 
policy designer, and the state as an administrative enforcement authority, in order to avoid the 
possibility of the influence of the rent seeking and regulatory capture issues on its enforcement 
decisions. The proposed separation or split of the state roles could be achieved by adopting a 
two-tier administrative body approach,1431 and that will also be subjected to the judicial review at 
all the time. 
Whether adopting deregulation policies with regard to mergers or with regard to industry-
specific issues, no policy is expected to win an undivided support from all the parties of the full 
picture, for instance the employees and even shareholders of the inefficient corporations will 
always suffer from mergers in general and its deregulation specially,1432 but the employees are 
already suffering even under the regulatory merger control system because that issue is not of the 
concern of the state, and even in some countries it is explicitly mentioned that the effect of a 
merger on unemployment is not considered.1433 
It is undoubtedly true that there is no clear cut comprehensive evidences to understand 
and theorize what is happening in the full picture, or to assert that there are certain gains or 
drawbacks as result of the cross-border mergers, but there is always a possibility for positives 
and negatives, and the right answer to the question should be always not only how to look for the 
opportunity but also how to create it by making use of all the tools in the global box. Otherwise, 
if the state failed to carry out its role to protect the employees for instance that will undoubtedly 
“undermine the social contract created within individual states.”1434 	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Now it become more obvious that more studies and efforts should be done toward 
answering the unanswered questions, which is how the law could be designed and enforced 
efficiently to grant the state the power to monitor and challenge anticompetitive practices before 
courts, whenever those practices cause any harm to employees or consumers. If this dissertation 
should call for one action, that action should be further research to answer that unanswered 
question, with no compromises in mind, but the law as a tool should be designed to encompass 
the good for all the members in society. 
At the end, it should be pointed out that previous researchers and professionals, poor and 
rich humans, adults or even kids, all have dreamed and some of those dreams come true. 
Meanwhile, those dreams came true not as a result of just imaging that they happen, but the 
imagination was a fuel sometimes for the dreamer and other times for others, a fuel to take 
serious steps in attempting to achieve it. Someday, someone dreamed of the EU or even of the 
US, the WTO, and those are all now facts from the past. 
The dream of that someday, the political will might agree to the reinvention of the role of 
the state in all jurisdictions, and all the other members of society will cooperate for their own 
prosperity and general welfare, and no one will suffer anymore in order to experience a higher 
quality of life. Albert Einstein said that: “[i]magination is more important than knowledge,”1435 
meanwhile if this dissertation will leave the literature with one message, it will be every rational 
human should keep asking and questioning, and that will someday lead to better imagined 
solutions for problems in all fields, those solutions could be from outside the box, and also from 
inside the box like merger deregulation. 	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23- Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 0 CFR Parts 355, 370, 
and 372. 
24- The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. 210l, et seq. 
25- The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 
26- Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. 2601, et seq. 
27- The Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 47 USC 1001-1010 
28- The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 15 U.S.C. Chapter 88, 
§  6201-§ 6212 
29- Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745, enacted July 30, 2002)  
30- Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (Pub.L. 110–49, 121 Stat. 246, 
enacted July 26, 2007). 
31- The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub.L. 110-49. 
X. Sweden 
1- Insurance Contracts Act (Försäkringsavtalslag (SFS 2005:104)) 
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XI. International Treaties 
1- GATT 1994: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 
17 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994). 
2- WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 
1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 
(1994). 
3- TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994). 
4- PCT: Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970. TIAS 8733; 28 UST 7645; 9 I.L.M. 978 
(1970) 
5- TBT: Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS. 
